United States v. Ramirez-Nava

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 10, 2026
• Docket: 25-628
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-628 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 4:24-cr-02938-RM-BGM-1 District of Arizona, Tucson v. MEMORANDUM* JOSE EDUARDO RAMIREZ-NAVA,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Rosemary Márquez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 3, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: CALLAHAN, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

A grand jury indicted Jose Eduardo Ramirez-Nava (“Ramirez-Nava”) on one

count of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens for profit, in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) and (B)(i), and two counts of transportation of illegal aliens

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). for profit in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(i). Ramirez-Nava

moved to suppress all evidence and statements acquired from an allegedly

unlawful traffic stop that preceded his arrest and subsequent indictment.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion. The

government appealed. We reverse and remand.

We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, including

determinations of reasonable suspicion, de novo and any underlying factual

findings for clear error. United States v. Willy, 40 F.4th 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2022)

(noting that we review a ruling on a motion to suppress de novo and factual

findings for clear error); United States v. Bontemps, 977 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir.

2020) (noting that we review “determinations of reasonable suspicion de novo, but

factual findings underlying those determinations are reviewed for clear error”

(quotation marks omitted)). The court must “give due weight to inferences drawn

from th[e] facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

When examining whether an agent has reasonable suspicion, we “must look

at the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d

1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.

266, 273 (2002)). Totality of the circumstances review “precludes a ‘divide-and-

conquer analysis’ because even though” a person’s acts are perhaps innocent

2 25-628 individually, collectively “they [may] warrant[] further investigation.” Id. (citation

modified). “A determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out

the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. “In the context of

border patrol stops,” we have held that the “totality of the circumstances may

include characteristics of the area, proximity to the border, usual patterns of traffic

and time of day, previous alien or drug smuggling in the area, behavior of the

driver, appearance or behavior of passengers, and the model and appearance of the

vehicle.” Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1079.

The government argues that the district court impermissibly employed a

divide-and-conquer analysis and gave too much weight to potential innocent

explanations for particular circumstances. We agree. A review of the district

court’s order shows an individualized analysis, demonstrating an isolated review of

the factors supporting reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court has recognized

that “the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts—especially when the parts

are viewed in isolation.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 60-61 (2018)

(citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78). By failing to fully review all the factors

together, the district court failed to consider “the whole,” focusing instead on only

the “sum of its parts.” Id.

We also conclude that the twelve factors identified by the agent in this case

as supporting his reasonable suspicion determination are sufficient to constitute

3 25-628 reasonable suspicion. Those factors include, inter alia, the vehicle type and that it

was a rental vehicle, the Lyft marking on the vehicle in an area where the agent

had never seen a Lyft, the conduct of the driver and the passengers, the time of day

(night, during shift change, when the checkpoint was closed), the location by the

border and its proximity to a recent illegal border crossing event, as well as the

driver’s directional change and general driving behavior.

When evaluating reasonable suspicion, an agent is allowed to “draw on their

own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions

about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an

untrained person.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). These specific factors considered in isolation may appear innocuous or

innocent. But when considered together and in conjunction with an officer’s

specialized training, they are enough to constitute reasonable suspicion. Id. at 277-

78.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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