24-28 United States v. Parks
United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term 2025 Argued: April 14, 2026 Decided: June 22, 2026
No. 24-28
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
EDWARD MICHAEL PARKS, AKA LEE, AKA TROUBLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut No. 03:19-cr-00299 Kari A. Dooley, Judge.
Before: JACOBS, WESLEY, and PARK, Circuit Judges. Defendant-Appellant Edward Parks appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dooly, J.), convicting him, following a jury trial, of two counts of kidnapping resulting in death in violation of Title 18 United States Code § 1201(a)(1) and one count of witness tampering by killing in violation of Title 18 United States Code §§ 1512(a)(1)(C) & 1512(a)(3)(A) and imposing three consecutive life sentences. Parks argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury that Parks’ acts needed only be the but-for cause of the victims’ deaths, and not that the deaths needed to be foreseeable from the kidnapping (in other words, that the kidnapping needed to be the proximate cause). Parks also raises a number of challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict on all counts. AFFIRMED.
BRIAN A. JACOBS (Sloane Lewis on the brief), Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello PC, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
ELENA LALLI CORONADO (Reed Durham on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT, for the United States of America.
DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Edward Parks on two
counts of kidnapping resulting in death in violation of Title 18 United
2 States Code § 1201(a)(1) and one count of witness tampering by killing
in violation of Title 18 United States Code §§ 1512(a)(1)(C) &
1512(a)(3)(A). Parks argues that the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut (Dooly, J.) improperly instructed the jury
on the elements of kidnapping resulting in death and challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence on all three counts. Parks is serving three
consecutive life sentences.
We AFFIRM. The district court properly instructed the jury
that, pursuant to Section 1201(a)(1), the kidnapping needed only be
the “but-for” cause of the victims’ deaths, not necessarily the
proximate cause. Evidence at trial overwhelmingly established that
Parks was the one to kidnap his first two victims, that the kidnapping
was the but-for cause of their deaths, and that he murdered the third
in anticipation that the third would talk to federal law enforcement.
3 I
A. Trial Evidence
Parks was convicted in 2023 on two counts of kidnapping
resulting in the deaths of Damian Connor 1 and Tamar Lawrence, and
on one count of witness tampering by killing eyewitness Devante
Williams. The government presented the following facts at trial.
In 2015, Parks was a gang member who was trafficking firearms
out of his girlfriend’s house. Present at the house with Parks on the
day of the murders were his girlfriend (who testified) and various
family and friends—including witnesses Jose Covington and
Rayquan Carr (who both testified) and Williams (who was
murdered). Also present that day, shopping for guns, were Eric
Gomez (who testified) and Connor and Lawrence (who were
kidnapped and murdered).
1 Although the trial record and various filings spell the name, at times, with
an “er,” the Indictment spells “Connor” with an “or.”
4 When Gomez left with two of Parks’ guns without paying,
Parks directed people in the house to call Gomez demanding return
of the guns or payment. As collateral, Parks held Connor and
Lawrence, with guns in his sweatshirt pocket, and told them that they
were not allowed to leave unless Parks received his guns or money
for them. Gomez was threatened over the phone that if the guns were
not returned by 7 p.m., Parks would hurt Connor and Lawrence.
When Gomez failed to return by the 7 p.m. deadline, Parks
advised Connor and Lawrence, “time’s up.” Connor protested that
he could get the money; Parks told Connor to retrieve it and directed
Carr, Lawrence, Williams, and Covington to join them both on a ride.
Connor drove Parks, Carr, and Lawrence in his car, with Parks in the
front passenger seat still armed. Covington drove himself and
Williams in another car. At a residential address, Lawrence remained
in the car with Carr and an armed Parks while Connor went to
retrieve cash. After Connor returned, he drove to a different parking
5 lot, where Parks had directed Covington and Williams to meet up
with the group in Connor’s car. In the parking lot, Connor gave Parks
his money, saying “this is all I have, bro.”
Carr testified that once Connor handed over the money and
Carr began exiting Connor’s car, Parks shot Connor and Lawrence,
and that Carr immediately ran out of Connor’s car and into
Covington’s car. Covington—who witnessed the murders from
inside the other car—testified that he heard gunshots, saw a muzzle
flash in Connor’s car, and saw Carr run out of Connor’s car.
Covington testified that after Carr left Connor’s car, Parks exited
Connor’s car, wiped down parts of it with his sleeve, and then joined
them in Covington’s car. 2 Carr testified that Parks pulled his sleeve
2 Ballistics evidence from the autopsies and inside the car corroborated Carr’s account of the revolver Parks used to shoot Connor and Lawrence. DNA evidence inside the car also corroborated witness accounts that Carr was sitting in the backseat and Parks was sitting in the front passenger seat, and that the shots that killed Connor and Lawrence came from the front seat.
6 over his hand before exiting Connor’s car and shutting the door.
After Parks, Carr, Covington, and Williams had regrouped in
the second car, they drove away. On the drive, Williams asked Parks,
“What are you doing, like, what’s going on?”
Carr testified that, later that day, he saw Parks murder
Williams. 3 Afterward, Parks told Covington that “[h]e had to get rid
of my boy, too . . . [b]ecause he-he talked too much.” App’x 530; see
also App’x 610 (Covington: “Yeah. He said he talks too much.”).
In closing arguments, Parks argued that Carr shot all three
victims. Parks highlighted evidence that Carr, who was in prison
after the events, told other inmates that he shot Williams and that Carr
rapped and posted on Facebook about killing people around the time
of the murders.
3 An eyewitness who lived nearby also observed a man of Parks’ description shoot the victim; her bystander account at trial generally corroborated Carr’s account.
7 B. Jury Instructions
At the conclusion of trial, the district court charged the jury on
Counts One and Two and the elements of kidnapping resulting in
death:
First, that Mr. Parks seized, confined, inveigled, kidnapped, abducted or carried away [Damian Connor/Tamar Lawrence]. Second, Mr. Parks held [Connor/Lawrence] for ransom. Third, Mr. Parks used any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense. Fourth, Mr. Parks acted unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully. And fifth, Mr. Parks’ acts resulted in the death of [Connor/Lawrence].
App’x 1359-1360. Prior to the charge, the government requested that
the court instruct the jury that it need find only but-for causation to
satisfy the “resulted in death” element; Parks advocated for an
instruction that the “resulted in death” element contains a proximate
causation requirement—that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that
Parks’ conduct would lead to the deaths of the victims “during the
course of the kidnapping.” The request to charge on proximate cause
was denied on the basis of this Court’s decision concerning a
8 similarly-worded death-results enhancement in the carjacking statute
in United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2021). During the
conference, the district court asked the government whether it
intended to “to take the position at closing arguments that it does not
have to prove that Mr. Parks pulled the trigger with respect to
Damian Conner and Tamar Lawrence.” App’x 1307. On the
government’s assurance that it intended to argue no such theory, the
court gave the following charge explaining the fifth element of Counts
One and Two:
The fifth element that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the Defendant’s acts resulted in the death of [Connor/Lawrence]. To prove this element, the Government must prove that [Connor/Lawrence] is deceased and that his death resulted from the willful and intentional conduct of the Defendant. To establish that the Defendant’s conduct resulted in the death of [Connor/Lawrence], the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that but for the Defendant’s actions [Connor/Lawrence] would not have died. Here, the Government asserts that the Defendant shot and killed [Connor/Lawrence].
9 App’x 1362-63 (emphasis added).
During summations, the government duly argued that Parks
was the one to shoot Connor and Lawrence. As to Count Three, the
government argued that Parks murdered Williams to prevent him
from reporting the murders to federal law enforcement.
After deliberations began, the jury asked for clarification: “Per
page 11 paragraph 5, to prove this element, is it necessary that the
Government’s assertion in the last sentence of the second section [that
Parks was the shooter] be the only way to satisfy the requirement of
the Defendant’s actions resulting in the deaths in Counts One and
Two?” App’x 1465-66. After consulting the parties, and over Parks’
objection, the district court gave a supplemental instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen, you have asked with respect to the fifth element of Counts One and Two whether the Government’s assertion as stated in the jury instructions is the only way to satisfy the requirement of the Defendant’s actions resulting in the death of Mr. Connor and Mr. Lawrence. The short answer to this inquiry is No. Let me
10 repeat and supplement this charge. The Government must prove that the victim is deceased and that his death resulted from the willful and intentional conduct of the Defendant. To establish that the Defendant’s conduct resulted in the death of the victim, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that but for the Defendant’s actions, the victim would not have died. The Defendant’s action is conduct on the part of the Defendant that he voluntarily undertakes. However, because neither the Government nor the Defendant have submitted argument to you as to this issue, I am going to give the parties the opportunity to present additional arguments, in light of your inquiry.
