United States v. Rausch

570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2008 WL 3411819
CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedAugust 13, 2008
Docket1:07-cr-00497
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (United States v. Rausch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2008 WL 3411819 (D. Colo. 2008).

Opinion

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON SENTENCING

KANE, Senior District Judge.

This Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order corrects the erroneous reference to supervised “parole” on pages 21 and 23 of the Memorandum Opinion and Order on Sentencing issued yesterday, August 12, 2008. The correct reference to supervised “release” has been substituted for both occurrences.

I.

Introduction

The defendant Ralph Rausch (Rausch) has plead guilty to a one count Information charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), Possession of Child Pornography. The statutory penalty is not more than ten years imprisonment; not more than $250,000 fine, or both such imprisonment and fine; not less than five years and not more than life supervised release and a mandatory $100 special assessment fee. The date of the offense was August 30, 2007 and the plea was entered and accepted on January 31, 2008. On December 13, 2007, Rausch was released from custody on bond. He has been in full compliance with its terms and conditions. Rausch appears now before me for sentencing.

II.

Advisory Sentencing Guidelines

Pursuant to Gall v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), I begin my sentencing analysis with a review of the advisory sentencing guidelines. See id. at 596. The United States Probation Office has calculated the total offense level for Rausch under the guidelines at 30. See Presentence Investigation *1297 Report at 9-10. With a criminal history category of 1, this total offense level yields an advisory guideline range for imprisonment of 97 to 121 months. Pursuant to Section 5G1.1(a), the range for a sentence is 97 to 120 months, the maximum allowable by statute. Because the applicable guideline range is higher than Zone B of the Sentencing Table, Rausch is not eligible for probation under the sentencing guidelines. United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual § 5B1.1(a)(2) (2007). The Probation Office reports that the sentencing guidelines set a fine range of $17,000 to $175,000 and a supervised release range of five years to life.

The facts bearing upon this sentence are uneontested. The Government asserted in its Response and Objection to the Presentence Investigation Report, however, that there is an evidentiary and legal basis to increase Rausch’s base offense level by five rather than two pursuant to Section 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), with which the Probation Department, Rausch’s counsel and I disagree, and for an upward departure pursuant to Section 5K2.0(a)(l)(B) as a result of the unusually large size of Rausch’s child pornography cache. The Government does not seek to increase Rausch’s total offense level on either basis, however, and ultimately concurs that the guideline sentence applicable to his offense level is 97 to 120 months as calculated by the Probation Office. See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum (Doc. # 21) at 1 & n.1. 1

“[T]he Guidelines give a district court a measure of national practice to use as a starting point ...” United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 808 (10th Cir.2008). The Government asserts that because the Sentencing Guidelines were constructed at the direction of Congress, they should receive great weight. Ordinarily this is so, but not when Congress ignores the recommendations and studies of the Sentencing Commission as it did with this crime, and thereby negates the rationale for affording such weight to them. Section 2G2.2 presents just such an instance. As the Supreme Court said in Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. at 594, some sections of the Guidelines are “the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions.... [but at FN 2 on 594] not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence.”

As Chief Judge Bataillon of the District of Nebraska observed:

[F]or policy reasons, and because statutory mandatory minima dictated many terms of the Guidelines, the Commission departed from past practices in setting offense levels for such crimes as ... child crimes and sexual offenses. Consequently, the Guideline ranges of imprisonment for those crimes are a less reliable appraisal of a fair sentence. In cases involving application of Guidelines that do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role — basing its determinations on “ ‘empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate expertise’ it is not an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that application of the guideline will yield a sentence “greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes set out in Section 3553(a).

United States v. Bennett, No. 8:07CR235, 2008 WL 2276940, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis *1298 45302 (D.Neb. May 30, 2008), cited in Defendant’s Reply Brief at 7.

Having found the correct calculation of the Guidelines sentence to be 97 to 120 months and a fine range of $17,000 to $175,000, and as directed by the Tenth Circuit’s recent pronouncements in United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir.2008), and United States v. MunozNava, 524 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir.2008), I make the following findings: (1) the Guidelines are not mandatory; (2) the facts have been provided by the Probation Office and subjected to objection by both the prosecution and the defense, but no objections have been made; (3) both parties have been advised that the sentence to be imposed will not be a Guideline sentence; and (4) both have been given full opportunity to brief and argue their positions as to a condign sentence even though the Supreme Court has recently made such notice unnecessary in Irizarry v. United States , — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2198, 171 L.Ed.2d 28 (2008). Moreover, Rausch has been afforded a full opportunity to exercise his right of allocution.

I further find, as stated in United States v. Bennett, supra, that the application of the Guidelines does “not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role” and that it produces a sentence greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, I will now consider the prescribed sentencing factors in Section 3553(a) and explain the sentence imposed in accordance with the above cited cases. 2

III.

The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

The Plea Agreement provides the following facts, nearly all of which are not in dispute:

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Related

United States v. Walker
918 F.3d 1134 (Tenth Circuit, 2019)
United States v. Kravetz
948 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Massachusetts, 2013)
United States v. Rausch
638 F.3d 1296 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Ilgen
417 F. App'x 728 (Tenth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Rausch
746 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Colorado, 2010)
United States v. Stern
590 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Ohio, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 2008 WL 3411819, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-rausch-cod-2008.