United States v. Ramirez

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 29, 2024
• Docket: Criminal No. 2023-0073
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Criminal Action No. 23-73-23 (CKK) RAUL PACHECO RAMIREZ, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION (January 29, 2024)

Defendant Raul Pacheco Ramirez is charged by indictment with conspiring to distribute,

with others, thousands of counterfeit pills of fentanyl. On November 20, 2023, Magistrate Judge

Maria Audero for the United States District Court for the Central District of California ordered

Defendant detained pending trial. Before the Court is Defendant’s [224] Motion for Bond Review

(“Motion” or “Mot.”). Defendant requests that the Court review the magistrate judge’s detention

order and release him on pretrial conditions. Mot. at 1, 8. Upon consideration of the pleadings, 1

the relevant legal authority, and the record before the Court, the Court shall DENY Defendant’s

[224] Motion for Bond Review.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On March 9, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendants Hector David

Valdez, Craig Eastman, and Charles Jeffrey Taylor. ECF No. 1 (sealed). Additional defendants

were indicted on April 26 and May 18, 2023. ECF No. 25; ECF No. 48 (sealed). On November 6,

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on: • Defendant’s Motion for Bond Review, ECF No. 224; and • The Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Review of Detention (“Gov’t’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 249, and exhibits therein.

1 2023, a grand jury returned a third superseding indictment, adding, among others, Defendant

Ramirez. ECF No. 134 (sealed). On November 17, 2023, a grand jury returned a fourth superseding

indictment in this matter. ECF No. 174. Following the third superseding indictment, Magistrate

Judge Robin M. Meriweather of this jurisdiction issued an arrest warrant for Defendant, which was

executed on November 16, 2023 in Los Angeles, California. ECF No. 246. That same day,

Defendant appeared before Magistrate Judge Audero, who ordered Defendant to be temporarily

detained. See ECF No. 5, Case No. 23-mj-05939 (sealed). On November 20, 2023, Defendant

appeared for a detention hearing before Magistrate Judge Audero, who ordered Defendant to be

detained pending trial. See ECF No. 10, Case No. 23-mj-05939 (sealed).

Defendant subsequently filed the pending motion on January 5, 2024, requesting this Court

to review the magistrate judge’s detention order and set conditions of release. ECF No. 224. The

Government opposes Defendant’s motion, filing its opposition on January 19, 2024. ECF No. 249.

B. Factual Allegations

In its opposition, the Government details the allegations against Defendant, including

messages exchanged between Defendant and two co-defendants in this case, photographs that

purportedly depict hundreds (if not thousands) of “blue ‘M-30’ pills” and various “apparent

firearms,” and numerous messages from various individuals on social media indicating that

Defendant was distributing illicit pills. Broadly, the Government alleges that Defendant was “a

wholesale distributor of pills, who obtained and resold thousands upon thousands of pills at a

time.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 25.

To support its claim, the Government recounts purported social media messages between

Defendant and co-Defendant Valdez. Id. at 14–15. For instance, on January 19, 2023, Defendant

messaged Valdez, via social media, stating, “This [expletive] told me you charging him 500 a

2 boat,” and “Ima need a couple in a few days but I’ll lyk if the tickets good.” Id. at 15. Valdez

responded, “How many,” to which Defendant stated, “8” and “But they gotta be good.” Id. The

Government proffers that the above exchange indicates that Defendant messaged Valdez when “he

heard that [] Valdez was charging $500 for 1,000 pills [(i.e., a boat)] and that he may need a couple

thousand pills.” Id. Defendant then informed Valdez that he would purchase “8,000, if the pills

were of good quality.” Id. According to the Government, these communications between

Defendant and Valdez “continued to the subsequent week” when Defendant informed Valdez on

January 25, 2023 that “Ima be ready for the 8 [boat symbol]” that week. Id.

In addition to speaking with Valdez, Defendant maintained a close relationship with co-

Defendant Hodges. See id. at 20. Specifically, the Government claims that Defendant “sold []

Hodges pills by the thousands.” Id. For instance, on January 7, 2021, in an Instagram conversation

purportedly between Defendant and Hodges, Defendant told Hodges: “Okay bet bro lmk what he

say I can get the boats for you for 3,500$.” Id. The Government states that the above interaction

indicates that Defendant “can get thousands of pills for [] Hodges for $3500 [sic].” Id. In addition,

in July 2022, Defendant sent Hodges “a photo of a USPS receipt reflecting a shipment to Suitland,

MD.” Id. at 20–21. Hodges then asked for a picture of “beans.” Id. at 21. The Government states

that Defendant responded with a “video of what appears to be unidentified pills of various shapes,

sizes, and colors (thus suggesting ‘beans’ means ‘pills’).” Id. The Government appends the

following images to support its allegations.

3 See id. at 21–22. The Government claims that the pills in the video sent by Ramirez “may have

contained fentanyl,” based on a comparison of what “rainbow fentanyl pills” appear as according

to a news story. Id. at 22–23.

4 See id. at 23. Then, on July 10, 2022, Hodges asked Defendant to “Send me those lol,” and then

stated “Lol them joints cool bro.” Id. at 23. On July 13, 2022, Hodges told Ramirez, “I got myself

a lane now in VA as of today for these.” Id. The Government claims that the above interaction

demonstrates that Hodges “had a way to redistribute pills sent to him by Defendant Ramirez.” Id.

at 23.

The Government also claims that Defendant’s social media account “contained numerous

messages about distributing pills.” Id. at 19. For instance, on April 2, 2022, a social media account

asked Defendant if he could “do a boat for 1k,” to which Defendant purportedly responded, “Yea

you wanna pull up.” Id. Defendant then instructed that account user to meet him in Long Beach,

California. Id. On May 4, 2022, Defendant messaged another social media account, stating, “My

boy I got a boy,” “Boat of the blues,” “I’m tryna get rid of asap,” and “Shoot me 850.” Id. The

Government proffers that this conversation indicates that Defendant had “1,000 blue ‘M-30’

fentanyl pills that he would sell for $850.” Id. at 19–20. On August 16, 2023, Defendant messaged

another social media account, stating, “You tryna make that play.” Id. at 20. Defendant then

messaged “4 boats,” which, according to the Government, means that Defendant was trying to

engage in a “drug transaction for 4,000 pills.” Id. On December 23, 2022, Defendant messaged

another social media account, stating “Ima come grab 15 boats every 2 weeks.” Id. The

Government proffers that Defendant “told the other Instagram account that he is going to buy

15,000 pills every two weeks.” Id. Additional communications via social media further indicate

that Defendant knew he was distributing fentanyl pills. On March 3, 2022, one social media

account asked Defendant: “Dis bitches fentanyl ?,” to which Defendant responded, “They the

ones,” “They burn n all,” and “Perfect ones.” Id.

Finally, the Government claims that Defendant was in possession of the illicit pills and

5 “apparent firearms,” as evinced by his social media account. See id. at 15. The Government

appends the following images, extracted from Defendant’s social media account, to support its

claims.

6 See id. at 16–19.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant ordered detained by a magistrate judge may file “a motion for revocation or

amendment of the order” with “the court having original jurisdiction over the offense.”

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). The Court applies de novo review to the question and is “free to use in its

analysis any evidence or reasons relied on by the magistrate judge, but it may also hear additional

evidence and rely on its own reasons.” United States v. Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 (D.D.C.

7 2011) (BAH) (quoting United States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2009) (PLF)).

“The motion shall be determined promptly.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b).

In our society, “liberty is the norm” and “detention prior to trial or without trial is the

carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The Bail Reform

Act permits pretrial detention in only “carefully defined circumstances.” United States v.

Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A detention hearing must be held only if a case

involves any of an enumerated set of offenses, including an offense “for which a maximum term

of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in[, inter alia,] the Controlled Substances Act,”

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C), or if the defendant poses a serious risk of flight or of trying to obstruct

justice or threaten, injure, or intimidate a witness or juror, id. § 3142(f)(2)(A)–(B).

The question for the Court is whether any “condition or combination of conditions will

reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and

the community.” Id. § 3142(e)(1). “In common parlance, the relevant inquiry is whether the

defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’” United States v. Vasquez-Benitez,

919 F.3d 546, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In determining whether a defendant should be detained

pending trial, the Court must consider “the available information” concerning four enumerated

factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence

against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and

seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s

release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

“To justify detention on the basis of dangerousness, the government must prove by ‘clear

and convincing evidence’ that ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure

the safety of any other person and the community.’” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273,

8 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). That standard requires the Government

to establish that the defendant “poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety” that cannot

be sufficiently mitigated by release conditions. Id. at 1280; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751

(requiring the Government to “prove[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents

an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community”). “Detention cannot be

based on a finding that defendant is unlikely to comply with conditions of release absent the

requisite finding of dangerousness or risk of flight; otherwise[,] the scope of detention would

extend beyond the limits set by Congress.” Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1283.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court concludes that the evidence presented by the Government in its briefing requires

Defendant Ramirez’s detention pending trial.

