Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2025 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-1359
ANTOAN RABAN,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:23-CR-00329-RMR-1) _________________________________
John C. Arceci, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant.
Kyle W. Brenton, Assistant United States Attorney (Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant United States Attorney, and Peter McNeilly, United States Attorney, on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. _________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. _________________________________
Two officers stopped a motorist for two violations: driving without a
front license plate and failing to use a turn signal. During the traffic stop, the
officers learned that the driver, who identified himself as Antoan Raban, was a Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 2
criminal gang member. The stop occurred in a high-crime area and a rival
gang’s territory. And just seconds after the officers stopped Raban, another
man, whom the police knew to be a fellow gang member, drove past, turned
around, parked across the street from the stop, and called Raban’s phone.
The officers called for backup and four more officers soon arrived.
Because Raban lacked identification, the officers decided to fingerprint him to
verify his identity. They removed Raban from the car and frisked him, finding
no weapons. While one officer walked Raban to the curb and prepared the
fingerprint reader, a second officer did a protective sweep of the car. That
officer found a loaded pistol under the driver’s seat and ammunition in the
center console.
A federal grand jury charged Raban with possessing a firearm and
ammunition as a felon. Raban moved to suppress evidence from the search,
arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a protective sweep of
the car. The district court denied his motion, concluding that the officers
reasonably suspected that Raban was dangerous and might access a weapon
from inside the car.
Raban pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s
suppression decision. Now he does just that. He argues that the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous and might access a weapon, so the
court erred by denying his suppression motion.
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Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. First, several
circumstances, taken together, provided reasonable suspicion that Raban was
presently dangerous. And second, when the officer conducted the protective
sweep, he reasonably believed that Raban would receive a civil citation and be
allowed to return to the car, where he might have had access to a weapon. The
officer therefore had reasonable suspicion for the protective sweep.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
In May 2023, two gang-unit police officers—Tyler Danielson and
Zachary Moldenhauer—were patrolling a high-crime area in northeast Denver.
Soon after 4 p.m., they noticed a car without its front license plate at a gas
station. That gas station “saw a lot of crime,” including “motor vehicle theft,
narcotics sale and distribution, [and] weapons-related offenses.” R. vol. I at
123.
When the driver left the gas station, he didn’t use a turn signal. So the
officers followed and pulled over the car.
Officer Danielson approached the driver-side window, and Officer
Moldenhauer approached the passenger side. Because the car had tinted
windows, the officers asked the driver—Antoan Raban—to roll down the
windows. Raban complied, and the officers saw that he was alone in the car.
The officers soon spotted an open beer can on the backseat floor. They
also noticed Raban’s face tattoos: the number “3” under each eye, which
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connected him to the Tre Tre Crips gang. Officer Danielson found Raban’s
Crips affiliation “odd” because Raban was driving through the territory of a
rival-gang, the Bloods. Id. at 79. In fact, later during the stop, Raban told
Officer Danielson: “If this is your area, I see why y’all would have scoped me
out.”
After Raban rolled down all four windows, Officer Danielson asked him
about the missing license plate. Raban said that the car belonged to his
girlfriend and explained that the car’s front had been recently damaged in an
accident. Raban then looked for, but could not find, the car’s registration. He
also lacked any identification. So he gave the officers his name, address, and
birthday instead.
Meanwhile, seconds after the officers stopped Raban, a white SUV drove
past, completed a three-point turn, and parked across the street from the stop.
Both officers recognized the SUV’s driver: Deshay Armstrong, 1 “a well-known
Crip gang member” with a violent criminal history. Id. at 79–80, 127. Officer
Moldenhauer acknowledged Armstrong by saying “sup, brother.” Id. at 101,
143. Then the officers noticed Armstrong placing a telephone call. They could
see inside Raban’s car that the call was to Raban’s phone. Raban, ignoring the
call, told the officers that Armstrong was his girlfriend’s brother.
1 At times, the record reflects Armstrong’s first name as “Dashae.” 4 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 5
After getting Raban’s information, Officer Moldenhauer returned to the
police car to run a records check. Officer Danielson stayed with Raban, partly
because Armstrong was parked nearby.
Officer Danielson and Raban chatted calmly. Raban explained that the
open beer can was from the night before. He also admitted that he didn’t have a
driver’s license. And he said that Armstrong “just so happened to be here.”
Around this time, the officers called for backup, largely because of
Armstrong. Four more officers soon arrived.
Officer Moldenhauer finished the records check, which revealed that
Raban had several violent and weapons-related convictions. It also showed that
Raban lacked a valid driver’s license. And though the check returned a photo
resembling Raban, the photographed individual lacked face tattoos. So to
confirm Raban’s identity, Officer Moldenhauer decided to fingerprint him.
Without telling Officer Danielson the records-check results, including
Raban’s criminal history, Officer Moldenhauer asked Danielson to remove
Raban from the car for fingerprinting. At the same time, Moldenhauer also told
Danielson: “I think he’s good.” Id. at 147.
Officer Danielson asked Raban to exit the car, frisked him, and noticed
he was wearing an ankle monitor. Finding no weapons, Danielson passed Raban
to Officer Moldenhauer, who walked Raban closer to the police car. Surrounded
by several officers, Raban sat on the curb with his legs crossed while Officer
Moldenhauer prepared the fingerprint reader.
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Officer Danielson then did a protective sweep of the car. He soon found a
loaded handgun under the driver’s seat. At that point, officers handcuffed
Raban. Officers later found a baggie of ammunition in the center console.
II. Procedural History
A federal grand jury charged Raban with possessing a firearm and
ammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
A. Motion to Suppress & Evidentiary Hearing
Raban moved to suppress evidence from the search, arguing that the
protective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment. To justify a protective
sweep, officers must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect (1) “is
dangerous” and (2) “may gain immediate control of weapons.” Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). Raban argued that the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous. In response, the government
argued that Officer Danielson had reasonable suspicion for the protective sweep
based on the area, Raban’s gang affiliation and criminal history, Armstrong’s
presence and conduct during the stop, and Raban’s ankle monitor.
The court held an evidentiary hearing. Officers Danielson and
Moldenhauer testified about the stop and the circumstances they relied on to
justify the protective sweep.
To begin, Officer Danielson testified that the stop occurred in a high-
crime area—one with several recent shootings. He also noted that he had “been
shot at . . . by a gang member” in that area before. R. vol. I at 109.
6 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 7
Officer Danielson then explained the significance of Raban’s being in a
rival gang’s territory. He testified that the Crips did not usually enter the
Bloods’ “turf.” Id. at 79. Indeed, Danielson found Raban’s presence in Bloods
territory especially “odd” “because of recent violence in that neighborhood.”
Id. Officer Moldenhauer similarly attested that the area experienced violent
gang activity “specifically” related to “Bloods and Crips relations.” Id. at 122–
23, 131.
Next, the officers testified about Armstrong. Officer Danielson stated
that Armstrong’s presence concerned him for a few reasons: both Armstrong
and Raban were members of the Crips, Armstrong had a violent criminal
history, and Armstrong “ha[d] been armed in the past.” Id. at 80. Danielson
explained that sometimes “others . . . attempt to interfere with a traffic stop or
try to overwhelm officers to try to distract attention or even use violence
against officers.” Id. at 81. And he testified that “[Raban’s] being accompanied
by another Crip gang member set off red flags to me that there was a possibility
that . . . either he was armed or there were multiple firearms that could
potentially be used against us within immediate reach.” Id. at 87.
Likewise, Officer Moldenhauer testified that Armstrong’s presence
increased his safety concerns. He explained, “I didn’t know what Deshay
Armstrong’s intentions were being over there . . . . We don’t know if Deshay
wants us to basically leave the defendant alone and what he’s going to do.” Id.
at 129. According to Officer Moldenhauer, this “created a fairly large officer
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safety issue.” Id. Moldenhauer’s concerns only increased after learning about
Armstrong’s personal relationship with Raban.
Finally, Officer Danielson discussed the protective sweep. He testified
that he searched the car because he anticipated releasing Raban with only a
citation. Though Raban lacked a license, Danielson explained that they would
release him to the car with a warning not to drive. But he also added that at
some point “it was a consideration that we were going to either park and lock
or tow his vehicle from that scene” too. Id. at 117–18. Both officers testified
that Danielson did not know Raban’s criminal history when Danielson searched
the car.
B. Suppression Rulings
Though deeming it “a close call,” the district court orally denied Raban’s
suppression motion. Id. at 176. The court concluded that four considerations
together satisfied Long’s first prong: (1) the high-crime neighborhood,
(2) Raban’s gang affiliation, (3) Armstrong’s presence, and (4) Raban’s ankle
monitor. The court ruled that, under the totality of the circumstances, these
factors supported reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.
As for Long’s second prong, Raban’s access to weapons, the court was
silent. But at the end of the hearing, the court stated that it “did not find the
officers’ testimony” about intending to return Raban to the car to be “credible,
plausible or otherwise.” Id. at 176–77. The court found “it hard to imagine that
these officers, given what they knew, were going to release this man with a
8 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 9
citation.” Id. at 177. With that in mind, the court emphasized that releasing
Raban to the car was “not one of the factors that [it] found to support the
reasonable suspicion for the sweep.” Id.
Hearing this, Raban argued that the court must grant his suppression
motion. He reasoned that if officers were not going to release him to the car (as
the court had just found), the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he may
access a weapon under Long’s second prong. But the court stuck with its
original ruling.
Two days later, the court sua sponte invited the parties to move for
reconsideration. Raban argued that the court’s credibility finding about the
officers’ intent to return Raban to the car required suppression. Perhaps
acknowledging that, the government asked the court to reconsider its credibility
finding and rule in the government’s favor.
On reconsideration, the district court again denied Raban’s suppression
motion. United States v. Raban, No. 23-cr-00329, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1
(D. Colo. May 1, 2024). Addressing Long’s first prong, the court reiterated the
facts supporting its earlier finding of reasonable suspicion that Raban was
dangerous—his gang tattoos, the high-crime and rival-gang area, Armstrong’s
presence, and Raban’s ankle monitor. Id. at *1, 3.
Then the court addressed Long’s second prong. This time, the court ruled
that it was “reasonable to believe[] . . . that Mr. Raban may have been allowed
to leave the scene with a citation and return to his car.” Id. at *6. Retreating
9 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 10
from its earlier credibility finding, the court remarked that “what [it] did not
find credible” was “[t]he Government’s assertion . . . that Officer Danielson
knew of Mr. Raban’s criminal history, but that he nevertheless would have
returned an individual with Mr. Raban’s criminal history to his vehicle without
an arrest.” 2 Id. at *5. As for Raban’s access to weapons, the court noted that the
hearing testimony and bodycam footage established that Officer Danielson in
fact knew nothing about Raban’s criminal history before the protective sweep.
Id. The court also noted that right before the sweep, Officer Moldenhauer had
told Danielson that Raban was “good.” Id.
With all this in mind, the court held that when Officer Danielson
“conducted the protective sweep, it was objectively reasonable for [him] to
conclude that Mr. Raban could have been permitted to return to his vehicle
after receiving a traffic citation.” Id. (emphasis omitted). So the court again
held the protective sweep lawful. Id. at *6.
C. Guilty Plea, Sentencing & Appeal
After the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Raban entered
a conditional guilty plea. He reserved his right to appeal the suppression
decision. The court sentenced Raban to seventy-one months’ imprisonment.
Raban timely appealed, challenging the court’s holding on both Long
prongs.
2 The court never explained why Raban’s criminal history would have supported an arrest. See generally Raban, 2024 WL 1911223. 10 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 11
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the
totality of the circumstances. United States v. Canada, 76 F.4th 1304, 1307
(10th Cir. 2023). “[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, accept the district court’s finding of fact unless clearly erroneous,
and review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).
