United States v. Parada

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 11, 2022
• Docket: 20-3244
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 20-3244 Document: 010110630281 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

TENTH CIRCUIT January 11, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 20-3244 (D.C. No. 5:03-CR-40053-JAR-l) v. (D. Kan.) NORMAN A. PARADA,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BACHARACH, SEYMOUR, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

Norman A. Parada was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than

100 grams or more of Phencyclidine, commonly known as PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), and of conspiracy to distribute the same in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.

The district court sentenced him to concurrent 405-month prison terms, later reduced to

327-month terms due to a retroactive change in the sentencing law and a resulting

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions set forth in 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 20-3244 Document: 010110630281 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 2

amended offense level. Mr. Parada subsequently sought to further reduce his sentence

by filing a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Citing

an outbreak of COVID-19 in the prison where he is held, Mr. Parada alleged that he

contracted the disease because the Bureau of Prisons failed to take adequate precautions.

He also suffers ongoing complications due to numerous risk factors and preexisting

maladies such as stage two kidney disease (not requiring dialysis), unspecified intestinal

and bladder issues, migraines, PTSD, and blindness in one eye. Rec., vol. I at 191.

With a current release date of June 27, 2026, Mr. Parada sought reduction of his sentence

to time served, arguing that the virus presents an ongoing health risk from which the

Bureau of Prisons has demonstrated itself incapable of protecting him.

Although the district court found that Mr. Parada’s medical conditions and

COVID-19 status established “extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” it denied his

motion based on considerations of other statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

On appeal, Mr. Parada contends that the district court abused its discretion by relying on

irrelevant considerations and unsupported facts, more specifically, that it erred in

allegedly making compassionate release contingent upon proof of citizenship.

Assuming jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

Standard of Review

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of relief on a § 3582

(c)(1)(A) motion. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021).

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A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect conclusion of law or a

clearly erroneous finding of fact. United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th

Cir. 2013).

Statutory Standard for Compassionate Release

District courts are ordinarily forbidden from modifying a term of imprisonment

once it has been imposed. United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 937 (10th Cir. 2021)

(citing Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011)). Congress carved out an

exception to the general rule of finality in 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A). Frequently

referred to as the compassionate release statute, it provides that a court “may reduce the

term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)

to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling

reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Thus, compassionate release is permissible when

(1) the district court finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; (2) the district court finds that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) the district court considers the factors set forth in § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.

United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2021). When any of the

prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking, a district court may deny compassionate

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release without addressing the others. United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1043

(10th Cir. 2021); see also Hald, 8 F.4th at 942–43.

Potentially relevant § 3553(a) factors include (1) the nature and circumstances of

the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the

sentence to comply with the aims of sentencing (i.e., to provide just punishment,

adequate deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation); (3) the recommended sentencing

range under the guidelines, and (4) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

among similarly situated defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Analysis

The district court denied relief to Mr. Parada under the third prong of the

compassionate-release analysis, concluding that “[a]pplication of the § 3553(a) factors

strongly militate[d] against reducing Parada’s sentence to time-served.” Rec., vol. I at

192. Specifically, the court cited the large quantity of PCP (340 grams) that he

possessed and was conspiring to distribute, the fact that he was already on probation for

drug possession at the time he committed his offenses, his substantial criminal history in

general, and the significant gap between the applicable guideline range (262 to 327

months) and the time he had actually served (206 months). Id. at 192–93.

The crux of this appeal revolves around the district court’s comments relating to

Mr. Parada’s history of using multiple identities, including fabricated government

documents, which “ma[de] it difficult to verify his true identity, citizenship, or otherwise

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verify his location at any given time.” Id. at 193. More specifically, the court noted

that, according to the probation office, Mr. Parada’s identity remained unconfirmed:

Thus, there remain serious questions about Parada’s identity and citizenship – until he can himself establish that he is in fact Norman Parada and that he is a United States citizen, reduction of his sentence to time- served would run counter to the need to promote respect for the law and protect the public.

Id. On appeal, Mr. Parada ignores all other factors considered by the district court and

makes the narrow argument that the court abused its discretion by making compassionate

release contingent on proof of citizenship and by relying on unsupported facts, namely

that Mr. Parada’s identity remains in question. We do not view the court’s decision

making so narrowly.

The district court denied Mr. Parada’s motion for compassionate release based on

its determination that “reducing his current sentence by approximately one-fourth would

produce a sentence that no longer reflects the seriousness of Parada’s criminal conduct,

nor furnishes adequate deterrence to criminal conduct or provides just punishment.”

Rec., vol. I at 193. These are all valid considerations under § 3553(a). The district

court thus cited many reasons why, under § 3553(a), Mr. Parada’s release for time served

would be inappropriate. Its concerns regarding his identity and citizenship were only

part of the consideration. Moreover, the court’s comments on this point were somewhat

ambiguous. While the court mentioned its concerns about Mr. Parada’s citizenship, it

expressly acknowledged “that citizenship is not a requirement for compassionate

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release.” Id. at 193 n.55.

The district court’s concerns regarding Mr. Parada’s repeated identity obfuscations

certainly were valid. The presentence investigation revealed that over the course of his

life, Mr. Parada has used at least fifteen aliases and multiple dates of birth. Rec., vol. II

at 8, 10, 21. At the time of his initial presentence interviews in December of 2003 and

again in January of 2004, Mr. Parada provided an incorrect social security number,

resulting in a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. Id. at 8. Moreover, his

arrest records showed that he had repeatedly reported different places of birth to law

enforcement. Id. at 21. In Washington, D.C., he said he was born in California. In

North Carolina, he said he was born in Washington, D.C. In Virginia, he said he was

born in New York.

The assertion that the court made compassionate release singularly contingent

upon proof of citizenship is a distortion of the court’s full analysis of the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors. Based on the entire record, in context, we cannot say that the district

court based its decision on an incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding

of fact.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Entered for the Court

Stephanie K. Seymour Circuit Judge

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United States v. Parada, No. 20-3244 BACHARACH, J., dissenting

I respectfully dissent. The district court bears considerable discretion

in deciding whether to grant early release based on extraordinary and

compelling circumstances. But here, the district court’s explanation was

internally inconsistent. The internal inconsistency requires a remand for

clarification. See Subsalve USA Corp. v. Watson Mfg., Inc., 462 F.3d 41,

45 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court confronted with an

internally inconsistent order would vacate the offending order and return

the case to the authoring court for clarification.”).

The court pointed to substantial questions about the defendant’s

identity, and these questions could support the denial of early release. But

the court also appeared to rely on doubts about the defendant’s citizenship.

The court recognized that citizenship in the United States is not required

for early release. Appellant’s App’x, vol. I at 193 n.55. But the court also

said that until the defendant proves citizenship in the United States,

reduction in his sentence to time served would diminish respect for the

law. Id. at 193. In my view, the court lacks support for this rationale.

The record contains no reason to question the defendant’s citizenship

in the United States. Even if he were not a U.S. citizen, however, the

district court didn’t explain why reduction of the sentence to time served

would diminish respect for the law. Appellate Case: 20-3244 Document: 010110630281 Date Filed: 01/11/2022 Page: 8

The court pointed out that if the defendant were released, he planned

to live with his step-sister. But the court also said that if the defendant

were not a U.S. citizen, he would immediately enter federal custody. Id

n.55. Why? There’s no evidence of a detainer. See generally 8 C.F.R.

§ 287.7(a). Without a detainer, early release would allow the defendant to

live wherever he wanted. The district court appeared to assume not only

that a question existed about the defendant’s citizenship but also that a

detainer would prevent release. These assumptions lack any support in the

record.

In the absence of the discussion about citizenship, the court could

still have denied early release based on doubts about the defendant’s

identity. But the court coupled this concern with unfounded doubts about

the defendant’s citizenship and ability to reside with his step-sister. The

majority thus characterizes the district court’s explanation as “somewhat

ambiguous.” Maj. Order & Judgment at 5. Given that ambiguity, we have

no way of knowing whether the district court would have denied early

release based solely on questions about the defendant’s identity. I would

thus remand for the district court to reconsider early release either without

considering doubts about the defendant’s citizenship or with additional

explanation for doubting his ability to reside with his step-sister. See

Zzyym v. Pompeo, 958 F.3d 1014, 1033–34 (10th Cir. 2020) (remanding an

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administrative decision when the agency gave some reasons that were valid

and some that were invalid).