United States v. Hanson

613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41877, 2009 WL 1314893
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMay 12, 2009
DocketCriminal 09-0071 (PLF)
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 613 F. Supp. 2d 85 (United States v. Hanson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41877, 2009 WL 1314893 (D.D.C. 2009).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendant Yarning Nina Qi Hanson’s motion for bond review filed on March 9, 2009 and her second motion for bond review filed on March 20, 2009. The government filed an opposition on March 25, 2009, and the Court held hearings on these motions on March 25, 2009 and April 1, 2009. At the conclusion of the second hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement and promised a written opinion shortly thereafter. On April 6, 2009, Mrs. Hanson’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw his appearance which the Court subsequently granted. Awaiting the entry of an appearance by new counsel, the Court issued an order on April 9, 2009, indicating that, in fairness to Mrs. Hanson and her new lawyer, the Court would not make a decision until after new counsel had an opportunity to present any additional arguments with respect to the bond review motions. New counsel entered his appearance on April 23, 2009 and filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of defendant’s second motion for bond review on April 28, 2009. The Court heard further argument on April 30, 2009. Defendant, through her new counsel, filed a further supplement in support of her motion on May 8, 2009, and the government filed a response later that same day.

I. BACKGROUND

A three-count indictment was returned by a grand jury against defendant Yarning *87 Nina Qi Hanson; her husband, Harold Dewitt Hanson; and ' ARC International LLC, a company of which Mrs. Hanson allegedly was the co-owner and president. Mrs. Hanson and her husband are charged in the first count of the indictment with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Export Administration Regulations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Mrs. Hanson is charged in the second count of the indictment with violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1705, and the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 744 and 764.2. Her husband is charged in the third count with making a false statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

The indictment alleges that the defendants illegally exported unmanned aerial vehicle (“UAV”) autopilot components to the People’s Republic of China. According to the government, Mrs. Hanson carried these UAV components to Germany and handed them to an acquaintance who took them to China. The government represents that these sophisticated components enable UAVs to perform certain tasks without the aid of human pilots, including autonomous take offs, bungee launches, and hand launches and landings, and that they have other tactical military uses. Moreover, according to the government’s expert, UAVs equipped with these components could be used to simulate stealth planes and cruise missiles to test air defense detection systems, and potentially could be armed. Thus, the United States has made a foreign policy and legal determination that these items should be controlled for national security' reasons through licensing. The government allegues that, at the time Mrs. Hanson smuggled these items out of the United States, both defendants knew that a license was - required for the export of such items. The government represents that, by its calculation, the base offense level for the offenses with which Mrs. Hanson is charged under the United States Sentencing Guidelines is 26. Assuming a Criminal History Category of I, Mrs. Hanson is facing a guideline sentencing range of between 63 and 78 months in prison.

All of these representations were made to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay at a detention hearing on February 17, 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing, Magistrate Judge Kay concluded that Mrs. Hanson should be held without bond under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., finding that there were no conditions of release that would reasonably assure her future presence in court. Among other things, he found that the charges against her were serious and carried a potential for a significant period of incarceration; that the government has strong evidence against Mrs. Hanson, including her own statements to investigators that she smuggled the UAV autopilot components out of the United States and knew there were licensing requirements for such items; and that she has strong ties to China (including the fact that she owns property in China), despite the fact that she is a naturalized citizen of the United States. On the basis of the information provided to it, this Court agrees with these factual findings.

II. THE BAIL REFORM ACT

Our system of criminal justice embraces a strong presumption against detention. “ ‘In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.’ ” United States v. Gloster, 969 F.Supp. 92, 96-97 (D.D.C.1997) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 sets forth the limited circumstances in which a defendant *88 may be detained before trial despite the presumption in favor of liberty. The Act provides that if a judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the [defendant] before trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). The Act also provides for pretrial detention when the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant in court as required. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); United States v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 96 (D.C.Cir.1987). As the D.C. Circuit has said, “[t]hat preponderance must, of course, go to the ultimate issue: that no combination of conditions— either those set out in the Bail Reform Act itself or any others that the magistrate or judge might find useful — can ‘reasonably' assure that the defendant will appear for trial.” United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C.Cir.1996).

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Bluebook (online)
613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41877, 2009 WL 1314893, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-hanson-dcd-2009.