Raban does not challenge the court’s factual determinations, only its
legal conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the protective
sweep. We review that question de novo. See id.
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection extends to cars. Canada, 76
F.4th at 1307 (“A vehicle is an effect protected by the Fourth Amendment.”
(citation modified)).
Typically, a search or seizure is reasonable only if “supported by a
warrant based on probable cause.” United States v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234,
1240 (10th Cir. 2021). But protective sweeps do not require warrants. See Long,
463 U.S. at 1051. Protective sweeps “exist for officer safety; we do not require
officers to take unnecessary risks.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1309. Rather, we allow
officers to “take steps reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety.” Id.
11 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 12
at 1307 (citation modified). Even so, we limit these warrantless protective
searches to areas where a suspect may keep or hide weapons. See Long, 463
U.S. at 1049.
To conduct a protective sweep under Long, “an officer must have
reasonable suspicion that a suspect” (1) “poses a danger” and (2) “may gain
immediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307. “Reasonable
suspicion demands less than probable cause,” but “requires the officer to act on
something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Id.
(citation modified). The government bears the burden of proving reasonable
suspicion. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 2022).
Below, we examine whether the government satisfied that burden for
each Long prong.
I. Presently Dangerous
To satisfy Long’s first prong, “the government must show that a
reasonable officer would believe the suspect to be presently dangerous.” United
States v. McGregor, 158 F.4th 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
In reviewing the district court’s holding on that point, “we first individually
analyze the probative value of each of the relevant factors that the district court
relied upon.” Id. at 1091. Then viewing those factors “collectively and in the
context of the totality of the circumstances, we determine whether those factors
support a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1091–92.
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Raban argues that Officer Danielson had only a “hunch” that Raban was
armed and dangerous. But under the totality of the circumstances, several
factors support that Officer Danielson reasonably suspected that Raban was
presently dangerous.
A. Individual Factors
The district court’s dangerousness analysis relied on four factors:
(1) Raban’s gang affiliation, (2) the high-crime and rival-gang neighborhood,
(3) Armstrong’s presence, and (4) Raban’s ankle monitor. See Raban, 2024 WL
1911223, at *1, 3. We discuss each factor in turn.
1. Gang Membership
To begin, the court found that Raban’s gang membership supported
reasonable suspicion of his dangerousness. Id. We agree.
We recently held that “[g]ang affiliation can support a finding of
reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous.” McGregor,
158 F.4th at 1097–98; see also United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 907–
08 (10th Cir. 2018) (determining that defendant’s status as a “known gang
member” supported reasonable suspicion). “Specifically, the presence of gang
affiliation can allow officers to reasonably determine that an individual is
armed.” McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1098.
But for gang membership to support reasonable suspicion, “officers must
have some objective basis for believing that the suspect is contemporaneously
or recently associated with a criminal gang.” Id. What’s more, “a defendant’s
13 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 14
gang affiliation must be accompanied by other factors to ultimately support a
reasonable suspicion finding.” Id. at 1099.
Here, officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that
Raban was presently affiliated with a gang. Namely, Raban’s face tattoos
signaled his association with the Tre Tre Crips gang. Highlighting the officers’
training and experience with “the significance of such tattoos” and gang
affiliations, the district court concluded that Raban’s tattoos “represent[ed]
some level of commitment” to the Crips. R. vol. I at 174. Indeed, because both
Officers Danielson and Moldenhauer were gang-unit officers, we too “credit
their expertise and ability to discern” Raban’s status as a Crips member. See
McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1100.
Another factor supporting Raban’s current Crips affiliation was
Armstrong and his actions at the stop. Armstrong—who arrived just seconds
after officers stopped Raban—parked across the street and stared at the
officers. Then he called Raban’s phone. Raban also told officers that Armstrong
was his girlfriend’s brother.
Both officers knew Armstrong as “a violent gang member in the
community that’s been active for a long time.” R. vol. I at 127; see also id. at
80. And both identified him as another Crips member. Thus, based on Raban’s
tattoos and his connection to Armstrong, the officers had “some objective basis
for believing” that Raban was “contemporaneously or recently associated with a
criminal gang.” McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1098.
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And so, Raban’s gang affiliation supported reasonable suspicion that he
was dangerous.
2. Characteristics of the Area
The district court also concluded that the neighborhood’s characteristics
supported reasonable suspicion. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. The
defendant’s “presence in a high-crime area . . . may be a relevant contextual
consideration” for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d
1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation modified); see also Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that “officers are not required to ignore the
relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances
are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation”).
Raban is correct that location alone cannot provide reasonable suspicion
that a defendant is dangerous. See United States v. Huerta, --- F.4th ----, 2025
WL 3018105, at *7 (10th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). Even so, the area’s characteristics
remain relevant to the reasonable-suspicion analysis. E.g., United States v.
Daniels, 101 F.4th 770, 781–82 (10th Cir. 2024). In fact, location impacts that
analysis here in two ways.
First, the officers testified that they stopped Raban in a high-crime area
that had experienced an uptick in violence, including multiple shootings. And
Officer Danielson testified based on his experience that the people he
encountered in this area were more likely to be armed and confrontational. So
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Raban’s “presence in a high-crime area” supported reasonable suspicion that he
was presently dangerous. See Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1208.
Second, and more importantly, officers stopped Raban in a rival gang’s
territory. Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. The officers explained that gang
members were often armed, that the area belonged to the Bloods gang, and that
the Bloods were the Crips’ rivals. Officer Danielson also testified that Raban’s
presence in a rival gang’s territory increased his suspicion that Raban was
armed. Officer Moldenhauer, too, testified that the area experienced violent
gang activity “specifically” related to “Bloods and Crips relations.” R. vol. I at
122–23, 131. So the stop’s location provided significant “relevant context[]”
for the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1208 (citation
omitted).
Raban’s contrary argument misses the mark. He argues that driving
“through a ‘high crime’ area in the heart of a city, or travers[ing] through an
enormous area ostensibly controlled by a rival gang, does not mean the person
is likely a violent criminal who would use a weapon against a police officer.”
Reply Br. at 5. We agree. But again, though “insufficient alone,” location
“c[an] be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.” Daniels, 101
F.4th at 781. And here, Raban’s presence in a high-crime area—and rival
gang’s territory—supported reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous.
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3. Armstrong’s Presence
Next, we consider whether Armstrong’s presence supported reasonable
suspicion that Raban was dangerous. We agree with the district court that it
did. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1.
Others’ behavior during a stop can add to the reasonable-suspicion
analysis. See, e.g., Daniels, 101 F.4th at 781, 783 (considering actions of
nearby SUV in totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); United States v.
McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “suspicious
behavior” by defendant “along with that of his compatriot” “only adds to the
‘reasonable suspicion’ calculus”); United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1290
(10th Cir. 2013) (noting that defendant’s and his companion’s suspicious
behavior “would have heightened a reasonable officer’s suspicion of criminal
activity”). In fact, in Terry v. Ohio—the foundational reasonable-suspicion
case—the Supreme Court considered both the defendant’s and his companions’
behavior in the reasonable-suspicion analysis. 392 U.S. 1, 22–23, 27–28 (1968).
Here, too, Armstrong’s presence and conduct during the stop supported
reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Take Armstrong’s conduct.
Armstrong drove past the officers just seconds after they stopped Raban. Then
17 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 18
Armstrong parked right across the street, called Raban, and watched the
encounter. 3
As discussed, the officers testified that they knew Armstrong was “a
well-known Crip gang member” with “a violent criminal history,” and that he
had been “armed in the past.” R. vol. I at 80, 127. The officers’ bodycam
footage shows that his presence put the officers on edge. In fact, the officers
even called for backup because of Armstrong’s presence.
Officer Danielson also testified that the two Crips gang members
traveling close together through rival-gang territory “set off red flags” that
Raban was armed or that “there were multiple firearms that could potentially be
used against” the officers. Id. at 87. Officer Moldenhauer, too, testified that
Armstrong’s presence heightened his safety concerns.
Courts “must permit officers to make commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380–81
(2020) (citation modified). So we conclude that the on-scene presence of
3 Raban suggests that Armstrong was simply “freely observ[ing] the police” during the stop. Reply Br. at 6. But we credit officers’ “ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” United States v. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1269 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). And here, officers used their common sense and experience to conclude that Armstrong’s conduct—arriving seconds after Raban was stopped, turning around, parking across the street, calling Raban, and staring at the officers—was not “so innocent . . . as to be innocuous.” See United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 18 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 19
another Crips gang member with a violent criminal history, and a personal
relationship to the defendant, supported reasonable suspicion.
Raban argues that Officer Danielson could not “imput[e]” his “general
suspicion” of Armstrong to Raban. Op. Br. at 16. But Officer Danielson did no
such thing. Instead, Armstrong’s presence heightened officers’ concerns about
Raban. In fact, Danielson stayed with Raban during the records check partly
because Armstrong’s presence heightened his concerns that Raban might
“attempt to retrieve [a] type of weapon.” R. vol. I at 78–79.
The district court also credited the officers’ testimony about Armstrong,
concluding that Armstrong’s presence “raise[d] more credibility with regard to
[the officers’] concern about Mr. Raban’s gang affiliation and his propensity
for having weapons and the reasonableness of the belief that he may be armed
and dangerous.” Id. at 175–76. And we must “keep in mind that it is the
province of the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses at the
suppression hearing and to determine the weight to be given to the evidence
presented, and we must give such determinations due deference.” United States
v. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). So we
accept the district court’s determination that Officer Danielson’s reasonable
suspicion for the protective sweep centered on Raban—not Armstrong. See id.
All in all, we conclude that Armstrong’s presence and conduct supported
reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.
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4. Ankle Monitor
Lastly, the district court concluded that Raban’s ankle monitor supported
reasonable suspicion. Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. Raban argues that
having an ankle monitor carries little weight here; in his view, it shows nothing
more than “some sort of legal monitoring.” Op. Br. at 16.
We agree that the ankle monitor adds little to the reasonable-suspicion
analysis in this case. “Standing alone, a criminal record . . . is not sufficient to
create reasonable suspicion of anything.” Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906 (citation
modified). And though criminal history can be “critically relevant” to
reasonable suspicion, “the circumstances of the stop itself [must] interact with
an individual’s criminal history to trigger an officer’s suspicions.” Id. at 907.
Here, Officer Danielson knew only that Raban had an ankle monitor. He
never asked why or what for. In fact, he knew nothing about Raban’s criminal
history. What’s more, Officer Danielson never testified that the ankle monitor
increased his suspicions that Raban was dangerous.
All told, because Danielson did not know why Raban had an ankle
monitor—and because he never asserted that it impacted his safety concerns—
the ankle monitor does not weigh heavily in our analysis.
B. Totality of the Circumstances
Raban argues that none of the factors discussed above can independently
support reasonable suspicion. That’s true. Even so, we must consider “the
totality of the circumstances,” or in other words, the “whole picture,” when
20 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 21
considering reasonableness. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
And here, the “whole picture” supported reasonable suspicion that Raban was
dangerous.
Consider McGregor. There, we held that the defendant’s gang affiliation,
furtive movements, and prior robbery conviction, when “viewed collectively
and in the light of the totality of the circumstances, provided a solid foundation
for the district court’s ruling.” 158 F.4th at 1105.
Though different factors are at play here, we reach the same conclusion.
Officers stopped Raban in a high-crime area known for gang violence. Raban
had face tattoos associating him with the Crips. Officer Danielson testified that
“gang members are often armed,” R. vol. I at 72, tying Raban’s gang
membership to the likelihood “that weapons may be found” in the car, see
Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1212; see also Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906 (noting in the
reasonable-suspicion analysis that officers “knew” gang membership “often
suggested the presence of guns”). And right after officers stopped Raban, a
well-known Crips member with a violent history—and a personal connection to
Raban—parked nearby, called Raban, and stared at the officers. This, too,
heightened Officer Danielson’s concerns that Raban was dangerous. Not to
mention that officers stopped Raban in a rival gang’s territory.
These factors taken together gave the officers “more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch” that Raban was “presently dangerous.”
Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307 (citation omitted).
21 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 22
Raban argues that other facts cut against reasonable suspicion. For one,
Raban was calm and cooperative throughout the stop. He also compares the
facts here to Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906–07, noting several factors from that
case that are missing here. Along those lines, he emphasizes that it was not
nighttime, he did not drive dangerously, he was not in a remote area, he did not
move furtively, and officers did not suspect him of another crime.
But these facts do not sway our reasonable-suspicion analysis in Raban’s
favor. When the McGregor defendant raised similar arguments, we rejected
them. See 158 F.4th at 1105. We explained that “we have previously found
reasonable suspicion even when a stop occurred during daytime hours in a
residential neighborhood” and that “a defendant’s compliance and cooperation
with officers do not undercut the probative weight of other factors.” Id. at
1105–06. Similarly, we have found reasonable suspicion without relying on
furtive movements, see Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1212–1214, and when officers
never suspected the defendant of another crime, see McGregor, 158 F.4th at
1087–88.
As the McGregor court put it, “these additional factors . . . may weigh in
[Raban’s] favor on the question of whether there was a reasonable basis to
suspect that he was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 1106. Even so, “they do not
alter our ultimate conclusion that the officers had such reasonable suspicion—
when the three factors that the district court relied on are viewed collectively
and in the context of the totality of the circumstances.” Id.; see also Canada,
22 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 23
76 F.4th at 1309 (concluding that mitigating factors did not dissipate
reasonable suspicion).
Viewed collectively—and in the light most favorable to the
government—the area’s characteristics, Raban’s gang affiliation, and
Armstrong’s presence provided reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.
II. Immediate Access to Weapons
Under Long’s second prong, “an officer must have reasonable suspicion
that a suspect . . . may gain immediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th
at 1307. This means officers must have “reason to believe that weapons may be
found” in the car and that the suspect may access those weapons. Id. at 1307–
08. This can happen in three scenarios:
(1) the suspect could break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile; (2) the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside; and (3) the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the investigation is over, and again, may have access to weapons.
Id. at 1309 (citation modified).
Here, the officers “had reason to believe that weapons may be found” in
the car based on the same factors supporting Raban’s dangerousness. See id. at
1307–08. As for Raban’s weapons access, the district court ruled that the
second scenario applied because Officer Danielson reasonably believed the
officers would return Raban to the car with a citation. Raban, 2024 WL
1911223, at *3, 5.
23 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 24
We think the district court got it right. The second scenario applies if
“officers—at the time of the search—had reason to believe they would not
detain a suspect further.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1310. And here, the court
ultimately ruled that Officer Danielson credibly testified that the officers
intended to release Raban with a citation.
The district court knew that Raban lacked a driver’s license. Yet Officer
Danielson explained that, even without a license, the officers would not
necessarily prevent Raban from getting in the car; instead, they might advise
him not to drive. Crediting this testimony, the court reasoned that the officers
could have reasonably expected to release Raban to the car to grab his
belongings or wait for a ride. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *5. We give
“due deference” to this finding. Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1263 (citation omitted).
But Raban argues that it was unreasonable for Officer Danielson to
believe that officers would release him to the car. In support, he emphasizes
that Raban “lacked a driver’s license, that there was an open container of beer
in the car, and there were six officers on the scene.” 4 Op. Br. at 9.
4 Raban suggests—with no supporting argument—that he also lacked “demonstrated ownership or authority” over the car. Op. Br. at 22. Raban waived this issue by raising it for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 988 (10th Cir. 2011). Also, if he lacked authority over the car, he might lack Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. See United States v. Guzman, 149 F.4th 1132, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2025). So we find this argument unpersuasive. 24 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 25
Yet these facts do not establish that the officers planned to “detain
[Raban] further.” See Canada, 76 F.4th at 1310. For one, driving without a
license is not a criminal offense in Colorado. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-2-
101(1), (10), 42-2-138(1). Nor is driving with an open container. See id. § 42-
4-1305(2)(c). Rather, these violations are “civil matter[s].” Id. § 42-4-1701(1).
So the officers could not arrest Raban for those violations. See People v.
Barrientos, 956 P.2d 634, 636 (Colo. App. 1997). And Raban points to no
evidence or law suggesting otherwise.
Instead, Raban contrasts the facts here with those in Canada, 76 F.4th
1304. He argues that we “determined [in Canada] that officers had reason to
believe they would not arrest the defendant when, at the time of the protective
sweep, they had not yet learned he had a revoked license.” Op. Br. at 23. Raban
suggests that if the Canada officers had known about the defendant’s revoked
license beforehand, then the officers would have lacked reasonable suspicion
for the search.
True enough, unlike the officers in Canada, Officer Danielson knew that
Raban lacked a license before he searched the car. But importantly, the offenses
here and in Canada carry different weight. The Canada defendant “was a
prohibited possessor with a revoked license,” 76 F.4th at 1310—a criminal
offense under Kansas law, see Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-235(e), 21-6602. Not so
here. Before the protective sweep, Raban had allegedly committed only civil
traffic offenses. Thus, “[u]ntil the gun was found, there was no reason to doubt
25 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 26
that [Raban] (though he did not have a driver’s license) would soon be allowed
to return to the car.” United States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807, 814 (5th Cir.
2022).
Consider the facts in Rodriguez. There, officers stopped a car after
observing a traffic violation. Id. at 809–10. Officers ultimately performed a
protective sweep. Id. at 810. The defendant—a passenger—had a gun in his
jacket, which he had left on the backseat. Id.
The defendant challenged the protective sweep, arguing that it was
unreasonable to believe that officers would return him to the car. Id. at 814.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that even though he did not own the car or
have a license, the defendant “could easily have returned to the car” as a
passenger. Id. The court highlighted that the defendant “had only been
detained, not arrested,” when the search occurred. Id.
Here, too, when Officer Danielson searched the car, Raban “had only
been detained, not arrested.” See id. And Danielson had no reason to think the
officers would arrest Raban. In fact, when Officer Moldenhauer asked
Danielson to remove Raban from the car, Moldenhauer said: “I think he’s
good.” R. vol. I at 147. So “at the time of the search,” Officer Danielson “had
reason to believe they would not detain [Raban] further.” See Canada, 76 F.4th
at 1310.
Raban argues that even if officers returned him to the car, six officers
were present. So in his view, “there is no reason to believe that the officers on
26 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 27
scene . . . could not have effectuated such a return in a safe and controlled
manner.” Op. Br. at 23.
Though the number of on-scene officers might matter for gun access in
the breaking-free scenario, 5 we are unsure how that might impact Raban’s gun
access if officers released him to the car with a citation. Cf. McGregor, 158
F.4th at 1106 (“[A]n increased number of police officers does not necessarily
undermine officers’ reasonable belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous.”).
Plus, Raban wasn’t alone. Armstrong waited nearby—possibly there to help
Raban if he chose to resist the officers. As a result, the number of on-scene
officers did not dispel Officer Danielson’s reasonable suspicion that Raban may
access a weapon once returned to the car.
We conclude that when he conducted the protective sweep, Officer
Danielson reasonably believed officers may release Raban to the car.
* * *
In the end, officers reasonably suspected both that Raban was dangerous
and that he may access a weapon upon release to the car. Because “the Fourth
Amendment permits protective sweeps under such conditions,” Canada, 76
F.4th at 1310, the district court did not err in denying Raban’s motion to
suppress.
5 Though the government argues that the breaking-free scenario also justified the search, we need not address this argument because we find the sweep lawful under a different scenario. 27 Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 28
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s suppression decision and
Raban’s conviction.