A. Legal Principles

As a threshold matter, the Court shall address the proper standard to apply at this stage of

proceedings. As explained above, Defendant has appealed his detention order pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). Such an appeal is subject to de novo review, in which the Court must engage

in a searching, “factbound inquiry” to determine danger to the community and/or risk of flight.

United States v. Sabol, 534 F. Supp. 3d 58, 69 (D.D.C. 2021) (EGS) (citing Munchel, 991 F.3d at

1283) (cleaned up).

In determining whether Defendant is a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court

considers the Section 3142(g) factors including: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense

charged”; (2) “the weight of the evidence”; (3) “the history and characteristics” of the defendant;

and (4) “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be

posed by the [defendant’s] release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

9 The Court shall consider these factors based upon the present record without holding an

additional hearing. See Sheffield, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (permitting district court to use in its

analysis the evidence relied on by the magistrate judge); see also United States v. Anderson, 384 F.

Supp. 2d 32, 33–34 (D.D.C. 2005) (PLF) (taking into consideration the indictment, “the briefs and

other papers submitted by the parties, the proceedings before [the magistrate judge], the

[magistrate’s] findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the evidence and proffers before [the

court]”). Based on the current record, the Court concludes that clear and convincing evidence

supports a finding that no condition or combination of conditions will “reasonably assure” the

“safety of any other person and the community” or Defendant’s appearance at trial. Accordingly,

the Court orders that Defendant shall remain detained pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).

B. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Charged

Turning to the Section 3142(g) factors, the Court first considers the “nature and

circumstances of the offense charged” including whether the offense involves “a controlled

substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). In this case, a rebuttable presumption of detention applies

because Defendant has been charged by indictment with serious violations of the Controlled

Substances Act. See id. § 3142(e)(3)(A); United States v. Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d 154, 165

(D.D.C. 2021) (RCL). Even the possession with intent to distribute “9.11 grams of fentanyl and

.89 grams of powdered cocaine” triggers such a presumption. Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 165–66.

Here, a grand jury has found probable cause that Defendant was engaged in a conspiracy to

distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl that ran from August 2020 until the present day, and

the Government has presented evidence that Defendant has trafficked thousands of grams of

fentanyl. See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 16–17, 19–20. The Court must therefore presume that no condition

10 or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance as required or the

safety of the community.

To rebut this presumption, Defendant must “offer some credible evidence” that he will not

endanger the community or flee if released. United States v. Cherry, 221 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32

(D.D.C. 2016) (GMH). The Court finds that Defendant has failed to do so here. He argues that

the allegations against him suggest that he “played a very minor role in a multi-year period in

which the distribution conspiracy is alleged to have taken place.” Mot. at 5. However, Defendant

offers no evidence—let alone credible evidence—that he is not a danger to the community or a

flight risk if released. Notably, while Defendant states that he is charged “with a non-violent drug

offense,” Mot. at 5, Defendant fails to acknowledge that the Government is still alleging that he

possessed and trafficked thousands of grams of fentanyl, see Gov’t’s Opp’n at 15–17, 19–22. And,

according to the Government, Defendant was selling the fentanyl pills, at least to an extent,

“disguised and passed off as legitimate oxycodone.” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 25.

The Court concludes that the nature and circumstances of the offense weigh in favor of

detention. Defendant is charged with conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to

distribute 400 grams or more of a substance containing fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 846. This charge carries a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, with a maximum

of life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). As the Government puts it, “it is common knowledge that

fentanyl kills,” Gov’t’s Opp’n at 24; this investigation began with the overdose death of a D.C.

resident who appears to have obtained her drugs through the member(s) of this conspiracy, id. at

3–4. “Moreover, this is not the case of an individual seller working alone.” Brown, 538 F. Supp.

3d at 167. The Government alleges not just a conspiracy among the defendants in this action, but

vast distribution across the United States. Therefore, Defendant’s “alleged participation in the

11 conspiracy charged thus strongly suggests that, if released, he would have the means to purchase

and distribute narcotics and thereby endanger [not just] the D.C. community,” but also

communities throughout the United States. Id.

Furthermore, the additional defendants in the third superseding indictment have been

ordered detained pending trial as well. See, e.g., ECF No. 167; ECF No. 182 (sealed); ECF No.

184; No. 191; ECF No. 231. In each of these cases, there was sufficient evidence of fentanyl drug

trafficking to warrant and support their detention. Releasing this particular defendant, who is a

large-scale fentanyl trafficker in California, would be contrary to the other detention orders in

effect. Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of detention.

C. Weight of the Evidence

The weight of the evidence against Defendant also favors continued pretrial detention. The

Government presents communications between Defendant and other co-defendants in this case,

including Defendants Valdez and Hodges, substantiating its claim that Defendant did in fact deal

with large quantities of illicit drugs. See Gov’t’s Opp’n at 14–15, 20–24. The Government also

presents communications between Defendant and various social media account, all of which

suggest that Defendant did distribute thousands of pills. See id. at 19–20. Finally, Defendant’s

own social media account evinces Defendant’s proclivity for possessing the drugs, as well as

apparent proclivity for firearms. See id. at 16–19.

In all, the Court finds that the weight of this evidence is strong. See Brown, 538 F. Supp.

3d at 168–69. Given the evidence to date, this factor weighs in favor of detention. See United

States v. Brockhoff, 590 F. Supp. 3d 295, 304 (D.D.C. 2022) (CKK).

12 D. History and Characteristics of the Defendant

Under the third Section 3142(g) factor, the Court must consider a defendant’s “history and

characteristics,” including his “character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment,

financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history

related to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court

proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3).

On the one hand, Defendant’s lack of a serious criminal record weighs against pretrial

detention. According to his Pretrial Services Report, Defendant has three arrests and one prior

conviction. See Pretrial Services Report (“PSR”), ECF No. 252. His prior conviction occurred in

December 2013 and involved three counts of receiving stolen property. Id. at 3. Although the

Government claims that Defendant’s criminal history suggests that Defendant is a danger, Gov’t’s

Opp’n at 26, the Court is not persuaded by his criminal history alone. Defendant also explains that

he has a history of employment, and strong ties to the Los Angeles community, including family—

a fiancé, children, mother, and sister. Mot. at 6–7.

On the other hand, the Government states that Defendant appears to have been in

possession, or at least has access to, various handguns and rifles, as depicted on his social media

account. Gov’t’s Opp’n at 26. This does raise concerns for the Court, and Defendant does not

address his purported possession of firearms in his Motion. See generally Mot. The Government

further argues that Defendant’s ties to Mexico also weigh in favor of detention. Gov’t’s Opp’n at

13 26. Specifically, Defendant is a citizen of Mexico, though he is in the United States legally

pursuant to the DREAM Act. See id.

In all, given Defendant’s proclivity for possessing controlled substances and alleged

possession of numerous firearms, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of detention.

E. The Nature and Seriousness of the Danger Posed by Defendant’s Release

The final factor that the Court must consider is “the nature and seriousness of the danger

to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(g)(4). Conspiring to distribute fentanyl presumptively renders a defendant a serious danger

to the community. See Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 170; cf. also United States v. Bethea, 763 F.

Supp. 2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2011) (RCL) (narcotics trafficking generally). Particularly so given the

vast amount of drugs at issue here. More generally, “the lethality of fentanyl and scourge of . . .

opioids on this community [and communities around the country] further demonstrate the serious

danger Defendant’s release could pose.” United States v. Bolivar, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 1171

(D.N.M. 2020). And, the significant statutory penalties Defendant faces provide him with a strong

incentive to flee.

Defendant maintains that he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. See Mot. at

3–4. As such, Defendant proposes that he be released on the condition that he reside in a duplex

in Los Angeles with his mother, fiancé, and children. Id. at 7. Defendant further consents to drug

testing and will refrain from communicating with any of the co-defendants in this case, except in

the presence of counsel. Id. at 4. Defendant notes that his Pretrial Services Report suggests there

14 are conditions of release that can be set to adequately supervise him. Id. at 3; see PSR, ECF No.

252, at 1; see also Ex. 1, ECF No. 224-1.

However, the Government has provided strong evidence indicating that Defendant

knowingly and intentionally trafficked counterfeit pills in the thousands. See generally Gov’t’s

Opp’n. Again, “it is common knowledge that fentanyl kills.” Id. at 24. Overall, the Court’s

concern regarding the safety of the community or Defendant’s appearance at trial is not alleviated.

Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of detention.

* * *

All in all, even if Defendant could rebut the presumption of detention, the Court finds that

no set of conditions can address the threat of danger he poses to the community or mitigate his risk

of flight. The Government has shown that Defendant has a strong incentive to flee given the

seriousness of the charges, the apparent weight of the evidence, the substantial statutory penalties

he is facing, and Defendant’s ties to Mexico. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Section 3142

factors require pretrial detention.

IV. CONCLUSION

The record as a whole establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or

combination of conditions can be imposed that would reasonably assure the safety of the

community or Defendant’s presence at trial if he was released pending trial. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(e)(1). As such, the Court DENIES Defendant’s [224] Motion for Bond Review. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: January 29, 2024

/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge