United States v. Pinto-Thomaz

357 F. Supp. 3d 324
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedFebruary 19, 2019
DocketS2 18-CR-579 (JSR)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 357 F. Supp. 3d 324 (United States v. Pinto-Thomaz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 357 F. Supp. 3d 324 (S.D. Ill. 2019).

Opinion

JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.

By Opinion and Order dated December 6, 2018 ("Op."), the Court resolved a number of pretrial motions filed by defendants Sebastian Pinto-Thomaz and Jeremy Millul; but the Court reserved judgment, pending a suppression hearing, as to (1) Mr. Pinto-Thomaz's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant for his Apple iCloud account and (2) Mr. Millul's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant for his iPhone. See Dkt. 75. Having now held a suppression hearing and received additional post-hearing briefing from the Government and both defendants, the Court, for the reasons stated below, denies both motions to suppress.

Familiarity with the underlying facts and all prior proceedings is herein assumed.

I. Pinto-Thomaz Motion to Suppress

Pinto-Thomaz initially moved to suppress all evidence seized by the Government pursuant to a search warrant for his Apple iCloud storage account (hereinafter, the "iCloud" and "iCloud warrant") on the grounds that the warrant was invalid as issued, or, in the alternative, that the executing agents failed to abide by the constraints of the warrant. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Sebastian Pinto-Thomaz's Motion to Suppress Items Seized Pursuant to the Apple iCloud Search Warrant, Dkt. 39 ("PT Mem. 1"); Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Sebastian Pinto-Thomaz's Motion to Suppress Items Seized Pursuant to the Apple iCloud *329Search Warrant, Dkt. 72 ("PT Rep. 1"). In its previous opinion, the Court found Pinto-Thomaz's argument that the warrant was invalid as issued without merit, but reserved judgment, pending a suppression hearing, as to whether the executing agent's seizure of certain items beyond the scope of the warrant constituted ground for suppression of all items seized pursuant to the warrant. Op. at 33-35. Following the suppression hearing, Pinto-Thomaz filed additional briefing in support of his argument for blanket suppression of all items seized. See Post-Hearing Memorandum in Further Support of Sebastian Pinto-Thomaz's Motion to Suppress Items Seized Pursuant to the Apple iCloud Search Warrant, Dkt. 92 ("PT Mem. 2"), Dkt. 92; Defendant Sebastian Pinto-Thomaz's Post-Hearing Reply Brief ("PT Rep. 2"), Dkt. 97.

A. Factual Findings

Based on the Court's assessment of the testimony presented at the suppression hearing - including assessments of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor - the Court makes the following findings of fact:

Magistrate Judge Peck issued a search warrant for Pinto-Thomaz's iCloud account in January 2018. See Govt. Ex. 5 (iCloud Warrant). The warrant as issued contained an apparent internal inconsistency in its text. Section II of the warrant, which is titled "Information to be Produced by the Provider," directs the Provider to produce message content for only the limited "period between March 8, 2016 and March 20, 2016." Id. § II(a). Section II places no time limitations on any other categories of information to be produced (for instance, "other stored electronic information" is defined to include "[a]ll records and other information stored by the Subject Account's user"). Id. § II, § II(d). Section III of the warrant, entitled "Review of Information by the Government," places the March 8, 2016 to March 20, 2016 time limitation only on (1) evidence related to the iCloud user's geographic location and (2) evidence related to in-person meetings involving the defendants. Id. § III (e), (j). The other categories of evidence listed in Section III are defined by subject matter without any time limitation whatsoever. Id. § III. Some of the categories without a time limitation would seem to naturally encompass message content (ex. "evidence of communications regarding Sherwin-Williams and Valspar"). Id. § III (a).

Special Agent Jordan Anderson of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), who submitted an affidavit in support of the warrant application, reviewed the warrant before it was signed but did not notice that Section II contained a date restriction as to message content. Tr. 107:19-108:1; 205:12-206:12. Anderson served the warrant on Apple but did not have any discussions with Apple concerning the warrant's terms or Apple's production obligations. Id. 152:22-153:7. In response to the iCloud Warrant, Apple produced messages outside of the scope of the time limit for message content contained in Section II. Id. at 152:12-16. Upon receipt of production from Apple, Anderson turned the material over to a different unit in the FBI to be uploaded into a system that allowed for law enforcement review. Id. 107:5-18.

Anderson subsequently reviewed the furnished materials. He had no prior experience conducting such a review, although he had received training. Id. 132:12-19. In completing his review of Apple's production, Anderson referred to Section III of the warrant ("Review of Information by the Government"), but not Section II, which he viewed as relevant primarily to the provider and not to his review because of its title, "Information to be Produced by the Provider." Id. 205:10-206:16, 148:6-13. Accordingly, Anderson seized some messages *330that were outside the time limitation of Section II, but consistent with the limits of Section III.

Anderson initially completed his review, marking items as responsive pursuant to the constraints of Section III, which he recognized as "dictat[ing]" what could be seized. Id. 108:2-20; 110:2-10. Then, following a conversation with the AUSA handling the case, Anderson came under the false impression that he had misunderstood the terms of Section III as more limited than they really were. Anderson understood from this conversation that anything between March 1, 2016 and June 30, 2016 would be "pertinent," which he understood to mean responsive to the warrant. Id. 110:15-111:19. Anderson reconciled his understanding of this conversation with the terms of the warrant upon re-review of the warrant by concluding that, while he had (correctly) viewed the categories of information to be seized in Section III as an inclusive list, it was actually a non-inclusive list providing examples of items that could be seized but not limiting law enforcement just to those specific items. Id. 180:7-183:17 (discussing how the warrant uses the word "including" to signify both inclusive and non-inclusive lists). Accordingly, Anderson marked as responsive all items with a creation date between March 1, 2016 and June 30, 2016. Id. 110:19-111:6. Anderson then concluded his review. Id. 111:22-24. Throughout the review, Anderson kept a diary of his searches, including the final, erroneous search. Id. 112:11-15; Govt. Ex. 10 (Anderson notes).

Later, after receipt of Pinto-Thomaz's motion to suppress, Anderson conducted a "re-review" of the materials marked responsive based on his original understanding of the warrant, which he by then understood to be accurate. Tr. 114:3-115:14. The files found to be improperly marked as responsive were within the March 1, 2016 through June 30, 2016 timeframe, and their seizure had resulted from Anderson's inaccurate understanding after his conversation with the AUSA. Id. 115:8-17.

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Bluebook (online)
357 F. Supp. 3d 324, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-pinto-thomaz-ilsd-2019.