USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10389 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:91-cr-00317-UU-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RAMON LOPEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(August 18, 2021)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 2 of 8
Ramon Lopez, a federal prisoner represented by counsel on appeal,1
challenges the district court’s order denying his motion for “compassionate
release” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as modified by § 603 of the First
Step Act.2 Lopez argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for compassionate release because it erred in determining the scope of
its authority by interpreting the policy statement in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 1B1.13 as limiting the court’s discretion and because it did not consider
certain of his arguments as “other factors” warranting compassionate release under
this policy statement.
We review a district court’s denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district
court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper
procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We may affirm on any ground
supported by the record. United States v. Muho, 978 F.3d 1212, 1219 (11th Cir.
2020).
1 Lopez filed the motion underlying this appeal pro se, but counsel subsequently filed a memorandum in support of the motion in the district court. 2 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. 2 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 3 of 8
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) permits district courts to modify a term of
imprisonment when they otherwise lack the inherent authority to do so. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c); United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2020). Prior to
the enactment of the First Step Act in December 2018, § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed a
district court to reduce a prisoner’s term of imprisonment only upon motion of the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Director. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018). Section
3582(c) now provides that in addition to a motion by a BOP Director, “upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative
rights,” a district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . , after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A); Pub. L. No.
115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239.
The district court determined that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 1B1.13 was the applicable policy statement that defined the court’s authority and
limited its discretion. Section 1B1.13 permits a sentence reduction, “if, after
considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are
applicable,” the district court determines that “[e]xtraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant the reduction,” “[t]he defendant is not a danger to the safety of any
3 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 4 of 8
other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g),” and the
reduction is consistent with the statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A), (2), (3). The
commentary to the policy statement defines four factors that qualify as
extraordinary and compelling reasons: medical condition, age, family
circumstances, and “other reasons . . . [a]s determined by the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons.” § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1.
Lopez argues that district court committed legal error by concluding that this
policy statement limited the court’s discretion because the Sentencing Commission
has not issued a new policy statement since the First Step Act became effective and
thus no policy statement addresses motions for compassionate release filed by
federal inmates, as opposed to by BOP directors. He thus urges that § 1B1.13 is
mere guidance and, at the same time, that under the First Step Act, district courts
have as much discretion as the BOP held prior to the Act under the “other reasons”
provision of § 1B1.13. In particular, he argues the court erred by not considering
any factor not expressly listed in the commentary and not addressing as “other
reasons” for release his argument about the effect Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 566 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), would have
had on his sentence had he been sentenced after those decisions were issued.
Lopez’s arguments in this regard, however, are foreclosed by our Court’s
recent decision in United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021).
4 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 5 of 8
In Bryant, our Court addressed two questions related to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),
as amended by the First Step Act, and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13: “[f]irst . . . whether
district courts reviewing defendant-filed motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A) are
bound by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement,” and “[s]econd, . . . how
[should] district courts . . . apply that statement to motions filed under Section
3582(c)(1)(A).” 996 F.3d at 1247. As to the first question, the Bryant court held
that § “1B1.13 is an applicable, binding policy statement for all Section
3582(c)(1)(A) motions,” regardless of whether the motions are brought by inmates
or BOP directors. 996 F.3d at 1262. With regard to the second question, the
Bryant court made clear that § 1B1.13’s catch-all “other reasons” provision
provides discretion only to the BOP to develop other reasons (outside of age,
medical condition, and family circumstances) warranting compassionate release,
not district courts. Id. Thus, district courts may not reduce a sentence by granting
a motion filed by a prisoner that asserts as the basis for a finding of extraordinary
and compelling reasons “other reasons.”
Therefore, in this case, the district court did not err as Lopez urges.
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USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10389 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:91-cr-00317-UU-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RAMON LOPEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(August 18, 2021)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 2 of 8
Ramon Lopez, a federal prisoner represented by counsel on appeal,1
challenges the district court’s order denying his motion for “compassionate
release” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as modified by § 603 of the First
Step Act.2 Lopez argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion for compassionate release because it erred in determining the scope of
its authority by interpreting the policy statement in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 1B1.13 as limiting the court’s discretion and because it did not consider
certain of his arguments as “other factors” warranting compassionate release under
this policy statement.
We review a district court’s denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district
court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper
procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We may affirm on any ground
supported by the record. United States v. Muho, 978 F.3d 1212, 1219 (11th Cir.
2020).
1 Lopez filed the motion underlying this appeal pro se, but counsel subsequently filed a memorandum in support of the motion in the district court. 2 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. 2 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 3 of 8
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) permits district courts to modify a term of
imprisonment when they otherwise lack the inherent authority to do so. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c); United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2020). Prior to
the enactment of the First Step Act in December 2018, § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed a
district court to reduce a prisoner’s term of imprisonment only upon motion of the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Director. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018). Section
3582(c) now provides that in addition to a motion by a BOP Director, “upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative
rights,” a district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . , after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A); Pub. L. No.
115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239.
The district court determined that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 1B1.13 was the applicable policy statement that defined the court’s authority and
limited its discretion. Section 1B1.13 permits a sentence reduction, “if, after
considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are
applicable,” the district court determines that “[e]xtraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant the reduction,” “[t]he defendant is not a danger to the safety of any
3 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 4 of 8
other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g),” and the
reduction is consistent with the statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A), (2), (3). The
commentary to the policy statement defines four factors that qualify as
extraordinary and compelling reasons: medical condition, age, family
circumstances, and “other reasons . . . [a]s determined by the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons.” § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1.
Lopez argues that district court committed legal error by concluding that this
policy statement limited the court’s discretion because the Sentencing Commission
has not issued a new policy statement since the First Step Act became effective and
thus no policy statement addresses motions for compassionate release filed by
federal inmates, as opposed to by BOP directors. He thus urges that § 1B1.13 is
mere guidance and, at the same time, that under the First Step Act, district courts
have as much discretion as the BOP held prior to the Act under the “other reasons”
provision of § 1B1.13. In particular, he argues the court erred by not considering
any factor not expressly listed in the commentary and not addressing as “other
reasons” for release his argument about the effect Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 566 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), would have
had on his sentence had he been sentenced after those decisions were issued.
Lopez’s arguments in this regard, however, are foreclosed by our Court’s
recent decision in United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021).
4 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 5 of 8
In Bryant, our Court addressed two questions related to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),
as amended by the First Step Act, and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13: “[f]irst . . . whether
district courts reviewing defendant-filed motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A) are
bound by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement,” and “[s]econd, . . . how
[should] district courts . . . apply that statement to motions filed under Section
3582(c)(1)(A).” 996 F.3d at 1247. As to the first question, the Bryant court held
that § “1B1.13 is an applicable, binding policy statement for all Section
3582(c)(1)(A) motions,” regardless of whether the motions are brought by inmates
or BOP directors. 996 F.3d at 1262. With regard to the second question, the
Bryant court made clear that § 1B1.13’s catch-all “other reasons” provision
provides discretion only to the BOP to develop other reasons (outside of age,
medical condition, and family circumstances) warranting compassionate release,
not district courts. Id. Thus, district courts may not reduce a sentence by granting
a motion filed by a prisoner that asserts as the basis for a finding of extraordinary
and compelling reasons “other reasons.”
Therefore, in this case, the district court did not err as Lopez urges. The
district court did not err in not considering any of Lopez’s other arguments outside
the framework required by § 3582(c)(1)(A) and § 1B1.13 and its commentary.
And the district court did not err in not thoroughly addressing the merits of
Lopez’s Apprendi-Alleyne argument because that argument does not fit within any
5 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 6 of 8
of the three express factors in § 1B1.13, and the district court did not have
discretion to consider it under the “other reasons” category.3 The district court had
no discretion to consider any of Lopez’s arguments as “other reasons” warranting
his compassionate release. The district court properly determined that the policy
statement in § 1B1.13 constrained the court’s discretion and was not just guidance,
as Bryant makes clear.
Not foreclosed completely by Bryant are Lopez’s arguments that the
district’s analyses of his age, medical conditions, and family circumstances were
erroneous under the proper framework. However, and as the government argues,4
even if the district court erred in determining that Lopez did not present any
3 Lopez argues that his case should be remanded because, in violation of Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), the district court completely failed to address his argument regarding Apprendi. But the district court did, in fact, address such argument: the district court explained in a footnote that it had considered Lopez’s argument regarding Apprendi and the “other reasons” category and concluded that it was not properly before the Court on a motion for compassionate release. And Clisby, by its terms, only requires “district courts to resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 960 F.2d at 936. Instead, for compassionate release motions made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), “a district court ‘must explain its sentencing decisions adequately enough to allow for meaningful appellate review,’” and “we must be able to understand from the record how the district court arrived at its conclusion, including what factors it relied upon.” United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). The district court’s footnote explaining why it was rejecting this argument by Lopez was enough to satisfy the applicable standard. The district court was not required to explain further its valid legal conclusion. 4 The government conceded in a letter filed after briefing that Lopez demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons, establishing eligibility for compassionate release, in that his hypertension may increase the likelihood of severe COVID-19. But the government maintains that the district court, nonetheless, did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez’s motion because it properly considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors. 6 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 7 of 8
extraordinary and compelling reasons, Lopez does not challenge the district court’s
alternative holding that he presents a danger to the community, nor does he rebut
the government’s argument that the district court appropriately considered the
applicable § 3553(a) factors, which include the defendant’s history and
characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); see also Cook, 998 F.3d at 1184
(holding a district court must consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors and explain
its decision in a way that allows for meaningful appellate review). Indeed, the
district court explained in its order that it was “inclined to touch upon Defendant’s
criminal background and history of disrespect for the law”—despite its holding
that Lopez failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons—and
proceeded to describe Lopez’s extensive criminal history that started in 1981 and
included violent and drug-related conduct and a history of disciplinary infractions
while imprisoned. Lopez presents no argument that the district court should have
considered other applicable § 3553(a) factors or that it was not within its discretion
to conclude as it did regarding Lopez’s being a danger to others and the
community. Lopez has thus waived any arguments on these issues. See Kelliher
v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1270, 1274 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that when a party
makes “no arguments on the merits as to [an] issue, the issue is deemed waived”).
Therefore, we conclude that the district court was within its discretion to deny
Lopez’s compassionate release motion after its valid determination that Lopez
7 USCA11 Case: 20-10389 Date Filed: 08/18/2021 Page: 8 of 8
presented a danger to the safety of another or the community and its consideration
of applicable § 3553(a) factors.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court denying Lopez’s
motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
AFFIRMED.