USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4558
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAFAEL CEE-ERWIN SOLOMON, a/k/a Rip,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (2:25-cr-00077-1)
Submitted: July 23, 2026 Decided: July 27, 2026
Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Natalie R. Atkinson, ATKINSON & FRAMPTON, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Moore Capito, United States Attorney, Jeremy B. Wolfe, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Rafael Cee-Erwin Solomon appeals the 121-month sentence of imprisonment
imposed following his guilty plea to three counts of distribution of fentanyl, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Solomon argues that the district court miscalculated his Sentencing
Guidelines range by finding that he constructively possessed drugs and a firearm found in
an apartment and by concluding that this possession was relevant conduct. He also argues
that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020).
We must first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether the district court
committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Id. If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Substantive reasonableness review
“takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the procedural reasonableness of Solomon’s sentence, we review
the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743, 748 (4th Cir. 2021). “Under the clear error standard,
we will only reverse if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 3 of 6
quotation marks omitted). “If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently.” United States v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 406, 417 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Solomon argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district
court improperly found that he constructively possessed certain contraband and wrongly
concluded that this possession was relevant conduct for the instant offenses. The
Government must prove disputed Guidelines enhancements by a preponderance of the
evidence, which “simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is
more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 435 (4th
Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696,
701 (4th Cir. 2021). Constructive possession requires “ownership, dominion, or control
over the contraband or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband was concealed”
and “knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d
352, 358 (4th Cir. 2010). “Notably, dominion and control cannot be established by mere
proximity to the contraband, . . . [or] mere presence on the property where the contraband
is found.” United States v. Blue, 808 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 2015).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, relevant conduct includes “all acts and omissions
committed, aided, [or] abetted . . . by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission
of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting
to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 4 of 6
§ 1B1.3(a)(1) (2024). Additionally, “with respect to offenses of a character for which
[USSG] § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts,” relevant conduct includes
“all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct . . . as the offense
of conviction.” USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2). Offenses may “qualify as part of the same course of
conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the
conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.”
USSG § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii). “That is to say, the same-course-of-conduct standard
requires only that the defendant be engaged in an identifiable pattern of certain criminal
activity.” United States v. McDonald, 28 F.4th 553, 564 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
In making this assessment, courts consider “the degree of similarity of the offenses, the
regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval between the offenses.” USSG
§ 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not clearly err
in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Solomon constructively possessed the
drugs and firearms recovered from an apartment. As the district court discussed, the
apartment’s landlord identified Solomon as the apartment’s lessee, investigators observed
Solomon leave the apartment immediately prior to selling fentanyl to confidential
informants on four different occasions, and the apartment contained clothes Solomon wore
while selling fentanyl, pre-recorded bills from his sales to the confidential informants, and
controlled substances he mentioned during the controlled purchases. Based on these and
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USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4558
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAFAEL CEE-ERWIN SOLOMON, a/k/a Rip,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (2:25-cr-00077-1)
Submitted: July 23, 2026 Decided: July 27, 2026
Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Natalie R. Atkinson, ATKINSON & FRAMPTON, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Moore Capito, United States Attorney, Jeremy B. Wolfe, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Rafael Cee-Erwin Solomon appeals the 121-month sentence of imprisonment
imposed following his guilty plea to three counts of distribution of fentanyl, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Solomon argues that the district court miscalculated his Sentencing
Guidelines range by finding that he constructively possessed drugs and a firearm found in
an apartment and by concluding that this possession was relevant conduct. He also argues
that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020).
We must first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether the district court
committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Id. If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Substantive reasonableness review
“takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the procedural reasonableness of Solomon’s sentence, we review
the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743, 748 (4th Cir. 2021). “Under the clear error standard,
we will only reverse if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 3 of 6
quotation marks omitted). “If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently.” United States v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 406, 417 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Solomon argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district
court improperly found that he constructively possessed certain contraband and wrongly
concluded that this possession was relevant conduct for the instant offenses. The
Government must prove disputed Guidelines enhancements by a preponderance of the
evidence, which “simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is
more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 435 (4th
Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696,
701 (4th Cir. 2021). Constructive possession requires “ownership, dominion, or control
over the contraband or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband was concealed”
and “knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d
352, 358 (4th Cir. 2010). “Notably, dominion and control cannot be established by mere
proximity to the contraband, . . . [or] mere presence on the property where the contraband
is found.” United States v. Blue, 808 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 2015).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, relevant conduct includes “all acts and omissions
committed, aided, [or] abetted . . . by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission
of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting
to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 4 of 6
§ 1B1.3(a)(1) (2024). Additionally, “with respect to offenses of a character for which
[USSG] § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts,” relevant conduct includes
“all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct . . . as the offense
of conviction.” USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2). Offenses may “qualify as part of the same course of
conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the
conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.”
USSG § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii). “That is to say, the same-course-of-conduct standard
requires only that the defendant be engaged in an identifiable pattern of certain criminal
activity.” United States v. McDonald, 28 F.4th 553, 564 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
In making this assessment, courts consider “the degree of similarity of the offenses, the
regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval between the offenses.” USSG
§ 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not clearly err
in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Solomon constructively possessed the
drugs and firearms recovered from an apartment. As the district court discussed, the
apartment’s landlord identified Solomon as the apartment’s lessee, investigators observed
Solomon leave the apartment immediately prior to selling fentanyl to confidential
informants on four different occasions, and the apartment contained clothes Solomon wore
while selling fentanyl, pre-recorded bills from his sales to the confidential informants, and
controlled substances he mentioned during the controlled purchases. Based on these and
other facts, we cannot definitively say that the district court erred in finding that Solomon
constructively possessed the contraband within the apartment.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4558 Doc: 32 Filed: 07/27/2026 Pg: 5 of 6
We further conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that
Solomon’s possession of the drugs and firearm was relevant conduct to his offenses. See
United States v. McVey, 752 F.3d 606, 610 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he application of the
relevant conduct standard typically involves consideration of factual circumstances, such
as whether acts or omissions are sufficiently similar . . . . Such analysis constitutes
factfinding that we review for clear error.”). Solomon’s possession of the drugs within the
apartment, if charged as an offense, would be grouped for sentencing purposes with the
fentanyl distribution charges to which he pled guilty. See USSG § 3D1.2(d) (requiring
grouping of drug offenses). And given that Solomon possessed the drugs and firearm
alongside drug distribution paraphernalia and only days after indicating to a confidential
informant that he had additional substances for sale, the district court plausibly found that
this possession was part of the same course of conduct as Solomon’s fentanyl distribution.
See United States v. Mondragon, 860 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that weapon
is possessed in connection with relevant illegal drug activity where there is “a temporal
and spatial relation linking the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Turning to the substantive reasonableness of Solomon’s sentence, his sentence is
presumptively reasonable because it is “within . . . [the] properly calculated Guidelines
range.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, the
district court explained that the sentence was necessary considering the seriousness of
Solomon’s offenses, his violent criminal history, and his return to drug trafficking shortly
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after his release from serving a long federal sentence for a drug offense. We thus conclude
that Solomon has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED