United States v. Peralta

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-2152
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-2152 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/21/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 21, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-2152 (D.C. No. 5:25-CR-00270-KG-1) SAMMIE JOE PERALTA, (D. N.M.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Sammie Joe Peralta pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine. He received a 240-month sentence. Mr. Peralta has appealed, but

the government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver contained in his plea

agreement. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004)

(en banc) (per curiam). Mr. Peralta responded in opposition.

We will enforce an appeal waiver if (1) the appeal falls within the waiver’s

scope, (2) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal, and

(3) enforcing the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice. See id. at 1325.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-2152 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/21/2026 Page: 2

Scope of the Waiver

“When construing an appellate waiver, we apply well-established contract

principles and examine the plain language of the plea agreement.” United States v.

Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Peralta’s signed plea agreement indicates that he waived the right to

appeal his “conviction(s) and any sentence, at or under the maximum statutory

penalty authorized by law.” R. vol. 1 at 21. During the plea colloquy, the magistrate

judge reviewed the plea agreement with Mr. Peralta and stated, “If I accept your

agreement you’re waiving or giving up your right to appeal your conviction and

sentence unless the district judge imposes a sentence that’s greater than what the law

allows.” R. vol. 3 at 42.

Mr. Peralta argues that the magistrate judge’s statement at the plea colloquy

narrowed the scope of his appeal waiver, allowing him to appeal from any sentence

“greater than what the law allows,” id., which could “mean something broader than

above the statutory maximum,” Aplt. Resp. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We disagree. The magistrate judge’s statement was consistent with the language of

the appeal waiver: “at or under the maximum statutory penalty authorized by law.”

R. vol. 1 at 21 (emphasis added). The plain language of the plea agreement does not

conflict with the magistrate judge’s statements at the plea colloquy, which clearly

referred to Mr. Peralta waiving any challenge to his sentence unless it was greater

than the statutory maximum.

2 Appellate Case: 25-2152 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/21/2026 Page: 3

Mr. Peralta also argues that his waiver permits him to raise a Second

Amendment challenge to his sentence because “nothing in the waiver language of the

plea agreement or change of plea hearing demonstrates that [he] waived his

fundamental Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.” Aplt. Resp. at 14. But

he waived the right to appeal his sentence so long as it did not meet or exceed the

statutory maximum. The appeal waiver contained no exception for claims based on

the Second Amendment. Accordingly, this appeal is within the scope of his waiver.

Knowing and Voluntary Waiver

When assessing whether an appeal waiver “is knowing and voluntary, we

especially look to two factors”: (1) “whether the language of the plea agreement

states that the defendant entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily,” and

(2) whether the district court conducted “an adequate Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. It is Mr. Peralta’s burden to

demonstrate that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary. United States v. Tanner,

721 F.3d 1231, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

Mr. Peralta’s signed plea agreement and the plea colloquy make clear that he

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. Arguing otherwise, he

emphasizes the conflict he sees between the language of the waiver and the

magistrate judge’s description of it. As we have already explained, however, no such

conflict exists.

3 Appellate Case: 25-2152 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 05/21/2026 Page: 4

Miscarriage of Justice

Enforcing an appeal waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice if (1) the

district court relied on an impermissible sentencing factor; (2) ineffective assistance

of counsel in negotiating the waiver makes it invalid; (3) the sentence exceeds the

statutory maximum; or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful in a way that seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See Hahn,

359 F.3d at 1327. “The burden rests with the defendant to demonstrate that the

appeal waiver results in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Anderson,

374 F.3d 955, 959 (10th Cir. 2004).

Mr. Peralta’s argument that enforcing his waiver would result in a miscarriage

of justice depends on his claim that the magistrate judge inaccurately described his

waiver, a claim we have already rejected.

Conclusion

We grant the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver. We dismiss

this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam