NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 1 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 24-2360 24-4526 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00222-SAB-1 v.
SETH RANDLES, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 20, 2025 Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Seth Randles appeals the district court’s order requiring payment of
restitution and its denial of Randles’ motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recount them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1. Because he did not object to the government’s remarks at the
sentencing hearing, we review Randles’ claim that the government breached the
parties’ plea agreement for plain error. United States v. Farias-Contreras, 104
F.4th 22, 27 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc). The government did not explicitly breach
the plea agreement because it did not “promise[] to recommend a particular
disposition of the case,” and then “recommend[] a different one.” United States v.
Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014). The government did not at any
point explicitly recommend to the court any sentence other than 240 months. Nor
did the government implicitly breach the plea agreement in its sentencing brief or
in its oral presentation to the court. Unlike the government’s sentencing
memorandum in Farias-Contreras, which contained repeated inflammatory
statements that “simply went too far,” 104 F.4th at 29, the government’s
sentencing memorandum here does not rise to the same level when read in context.
The sentencing memorandum stated that “[a] lower sentence carries a significant
risk of creating an unwarranted sentencing disparity with similarly-situated
Defendants across the country.” The sentencing memorandum was consistent with
an attempt to persuade the court that a sentence any less than 240 months would
create such a disparity, not that the 240-month sentence was insufficient.
Similarly, the prosecutor’s statement that he would have recommended life
in the absence of the plea agreement does not rise to the level of implicit breach.
2 24-2360 In Farias-Contreras, the en banc court found no plain error even where the
prosecutor “invit[ed] the court’s skepticism as to the government’s bona fide
position” by making an unprompted statement as to whether the prosecutor’s office
agreed with the low-end recommendation. Id. at 25, 29–30. Here, the court
invited the prosecutor to engage in a hypothetical. The government did not breach
its plea agreement obligations by answering the court’s question, and in answering
the question, the prosecutor was bound by his duty of candor to the court.
2. Although the Abolish Human Trafficking Act (AHTA) would not
otherwise be applicable to Randles’ conviction, the district court’s application of
the AHTA was not plain error because Randles agreed to pay restitution pursuant
to the AHTA in the plea agreement.1 Randles did not waive his right to appeal the
award of restitution. The appeal waiver only applies if the restitution amount was
no greater than $20,000, and the court awarded $304,212 in restitution. Nor does
the invited-error doctrine apply, because the record demonstrates that both parties
and the court thought that the AHTA applied and required ill-gotten gains
restitution. Because Randles did not object to the restitution order other than to
challenge the credibility of Victim M, we review for plain error. United States v.
Yijun Zhou, 838 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016).
1 We deny the government’s motion to supplement the record. Dkt. No. 40.
3 24-2360 Even if the court had applied the AHTA ex post facto without reference to
the plea agreement, its error would not have affected Randles’ substantial rights or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings because Randles agreed to pay restitution pursuant to the AHTA.
United States v. Minasyan, 4 F.4th 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2021); In re Doe, 57 F.4th
667, 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alexander v. Doe, 144 S. Ct. 279 (2023)
(“[R]egardless of the crimes of conviction, and regardless of the defendant’s
conduct, a defendant may agree in a plea agreement to pay restitution to a
victim.”).
We reject Randles’ argument that the plea agreement is unenforceable
because the government failed to “submit restitution information prior to
sentencing.” The plea agreement does not define “restitution information,” nor is
it clear from the text of the agreement that the government’s obligation to provide
restitution information is a condition precedent to Randles’ agreement to pay
restitution.
We also reject Randles’ argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2429, which permits the
court to order restitution in “the full amount of the victim’s losses,” cannot include
ill-gotten gains. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2) (defining “full amount of the victim’s
losses”). Plea agreements are contracts, and we construe them with an eye toward
what the defendant “reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement when
4 24-2360 he pleaded guilty.” Farias-Contreras, 104 F.4th at 28 (citation omitted). Randles
does not cite a case holding that it is improper for a court to order ill-gotten gains
restitution pursuant to § 2429 or § 2259(c)(2). Because the plain text of the plea
agreement does not carve out ill-gotten gains from the victim’s losses, Randles
could not have reasonably understood the plea agreement to exclude ill-gotten
gains restitution.
3. The court did not err in ordering $100,000 in restitution for the “flat
fees” clients paid to Randles in exchange for access to Victim M. The government
bears the burden of proving the amount of the victim’s losses and must provide the
court “with enough evidence to allow the court to estimate the [amount] with
‘some reasonable certainty.’” United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The $100,000 figure came from Victim M’s sworn affidavit. She stated that the
figure was a “conservative” estimate of fees paid to Randles for access to her.
Randles called into question Victim M’s credibility based on her mistaken
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 1 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 24-2360 24-4526 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00222-SAB-1 v.
SETH RANDLES, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Stanley Allen Bastian, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 20, 2025 Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Seth Randles appeals the district court’s order requiring payment of
restitution and its denial of Randles’ motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recount them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1. Because he did not object to the government’s remarks at the
sentencing hearing, we review Randles’ claim that the government breached the
parties’ plea agreement for plain error. United States v. Farias-Contreras, 104
F.4th 22, 27 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc). The government did not explicitly breach
the plea agreement because it did not “promise[] to recommend a particular
disposition of the case,” and then “recommend[] a different one.” United States v.
Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014). The government did not at any
point explicitly recommend to the court any sentence other than 240 months. Nor
did the government implicitly breach the plea agreement in its sentencing brief or
in its oral presentation to the court. Unlike the government’s sentencing
memorandum in Farias-Contreras, which contained repeated inflammatory
statements that “simply went too far,” 104 F.4th at 29, the government’s
sentencing memorandum here does not rise to the same level when read in context.
The sentencing memorandum stated that “[a] lower sentence carries a significant
risk of creating an unwarranted sentencing disparity with similarly-situated
Defendants across the country.” The sentencing memorandum was consistent with
an attempt to persuade the court that a sentence any less than 240 months would
create such a disparity, not that the 240-month sentence was insufficient.
Similarly, the prosecutor’s statement that he would have recommended life
in the absence of the plea agreement does not rise to the level of implicit breach.
2 24-2360 In Farias-Contreras, the en banc court found no plain error even where the
prosecutor “invit[ed] the court’s skepticism as to the government’s bona fide
position” by making an unprompted statement as to whether the prosecutor’s office
agreed with the low-end recommendation. Id. at 25, 29–30. Here, the court
invited the prosecutor to engage in a hypothetical. The government did not breach
its plea agreement obligations by answering the court’s question, and in answering
the question, the prosecutor was bound by his duty of candor to the court.
2. Although the Abolish Human Trafficking Act (AHTA) would not
otherwise be applicable to Randles’ conviction, the district court’s application of
the AHTA was not plain error because Randles agreed to pay restitution pursuant
to the AHTA in the plea agreement.1 Randles did not waive his right to appeal the
award of restitution. The appeal waiver only applies if the restitution amount was
no greater than $20,000, and the court awarded $304,212 in restitution. Nor does
the invited-error doctrine apply, because the record demonstrates that both parties
and the court thought that the AHTA applied and required ill-gotten gains
restitution. Because Randles did not object to the restitution order other than to
challenge the credibility of Victim M, we review for plain error. United States v.
Yijun Zhou, 838 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016).
1 We deny the government’s motion to supplement the record. Dkt. No. 40.
3 24-2360 Even if the court had applied the AHTA ex post facto without reference to
the plea agreement, its error would not have affected Randles’ substantial rights or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings because Randles agreed to pay restitution pursuant to the AHTA.
United States v. Minasyan, 4 F.4th 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2021); In re Doe, 57 F.4th
667, 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alexander v. Doe, 144 S. Ct. 279 (2023)
(“[R]egardless of the crimes of conviction, and regardless of the defendant’s
conduct, a defendant may agree in a plea agreement to pay restitution to a
victim.”).
We reject Randles’ argument that the plea agreement is unenforceable
because the government failed to “submit restitution information prior to
sentencing.” The plea agreement does not define “restitution information,” nor is
it clear from the text of the agreement that the government’s obligation to provide
restitution information is a condition precedent to Randles’ agreement to pay
restitution.
We also reject Randles’ argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2429, which permits the
court to order restitution in “the full amount of the victim’s losses,” cannot include
ill-gotten gains. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2) (defining “full amount of the victim’s
losses”). Plea agreements are contracts, and we construe them with an eye toward
what the defendant “reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement when
4 24-2360 he pleaded guilty.” Farias-Contreras, 104 F.4th at 28 (citation omitted). Randles
does not cite a case holding that it is improper for a court to order ill-gotten gains
restitution pursuant to § 2429 or § 2259(c)(2). Because the plain text of the plea
agreement does not carve out ill-gotten gains from the victim’s losses, Randles
could not have reasonably understood the plea agreement to exclude ill-gotten
gains restitution.
3. The court did not err in ordering $100,000 in restitution for the “flat
fees” clients paid to Randles in exchange for access to Victim M. The government
bears the burden of proving the amount of the victim’s losses and must provide the
court “with enough evidence to allow the court to estimate the [amount] with
‘some reasonable certainty.’” United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The $100,000 figure came from Victim M’s sworn affidavit. She stated that the
figure was a “conservative” estimate of fees paid to Randles for access to her.
Randles called into question Victim M’s credibility based on her mistaken
estimate of her student loan balance and statements she made to the dentist when
she obtained treatment for a cracked tooth after one of Randles’ assaults. These
arguments are baseless. The district court found Victim M credible, and Randles
presented no evidence to justify doubting that finding. See United States v.
Jordan, 291 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002). The record does not indicate that
5 24-2360 Victim M was at any point dishonest or untrustworthy. To the contrary, Victim M
provided the court with a conservative estimate based on her first-hand
observations. This was more than sufficient to support the restitution order.
United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 557 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[V]ictim affidavits
will generally provide sufficient, reliable evidence to support a restitution order.”).
4. We review the district court’s denial of Randles’ 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Lightfoot, 626 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court
correctly concluded at the first step that Randles was eligible for a sentence
reduction because the retroactive application of the amended United States
Sentencing Guideline §4A1.1 has the effect of lowering Randles’ guidelines
range.2 United States v. Rodriguez, 921 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019). The
court did not consider an “impermissible sentencing factor” at the second step
when it stated that “240 months may not be enough to adequately punish
[Randles].” The unavoidable implication of the court’s statement is that, because
the original sentence of 240 months “may not be enough to adequately punish”
Randles, the court concluded that a reduced sentence was not warranted.
2 Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 88 Fed. Reg. 60534 (Sept. 1, 2023); Amendment 821, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/821 (last visited June 23, 2025).
6 24-2360 Nor did the court abuse its discretion by failing to adequately explain why it
rejected Randles’ argument that his unblemished disciplinary record while in
prison warranted a reduction. We infer from the record that the district court was
not convinced by Randles’ one-paragraph, conclusory argument that his sentence
should be reduced because he “has been a model inmate.” United States v. Carty,
520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[A]dequate explanation in some
cases may [] be inferred from the PSR or the record as a whole.”). The district
court’s omission of further explanation was not an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
7 24-2360