United States v. Ramone Jones

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: June 11, 2024
• Docket: 23-6016
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-6016

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RAMONE STEPHON JONES, a/k/a Duggie,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District Judge. (8:03-cr-00321-DKC-3)

Submitted: May 23, 2024 Decided: June 11, 2024

Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Sapna Mirchandani, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Jonathan S. Tsuei, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Ramone Stephon Jones appeals the district court’s order denying his motion seeking

compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), or, alternatively, a sentence

reduction pursuant to § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat.

5194, 5222 (“First Step Act”). We affirm.

We review a district court’s decision whether to grant a reduction under the First

Step Act, either under § 404(b) or for compassionate release, for abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021) (reviewing compassionate

release denial); United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 497 (4th Cir. 2020) (reviewing

§ 404(b) decision). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or

irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of

discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.”

United States v. Jenkins, 22 F.4th 162, 167 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Jones first contends that the district court abused its discretion when it determined—

after considering his claims concerning the risks to his health created by the COVID-19

pandemic; the disparity between his current sentence, the sentence he would receive today,

and the sentences of similarly situated defendants; and his postsentencing rehabilitation—

that he failed to state extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate

release. “To grant a compassionate release motion, the district court must [first] conclude

that the prisoner is eligible for a sentence reduction because he has shown extraordinary

and compelling reasons supporting relief.” United States v. Brown, 78 F.4th 122, 128 (4th

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Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Because the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement

applicable to defendant-filed motions for compassionate release had not yet been enacted

when the court ruled on Jones’ compassionate release motion, the district court was

“empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a

defendant might raise.” United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020)

(cleaned up). In doing so, a district court considers “the severity of the inmate’s personal

circumstances,” United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 197 (4th Cir. 2022), taking “into

account the totality of the relevant circumstances,” id. at 198. The “touchstone” of our

review is whether the district court demonstrated “that it has considered the parties’

arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.”

United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 190 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Upon review of the

record, we conclude that the district court adequately considered Jones’ proffered

extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief, and we discern no abuse of discretion in

the court’s denial of Jones’ motion.

Jones also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request

for a sentence reduction under § 404(b), despite finding that he was eligible for such a

reduction. When a defendant is eligible for relief, the First Step Act “directs district courts

to calculate the [Sentencing] Guidelines range as if the . . . amendments [by the Fair

Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-120, 124 Stat. 2372,] had been in place at the

time of the offense.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 498 n.6 (2022). “The

district court may then consider” other intervening factual or legal changes, such as the

defendant’s “postsentencing conduct or nonretroactive changes [to the Guidelines] in

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selecting or rejecting an appropriate sentence, with the properly calculated Guidelines

range as the benchmark.” Id.

We will “affirm a district court’s denial of [§] 404(b) relief unless the court’s

decision is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th

816, 820 (4th Cir. 2023). With respect to procedural reasonableness, as is relevant here,

“when deciding a First Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obligation to

explain their decisions and demonstrate that they considered the parties’ [nonfrivolous]

arguments.” Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 500-01. However, a court “may, in its discretion,

dismiss arguments that it does not find compelling without a detailed explanation.” Id. at

501. The district court is not “required to articulate anything more than a brief statement

of reasons” or “to expressly rebut each argument made by the parties.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “All that the First Step Act requires is that a district court make

clear that it reasoned through the parties’ arguments.” Id. (cleaned up). With respect to

substantive reasonableness, we “consider the totality of the circumstances to determine

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose

satisfied the standards set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” Reed, 58 F.4th at 820 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Jones argues that the district court’s decision is procedurally and substantively

unreasonable. We disagree. With respect to procedural reasonableness, in declining to

reduce Jones’ sentence, the court correctly calculated Jones’ revised Guidelines range and

considered the revised statutory sentencing range, Jones’ criminal history, the

circumstances of the offenses of conviction, and his evidence of postsentencing

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rehabilitation. The decision is also substantively reasonable, as Jones’ mere “disagreement

with how [the] district court balance[d] the § 3553(a) factors is insufficient to overcome

the district court’s discretion.” United States v. Troy, 64 F.4th 177, 186 (4th Cir.) (cleaned

up), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 167 (2023).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED