United States v. Baron

914 F. Supp. 660, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20949, 1995 WL 784844
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 2, 1995
DocketCriminal 95-10118-NG
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 914 F. Supp. 660 (United States v. Baron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Baron, 914 F. Supp. 660, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20949, 1995 WL 784844 (D. Mass. 1995).

Opinion

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

GERTNER, District Judge:

Robert B. Baron was charged in a one count felony information with bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. On May 3, 1995, Mr. Baron appeared before me, waived indictment, and pled guilty. Mr. Baron was sentenced on September 27,1995.

Mr. Baron is 76-years old with a variety of quite substantial medical problems, as will be described below. He was the president and principal shareholder of Baron Peters Corporation, a now defunct clothing manufacturer, and of its wholly owned subsidiary, ASBP Corporation. The business had been in his family for decades. For most of that time, State Street Bank & Trust Company, was its exclusive lender.

In the mid-1980’s, apparently during the “downturn” in the economy, Baron was in need of cash to save the business. He turned to other banks, concealing that fact from State Street. He arranged an annual “flip,” executing documents that transferred the corporate debt to himself personally during the period when the company’s accountants were preparing their annual audited financial statements. When the auditors contacted the bank in question, they were told that the company owed nothing. In addition, Baron caused false sales documents to be prepared by company employees, reflecting that orders for goods had been placed totalling several hundred thousand dollars. In fact, the orders had never been placed and the sales were never made.

On May 1,1992, Baron signed two demand notes to the State Street Bank in the amounts of 1.5 million and 1.1 million. By the end of 1992, the company had defaulted on its loans, with the Bank suffering a loss of more than 2.5 million. 1

The principal issue addressed in this Memorandum is the appropriateness of a depar *662 ture downward on account of Mr. Baron’s age and infirmity. 2

1. OFFENSE LEVEL COMPUTATION

Although the offense level computation is not contested, I repeat my findings here:

I find the applicable sentencing guideline provides for a base offense level of 6. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(a).

Section 2F1.1(b)(1) provides for an upward adjustment if the loss due to the fraudulent conduct exceeds $2,000. Specifically, the losses are more than $2.5 million but less than $5 million, a 13 point upward adjustment is warranted under § 2F1.1(b)(1)(N). An additional two-level increase is warranted because the offenses involved more than minimal planning within the meaning of § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). I will deduct three points for acceptance of responsibility, leaving an offense level of 18. The defendant’s criminal history category is zero, and thus, the guideline range is 27 to 33 months.

II. DEPARTURES FOR AGE AND INFIRMITY

A defendant’s age and physical condition are “not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.2, Introductory Commentary. However, “age may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range when the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1.

At the same time as the guidelines discourage age and infirmity departure, the language of this section invites the district court to give the matter serious consideration. See, United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir.1993). Unlike other areas of the guidelines, where the fact that the Sentencing Commission considered a given factor to a degree undermines its use as a basis for departure, here I am invited to make certain quantitative judgments — the degree of infirmity of the defendant, the degree to which home confinement is efficient and costly as compared with imprisonment. Rivera, supra at 947-51.

I must make those quantitative judgments about both factors — age and infirmity. Age and infirmity are linked by a conjunction in § 5H1.1 (i.e., the defendants must be both “elderly” and “infirm”). Indeed, I am obliged to read § 5H1.1 (age) together with § 5H1.4 (physical condition). § 5H1.4 begins with the same caveat — that physical condition is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable range, but adds: “However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range, i.e. in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment.”

From these guidelines, I glean three areas for consideration: a) the defendant’s age; b) his physical infirmity, and c) the efficacy of home detention, as described in §§ 5H1.1 and 5H1.4.

A. Age

The defendant is 76-years old. His life expectancy is 7.39 years. Few cases involve defendants in this age range, and those that do have found it significant. See e.g. United States v. Moy, 1995 WL 311441 (N.D.Ill.1995).

Viewing the defendant’s age, in conjunction with the “infirmity” standard suggests an inverse relationship between the two. Conditions that may be relatively minor or not life-threatening in a younger person, become life-threatening in the older defendant.

B. Medical Condition

I am obliged to consider whether Mr. Baron’s physical impairment meets the following standards a) serious and imminent medical threats 3 b) which would be made *663 worse by incarceration 4 and/or c) which the Federal Bureau of Prisons could not adequately treat. 5

1. Medical Condition

Mr. Baron’s medical condition is characterized by three elements: a) first, it is unstable, with several conditions interrelating and potentially exacerbating each other; b) second, a number of quite ordinarily found factors could upset the balance, including stress and the exposure to even common germs; c) third, if the medical balance is upset, the result would be a rapid deterioration to a life-threatening illness.

The complex medical condition consists of the following:

Pituitary: Mr. Baron has had several pituitary tumors removed. Dr. Reichlin, Research Professor of Medicine of the University of Arizona, (Exhibit 2) reported that the first pituitary tumor he removed had grown so large as to threaten Mr. Baron’s vision. After eight years, it was discovered that the tumor was beginning to grow again. At that point, the pituitary was completely removed.

Since Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
914 F. Supp. 660, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20949, 1995 WL 784844, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-baron-mad-1995.