Judge OHLSON
delivered the opinion of the Court.1
Appellant was charged with communicating a threat against the President of the United States in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012), Contrary to his pleas, Appellant was convicted by a military judge sitting as a special court-martial. We granted review to determine whether the military judge’s interpretation of what constitutes communicating a threat under Article 134, UCMJ, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Elonis v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015), and, if not, whether Appellant’s conviction was nonetheless legally insufficient in light of the First Amendment.2 We answer both questions in the negative. First, the requirement under Article 134, UCMJ, that the communication be “wrongful” separates lawful conduct from unlawful conduct and thereby distinguishes the offense at bar from the one at issue in Elonis. Second, even assuming Appellant’s speech was within the ambit of the First Amendment, the unique nature of Article 134, UCMJ, and the interests it seeks to protect justify the criminal prohibition placed on the statements made by Appellant against the President. As a result, the decision below is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
On Tuesday, November 6, 2012, Appellant and his wife went to the home of their friends, the Kilburns, in order to watch the results of the presidential election. As the election coverage unfolded on television, Appellant became angry when he realized that President Obama would be reelected for a second term.
After the election was officially called in favor of the President, Appellant stepped outside with his wife and Mr. Kilbum to smoke a cigarette. Also outside were the Kilburns’ neighbors. According to Mr. Kil-burn’s testimony at trial, Appellant stated the following:
I can’t believe that n[****]r won this election. He hasn’t done anything in the 4 years prior and I don’t feel that he’s going to do anything in the 4 years upcoming. I don’t think I can serve in the military another 4 years under his control. I might ■have to go back home in this upcoming training session that we’re going to do for the winter and break out my KKK robe [166]*166that was handed down to me by my grandfather and go put one order up and make it my last order to kill the President.3
Mr. Kilburn was shocked by Appellant’s statements and took them seriously. According to Mr. Kilburn, Appellant previously had indicated that his family had ties to the Ku Klux Klan. Ultimately, Mr. Kilburn told his wife, Specialist Kilburn, about the statements and she reported them to her chain of command.
The Criminal Investigation Division notified the Secret Service about Appellant’s alleged statements and an investigation was opened. During trial, a Secret Service agent testified that Appellant admitted that while at the Kilburns’ house on election night 2012, he “had made several statements claiming to be a member of the KKK, and that he was planning on going back to Missouri and giving an order to lynch President Obama, hang him from a tree, and cut his throat.” However, Appellant also told the Secret Service that his statements that night were “completely me[a]nt as harmless jokes” and that he “didn’t mean anything by those statements.” Ultimately, the inquiry uncovered no evidence that Appellant or his family had any connection to the Ku Klux Klan.
Appellant was tried by a military judge sitting as a special court-martial and found guilty of communicating a threat against the President of the United States in violation of Article 134, UCMJ.4 The specification for which Appellant was found guilty reads as follows:
Specialist Eric L. Rapert, U.S. Army, did, ... wrongfully communicate to Keith Kil-burn a threat to wit: “When I go back to Missouri for training soon, I am going to pull my robe out and give one order to be carried out to kill that n[****]r. I am not going to serve under that n[i|!***]r and I will ask for this one order to be carried out by me[],” or words to that effect, such communication referring to the President of the United States of America, and that said conduct was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces and was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.5
The military judge sentenced Appellant to confinement for six months, a reduction to E-l, and a bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence and the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals summarily affirmed. We subsequently granted review of Appellant’s petition on the following specified issue:
Whether the finding of guilty for Charge I and its specification for communicating a threat is legally insufficient because the comments are constitutionally protected and do not constitute a threat under the totality of the circumstances and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015).
II. DISCUSSION
As specified by the President, communicating a threat under Article 134, UCMJ, requires the Government to demonstrate four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That the accused communicated certain language expressing a present determination or intent to wrongfully injure the person, property, or reputation of another person, presently or in the future;
(2) That the communication was made known to that person or to a third person;
(3) That the communication was wrongful; and
(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the [167]*167armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States pt. IV, para. 110.b (2012 ed.) (MCM); see also United States v. Brown, 65 M.J. 227, 229 (C.A.A.F.2007).
Appellant argues that his conviction is premised on legally insufficient evidence for two reasons. First, Appellant focuses on this Court’s long history of identifying a “threat” through an objective lens. He avers that if a “threat” is alone defined by what a reasonable listener would understand to be a threat—with no consideration of the accused’s state of mind when making the communication—then this approach runs counter to the traditional rule that mens rea is an essential element of every crime.6 Moreover, Appellant argues that under such a legal construct, the question of criminality is improperly reduced to a mere question of negligence, which is the very standard that was recently rejected by the Supreme Court in Elonis, 135 S.Ct. 2001. Second, Appellant urges that his statements are within the scope of the First Amendment and thus cannot provide the basis for his conviction. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree both with Appellant’s premises and with his conclusions.
A. ELONIS AND COMMUNICATING A THREAT
In Elonis, a defendant who had made a number of emotionally charged “posts” on social media was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)—a statute criminalizing the interstate communication of threats.7 The defendant argued that the prevailing interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) improperly relieved the Government of a need to prove mens rea,8 and the Supreme Court agreed. “The fact that [a] statute does not specify any required mental state,” the Supreme Court held, “does not mean that none exists.” Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2009. “Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant’s mental state.” Id. at 2012. Further, the Court stated, “federal criminal statutes that are silent on the required mental state [must be read to require] only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from otherwise lawful conduct.” Id. at 2010 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000)). Absent this requirement, liability would “turn on whether a ‘reasonable person’ regards the communication as a threat,” which would “ ‘reduce culpability on the all-important element of the crime to [mere] negligence.’ ” Id. at 2011 (noting further that the Supreme Court has “ ‘long been reluctarit to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes’ ”) (citation omitted). On this basis, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 2013.
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Elonis, and consistent with the assigned issue in this case, we first are tasked with [168]*168determining whether the Government in the instant case was only required to prove negligence in order to secure a conviction for communicating a threat under Article 134, UCMJ. This is an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. United States v. Lopez de Victoria, 66 M.J. 67, 73 (C.A.A.F.2008).
Simply stated, the infirmities found in 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) are not replicated in Article 134, UCMJ. As explained in further detail below, both our precedent and basic principles of statutory construction demonstrate that communicating a threat under the UCMJ does not predicate criminal liability on mere negligence alone, but instead requires the Government to also prove a subjective element, i.e., the accused’s mens rea. This subjective element, which requires the communication to be “wrongful,” prevents the criminalization of otherwise innocent conduct and places the case at bar beyond the reach of Elonis.
i. The Objective Prong of Communicating a Threat Under Article 134, UCMJ
We have long embraced an objective approach in determining whether a communication constitutes a “threat” under the first element of Article 134, UCMJ. The general definition of this term in the military justice system can be traced to a 1918 federal district court opinion. See United States v. Sturmer, 1 C.M.A 17, 18, 1 C.M.R. 17, 18 (1951) (“ ‘A threat is an avowed present determination or intent to injure presently or in the future.”’ (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Metzdorf, 252 F. 933, 938 (D.Mont.1918))); accord United States v. Davis, 6 C.M.A 34, 36, 19 C.M.R. 160, 162 (1956) (acknowledging Metzdorf as the source of the definition). This understanding of a “threat” progressively suffused our holdings, compare United States v. Holiday, 4 C.M.A 454, 459, 16 C.M.R. 28, 33 (1954) (referencing Metzdorf in its analysis of communicating a threat), with United States v. Phillips, 42 M.J. 127, 129 (C.A.A.F.1995) (same), and is reflected in the current language of the first element of communicating a threat under Article 134, UCMJ.9 Thus, when analyzing whether a communication constituted a threat under this first element, we have held that “the existence of a threat should be evaluated from the point of view of a reasonable [person].” Phillips, 42 M.J. at 130.
Importantly, however, this objective approach to the notion of a “threat” refers only to the first element of the offense and not to the third element. See, e.g., United States v. Humphrys, 7 C.M.A. 306, 307, 22 C.M.R. 96, 97 (1956) (“The point which seems to need emphasis [in this case] is that proof of a declaration of intent is different from proof of the intent itself. To establish the [declaration of a] threat [under the first element of Article 134], the prosecution must show that the declaration was made” and not “that the accused actually entertained the stated intention.”); Phillips, 42 M.J. at 129 (noting that the issue on review was “whether a rational factfinder ... could find ... that appellant’s language constituted a threat as defined [in the first prong of the offense]”). Absent this distinction between the first and third elements of the offense, our recognition that a speaker’s “true intention” is significant—the third element—would conflict with our coordinate (and often simultaneous) suggestion that the “intent locked in the mind of the declarant” does not matter—the first element. See, e.g., United States v. Gilluly, 13 C.M.A. 458, 461, 32 C.M.R. 458, 461 (1963) (acknowledging both). These apparently contradictory propositions exist in harmony because they speak to the requirements of two different elements of a single offense. See United States v. Shropshire, 20 C.M.A. 374, 375, 43 C.M.R. 214, 215 (1971) (“[P]roof of a declaration of intent is different from proof of the intent itself.”); accord Humphrys, 7 C.M.A. at 308, 22 C.M.R. at 98. Accordingly, it is only with respect to identi[169]*169fying a “declaration of intent”—that is, the first element of this offense regarding whether the communication was indeed threatening—that subjectivity is of no bearing and the objective determination of whether a communication constituted a threat prevails. In his argument, Appellant ignores the wrongfulness requirement of the third element, as discussed below.
ii. The Subjective Prong of Communicating a Threat Under Article 134, UCMJ
The third element of this offense, which requires that a threat be “wrongful,” is properly understood to reference the accused’s subjective intent. “The wrongfulness of [an] act obviously relates to mens rea (not elsewhere specified amongst the elements) and lack of a defense, such as excuse or justification.” United States v. King, 34 M.J. 95, 97 (C.M.A.1992); accord United States v. Thomas, 65 M.J, 132, 134 (C.A.A.F.2007) (citation omitted) (“The word ‘wrongful,’ like the words ‘willful,’ ‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ etc., when used in criminal statutes, implies a perverted evil mind in the doer of the act.”). It is important to note that a contrary understanding would render the third element superfluous. See King, 34 M.J. at 97 (noting in the context of adultery that “the wrongfulness of the intercourse is independent, not redundant, of marital status” and must itself be proven as a separate element).10 In regard to an accused’s subjective intent, both the MCM and our jurisprudence reflect the fact that “a declaration made under circumstances which reveal it to be in jest or for an innocent or legitimate purpose ... does not constitute [communicating a threat under Article 134].” MCM pt. IV, para. llO.c; accord Gilluly, 13 C.M.A. at 461, 32 C.M.R. at 461 (“[A] declarant’s true intention ... and the surrounding circumstances may so belie or contradict the language of the declaration as to reveal it to be a mere jest or idle banter.”); Davis, 6 C.M.A. at 37, 19 C.M.R. at 163 (suggesting the defense of “jest” can be available notwithstanding the explicitly threatening language used in the contested communication).
As can be seen then, the proper legal framework for analyzing whether an individual communicated a threat as proscribed by Article 134, UCMJ, consists of both an objective prong and a subjective prong. Indeed, for clarity’s sake, the elements of this offense could be considered to read as follows:
(1) That the accused communicated certain language [that a reasonable person would understand as] expressing a present determination or intent to wrongfully injure the person, property, or reputation of another person, presently or in the future;
(2) That the communication was made known to that person or to a third person;
(3) That the communication was wrongful [in that the speaker intended the statements as something other than a joke or idle banter, or intended the statements to serve something other than an innocent or legitimate purpose]; and
(4) That ... the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline ... or ... of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
MCM pt. IV, para. llO.b.
The MCMs requirement that the Government prove that an accused’s statement was wrongful because it was not made in jest or as idle banter, or for an innocent or legitimate purpose, prevents the criminalization of otherwise “innocent conduct,” and thus requires the Government' to prove the accused’s mens rea rather than base a conviction on mere negligence. It is thereby evident that the offense of communicating a threat under Article 134, UCMJ, is substantively different than the offense at issue in Elonis. Cf. 135 S.Ct. at 2010-12.
B. THE MILITARY JUDGE’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW
Having laid out the proper analytical framework to be used in determining wheth[170]*170er the actions of an accused constitute communicating a threat under Article 134, UCMJ, we now turn our attention to deciding whether the military judge in the instant case correctly employed this framework when convicting Appellant of the charged offense. We conclude that he did.
We first start with the proposition that “Military judges are presumed to know the law and to follow it absent clear evidence to the contrary.”11 United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 225 (C.A.A.F.2007). We then note that in the record before us we find no clear evidence that the military judge embraced a view of the law that conflicts with our holding today. In fact, each of the admittedly few insights into the military judge’s understanding of the law indicates that he properly considered both the objective and subjective prongs of the offense in determining that Appellant was guilty of communicating a threat under Article 134, UCMJ.
Take, for example, the questioning of Agent Taylor (AT) by the military judge (MJ):
MJ: Agent Taylor, ... during cross-examination counsel just asked you something to the effect that [Appellant] said he wasn’t serious. Could you elaborate on that? What, if anything, did the accused tell you about why he made the statements?
AT: He said he was upset. I can’t remember the exact words here. It was something to the lines of he was venting, you know, that night, and that he didn’t mean anything by those statements.
MJ: Okay. Thank you. That’s all the questions I have for the Court.
Although the response provided by the witness may be seen as weakening the Government’s case, it is not the evidentiary weight of this response that is key to our current review; it is the nature of the military judge’s inquiry that matters. The military judge’s line of questioning correctly focused on Appellant’s subjective intent. This inquiry thereby indicates that the military judge was properly evaluating Appellant’s mens rea as he, the trier of fact, contemplated the wrongfulness element of communicating a threat.
Further, when trial counsel and defense counsel argued past one another with respect to intent while citing two cases—United States v. Hall12 and United States v. Humphrys—the military judge requested and received from the parties copies of both decisions for “review during deliberations.” Neither of these cases conflicts with our holding today, and there is no clear evidence in the record to conclude that the military judge misapplied the applicable law to the facts of the instant case. As a result, we must adhere to the presumption that “Military judges ... know ... and ... follow [the law].” Erickson, 65 M.J. at 225.
C. APPLICABILITY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Also at issue in this case is whether the First Amendment renders Appellant’s conviction legally insufficient. This question requires that we initially consider whether “the speech involved ... is ... protected under the First Amendment.” United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 447 (C.A.A.F.2008). If so, our attention turns next to whether “the Government ... [has] proved the elements of [171]*171an Article 134, UCMJ, offense.” Id. Finally, if the Government has successfully carried its burden under these elements, the Court may undertake to determine “whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 449 (establishing this question as a tertiary consideration). This, we have held, “‘is a question of proximity and degree.’” Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 570, 45 C.M.R. at 344 (citation omitted).
Upon considering these issues, we conclude that Appellant’s arguments in this vein are without merit. Even assuming ar-guendo that Appellant’s speech was within the ambit of the First Amendment’s embrace,13 the unique nature of Article 134, UCMJ, and the interests it seeks to protect justify the proscription of Appellant’s speech in this case. First, contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the Government proved a palpable connection between his speech and the military mission or environment. Second, the balance of interests in this case weighs heavily in favor of proscription.
i. The Communication’s Effect on the Military Mission or Environment
We first consider whether in the instant case the Government proved the existence of a direct and palpable connection between Appellant’s speech and the military mission or environment. This connection is a necessary showing under Article 134, UCMJ. United States v. Brown, 45 M.J. 389, 396 (C.A.A.F.1996) (“‘[Ojur national reluctance to inhibit free expression dictates that the connection between statements or publications involved and their effect on military discipline be closely examined.’” (quoting Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 569-70, 45 C.M.R. at 343-44)); see also Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448. In practice, this connection is contextually oriented, see United States v. Daniels, 19 C.M.A. 529, 534-35, 42 C.M.R. 131, 136-37 (1970), and cannot be evidenced by speech that is “prejudicial only in a remote or indirect sense,” MCM pt. IV, para. 60.c.(2)(a); see also Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 448-49. In conducting our review, we approach this question “‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’” Wilcox, 66 M.J. at 446 (citation omitted).
The record clearly supports the conclusion that Appellant’s speech had a direct and palpable effect on the military mission and environment. Speech such as that used by Appellant on Election Day 2012 regarding the President of the United States—who also serves as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces—unquestionably undermines the military’s unique interest in ensuring obedience to the chain of command, and also undermines the military’s unique responsibility to maintain an effective fighting force during a time of war. “[T]o accomplish its mission[,] the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986); cf. Article 89, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (2012) (criminalizing disrespect towards a senior commissioned officer); Article 90, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2012) (criminalizing willful disobedience of a superior officer).
Also central to the American military’s successful operation is respect for the principle of civilian supremacy. Brown, 45 M.J. at 397 (noting that the “right [to free speech] must be tempered in a military setting based on ... civilian supremacy”); cf. Article 88, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2012) (criminalizing the use of “contemptuous words” by a commissioned officer against the President or other senior officials). It is patently evident that Appellant’s speech runs directly counter to the ethos of the United States armed forces. For these reasons, we conclude there is legally sufficient evidence to indicate that Appellant’s statements were indeed directly [172]*172linked to the military mission and environment.
ii. Balancing Interests Regarding the Proscription of Certain Speech
Both this Court and the Supreme Court have “long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society,” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); accord United States v. Goings, 72 M.J. 202, 206 (C.A.A.F.2013) (“There is no. question that Appellant’s rights as a member of the military are not coextensive with those enjoyed by civilians,”). Consistent with this principle, we have held “the right of free speech in the armed services is not unlimited and must be brought into balance with the paramount consideration of providing an effective fighting force for the defense of our Country,” United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972).
To achieve this balance, we must first weigh the gravity of the evil posed by the speech at issue against the probability of this evil’s manifestation. Id, (“ ‘In each case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.’” (citation omitted)). If the resulting danger justifies the invasion of free speech necessary to avoid it, the rights of individual servicemembers must yield to the needs of the nation. This, of course, is a question of law, which we review de novo.14 See United States v. Sullivan, 42 M.J. 360, 363 (C.A.A.F.1995).
The facts of Priest are instructive on this point. In Priest, this Court was confronted with a servicemember who had edited, published, and distributed an “underground” newsletter15 in which he “sought to agitate against the Vietnam [W]ar and those things he considered unjust in the armed forces.” 21 C.M.A. at 566, 45 C.M.R. at 340. We held in that case that “[o]ne possible harm from the [publications] is the effect on others if the impression becomes widespread that ... the assassination of public officials [is] acceptable conduct.” 21 C.M.A. at 571, 45 C.M.R. at 346. Here, we are faced with a similar scenario.
The danger bred by Appellant’s speech about his desire to kill the President was twofold. First, there is the obvious risk that this conduct posed to the ability of Appellant, himself, to function as a member of the military. Statements such as those made by Appellant not only indicate a present disregard for the chain of command, but also forecast a future tendency for the same. This stands at direct odds with the reality that “the primary function of a military ,.. is to execute orders, not debate the wisdom of decisions that the Constitution entrust to ... the Commander in Chief.” Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 571, 45 C.M.R. at 344. Thus, we have recognized that, in the armed forces, this reality strips speech of its constitutional armor in instances where it “undermines the effectiveness of response to command.” 21 C.M.A. at 570, 46 C.M.R. at 344.
Second, there is a collateral threat that this disregard for the chain of command might metastasize. This is true “despite the general intelligence and independence of thought that most military persons possess,” as not all have the maturity of judgment to resist an invitation to undermine the hierarchy that is central to the fluid operation of [173]*173the U.S. military. Cf. Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 571-72, 45 C.M.R. at 345-46.
In weighing the gravity of these two evils, it must be noted that the perils they pose need not be made manifest in order to warrant censure. “The hazardous aspect of license in this area is that the damage done may not be recognized until the battle, has begun.” 21 C.M.A. at 571, 45 C.M.R. at 345. It is for this reason that we have recognized that “danger resulting from an erosion of military morale and discipline is too great to require that discipline must already have been impaired before a prosecution for uttering statements can be sustained.” 21 C.M.A. at 570, 45 C.M.R. at 344.
III. CONCLUSION
In regard to the military’s decision to prosecute Appellant for the remarks he uttered on November 6, 2012, we note what the Supreme Court acknowledged nearly half a century ago: “The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.” Parker, 417 U.S. at 758, 94 S.Ct. 2547. Having considered .the legal and constitutional aspects of this issue, as well as all of the relevant facts, we conclude that the balance of interests in this ease ultimately—and clearly—weighs in favor of proscribing Appellant’s speech in which he threatened to loll the President of the United States.
IV. DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.