App’x 1503-1504 (emphasis added). In Parks’ supplemental closing,
he re-emphasized the lack of evidence that the kidnapping caused the
deaths of Connor and Lawrence but acknowledged that “the law is
that you don’t need to find that the Defendant is actually the one that
pulled the trigger in order to find him guilty.” After several more
hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all
counts. Following the verdict, Parks moved for an acquittal or,
alternatively, for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 29 and 33. The district court denied the motion, and this
11 appeal followed.
II
Parks challenges the jury instructions for Counts 1 and 2, and
the sufficiency of evidence for all three counts.
A. Counts 1 and 2 – Kidnapping Resulting in Death
1. Governing Law
Parks challenges the denial of his Rule 29 motion, arguing
insufficiency of evidence. “[A]fter viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution,” we must affirm if “any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237,
243 (2016) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). A “jury is
entitled to base its decision on reasonable inferences from
circumstantial evidence,” and ultimately, “the task of choosing
among competing, permissible inferences is for the jury, not for the
reviewing court.” United States v. Ho, 984 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2020)
12 (cleaned up). In the alternative to acquittal, Parks argued for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 33. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Although courts have
“broader discretion to grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 than to
grant a motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to [Rule] 29,
where the truth of the prosecution’s evidence must be assumed, that
discretion should be exercised sparingly and only in the most
extraordinary circumstances.” United States v. Landesman, 17 F.4th 298
(2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). A court considering a Rule 33 motion
“must ‘examine the entire case, take into account all facts and
circumstances, and make an objective evaluation,’ keeping in mind
that the ‘ultimate test’ for such a motion is ‘whether letting a guilty
verdict stand would be a manifest injustice.’” United States v. Alston,
899 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Aguiar, 737
F.3d 251, 264 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Parks also challenges the jury instructions. “A jury instruction
is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or
13 does not adequately inform the jury on the law.” United States v.
Zheng, 113 F.4th 280, 298 (2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). “In reviewing a
jury instruction, we examine not only the specific language that the
defendant challenges but also the instructions as a whole to see if the
entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law.” United
States v. Guldi, 141 F.4th 435, 446 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting United States
v. Raniere, 55 F.4th 354, 362 (2d Cir. 2022)).
Even when error is found, we may nevertheless affirm if the
error is harmless. Id.; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). Where the error in a jury
instruction is an omitted element, this Court “consider[s] the weight
of trial evidence bearing on the omitted element; and if such evidence
is overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted, there is no basis for
concluding that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gomez, 580
F.3d 94, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The government
bears the burden of establishing “beyond a reasonable doubt that a
14 rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the
error.” United States v. Silver, 948 F.3d 538, 547 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted).
2. Proximate Cause
The crux of Parks’ appeal is whether the district court should
have instructed the jury that death needed to be a reasonably
foreseeable result of the kidnapping—in other words, that the
kidnapping was the proximate as well as the but-for cause of death.
We review this preserved challenge de novo. Guldi, 141 F.4th at 446;
United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2021).
Section 1201(a)(1) sets out enhanced penalties for kidnapping
(death or life imprisonment) “if the death of any person results.” 18
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Kidnapping has three elements: “the victim must
be unlawfully taken, coerced, or deceived into accompanying the
accused nonconsensually; he or she must be held by the accused for
ransom, reward or otherwise; and he or she must be transported in
15 interstate or foreign commerce.” United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245,
250 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 65 (2d
Cir. 1982)). A “death results” enhancement like this one, which
“increased the minimum and maximum sentences to which [a
defendant] was exposed, . . . is an element that must be submitted to
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Burrage v. United
States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014). The supplemental charge instructed
that “[t]o establish that the Defendant’s conduct resulted in the death
of the victim, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that but for the Defendant’s actions the victim would not have died.”
App’x at 1503-04. The issue on appeal is whether the “death results”
enhancement required the government also to prove proximate
cause.
The plain language of Section 1201(a) does not include a
proximate cause requirement, and we have held that “[g]enerally” in
statutes with a “death results” enhancement, the phrase “‘results
16 from’ imposes a requirement of actual or but-for causation … and not
proximate causation.” Felder, 993 F.3d at 69 (cleaned up). The Felder
defendants argued that the “death results” enhancement in the
carjacking statute—similarly worded 4 to the kidnapping statute—
required a finding of proximate cause. Id. at 69-70. Adopting
principles applied by other circuits interpreting similar “death
results” language in the Controlled Substances Act, Felder concluded
that proximate cause is not required under the carjacking statute, for
three reasons. First, “Congress’ use of the phrase ‘results from’ rather
than ‘causes,’” is telling because “resulting in death and causing
death are not equivalents.” Id. at 69 (quoting United States v.
4 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) states, in relevant part: Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall— . . . (3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
17 Burkholder, 816 F.3d 607, 614 (10th Cir. 2016). Second, “Congress’ use
of the passive voice in the phrase ‘results from,’…generally ‘evinces a
concern with whether something happened—not how or why it
happened.’” Id. at 69-70 (quoting Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 614). Last,
“where a defendant is proved to have acted” with injurious intent in
commission of a violent carjacking, a requirement that the resulting
death “be ‘foreseeable’ appears redundant and even confusing.” Id.
at 70.
The Felder analysis applies here. Section 1201(a) uses the word
“results”; and Congress knows how to include an explicit proximate
cause requirement in a punishment enhancement, as it has done in
myriad other statutes. 5 Further, kidnapping, like carjacking, is
5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 247(d)(2) & (3) (enhanced punishment for damaging religious property where “bodily injury results . . . as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this section”), id. § 844(d) (enhanced punishment for transportation of explosives, where “personal injury results . . . as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this subsection”), id. § 844(f)(2) & 3 (enhanced punishment for transportation of explosives “and as a result of such
18 generally considered a violent crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959
(prohibiting “violent crimes in aid of racketeering,” including
kidnapping); United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 324 (2d Cir. 1993)
(listing kidnapping among the “violent crimes” committed by
defendant); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1054 (2d Cir. 1987)
(same); cf. United States v. Telesco, 962 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[F]or
purposes of determining career offender status under the Guidelines,
there is no such thing as a non-violent kidnapping…”). Requiring
that death be “foreseeable” as a result of kidnapping may be
“redundant and even confusing.” See Felder, 993 F.3d at 70. Parks
maintains that kidnapping is not inherently dangerous because it can
conduct, directly or proximately causes” personal injury or death), id. § 844(i) (enhanced punishment for damaging or destroying by fire or explosives, any building, vehicle, or real or personal property “if personal injury results to any person . . . as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this subsection”) see also id. § 38(b)(2) & (3) (enhanced penalty for fraud related to aircraft parts where “the part . . . is the proximate cause of a malfunction or failure that results in” serious bodily injury or death).
19 involve either “physical or psychological force.” Appellant Reply at
14 (quoting Corbett, 750 F.3d at 251). Still, holding someone against
their will, no matter if the threatened force is physical or
psychological, 6 often creates dangers that may lead to death.
Parks’ main argument is that our decision in United States v.
Guillette requires that Section 1201(a)’s “death results” enhancement
be read to require no less than proximate cause. 547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir.
1976). But Guillette’s holding does not compel the conclusion that
every criminal statute with a “death results” clause requires a
foreseeability finding. The Guillette defendants were convicted of
killing a suspected informant by exploding a bomb in his home. The
two defendants were convicted of (1) obstruction of justice through
use of force, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and (2) conspiracy against
6Macklin, 671 F.2d at 64 (“The very nature of the crime of kidnapping requires that the kidnapper use some means of force-actual or threatened, physical or mental-in each elemental stage of the crime, so that the victim is taken, held and transported against his or her will.”).
20 civil rights, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241, which punishes conspiracy to
“injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution . . . ,” and provides for a sentence enhancement “if death
results” from the conspiracy. 7 18 U.S.C. § 241. The defendants argued
that the victim himself installed the bomb as a booby trap, and that
the trial court erred in refusing their proposed instruction requiring
the jury to find “beyond a reasonable doubt that death was
deliberate.” Id. This Court rejected defendants’ argument that the
“death results” statutory phrase requires proof of “direct causation”
and held instead that defendants could be liable if their acts
proximately caused the victim’s death. Id. at 748-49.
Guillette does not aid Parks’ case. Like the defendants in
7 The right to be a witness in a federal trial is a civil right secured by the Constitution and is therefore protected by Section 241. Id. at 748 (citing United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1113-15 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
21 Guillette, Parks could be held liable for deaths resulting from
kidnapping even if the jury believed his defense that the victims were
murdered by Carr—a third party. Moreover, Guillette derived its
holding from the “fundamental principle of criminal law [] that a
person is held responsible for all consequences proximately caused
by his criminal conduct,” even if “his acts were not the immediate
cause of the victim’s death or injury.” Id. at 749. In that sense,
embedding proximate cause in the “death results” phrase in Section
241 states what is sufficient in every such instance, rather than what
is required in all cases. Guillette’s acknowledgment of the general
principle that consequences should flow from the scope of the crime
does not inject a foreseeability element into every crime with a “death
results” enhancement.
Further, Guillette preceded modern Supreme Court cases that
have expanded and clarified the bounds of causation in the context of
intentional crimes. First, Burrage v. United States held that “death
22 results” language in an similarly-worded statute imposes a but-for
causation requirement. 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014). 8 Although it is the
rule that “a defendant generally may not be convicted unless his
conduct is ‘both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the legal cause (often
called proximate cause) of the result,’” id. at 210, “we read into the
statute ‘only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful
conduct from otherwise innocent conduct.’” Elonis v. United States,
575 U.S. 723, 736 (2015). The underlying kidnapping offense requires
that, irrespective of whether death results, the alleged kidnapper
acted with “a willful intent. . . to confine the victim.” United States v.
Krivoi, 80 F.4th 142, 150 (2d Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). A “willful intent”
to confine, id. (cleaned up), ensures that kidnapping “falls outside the
realm of otherwise innocent conduct,” and therefore “fully satisfie[s]”
“the concerns underlying the presumption in favor of scienter.”
8 The Court did not reach the question of whether a proximate cause finding
is required under the “death results” enhancement. Id.
23 Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255,
269–70 (2000)).
Any error here would nevertheless be harmless because the
trial evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that Parks’
kidnapping of Connor and Lawrence was the proximate cause of their
deaths. Considering the “trial evidence bearing on the [purportedly]
omitted element,” Gomez, 580 F.3d at 100–01 (cleaned up), multiple
witnesses testified that Parks held the victims at gunpoint and
prevented them from leaving. Since death is certainly foreseeable
from holding someone at gunpoint, the evidence established beyond
reasonable doubt that Parks’ kidnapping of Connor and Lawrence
was the proximate cause of their deaths. Silver, 948 F.3d at 547.
3. Other sufficiency arguments
Parks’ remaining challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
on the two counts of kidnapping resulting in death are reviewed de
novo. Capers, 20 F.4th at 113. Parks argues first that the deaths of
24 Connor and Lawrence could not result from the kidnapping because
the kidnapping ended once Connor handed over the money. But the
evidence at trial was sufficient to establish that the victims were still
in the car with their armed kidnapper when Parks pulled the trigger.
No reasonable victim still held at gunpoint would have believed they
were free to leave. Second, Parks argues that the kidnapping was not
the but-for cause of the victims’ deaths because the theory he
presented to the jury was that Connor and Lawrence were shot by
Carr, not Parks. But even if the jury believed that Carr was the
gunman, the evidence was still sufficient for it to find that Parks’
commission of the kidnapping—which set in motion all the day’s
events—was the but-for cause of the deaths.
4. Supplemental Jury Instructions
Parks argues that the supplemental jury instructions
erroneously stated that death must result from “actions” of the
defendant, as opposed to specifically from the kidnapping. He
25 contends that the instruction left room for the jury to consider Parks’
acts other than the kidnapping, such as his illegal gun sales. Parks
failed to raise this argument during trial or deliberations, so we
review for plain error. Guldi, 141 F.4th at 446. “To demonstrate plain
error, a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that was clear and obvious
under existing law, i.e., law established at the time of this appeal, (3)
that affected his substantial rights, and (4) that cast doubt on the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
On any standard of review, this argument ignores the vital
“context of the instructions as a whole,” which were singularly
focused on the act of kidnapping. United States v. Denkberg, 139 F.4th
147, 160 (2d Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). Parks objects to the framing of
the fifth element in the supplemental instruction. But in that respect,
the supplemental instruction was nearly verbatim the instruction
given during the initial charge, in which the fifth element (and its
26 reference to “Defendant’s actions”) was preceded by explanations of
the first four elements, which either mentioned kidnapping explicitly
or via description of a forced taking. 9 The district court’s recitation of
the fifth element in the supplemental instruction is properly placed in
the same context, as the jury was tasked with finding each element
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. (concluding that “the context of
the instructions” is important “[f]or supplementary instructions in
9See App’x 1360 (“The first element that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the Defendant seized confined, inveigled, kidnapped, abducted or carried away the victim -- Damian Conner. ‘Kidnap’ means to take and carry away a person by force and against his will.”); id. 1361 (“The second element that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the Defendant held Damian Conner for ransom.”); id. 1361-1362 (“The third element … is that the Defendant used any means, facility or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense. . . . If you find that a cellular telephone was used in some way in committing or in furtherance of the charged kidnapping, the Government has satisfied this element.”); id. 1362 (“The fourth element … is that the Defendant acted unlawfully, knowingly and willfully. . . . In order to satisfy this element, the Government must show that the Defendant knew that Damian Conner was not accompanying him voluntarily, but rather, was forced or coerced or tricked into coming along with him.”).
27 particular” (cleaned up)).
Parks also argues that it was a violation of his due process
rights to instruct the jury, upon its question, that the government need
not prove that Parks was the shooter to find him guilty of kidnapping
resulting in death because it “permit[ted] the prosecution to change
its theory of the case at the last moment.” Appellant Br. at 2. But
Parks was aware as far back as the charging conference that the
district court interpreted the law to be that he could be found guilty
of causing the victim’s death without necessarily having been the
shooter. And the district court complied with the precedent Parks
cites for his due process argument; Parks was given an opportunity
“to be heard on the specific charges of which he is accused”
throughout trial and again during supplemental closing arguments.
Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979). 10
10Parks suffered no violation of his rights from the jury instructions as to Counts One and Two, which defeats Parks’ argument as to spillover effects on Count Three. See United States v. Aiello, 118 F.4th
28 B. Count 3 – Witness Tampering by Killing
Parks challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show that
the killing of Williams constituted witness tampering on the ground
that the evidence failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that
Williams would have communicated with federal officers. We review
the sufficiency of the evidence as to Count 3 de novo. Capers, 20 F.4th
at 113.
Section 1512 makes it a federal crime to “kill or attempt[] to kill
another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any
person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of
information relating to the commission or possible commission of a
Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). To prove that a killing was
intended to prevent communication with a federal law enforcement
officer, “the Government must show that there was a reasonable
291, 305 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Ciminelli v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2814 (2025).
29 likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a
federal officer.” Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 670 (2011). The
likelihood of communication with a federal officer must be “more
than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical” but need not be
shown to be “beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even that it is more
likely than not.” Id. at 678.
An FBI Special Agent testified that she “would have liked to
talk to” Williams about Connor’s and Lawrence’s deaths. App’x 1267.
Parks emphasizes the conditional phrasing, but that testimony was
hardly necessary considering that every witness to the murders still
alive testified for the government. The prospect that federal agents
would have contacted Williams concerning Parks’ crimes was by no
means “remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical,” Fowler, 563 U.S.
at 678, especially considering that the FBI was involved in
investigating the murders since the day they happened and the
murders arose from illicit firearm sales. Finally, Parks posits that
30 Williams “may not have been willing to talk” to law enforcement,
Appellant Br. 51; but a rational jury could conclude otherwise based
on the testimony that Parks told Covington that he “had to get rid of
my boy [Williams], too . . . [b]ecause he . . . talked too much.” App’x
530.
III
We have considered the remainder of Parks’ arguments and
find them to lack merit. For these reasons, we AFFIRM Parks’
convictions.