United States v. Reed

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-6020
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-6020 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 16, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-6020 (D.C. No. 5:21-CR-00243-SLP-1) TREYSON DARON REED, (W.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before McHUGH and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and LUCERO, Senior Circuit Judge. _________________________________

Defendant Treyson Reed was convicted of two counts of assaulting a federal

officer causing bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b) and was

sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to run

concurrently. Mr. Reed now appeals his convictions and sentence. Exercising

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-6020 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2025 Page: 2

I

On May 6, 2021, Mr. Reed was confined at the United States Bureau of

Prisons’ Federal Transfer Center (FTC) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Shortly before

dinner that day, Mr. Reed began fighting with his cellmate near the back of their cell.

S.R., a correctional officer at FTC observed the two men fighting. According to

S.R., Mr. Reed had his cellmate in a headlock with one hand and was using his other

hand to strike his cellmate with a closed fist. The cellmate in turn was attempting to

strike Mr. Reed with one hand. S.R. ordered the two men to stop fighting, but they

ignored her. S.R. therefore called for assistance.

Two officers responded to the call: M.W., who also worked as a correctional

officer at FTC, and Dustin Cogburn, who was an acting unit manager at FTC.

Mr. Cogburn, concerned for the safety of Mr. Reed’s cellmate, instructed S.R. to

open the cell door.

After S.R. opened the cell door, Mr. Cogburn entered the cell first and

“grabbed ahold of [Mr.] Reed to pull him off” of his cellmate. R. vol. 4 at 67.

Mr. Reed refused to comply with orders to place his hands behind his back.

Mr. Cogburn grabbed Mr. Reed “in a cross-body fashion” with his “arms . . .

interlocked around Mr. Reed’s body” and began trying to “extract[] him from the

cell.” Id. at 56, 63.

M.W. entered the cell after Mr. Cogburn and instructed Mr. Reed’s cellmate

“to get on the ground, which . . . he did.” Id. at 87. M.W. put his hand on the back

of Mr. Reed’s cellmate “and outstretched [his] right leg in front of” the cellmate’s

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“head on the ground to make sure he didn’t move.” Id. After doing so, M.W. looked

up and Mr. Reed kicked him in the area of his right thigh and knee. Mr. Reed then

asked M.W. “if it hurt.” Id. at 88.

S.R. assisted Mr. Cogburn in attempting to restrain Mr. Reed and remove him

from the cell. As Mr. Cogburn and S.R. were removing Mr. Reed from the cell, S.R.

“turned around to ask [M.W.] . . . if he was okay.” Id. at 68. When S.R. turned back

around, Mr. Reed’s right elbow “struck [her] in the face.” Id. The blow to S.R.’s

face resulted in bruising and swelling around one eye, broken blood vessels in the top

of the same eye, and a “basic concussion” that caused S.R. “quite a headache for a

few days, and then a lingering smaller headache for a couple of months.” Id. at 69.

The day after the incident, M.W. sought medical treatment for his right knee,

which had swollen from being kicked by Mr. Reed. M.W. was diagnosed with a

sprain and strain to his right inner thigh. M.W. was forced to miss work due to the

injury and was also required to be on work restrictions for an extended period.

II

A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Reed on two counts of assaulting a federal

officer causing bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b). The case

proceeded to a bench trial in November 2022. Mr. Reed was convicted of both

counts.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court calculated a total offense level of

27, a criminal history score of eight, a criminal history category of IV, and a resulting

guideline sentencing range of 100 to 125 months. After considering the factors

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outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court sentenced Mr. Reed to 120 months’

imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. The district

court also imposed a three-year term of supervised release.

III

Mr. Reed raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Second, he challenges

the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in

imposing a six-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(2) for each

offense of conviction. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that both of these

issues lack merit.

A

“We review de novo whether the government presented sufficient evidence to

support a conviction.” United States v. Flechs, 98 F.4th 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2024)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “In so doing, we view the facts in evidence in the

lights most favorable to the government.” Id. at 1242–43 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “While the evidence supporting the conviction must be substantial and do

more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt, it need not conclusively exclude every

other reasonable hypothesis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” Id.

at 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted). This “restrictive standard of review . . .

provides us with very little leeway.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Mr. Reed was convicted of assaulting two federal employees in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b). Those statutory provisions provide, in relevant part,

as follows:

(a) In general.—Whoever— (1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties . . . shall, where the acts in violation of this section . . . involve physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to commit another felony, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.

(b) Enhanced penalty.--Whoever, in the commission of any acts described in subsection (a), . . . inflicts bodily injury, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b).

Mr. Reed argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

establish that he acted with the intent to threaten or inflict injury upon either of

the two officers. We disagree. The government’s evidence established that

Mr. Reed ignored repeated orders to stop fighting and resisted the officers’

efforts to restrain him and remove him from his cell. The government’s

evidence further established that, shortly after the officers entered his cell,

Mr. Reed kicked M.W. in the right leg and then looked directly at him and

asked “if it hurt.” R. vol. 4 at 88. The government’s evidence also established

that Mr. Reed elbowed S.R. in the face as he was being removed from his cell.

Although there is no direct evidence of Mr. Reed’s intent, we conclude it was

entirely reasonable for the district court to infer from all of this evidence that

Mr. Reed knowingly made physical contact with both M.W. and S.R. and

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intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts, i.e., to physically

injure both officers. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975)

(holding “that in order to incur criminal liability under § 111 an actor must

entertain merely the criminal intent to do the acts therein specified”);

United States v. Wolfname, 835 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing

elements of § 111(a)).

B

“[T]he overarching standard for our review of the procedural reasonableness of

the court’s sentence is abuse of discretion . . . .” United States v. Nkome, 987 F.3d

1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2021). Under that standard, “[w]e review the district court’s

legal conclusions under the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its “findings of fact

for clear error.” United States v. Aragon, 112 F.4th 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 2024)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

At issue here is the district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(2) in

calculating Mr. Reed’s total offense level and resulting guidelines sentencing range.

Section 3A1.2(c)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

If, in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, the defendant . . . knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that a person was a prison official, assaulted such official while the defendant . . . was in the custody or control of a prison or other correctional facility, increase [the offense level] by 6 levels.

U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(2). “Serious bodily injury” is defined under the

Sentencing Guidelines as “injury involving extreme physical pain or the

protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental

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faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or

physical rehabilitation.”1 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. 1(M).

Application Note 4 to § 3A1.2 provides, in relevant part, that

“[s]ubsection (c) applies in circumstances tantamount to aggravated assault . . .

against a prison official, while the defendant . . . was in the custody or control

of a prison or other correctional facility.” Id. cmt. 4(A). Application Note 4

also states that “‘[s]ubstantial risk of serious bodily injury’ includes any more

serious injury that was risked, as well as actual serious bodily injury (or more

serious injury) if it occurs.” Id. cmt. 4(B).

Mr. Reed argues that § 3A1.2(c)(2) is inapplicable to him because “the

facts do not support a finding that [he] ‘assaulted’ any of the officers—let

alone created circumstances tantamount to aggravated assault.” Aplt. Br. at 17

(internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons that follow, we reject that

argument.

The Sentencing Guidelines do not provide a definition of the terms

“assault” or “aggravated assault.” See United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d

654, 660 (4th Cir. 2010). We therefore must look to the common meaning and

common law definitions of the terms. Id. Notably, the Fourth Circuit has

concluded that the common law crimes of “assault” and “battery” are “nearly

1 The Sentencing Guidelines define “[b]odily injury” as “any significant injury; e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a type for which medical attention ordinarily would be sought.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. 1(B). 7 Appellate Case: 24-6020 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2025 Page: 8

synonymous” and that, as a result, “battery of a law enforcement officer was

intended to and in fact does satisfy U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1)’s assault

requirement.” Id. at 661. We agree with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis and also

note that the term “aggravated assault” is commonly defined as “[c]riminal

assault accompanied by circumstances that make it more severe, such as the

intent to commit another crime or the intent to cause serious bodily injury, esp.

by using a deadly weapon.” Assault, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

We therefore conclude that Application Note 4 simply rephrases the language

of § 3A1.2(c)(2) and requires nothing more than an assault, which necessarily

includes a completed battery, that created a substantial risk of serious bodily

injury to the victim. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993)

(holding that “commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains

a guideline is authoritative unless it . . . is inconsistent with, or a plainly

erroneous reading of, that guideline”).

The record in this case supports the district court’s conclusion that the

requirements of § 3A1.2(c)(2) were satisfied. As we previously concluded, the

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable

doubt that Mr. Reed acted knowingly and with the intent to injure both

officers. Further, there is no dispute that Mr. Reed made contact with and

injured both officers. As for whether Mr. Reed’s conduct created a substantial

risk of serious bodily injury to the two victims, it is certainly arguable that

S.R. in fact suffered a serious bodily injury by sustaining a concussion that

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impaired her functioning for an extended period following the incident. But

even if we assume that S.R. only sustained “bodily injury” and not “serious

bodily injury,” we agree with the district court that the circumstances of the

case firmly establish that Mr. Reed’s conduct created a substantial risk of

serious bodily injury to both officers. Given Mr. Reed’s physical stature (the

district court noted he was “a healthy, 6-foot-3, 190-pound man,” R. vol. 4

at 206), it is not difficult to imagine that Mr. Reed’s kick could have resulted

in much more serious damage to M.W.’s leg or knee. Likewise, it is easy to

imagine various scenarios in which Mr. Reed’s blow to S.R.’s face would have

resulted in her sustaining more serious injuries than she did.

In sum, we conclude the district court did not procedurally err by

applying the § 3A1.2(c)(2) enhancements.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge