USCA4 Appeal: 23-4451 Doc: 128 Filed: 10/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 9
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PATRICK TATE ADAMIAK,
Defendant - Appellant.
------------------------------
FIREARMS POLICY COALITION; FPC ACTION FOUNDATION,
Amici Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda L. Wright Allen, District Judge. (2:22-cr-00047-AWA-LRL-1)
Argued: September 12, 2025 Decided: October 14, 2025
Before AGEE, RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Matthew Michael Larosiere, Lake Worth, Florida, for Appellant. Jacqueline Romy Bechara, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Joseph G.S. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4451 Doc: 128 Filed: 10/14/2025 Pg: 2 of 9
Greenlee, GREENLEE LAW, PLLC, McCall, Idaho, for Amici Curiae.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4451 Doc: 128 Filed: 10/14/2025 Pg: 3 of 9
PER CURIAM:
A jury found Defendant Patrick Tate Adamiak guilty of receiving and possessing
an unregistered firearm, possessing and transferring a machinegun, and three counts of
receiving and possessing an unregistered destructive device. The district court sentenced
him to twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Adamiak contends that at least one of his
convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He further
objects to the adequacy of the indictment under which he was charged, the sufficiency of
the evidence against him, the district court’s jury instructions, and his sentence. Finally,
Adamiak argues that his convictions violate the Second Amendment and that the statutes
under which he was convicted are unconstitutionally vague. Only his Double Jeopardy
argument succeeds. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and carefully considered the
briefs, arguments, and materials provided by the parties, we discern no other reversible
error.
I. Analysis
We properly assert jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
18 U.S.C. § 3742. We “review the district court’s factual findings . . . for clear error, but
we review its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 171 (4th
Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 2005)). As for
challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, “reversal . . . will be confined to cases where the
prosecution’s failure is clear,” and no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360,
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4451 Doc: 128 Filed: 10/14/2025 Pg: 4 of 9
367 (4th Cir. 2010) (first quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978), then
quoting United States v. Madrigal–Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009)).
A. Double Jeopardy
We turn first to Adamiak’s argument under the Fifth Amendment’s Double
Jeopardy Clause, which provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The clause “prohibits the
government from subjecting a person to ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’”
United States v. Schnittker, 807 F.3d 77, 81 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 467
U.S. 493, 498 (1984)). “To determine whether two offenses charged under separate statutes
are the same offense, courts apply the Blockburger test.” United States v. Whitley, 105
F.4th 672, 677 (4th Cir. 2024). “If each offense ‘requires proof of a fact that the other does
not, the Blockburger test is satisfied,’ meaning the two offenses are not the same,
‘notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.’” Id.
(citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977)). This particular requirement of the
Double Jeopardy Clause “ensure[s] that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to
the limits established by the legislature.” Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499. It follows, then, that
“cumulative sentences are not permitted” for convictions constituting the same offense
“unless elsewhere specifically authorized by Congress.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
367 (1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693
(1980)).
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Adamiak contends, and the Government concedes, that his convictions and
consecutive sentences on Counts One and Two of the indictment, for possessing or
receiving an unregistered firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and possessing or
transferring a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. We agree. As charged, the jury could convict Adamiak based on the same facts:
knowing possession of a machinegun. See United States v. Kuzma, 967 F.3d 959, 977 (9th
Cir. 2020). Thus, the Section 922(o) offense does not require proof of any fact that the
Section 5861(d) offense does not. See Whitley, 105 F.4th at 677. Neither statute evinces a
clear Congressional intent to authorize cumulative punishment. See Missouri, 459 U.S. at
366–67 (quoting Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691–92, 693); Kuzma, 967 F.3d at 977. They are thus
“the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.” Whitley, 105 F.4th at 678 (quoting
Currier v. Virginia, 585 U.S. 493, 500 (2018)).
Because Adamiak’s convictions and consecutive sentences on Counts One and Two
violate his Fifth Amendment right, “the only remedy consistent with [ ] congressional
intent is for the District Court, where the sentencing responsibility resides, to exercise its
discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions.” Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856,
864 (1985). We therefore remand with instructions to vacate Adamiak’s conviction under
either Count One or Count Two, and to resentence Adamiak in a manner consistent with
this opinion.
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USCA4 Appeal: 23-4451 Doc: 128 Filed: 10/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 9
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PATRICK TATE ADAMIAK,
Defendant - Appellant.
------------------------------
FIREARMS POLICY COALITION; FPC ACTION FOUNDATION,
Amici Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda L. Wright Allen, District Judge. (2:22-cr-00047-AWA-LRL-1)
Argued: September 12, 2025 Decided: October 14, 2025
Before AGEE, RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Matthew Michael Larosiere, Lake Worth, Florida, for Appellant. Jacqueline Romy Bechara, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Joseph G.S. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4451 Doc: 128 Filed: 10/14/2025 Pg: 2 of 9
Greenlee, GREENLEE LAW, PLLC, McCall, Idaho, for Amici Curiae.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4451 Doc: 128 Filed: 10/14/2025 Pg: 3 of 9
PER CURIAM:
A jury found Defendant Patrick Tate Adamiak guilty of receiving and possessing
an unregistered firearm, possessing and transferring a machinegun, and three counts of
receiving and possessing an unregistered destructive device. The district court sentenced
him to twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Adamiak contends that at least one of his
convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He further
objects to the adequacy of the indictment under which he was charged, the sufficiency of
the evidence against him, the district court’s jury instructions, and his sentence. Finally,
Adamiak argues that his convictions violate the Second Amendment and that the statutes
under which he was convicted are unconstitutionally vague. Only his Double Jeopardy
argument succeeds. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and carefully considered the
briefs, arguments, and materials provided by the parties, we discern no other reversible
error.
I. Analysis
We properly assert jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
18 U.S.C. § 3742. We “review the district court’s factual findings . . . for clear error, but
we review its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 171 (4th
Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 2005)). As for
challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, “reversal . . . will be confined to cases where the
prosecution’s failure is clear,” and no “rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360,
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4451 Doc: 128 Filed: 10/14/2025 Pg: 4 of 9
367 (4th Cir. 2010) (first quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978), then
quoting United States v. Madrigal–Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009)).
A. Double Jeopardy
We turn first to Adamiak’s argument under the Fifth Amendment’s Double
Jeopardy Clause, which provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The clause “prohibits the
government from subjecting a person to ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’”
United States v. Schnittker, 807 F.3d 77, 81 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 467
U.S. 493, 498 (1984)). “To determine whether two offenses charged under separate statutes
are the same offense, courts apply the Blockburger test.” United States v. Whitley, 105
F.4th 672, 677 (4th Cir. 2024). “If each offense ‘requires proof of a fact that the other does
not, the Blockburger test is satisfied,’ meaning the two offenses are not the same,
‘notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.’” Id.
(citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977)). This particular requirement of the
Double Jeopardy Clause “ensure[s] that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to
the limits established by the legislature.” Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499. It follows, then, that
“cumulative sentences are not permitted” for convictions constituting the same offense
“unless elsewhere specifically authorized by Congress.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
367 (1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693
(1980)).
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Adamiak contends, and the Government concedes, that his convictions and
consecutive sentences on Counts One and Two of the indictment, for possessing or
receiving an unregistered firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and possessing or
transferring a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. We agree. As charged, the jury could convict Adamiak based on the same facts:
knowing possession of a machinegun. See United States v. Kuzma, 967 F.3d 959, 977 (9th
Cir. 2020). Thus, the Section 922(o) offense does not require proof of any fact that the
Section 5861(d) offense does not. See Whitley, 105 F.4th at 677. Neither statute evinces a
clear Congressional intent to authorize cumulative punishment. See Missouri, 459 U.S. at
366–67 (quoting Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691–92, 693); Kuzma, 967 F.3d at 977. They are thus
“the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.” Whitley, 105 F.4th at 678 (quoting
Currier v. Virginia, 585 U.S. 493, 500 (2018)).
Because Adamiak’s convictions and consecutive sentences on Counts One and Two
violate his Fifth Amendment right, “the only remedy consistent with [ ] congressional
intent is for the District Court, where the sentencing responsibility resides, to exercise its
discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions.” Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856,
864 (1985). We therefore remand with instructions to vacate Adamiak’s conviction under
either Count One or Count Two, and to resentence Adamiak in a manner consistent with
this opinion.
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B. Adequacy of the Indictment
We next turn to the adequacy of the indictment. “[A]n indictment must contain the
elements of the offense charged, fairly inform a defendant of the charge, and enable the
defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense in a future prosecution for the same
offense.” United States v. Barringer, 25 F.4th 239, 246–47 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting United
States v. Kingrea, 573 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 2009)). “It is generally sufficient” for “an
indictment [to] set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself.” Perry, 757 F.3d at
171 (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). The indictment must
also include “a statement of the facts and circumstances” necessary to inform the accused
of the particular offense with which he is charged. Id. (quoting Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117–
18).
Counts One, Three, Four, and Five allege violations of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), which
criminalizes the unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm or destructive device. That
statute makes it “unlawful for any person to” (1) “receive or possess” (2) “a firearm” (3)
“which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration or Transfer record”
with (4) knowledge that the features of the relevant firearm “brought it within the scope of
the Act.” 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994). Count
Two alleges unlawful possession and transfer of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(o). That statute makes it unlawful for any person to (1) transfer or possess (2) a
machinegun with (3) knowledge that the relevant weapon possessed characteristics that
qualified it as a machinegun. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); Staples, 511 U.S. at 619.
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The indictment against Adamiak states each element of the relevant offenses. It
further specifies which items within Adamiak’s possession comprised the basis of the
relevant offense. It lists a PPSH machinegun as the basis for the first two firearms counts.
As to the remaining three counts, it lists a M79, 40mm grenade launcher, a M203, 40mm
grenade launcher and two RPG-7 variant recoilless antitank projectors. This detail
adequately informed Adamiak of the nature of the charges against him. To the extent he
desired further specificity, he could have sought a bill of particulars. United States v.
Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 136 (4th Cir. 2022) (“A defendant who needs evidentiary details
beyond those provided in the indictment to prepare his defense may seek a bill of
particulars”). He did not.
Adamiak further argues the indictment is deficient because it does not specify which
statutory definition of “machinegun” or “destructive device” applies to the relevant item.
There is no basis for this argument in the relevant case law, nor is such detail required to
accord with the requirements and purpose of an indictment. See United States v. Resendiz-
Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109–10 (2007).
C. Remaining Issues on Appeal
Adamiak’s remaining arguments fare no better. He argues that the question of
whether the items discovered in his home qualify as “machineguns” or “destructive
devices” is one of law that should not have been submitted to the jury. Not so. “[W]hile
‘the judge must instruct the jury on the law applicable to the issues raised at trial . . . . [,]
the next two steps are strictly for the jury: (1) determining the facts as to each element of
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the crime, and (2) applying the law as instructed by the judge to those facts.’” United States
v. Lindberg, 39 F.4th 151, 160 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d
139, 142 (4th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Medley, 972 F.3d
399, 412 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc)); see also United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d
205, 213 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he jury’s constitutional responsibility is not merely to
determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion of
guilt or innocence.” (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995)).
A thorough review of the record shows sufficient evidence for the jury to convict
Adamiak of the charged offenses. The Government put forth the testimony of federal law
enforcement agents involved in the investigation, a cooperating informant, an individual
that interacted with Adamiak in a professional capacity as a firearms retailer, and several
expert witnesses. “[A]ny rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 654 (2012)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
Further, the jury instructions accurately stated the law. Adamiak’s Second
Amendment challenge is squarely foreclosed by this court’s holdings in Bianchi v. Brown,
111 F.4th 438, 453 (4th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 704 (4th Cir.
2024), and the relevant statutes are not unconstitutionally vague. Finally, we conclude that
the district court committed no error in sentencing.
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II. Conclusion
For these reasons, we remand to the district court with instructions to vacate
Adamiak’s conviction on either Count One or Count Two, and to resentence accordingly.
We otherwise affirm the district court in all other respects.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS