United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1356
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN PILSON,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Jon D. Levy, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Howard and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Emmett E. Robinson, with whom Robinson Law Firm LLC was on brief, for appellant. Linday B. Feinberg, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
June 1, 2026 THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of a
series of lamentable events -- dire ones that led to Stephen
Pilson's federal convictions for kidnapping his then-girlfriend,
Rilka Stefanov, and for an interstate violation of a protective
order. Those events began in October 2019 and continued through
December 2019 -- some three days after Pilson's release from a
Massachusetts jail following his conviction for similar offenses
in the Commonwealth (against the same victim).
Pilson now raises a few claims of error to the goings-on
below, one alleging insufficient evidence to sustain the 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1) federal kidnapping conviction, another asserting jury
instructional error premised on the district court's purported
misunderstanding of the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1)'s
protections as it applies to state issued domestic violence "stay-
away" orders. Pilson also challenges the district court's
application of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of
justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which is (as you will see below)
essentially a challenge aimed at the procedural reasonableness of
that enhancement. For the reasons we discuss below, we affirm.
I. Background
We provide most of the basic facts here in the light
most flattering to the verdict, "reserving additional details for
our discussion of the specific issues raised in this appeal." See,
- 2 - e.g., United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2014).
a. Pilson's Massachusetts Conviction
Pilson first crossed paths with Stefanov in 2018 at a
rehab center known as "Dexter House," where he was admitted
following injuries he suffered in a traffic accident. Stefanov
was the center's director of social services and, while there, she
and Pilson developed a close relationship. After spending nearly
three months at Dexter House, Pilson left and, shortly thereafter,
moved in with Stefanov.1
Pilson and Stefanov continued their relationship, but
the good times quickly turned bad. So bad, in fact, that on
October 15, 2019, a calamitous domestic violence episode ensued:
after kicking, striking, and forcing Stefanov into a vehicle,
Pilson held her captive while driving erratically from New
Hampshire into Massachusetts. Throughout the ordeal, Pilson
repeatedly yelled threats at her, such as: "You are going to die,
bitch. You deserve it. You put me in jail for three months, and
now you think you can leave me . . . You're going to die today."
Stefanov was in tears and pleading with him to stop the car, but
instead (that is, instead of adhering to her pleas), Pilson slowed
the vehicle to turn around, and she was "able to free herself from
1 Stefanov's employment with Dexter House ended in November of 2018.
- 3 - the vehicle [and thereafter, she] began yelling for help and for
someone to call the police." After screaming to her, "[y]ou'll be
sorry, bitch," Pilson fled the scene, but, after the police
gathered more details from Stefanov, he was apprehended and jailed.
Eventually, Pilson pleaded guilty in a Massachusetts
court to multiple charges, including kidnapping, witness
intimidation, assault and battery on a household member, and more.
At his consolidated change of plea and sentencing hearing, the
Commonwealth's prosecutor asked the judge to impose a "stay-away,
no contact" provision ("No Contact Order") against Pilson to
prevent him from interacting with Stefanov upon his release. While
acknowledging that Stefanov did not join in the Commonwealth's
request, the prosecutor pressed for the No Contact Order based on
the history of physical abuse between the couple and the extremely
volatile nature of their relationship.2 Troubled by the thought
of Pilson's incarceration, Stefanov chose to testify on his behalf,
proclaiming that she felt safe around him and that she did not
want him to be prohibited from communicating with her. Pilson's
attorney also asked the court to refrain from imposing the No
2 The Commonwealth's prosecutor also explained during its summation of the case that Stefanov "told police . . . there had been a past incident in January in Woburn, Massachusetts[,] where [Pilson] had been charged with strangulation threats and domestic [violence offenses]," resulting in a "three month[]" period in jail. Pilson did not protest those allegations.
- 4 - Contact Order, stating that "they clearly want to be together,"
and "[s]he clearly feels safe with him."
After accepting Pilson's guilty plea and meting out a
fifty-six-day, time-served prison sentence (along with two years'
probation), the court sided with the Commonwealth and granted the
request for the No Contact Order. In imposing that Order, the
court succinctly reasoned that it had "some concerns that
[Stefanov] really could have been killed that day [of the October
kidnapping]," and after considering the couple's history of
violence, that "[i]t doesn't sound like them being together is a
good thing."
b. The December Incident
And then, déjà vu.
On December 13, 2019, one day after Pilson's sentencing
hearing, and notwithstanding the No Contact Order, Stefanov went
to retrieve Pilson from jail. That night and through the next
morning, the two stayed holed up in a hotel room with no reported
incidents.
Fast forward two days later to December 15 where Pilson
and Stefanov could be found in Stefanov's car, parked near the
Beverly, Massachusetts beach with Pilson behind the wheel and
Stefanov voluntarily situated in the front passenger seat. After
some (unimportant) chit-chat, Pilson began to drive away. They
were headed to Canada, he said, and going for the ride of their
- 5 - lives. Moments later, he started belting down a large bottle of
Grey Goose Vodka and spewing a stream of threatening comments
towards Stefanov. Pilson told Stefanov that she wouldn't "need
[her seatbelt] because today is the day that [she] will be dying."
He said that he planned to bury her in Canada and that she wouldn't
be able to see her kids. Stefanov began to sob and pleaded with
Pilson, but her actions seemed only to fuel his anger. He called
her a "bitch" and told her she was "going to get what [she]
deserve[s]." Stefanov described Pilson's driving that day as
erratic and very fast, reaching speeds of 110 miles per hour. In
her telling, Pilson was in a trance-like state, appearing both
intoxicated and enraged. Desperate to flee, Stefanov made multiple
attempts to open her car door, aiming to signal other drivers for
help. At one point, Pilson demanded that Stefanov hand over her
phone, but she refused. Pilson then began striking her, bloodying
and bruising her face with his attacks, and her phone ended up on
the floor by her feet.
Amidst this scuffle, Pilson attempted to tie Stefanov's
wrists to the gear shift of the vehicle using her scarf.3 Whether
3 At trial, Stefanov testified that Pilson made the bondage attempt while simultaneously driving the vehicle. On cross-examination, Pilson's counsel attempted to conflate Stefanov's testimony with her prior statements in a police report where she said Pilson "reduced speed and stopped the car, trying to tie [her] with [her] yellow scarf." As we'll discuss later on, a jury later sorted out this and all other factual discrepancies.
- 6 - or not Pilson was successful is unclear, but his attack did not
halt Stefanov's attempts to flee. She tried to stop the car by
removing the key from the ignition, but she inadvertently broke
the fob, and the vehicle motored on.
Distracted by the fob's breakage and in an effort to
regain his bearings, Pilson eventually pulled into the breakdown
lane in Arundel, Maine, and stopped the car. At that point
Stefanov was finally able to escape. After jumping out, Stefanov
said she "started running the opposite direction [from] where the
car was going," and she didn't "know how long exactly [she] ran
for [her] life." A foot chase ensued, but it thankfully ended
when Stefanov encountered Maine state troopers. Pilson then
switched paths making a beeline "toward the forest" to facilitate
his own escape. He was eventually caught and (once again) arrested
for kidnapping and domestic offense charges.
II. Procedural History
A federal grand jury ultimately returned a two-count
superseding indictment against Pilson for his actions on December
15, 2019. One count for kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1) ("Section 1201"), and the second for committing an
interstate violation of a protective order, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) ("Section 2262"). Pilson opted to let a jury
decide his fate.
- 7 - During his trial, at the end of the government's
case-in-chief, Pilson moved for a judgment of acquittal on both
counts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). His challenge to the
kidnapping offense centered on two theories. The primary argument
focused on the first half of the statutory element, specifically
that the government failed to meet its evidentiary burden in
proving Pilson "knowingly transported [Stefanov] across state
lines."4 Alternatively, Pilson asserted that even if interstate
transportation had occurred, the government failed to prove he
held Stefanov against her will "during her transportation from
Massachusetts through to Maine."
On the second charge involving the protection order
violation, Pilson argued for acquittal based on the government's
purported failure to prove the No Contact Order (from his October
2019 Massachusetts case) was a "protection order" as a matter of
law because, at the time the Massachusetts court imposed it,
Stefanov stood in opposition to the Order; thus, it was not made
on behalf of "a person seeking protection" (as required by
Section 2262(a)(1)). The trial judge took the motion under
advisement.
4The government also had to prove "that there was [an] articulated benefit, reward, or otherwise that motivated his kidnapping of Ms. Stefanov," but that isn't at issue before us.
- 8 - Near the trial's end, the parties debated jury
instructions. With respect to the Section 2262(a)(1) violation,
the government asked the court to modify its proposed instruction
to say that, as a matter of law, the No Contact Order qualified as
a protection order. Pilson objected, arguing that the question of
whether a victim is seeking protection is a factual inquiry that
had to be determined by a jury. The court ultimately agreed with
the government and granted the request for the proposed
instruction, finding support in the language of the statute,
precedent, and the undisputed facts in evidence.
After Pilson rested his case and the court read the jury
instructions, Pilson renewed his motion for acquittal on the same
grounds as before. In due course, the jury returned a guilty
verdict on both counts. The court later issued a written denial
of Pilson's acquittal motion.
At Pilson's sentencing hearing, he objected to an
obstruction of justice enhancement that probation recommended
based on his telephone calls to Stefanov during his pretrial
incarceration (the substance of which was evidenced by a
transcript). Overruling the objection, the court found the
enhancement rightfully applied because the substance of the
conversation evinced that Pilson sought to influence Stefanov by
urging her to recant her accusations against him -- as the court
put it, "in other words, to lie" -- and Pilson "threatened that he
- 9 - might kill himself if she didn't." And the court noted, in
response to Pilson's effort to obstruct justice, Stefanov had in
fact sent a letter to the prosecutor explaining that the kidnapping
charges against Pilson should be dropped, falsely asserting the
situation was nothing more than an "interpersonal affair."
After all formal matters had been addressed, Pilson
exercised his elocution rights and thereafter, the court handed
down 156-months' imprisonment for Count I and a concurrent sentence
of fifty-months' imprisonment for Count II. This appeal followed,
and here we are.
III. Discussion
Before us, Pilson reprises substantially the same
arguments he presented below, and we'll resolve them in the same
order we've introduced them above.
a. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Pilson asserts that the government's evidence was
insufficient for a jury to conclude the voluntary car ride became
a kidnapping before or while he and Stefanov traveled from
Massachusetts into New Hampshire or Maine and therefore, the
district court should have granted his motion for acquittal. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). Read on to understand why we disagree.
The essence of Pilson's position is this: to be guilty
of interstate kidnapping under Section 1201(a)(1) there must
necessarily be a nexus between the seizure of an individual and
- 10 - interstate travel (which we'll explain below). Such a nexus did
not exist here, he says, because Stefanov's withdrawal of
consent -- and both Pilson and the government do agree the ride
began with her consent -- did not occur until the two had already
crossed the state line into Maine. Because Pilson preserved his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is de
novo. See United States v. Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 50 (1st
Cir. 2021).
We examine the record in the light most favorable to the
verdict. United States v. Clough, 978 F.3d 810, 816 (1st Cir.
2020). Reversal on a sufficiency challenge is permissible only
when, "after viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the
light most flattering to the prosecution, we conclude that no
rational jury could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt." United States v. Seary-Colón, 997 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Our review does not require
us to "view each piece of evidence separately, re-weigh the
evidence, or second-guess the jury's credibility calls." Id.
Instead, we give the government "the benefit of all sensible
inferences and credibility choices." United States v. Cruz-Ramos,
987 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2021). Pilson cannot be successful by
merely demonstrating that there exists a plausible interpretation
of the evidence supporting a "not guilty" verdict. See Seary-
Colón, 997 F.3d at 11-12. Moreover, the government is not required
- 11 - to dispel "every possible theory consistent with the defendant's
innocence" before the jury. Id. at 14 (citation omitted). And in
making our assessment, we do not step into the shoes of the jury
to "decide which witness to credit, for we must assume that the
jury credited those witnesses whose testimony lent support to the
verdict." United States v. Soler-Montalvo, 44 F.4th 1, 8 (1st
Cir. 2022) (citation modified). In the event our record review
causes us to conclude reversal is proper, acquittal will ensue and
preclude a second trial. See Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 50.
To be successful in its kidnapping prosecution, the
government had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Pilson:
(1) knowingly and willfully, (2) seized, abducted, or confined
Stefanov, (3) transported Stefanov in interstate commerce, and
(4) held Stefanov for ransom, reward, or otherwise. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a). Because the challenges here concern only the second
and third elements -- seizure and transport across state
lines -- we'll limit our discussion to the evidence relevant to
those two elements. As such, the crucial question we ask is
whether the evidence could allow a reasonable jury to conclude
Pilson and Stefanov's journey took a turn for the worse (literally
and figuratively) before or during their travel across state lines,
both of which could sustain his conviction for the Section 1201(a)
offense.
- 12 - First, though, given Pilson's arguments on appeal, it
will be helpful to say a bit more about those two elements of the
i. The basics of seizure and consent
The Supreme Court has long made clear that "the
involuntariness of seizure and detention . . . is the very essence
of the crime of kidnapping." Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S.
455, 464 (1946). As such, the seizure element of Section
1201(a)(1) is not met when the alleged victim is actually a
consenting participant in accompanying a purported kidnapper. See
United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Consent
is a defense to kidnapping . . . ."); see also United States v.
Coleman, 149 F.4th 1, 50 (1st Cir. 2025) (stating that it would be
"appropriate to include an explicit instruction [for the jury]
regarding consent in describing both the seizure and holding
elements" in Section 1201(a)(1)); United States v. Toledo, 985
F.2d 1462, 1468 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a victim's
consent to accompany the defendant in interstate travel is a
defense to Section 1201(a)(1)).
But there are temporal and geographic aspects of an
alleged victim's voluntariness that remain important in
determining whether they were kidnapped for the purposes of Section
1201(a)(1).
- 13 - A kidnapping victim is not prohibited from giving their
consent to a kidnapper after the incident has begun (thereby ending
the kidnapping) but before crossing state lines. Those two
elements of Section 1201(a) (seizure and transport across state
lines) must coincide with one another for a defendant's actions to
fall within the scope of the offense. United States v. Krivoi, 80
F.4th 142, 149 (2d Cir. 2023) ("[T]here must be an interstate or
foreign commerce nexus[.]"); Toledo, 985 F.2d at 1467 ("If the
victim is no longer being held against her will, the kidnapping
has ended, and the interstate travel cannot serve to further the
commission of the crime."); United States v. Hernandez-Montoya, 39
F. App'x 38, 39 (4th Cir. 2002) ("The interstate travel requirement
merely necessitates that the victim was held against her will while
crossing state lines."); United States v. Wright, 340 F.3d 724,
731 (8th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he individual charged [with violating
Section 1201(a)] may raise a valid defense that the victim
consented to accompany him in interstate travel.").
Contrariwise, a kidnapping victim is not prohibited from
withdrawing their consent to travel with a person after embarking
on the journey, and such a withdrawal can be sufficient to satisfy
the seizure element of Section 1201(a)(1). If consent is withdrawn
prior to crossing state lines, and they do, in fact, cross state
lines, the interstate travel element is met. As our sister circuit
explained, "[t]he fact that one originally accompanies another
- 14 - without being forced does not prevent the occurrence of a
kidnapping where force is later used to seize or confine the
victim." United States v. Redmond, 803 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir.
1986). Put simply, a traveler's consent is not set in stone;
rather, they reserve autonomy to decide they want out. And the
travel companion must accept that traveler's withdrawal of consent
or potentially face the consequences for violating Section
With these basics in mind, we move on to discuss the
merits of Pilson's challenges.
ii. Viewing the record
Pilson does not seriously contest that at some point
after Stefanov voluntarily entered her own vehicle with Pilson
sitting in the driver's seat, he held her against her will.
Rather, his allegation of reversible error is premised on the
notion that Stefanov was never specifically asked during any of
her testimony to provide the exact point at which she became a
non-consenting victim. In Pilson's view of the evidence, it was
only when Stefanov testified that "Pilson backhanded her and
attempted . . . to tie her wrist to the car's gear shift" did she
become a person held against her will, and that turning point
didn't occur until the two were already "deep into Maine . . . [,]
at or very near the end of the trip" -- which concluded in Arundel,
a town located "roughly 30 miles into Maine."
- 15 - Not so, says the government, and we need look no further
than its Exhibit 305, Stefanov's Witness Statement, to find proof
of Stefanov's involuntary seizure and transportation across state
lines.5 We agree. At trial, this Witness Statement -- that
5 On this piece of evidence, Pilson makes two arguments as to why we should disregard it in our review of the record. We disagree on both fronts. First, Pilson stated in his supplemental brief that the government is now relying on Exhibit 305 to present what he deems a novel theory of the case. His position is fallacious. Contrary to his belief, the government's reliance on Exhibit 305 to prove the kidnapping began before Pilson and Stefanov crossed state lines is not a novel theory of the case; it is the theory the government presented at trial. See United States v. Matta-Quiñones, 140 F.4th 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2025) ("[W]e treat arguments as preserved only if litigants 'said enough to alert the [district] court to the theory now being propounded' on appeal."). Pertinent to this conclusion is the government's summary of the case in its closing argument, which began with the following direct quotes from Exhibit 305: "We are going to go for the ride of your life, which is going to end tonight, your life and mine. The defendant [(Pilson)] said these words to Rilka Stefanov as they drove up the interstate from Massachusetts, through New Hampshire, into Maine." This narrative is consistent with the theory of the case presented by the government. Second, Pilson contends that although the government leaned heavily on Exhibit 305 during oral argument to show it introduced sufficient evidence at trial of the transportation-across-state-lines element, it didn't rely on Exhibit 305 in its opening briefing to us to argue the same. But Pilson cites to no case law, and we are aware of none, suggesting a prosecutor is obligated to harp on every single piece of properly admitted trial evidence in its briefing to support its arguments. The trial court admitted Exhibit 305 in full, the jury was allowed to consider it in reaching its verdict, and that evidence is present in the trial record for our review and evaluation. Additionally, Pilson can hardly claim surprise and prejudice here. There are multiple portions of the government's brief to this court that draw attention to the statements inscribed in Exhibit 305, so that even if Pilson's waiver argument had some bite (which it doesn't), the government's effort here is sufficient to preserve the issue for our consideration. See, e.g., United States v. Ilarraza, 963 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2020) (stating that "a party
- 16 - Stefanov completed in her own handwriting on December 15, 2019,
the day of the incident, and signed under pains and penalty of
criminal prosecution -- was admitted without objection as a full
exhibit. In her statement, Stefanov said (as we previously
highlighted) that after Pilson "started driving my car" away from
Beverly Beach in Massachusetts where they had been parked, he said
"we're going for a ride to Canada." He then began "drinking from
a large bottle" and said (to Stefanov), "we are gonna go for the
ride of your life which is gonna end tonight, your life and my
life." She explained that Pilson, who "[spoke] in [a] pressured
way and . . . was like in some kind of his own world or tran[ce],"
said (after making his initial threat) "people like [her] need to
die," and he "sped up to like 110 miles per hour while driving to
New Hampshire and then Maine." While Stefanov's Statement doesn't
pin down the exact moment Pilson communicated his threats to her,
a reasonable jury could easily and fairly infer from her
chronological recounting of what happened that day that Stefanov
transitioned from being a willing passenger in Massachusetts to an
unwilling captive, and did so during or prior to when they crossed
one, if not two, state lines into Maine.
must do more than merely 'mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.'" (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990))).
- 17 - If that were not enough (though it is), Stefanov's
testimony during the government's direct examination further
corroborates her Exhibit 305 statement and provides more support
for the jury's conclusion. For instance, Stefanov explained that
during her ordeal, Pilson was driving erratically, and that is
when she started trying to open the door to "signal people that
[were] driving around [them]." Pilson had then "knocked the phone
out of [her] hand," "tied [her] hands [with her scarf] while
[(simultaneously)] driving," and "hit [her] several times in the
face." When questioned about the number of times she tried to
signal other motorists, Stefanov specifically stated that she
attempted to open the door to signal other drivers "[s]everal
times" throughout their travel from Massachusetts to Maine. This
testimony, in conjunction with Exhibit 305, would allow a
reasonable jury to infer that the kidnapping began prior to the
two crossing into Maine.
Resisting this conclusion, Pilson points to several
pieces of evidence he contends are vague at best or uncredible at
worst, which he says the government leans on heavily to prove the
kidnapping satisfied the interstate travel element. Though we
have considered all of Pilson's references to so-called
problematic evidence, we will provide a couple of examples
representative of the batch to explain why this argument falls
flat.
- 18 - Pilson says the government's arguments place improper
reliance on emergency (9-1-1) calls by concerned citizens in Maine,
which he says provide no support for a finding that the kidnapping
began before the two entered Maine. Pilson makes a similar attack
on portions of Stefanov's testimony wherein she explained that
Pilson told her she didn't need a seatbelt because she would die
that day and that he was going to take her to Canada where she'd
be buried. He contends that, like the 9-1-1 calls, Stefanov's
testimony does not prove that the kidnapping began before the two
crossed into Maine.
The problem with Pilson's argument is that even if his
view of these particular facts could be deemed plausible, he is
singling out individual pieces of evidence while ignoring the
entirety of the government's evidentiary narrative as we've
already described it. And our role here is to "determine whether
th[e] sum [of evidence] is enough for any reasonable jury to find
all the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
even if the individual pieces of evidence are not enough when
viewed in isolation." Seary-Colón, 997 F.3d at 12 (citation
modified). Pilson therefore fails in his attempt to limit the
government's position to individual pieces of evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Shaw, 670 F.3d 360, 362 (1st Cir. 2012)
("Individual pieces of evidence viewed in isolation may be
- 19 - insufficient in themselves to prove a point, but in cumulation may
indeed meet the mark.").
Additionally, Pilson's multiple attempts to challenge
the jury's ability to credit Stefanov's testimony as supportive of
a conclusion that the government met its interstate travel
evidentiary burden, solely because he finds it to be inconsistent
with some pieces of the evidentiary record, gets him nowhere.6 To
reiterate, we are not here to "decide which witness to credit,"
Soler-Montalvo, 44 F.4th at 8, or to "second-guess the jury's
credibility calls," United States v. Acosta-Colón, 741 F.3d 179,
191 (1st Cir. 2013). Moreover, the existence of conflicting pieces
of evidence or testimonies by different witnesses does not require
the jury to conclude in favor of the defendant. See United States
6Describing what he views as inconsistent evidence, Pilson asserts in his brief that Stefanov testified that he tied her wrists while driving at a high-speed, but she previously stated to the police that Pilson attempted to tie her wrist after pulling over in Maine. Pilson similarly points out that Stefanov testified that she broke the key off in the ignition while Pilson was driving and that is what forced him to pull over, but she stated to police that she didn't break the key off until after Pilson pulled the vehicle over. He then draws attention to Stefanov's testimony that "Pilson backhanded her and attempted -- deep into Maine -- to tie her wrist to the car's gear shift." He asserts that these events occurred "at or very near the end of the trip, which concluded roughly 30 miles into Maine." Pilson argues that because the incident concluded in Maine, and that Stefanov gave conflicting explanations of when the bondage attempt occurred, the jury could not reasonably rely on her statements to conclude the kidnapping began before crossing into Maine. As we are about to explain above the line, it is the jury that is tasked with resolving potential evidentiary conflicts. See United States v. Acosta-Colón, 741 F.3d 179, 191 (1st Cir. 2013).
- 20 - v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) ("The jury assesses
witness credibility." (quoting United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez,
617 F.3d 581, 596 n.6 (1st Cir. 2010))). The same rule applies
when a jury hears one witness's statements that may be in
contradiction to what they previously said but renders a verdict
in favor of that witness's in-court narrative.7 Id. The jury is
charged with determining which narrative to believe, and our only
job is to assure that there was adequate record support for its
findings. Because here, we conclude that the evidence
satisfactorily gets the job done, we will not override the jury's
determination that Stefanov retracted her consent prior to
crossing into New Hampshire or Maine, thereby establishing the
nexus between the kidnapping and travel across state lines.
Pilson's conviction for the Section 1201(a)(1) offense stands.
b. Jury Instruction
Persistent in his efforts to overturn his conviction,
Pilson also takes issue with the district court's jury instruction
It is worth mentioning, even though the jury is charged with 7
weighing the evidence, Soler-Montalvo, 44 F.4th at 8, nothing in the record demonstrates Stefanov ever presented a different narrative of the incident for the jury to rely upon. Despite any purported inconsistencies, even when being cross-examined about her statements in Exhibit 305, Stefanov held the line by confirming that she wrote the statements "immediately after" the incident and found them to be "most true." Her testimony and Exhibit 305 match the narrative that the government presented at trial -- Pilson made the threatening statements and initiated the kidnapping before the two crossed into New Hampshire or Maine.
- 21 - for the Section 2262 offense -- the statute criminalizing
interstate violations of protection orders. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2262(a)(1). Again, we are unconvinced.
But before we explore Pilson's challenge, allow us to
explain some ground rules that will guide us in our analysis.
We analyze preserved challenges to jury instructions
under a bifurcated framework. United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d
25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012). Challenges to whether an instruction is
an accurate representation of the applicable law are reviewed de
novo; challenges to the specific language the court uses in an
instruction (that confuses or misleads the jury) are reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See id. Pilson's challenges concern the
statutory definition of the term "protection order" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2266(5)(A) ("Section 2266") and thereby fall in the former
category (those subject to de novo review).
Section 2262(a)(1) was established by the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40001,
108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (1994), and it criminalizes the conduct of
one who travels
in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with the intent to engage in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that prohibits or provides protection against violence, threats, or harassment against, contact or communication with, or physical proximity to, another person . . . and subsequently engages in such conduct.
- 22 - 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1). The term "protection order" is defined in
Section 2266(5)(A) (the definitions provision of VAWA) to include
any other order issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence, or contact or communication with or physical proximity to, another person, including any temporary or final order issued by a civil or criminal court . . . so long as any civil or criminal order was issued in response to a complaint, petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a person seeking protection[.]
18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A). We've previously explained that Congress
intended this portion of the definition to be a "catch-all" phrase
for "a wide swath of court orders that are not specifically
delineated" in the statute. United States v. Dion, 37 F.4th 31,
35 (1st Cir. 2022); see also id. ("reasoning that [a] statutory
phrase including [the] term 'any' 'suggests a broad
interpretation'" (citation modified)). Though we find its meaning
expansive, we did not render a free-reign interpretation of the
phrase. There are, as we explained, two key requirements. A
"protection order" must first be issued for a reason consistent
with those listed in Section 2266(5)(A); and, second, "'any other
order issued by a civil or criminal court' may be a 'protection
order' . . . 'so long as' it is 'issued in response to a complaint,
petition, or motion filed by or on behalf of a person seeking
protection.'" Id. at 36 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A)). We
base these two requirements on the plain and unambiguous language
- 23 - in Section 2266(5)(A) set forth by Congress in promulgating VAWA.
Id.; see also Littlefield v. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, 951
F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2020) ("If [the statutory text is plain and
unambiguous], we must apply the statute according to its terms."
(quoting Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009))).
In his opening brief, Pilson asserts that the district
court fumbled by instructing the jury that the No Contact Order
entered by the Massachusetts court fits within the definition of
a "protection order" provided in Section 2266(5)(A).8 The
aggrieved Pilson claims the No Contact Order fails to meet the
statutory definition as it was not, according to him, "issued in
response to a complaint, petition, or motion filed . . . on behalf
of a person seeking protection." 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A). His
attack is double-barreled. First, finding support in Stefanov's
testimonial opposition to the Commonwealth's oral motion for the
No Contact Order, Pilson argues that because Stefanov (the victim
of the underlying offense) herself rejected the Order, she could
not plausibly be characterized as "a person seeking protection" in
accordance with Section 2266(5)(A). He points to portions of
Stefanov's testimony where she stated, "I do feel safe, and I do
feel that . . . having . . . interaction, it will be good for him,
8In providing instructions to the jury, the district court stated: "I instruct you that the stay-away, no contact condition in Government's Exhibit 101 is a protection order as a matter of law."
- 24 - but also it will be good for me." With the same factual support,
Pilson's second contention is that the Massachusetts court
couldn't have entered the No Contact Order on Stefanov's behalf as
it went against her express wishes.
The government's retort is that the No Contact Order met
the dual criteria for Section 2266(5)(A) that we set forth in Dion,
37 F.4th at 36. Specifically, it asserts, (1) that the
Massachusetts court imposed the No Contact Order to prevent Pilson
from contacting or interacting with Stefanov, and (2) the court
did so in response to Stefanov's initial complaint seeking
protection from law enforcement following the October 15 incident.
As for Stefanov speaking against the No Contact Order at the
Massachusetts court proceeding, the government first says her
remarks should not be difference-makers as Stefanov was clearly
under duress, and she made the reality of her duress quite clear
when she testified against Pilson at his federal trial.9 Further,
9 The government points out that, during its direct examination of Stefanov at the trial below, it asked Stefanov if she spoke with Pilson during his pre-trial incarceration on the state charges, and she replied, "[y]es." They spoke near daily -- and at her expense -- she said, and during some of those calls, Pilson told Stefanov "it was [her] fault" he was in jail, and he asked Stefanov to "help him get out." And if she refused, he'd "[h]urt himself or kill himself." So at his sentencing hearing, she spoke at his request and told the court what he said she "should say when [she] got there" -- that she felt safe with him. The government then asked Stefanov whether she was being truthful when she "told the [c]ourt that [she] felt safe with Mr. Pilson[,]" and Stefanov replied, "[n]o." When asked why she stated the opposite, Stefanov responded, "I don't know, I just felt guilty
- 25 - the government argues Stefanov's statements (made under duress) do
not negate the fact that the No Contact Order was made "in the
interest of" or "for the benefit of" Stefanov -- as we understood
those terms to mean in our previous construction of "on behalf of"
in Section 2266(5)(A)'s clause. See id. at 40. Therefore,
concludes the government, Stefanov "qualif[ies] as a 'person
seeking protection' from precisely the type of abuse that" Section
2266(5)(A) was intended to protect.
Pushing back on the government's arguments, Pilson's
reply brief reasserts, in core essence, that the No Contact Order
here did not fall under the purview of Section 2266(5)(A) because
the Commonwealth's motion for the No Contact Order was not made on
Stefanov's behalf -- she opposed it, and she cannot be considered
a person seeking protection because what she was actually seeking
was continued contact with Pilson. And he says the government's
argument that in the "broader 'backdrop,'" Stefanov was either
secretly wanting the No Contact Order or, even if not, such an
order was in her best interest and thus sought on her behalf, was
"deeply flawed." So, argues Pilson, if the government is correct
that the statute allows for disregarding a victim's express wishes,
because he would somewhat easily kind of go off on a -- become upset easily, his mood would change, and I think I often tended to blame myself for that," and "[b]ecause I think I was torn and I needed to -- I felt like I have to oblige and kind of help him in this situation."
- 26 - or allows for a determination that the victim's need for protection
can fall contrary to their stated will, such a determination, as
well as a finding of duress, "must be made by the finder of fact,
not decreed from the bench as a matter of law."
i. Whether Stefanov was "a person seeking protection"
We begin with Pilson's attempt to cast Stefanov out of
the meaning of "a person seeking protection" because, as he tells
it, the request for a protective order was made against her express
wishes. In Dion, we found the victim constituted "'a person
seeking protection' from abuse of the kind with which . . . VAWA
is concerned" based on her "complaining of [physical] abuse to the
authorities . . . at the hands of her long-term boyfriend (the
defendant)," thus initiating a criminal charge of aggravated
assault. 37 F.4th at 38. The "No Contact Order" relevant to our
inquiry there was a provision included in the defendant's
conditional release order. Id. at 33. And regardless of the
procedural process which led to the imposition of the No Contact
Order, it was the victim's initial complaint -- not some
additional information from the victim (who was not present) at
the time of the bail hearing -- that served as the focal point for
our determination of whether she should have been classified as "a
person seeking protection," 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A). See Dion, 37
F.4th at 38.
- 27 - The same holds true here. Regarding the October 2019
kidnapping, Stefanov first sought protection from law enforcement
the first time around, after she escaped the vehicle Pilson was
driving (her vehicle) and called out for help and for someone to
contact the police. When the police arrived, Stefanov was "visibly
upset," as she explained to them the domestic abuse she'd just
endured and her long-term dealings with Pilson. And she provided
law enforcement with sufficient information to apprehend Pilson
(who had driven off in Stefanov's vehicle after her escape). These
events resulted in the Massachusetts criminal complaint against
Pilson for kidnapping and other domestic abuse offenses wherein,
at sentencing, the court imposed (among the other punishments we've
listed above), the No Contact Order. Consistent with our reasoning
in Dion, which focused on the victim's initial complaint to police,
Stefanov was necessarily "a person seeking protection" here at the
time the Commonwealth initiated the complaint against Pilson.
Accordingly, the No Contact Order satisfied the first requirement
of Section 2266(5)(A).
ii. Whether the No Contact Order was filed "on behalf of" Stefanov
Next is Pilson's assertion that the No Contact Order was
not filed "on behalf of" Stefanov because she opposed the Order.
We cannot agree.
- 28 - The government presses (and we agree) that our Dion
decision remains the primary authority for this issue. There, we
found Congress intended the meaning of the "on behalf of" clause
to be expansive. See 37 F.4th at 41-42. The inclusion of "criminal
orders" in Section 2266(5)(A) indicated the "on behalf of" clause
has a meaning akin to "in the interest of" or "for the benefit
of[,]" based on the distinction between "civil protection orders"
that are "sought by a petitioner either by bringing an independent
civil action or by motion in an ongoing civil case" and "criminal
protection orders" that "are often issued as bail conditions or as
conditions of release to protect the victim during the pendency of
a criminal case." Id. at 40 (citation modified) (quoting Off. on
Violence Against Women, U.S. Dep't of Just., 2018 Biennial Report
to Congress on the Effectiveness of Grant Programs Under
the Violence Against Women Act (hereinafter "VAWA Report")
148 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/1292636/dl [ht
tps://perma.cc/R88U-L965])). Resultingly, we rejected a narrow
interpretation of the clause that would align with agency
principles (as in a party acting as a representative of a client)
and instead favored a broader meaning of "on behalf of" that
captures criminal orders "issued either at a prosecutor's behest
or sua sponte by the court (and not at the request of a victim)"
(as in simply the interest of or for the benefit of one seeking
protection). Id. at 41 (emphasis added). An opposite conclusion,
- 29 - we said, would "be unreasonable as it would nullify Congress's
apparent intent to include 'criminal order[s]'" in the
definition's sweep. Id.
Similar to Dion, the prosecutor in Pilson's case moved
the court to impose the No Contact Order as part of his sentence
due to the history of domestic disputes between him and Stefanov.
Thus, the Commonwealth undoubtedly made its motion "in the interest
of" or "for the benefit of" Stefanov -- to protect a victim that
suffered from repeated instances of domestic abuse. See VAWA
Report, at 7 (stating that domestic abuse "rarely occur[s] as one-
time incidents, but rather comprise behaviors that tend to be
ongoing, repetitive, and patterned, and leave their victims
vulnerable to further harm"). When considering the Commonwealth's
request for the No Contact Order, the court -- after hearing from
Stefanov herself, Pilson's counsel, and the Commonwealth's
attorney, and after giving Pilson an opportunity to be heard on
the issue -- concluded the Order would benefit Stefanov. The court
explained that it had "concerns that [Stefanov] really could have
been killed that day[,]" and that "[i]t doesn't sound like [Pilson
and Stefanov] being together is a good thing."
Relying on our interpretation in Dion, we read the "on
behalf of" clause to include this Order in its scope. That is, a
criminal No Contact Order that, even after considering Stefanov's
(the victim) stance, the court issued as part of Pilson's sentence
- 30 - to prevent him from subjecting Stefanov to future instances of
domestic abuse. See Dion, 37 F.4th at 40; Model Code on Domestic
and Family Violence § 208 (Nat'l Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges
1994) ("[T]he court or agency having authority to make a
decision . . . may impose conditions of release or bail on the
person to protect the alleged victim," including no-contact and
stay-away orders. (citation modified)).
Were we to interpret Dion as Pilson suggests -- to mean
a victim's subjective benefit determines whether a protection
order was made on their behalf -- we would cut against "Congress's
intent to afford the 'protection order' definition expansive
scope[,]" and "leave unpunished (under the VAWA) violators of
criminal orders sought by prosecutors to protect victims of
abuse . . . [,] simply because the victim or her legal
representative may not specifically have requested [or concurred
with] such [an] order[]." Id. at 41-42 (quotation modified); see
also id. at 42 (reasoning that "Congress's changes to the
'protection order' definition" have "served only to expand its
breadth"); Violence Against Women and Department of Justice
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 106, 119 Stat.
2960, 2982 (2006) (adding the terms "restraining order" and the
word "any" before "other order")). Accordingly, we refuse to now
interpret the statute in a way that would undermine the
Commonwealth's decision to move for a protective order on behalf
- 31 - of a victim of domestic abuse that the prosecutor deems necessary
to protect said victim. And we equally refuse to interpret it in
a way that would undermine a trial judge's reasonable assessment
of facts or legal determination that a No Contact Order is
necessary to protect a domestic abuse victim. See, e.g., Acosta-
Colon, 741 F.3d at 200 ("[D]etermining credibility, weighing the
evidence, and drawing inferences from the evidence all f[e]ll
within [the trial judge's] province[.]).
Bolstering our interpretive view of the "on behalf of"
clause is the prevalent issue, as acknowledged by the Supreme
Court, of repeated domestic abuse offenses deriving from victims
being intimidated or coerced to not testify against, or speak in
favor of, their abuser. See, e.g., Kathleen Waits, The Criminal
Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem,
Forging the Solutions, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 267, 281-84 (1985)
(explaining the "battering cycle" and the psychological effects of
victims facing domestic abuse); see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 833 (2006) (stating that domestic abuse victims are
"notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion"); VAWA
Report, at 26 (explaining that "[v]ictim intimidation or tampering
with victim-witnesses are often significant reasons for victim
reluctance to cooperate in prosecution"). Considering this common
understanding of domestic abuse cycles, we find that Congress was
undoubtedly aware of such testimonial risks and took into
- 32 - consideration the psychological aspects of domestic abuse when it
provided VAWA's legal definition of "protection order" -- "the
federal response to the issue of domestic violence" -- using
broad, inclusive language. Dion, 37 F.4th at 40; cf. Voisine v.
United States, 579 U.S. 686, 699 (2016) (using state-law background
to infer Congress intended the scope of a federal ban on firearm
ownership to encompass individuals with prior misdemeanor
convictions for reckless use of force against a domestic relation).
Thus, we reasonably conclude that our understanding of the "on
behalf of" clause includes No Contact Orders that may be
inconsistent with a domestic abuse victim's testimony.
All in all, we find no error in the district court's
instruction that the No Contact Order met the definition of
"protection order" in Section 2266(5)(A). In the same vein as
Dion, we conclude the No Contact Order imposed as part of Pilson's
sentence satisfactorily "constitute[d] a protection order" as it
was "issued in response to a complaint, petition, or motion
filed . . . on behalf of [Stefanov]," who qualified as "a person
seeking protection." 37 F.4th at 43 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2262(5)(A)). Section 2262(5)(A) "does not require that the
person seeking protection" do so "directly in the form of a court
order." Id. Rather, as was the case here, "a person need only be
found to be seeking protection," and the resulting No Contact Order
"sought by a prosecutor on [the person's] behalf [that] . . . aids
- 33 - [their] protection" falls within the statutory scope. Id.
Accordingly, we will not disturb Pilson's conviction for the
Section 2262(a)(1) offense.
c. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement
We briefly discuss Pilson's last challenge, which argues
that the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement
for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 ("Section
3C1.1") -- due to his pre-trial incarceration phone calls to
Stefanov -- was error.10 We review preserved claims of procedural
sentencing errors for abuse of discretion. United States v.
González-Santillan, 107 F.4th 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2024). "Within
this framework, we review a district court's factual findings for
clear error, and its interpretation and application of the
Guidelines de novo." Id. (quoting United States v. Vélez-Soto,
804 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2015)).
We can set aside the specifics of Pilson's obstruction
enhancement challenge for a rather simple reason: in sentencing
10 The two-level enhancement is applicable where: (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense[.]
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
- 34 - Pilson, the district court stated that it had "carefully considered
each of" his objections "as it might impact the determination of
the sentencing guidelines," and that "the sentence . . . [was]
untethered from the guidelines." Meaning, the court said, it
"would [have] impose[d] the same exact sentence even if the
applicable sentencing guideline[s] range would have been reduced
by one or more of the . . . arguments . . . ."
We've held on several occasions that such situations,
without more, result only in harmless error that we will not
overturn on appeal. See United States v. Ortiz-Álvarez, 921 F.3d
313, 319 (1st Cir. 2019)(explaining that the district court
"'intended to untether' its sentence from the guidelines
calculations presented to him (and any errors in them)"); United
States v. Fernández-Garay, 788 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2015)("[A]n
error is deemed harmless if a reviewing court can say with fair
assurance that the sentencing court 'would have imposed the same
sentence even without the error.'" (quoting United States v.
Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 25 (1st Cir. 2013))); United States v.
Acevedo-Hernández, 898 F.3d 150, 172 (1st Cir. 2018) ("In light of
this clear indication in the record that the court would have
imposed the same sentence even without any of the alleged errors,
we find that any errors in calculating Acevedo's [guidelines range]
would have been harmless."). Due to the district court's
explanation that it provided at Pilson's sentencing, the result
- 35 - here tracks with the relevant line of cases. Accordingly, we find
there is no reversible error regarding the district court's
application of the obstruction enhancement.
Conclusion
Consistent with our discussion, we affirm Pilson's
conviction and sentence in their entirety.
- 36 -