United States v. Papantoniadis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: January 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-1126
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 25-1126

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

STAVROS PAPANTONIADIS,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Lipez and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

Martin G. Weinberg, with whom Kimberly Homan was on brief, for appellant.

Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

January 21, 2026 RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. After a ten-day trial, a jury

convicted Stavros Papantoniadis, the owner of a chain of pizzerias

in Massachusetts, of six counts of forced labor and attempted

forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a) and 1594(a).

The district court then sentenced him to 102 months in prison.

Papantoniadis now appeals both his convictions and sentence. He

challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against him, as

well as the district court's (2) evidentiary rulings, (3)

sentencing calculations, and (4) denial of his requests for a

longer continuance and a new trial. Finding no reversible error,

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts

Because Papantoniadis challenges the sufficiency of the

government's evidence against him, "[w]e recount the relevant

facts as presented at trial in the light most favorable to the

jury's verdict, consistent with record support." United States v.

Coleman, 149 F.4th 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2025) (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.

Katana, 94 F.4th 521, 525 (1st Cir. 2024)). In evaluating

Papantoniadis's other claims on appeal, however, including his

challenges to certain evidentiary rulings, "we offer a balanced

treatment, in which we objectively view the evidence of record."

Id. (quoting United States v. Greaux-Gomez, 52 F.4th 426, 430 (1st

- 2 - Cir. 2022)). "Because we cannot simultaneously recite the facts

in both manners, we limit our initial summary . . . to those

[facts] essential to framing the issues on appeal, and provide

additional details later in our analysis, as needed." Id.

(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Greaux-Gomez, 52 F.4th at 430).

Papantoniadis owned a group of pizzerias, mainly known

as "Stash's," throughout Massachusetts. He was responsible for

hiring, paying, and determining the schedules of his employees.

Within the immigrant community, Papantoniadis was known

for actively recruiting and hiring undocumented workers. He often

hired undocumented immigrants who spoke little to no English to

work at the back of Stash's, most often in the kitchen. By

contrast, the employees who worked up front, including cashiers,

were primarily native English speakers with legal status in the

United States. Although generally a demanding and quick-tempered

boss, Papantoniadis treated the employees in the back in a

noticeably worse manner than he treated his other employees. A

former cashier testified that Papantoniadis would often yell at

the employees in the back, who "work[ed] extraneous hours" and

"wouldn't get proper breaks."

Seven former employees of Stash's who were undocumented

immigrants and served as kitchen staff testified at

Papantoniadis's trial. They worked primarily in the Norwood and

- 3 - Roslindale locations. None were authorized to work in the United

States at the time they were employed by Stash's.

Collectively, the seven former employees testified that

Papantoniadis was a frightening boss who surveilled them during

their shifts via video camera, rebuked and yelled at them,

assaulted several of them and their coworkers, and threatened them

with deportation. See infra Section II.A.2. For instance, they

described an incident when Papantoniadis assaulted and injured one

of the employees, Thiago Silva Teixeira, on Teixeira's last day of

work. Another employee, Julio Cesar Yanes Reyes, testified that

when he tried to quit, Papantoniadis pursued him in a truck and

made a gesture with his wrists crossed that Yanes interpreted as

signaling that Papantoniadis would have him arrested. The

employees also testified that Papantoniadis required them to work

long hours, without breaks or days off, and would often underpay

them. In 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL) investigated

Papantoniadis for his compensation practices.

B. Procedural History

In March 2023, a grand jury charged Papantoniadis with

four counts of forced labor and three counts of attempted forced

labor. With the parties' input, the district court eventually set

May 20, 2024, as the trial date.

Twelve days before the trial was scheduled to begin,

Papantoniadis moved to continue it by over four months, until

- 4 - September 30, 2024, based on the volume of discovery in the case.

The government opposed the motion. The district court granted the

motion in part and denied it in part, permitting an eight-day

continuance until May 28, 2024. Nonetheless, jury selection still

occurred as scheduled on May 20, 2024.

After a ten-day trial, the jury found Papantoniadis

guilty of six of the seven counts charged in the indictment.

Papantoniadis then moved for a new trial based on alleged discovery

violations by the government and the district court's partial

denial of his motion for a continuance. The district court denied

his motion.

The district court ultimately sentenced Papantoniadis to

102 months in prison and one year of supervised release for each

count, to be served concurrently.

Papantoniadis timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Papantoniadis raises several challenges on appeal.

First, he maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support

his convictions on five of the six counts. Second, he contests

three of the district court's evidentiary rulings. Third, he

challenges his sentence as procedurally unreasonable based on what

he contends were erroneous sentencing enhancements. Fourth, he

argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying

- 5 - him a longer continuance and in denying his request for a new

trial. As we explain below, we reject each of his challenges.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Before turning to the merits of Papantoniadis's

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him, we

address whether he preserved this claim for appeal and, thus, which

standard of review applies.

After the government rested its case at trial,

Papantoniadis moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 29(a), contending that the government had

not met its burden of proof. The district court denied his motion,

and Papantoniadis then confirmed that he would not present any

evidence of his own. The next day, Papantoniadis formally rested

his case. He did not renew his Rule 29 motion before closing

arguments, nor did he renew his motion after the jury returned its

verdict. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). According to the

government, Papantoniadis's failure to renew his motion at either

point resulted in waiver of his sufficiency challenge. For his

part, Papantoniadis maintains that he did not need to renew the

motion given that the defense decided not to put on any evidence.

We agree with Papantoniadis that he preserved his

sufficiency claim. As we have held, a Rule 29 motion at the close

of the government's case is enough to preserve a sufficiency

challenge if the defendant does not present any evidence. See

- 6 - United States v. Acevedo, 882 F.3d 251, 258 n.6 (1st Cir. 2018);

United States v. Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 63 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000);

see also United States v. Rivera-Ortiz, 14 F.4th 91, 98 (1st Cir.

2021) (explaining that "it is the 'combine[d]' omission of a proper

pre- and post-verdict motion for acquittal that constitutes

waiver" (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United

States v. Maldonado-García, 446 F.3d 227, 230 (1st Cir. 2006))).

We review a preserved sufficiency claim de novo. See

Coleman, 149 F.4th at 42 (citing United States v. Falcón-Nieves,

79 F.4th 116, 123-24 (1st Cir. 2023)). "[T]he relevant question

is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Falcón-Nieves, 79 F.4th at

123). In undertaking this analysis, "[w]e consider the evidence

as a whole." United States v. Cedeño-Pérez, 579 F.3d 54, 58 (1st

Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Morillo, 158 F.3d 18, 22 (1st

Cir. 1998)). If the evidence "viewed in the light most favorable

to the verdict gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support

to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged,

[we] must reverse the conviction." Coleman, 149 F.4th at 42

(quoting Morillo, 158 F.3d at 22). This is so because "a

reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt"

- 7 - when such circumstances exist. Id. (quoting Morillo, 158 F.3d

at 22).

1. The Charged Offenses

To put the trial evidence in context, we review the

elements of the charged offenses -- forced labor and attempted

forced labor. The forced labor statute makes it illegal to

"knowingly . . . obtain[] the labor or services of a person by any

one of" four prohibited means:

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person;

(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person;

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or

(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint[.]

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a).

Under the forced labor statute, "serious harm" is:

[A]ny harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm.

- 8 - Id. § 1589(c)(2). We have read the phrase "serious harm" to

"extend[] to non-physical coercion." United States v. Bradley,

390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 545

U.S. 1101 (2005). Nonphysical coercion may include threats of

deportation. See United States v. Chaudhri, 134 F.4th 166, 186-87

(4th Cir. 2025) (treating the threat of deportation as a serious

harm).

Additionally, the forced labor statute defines "abuse or

threatened abuse of law or legal process" as:

[T]he use or threatened use of a law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure on another person to cause that person to take some action or refrain from taking some action.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1).

Consistent with the forced labor statute, the district

court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required proof

beyond a reasonable doubt that Papantoniadis "obtained the labor

of the victim . . . through at least one of the [four] prohibited

means" and that he "acted knowingly" in doing so. The court

clarified that the jury "need not unanimously agree on which, if

any, of the four terms of prohibited means was used, as long as

[the jury] agree[d] that at least one of them was used." The court

further instructed the jury to determine whether the use of

prohibited means "was sufficient to cause the victim to reasonably

- 9 - believe that he or she had to work (or to remain working) to avoid

a use of force, a threat of force, serious harm, or an abuse

of . . . law or legal process." Papantoniadis does not contest

these instructions on appeal.

Moving to the attempted forced labor charge, the

government needed to prove that Papantoniadis "intended to commit

the substantive offense" -- forced labor -- and that "he took a

substantial step toward its commission." United States v.

Concepcion-Guliam, 62 F.4th 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United

States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 2006)). There is no

dispute here that the district court instructed the jury

accordingly.

2. Sufficiency Challenges

With this legal framework set out, we turn to evaluating

Papantoniadis's sufficiency arguments. He contends that the

evidence was insufficient for the jury to convict him on five of

the six counts. Specifically, he challenges his convictions on

counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 (but not 6):

- 10 - Count Employee1 Charge Verdict Sufficiency Challenge?

1 Mamdouh Elkashilan Forced Not - Labor Guilty

2 Jose Antonio Forced Guilty Yes Hernandez Navarette Labor

3 Tharcisio Ribeiro Forced Guilty Yes do Carmo Labor

4 Silvia Bonilla Forced Guilty Yes Villorio Labor

5 Thiago Silva Attempted Guilty Yes Teixeira Forced Labor

6 William dos Passos Attempted Guilty No Forced Labor

7 Julio Cesar Yanes Attempted Guilty Yes Reyes Forced Labor

Papantoniadis makes three overarching arguments as part

of his sufficiency challenge. First, he claims that the government

did not prove causation, because it did not establish that his

conduct "actually caused the employee[s] to remain in his employ

against their will." According to Papantoniadis, the evidence

demonstrated only that he was a "demanding boss when he felt

employees were not working up to his standards," not someone who

1 We follow the parties' lead and refer to the employees for counts 2 through 7 as Hernandez, do Carmo, Bonilla, Teixeira, Passos, and Yanes.

- 11 - illegally coerced his workers' labor. Second, he claims that what

transpired on certain employees' last days of work reflected only

his reaction to their plans to quit and was not evidence of his

attempt to force them to remain employed. Third, Papantoniadis

contends that this case is too far afield from Bradley, 390 F.3d

145, the other forced labor case decided by our court. He argues

that the forced labor statute was designed to prohibit a type of

involuntary servitude; that the defendants in Bradley imposed

severe conditions on their employees akin to involuntary

servitude; and that, by comparison, his own conduct proved at trial

was qualitatively different and thus cannot, as a legal matter,

amount to forced labor.

Considering the record as a whole, we agree with the

government that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury

to accept its theory of the case and convict Papantoniadis. That

is, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Papantoniadis sought out undocumented immigrants as employees so

that he could intimidate them into working long hours under

difficult conditions and, thereafter, intentionally caused them to

fear that if they left, he would retaliate against them. In

arguing to the contrary, Papantoniadis applies a too narrow lens

in his framing of the facts. As the government observes, he takes

a "divide-and-conquer approach," suggesting that the jury could

consider only his conduct directed at a specific employee when

- 12 - evaluating his liability as to that count. But the jury was

entitled to consider the evidence in its entirety and draw

reasonable inferences from it. See Cedeño-Pérez, 579 F.3d at 58.

As we observed in Bradley, "the defendants' prior

treatment of [former employees] . . . tended to reinforce the

inference that the later, similar treatment of [other employees]

was part of a deliberate scheme to hold laborers by intimidation."

390 F.3d at 155. The district court here instructed the jury

accordingly, explaining that "the crime of forced labor requires

that there be a specific identified victim" but that the jury could

"consider the entire factual context, including a workplace with

multiple employees, some of whom . . . could be victims, some

not." (Emphasis added.) Based on the entire factual context, a

rational jury could have found that Papantoniadis intentionally

"created a climate of fear and violence through repeated physical

abuse and threats of deportation" so that his workers would remain

in his employ. Chaudhri, 134 F.4th at 187.

Finally, nothing in Bradley suggests that only facts

similar to those posed in that case are sufficient to permit a

conviction under the forced labor statute. Instead, the focus

must be on the evidence in this case and how it maps onto the

statutory requirements.

Thus, we reject Papantoniadis's overarching arguments

and proceed to analyze the sufficiency of the evidence count by

- 13 - count, summarizing the individual testimonies of the five

employees while considering the evidence as a whole. To that end,

we note that the jury was permitted to consider Passos's testimony,

which Papantoniadis does not challenge in any respect, in reaching

its verdicts on the other counts. At trial, Passos testified that

he felt forced to continue working at Stash's because Papantoniadis

(1) threatened him with deportation if he quit, (2) told Passos he

had killed someone, and (3) threw a pan at him in anger.

Further, to the extent Papantoniadis argues that a

conviction under the forced labor statute requires proof that he

"intentionally coerc[ed] (or attempt[ed] to coerce) the employees

at issue to remain in his employ," a rational jury could infer

that intent from evidence that he acted knowingly. See, e.g.,

United States v. Pagán-Romero, 894 F.3d 441, 444-45 (1st Cir. 2018)

(accepting a trial court's instruction to the jury that they could

"infer . . . that a person intends the natural and probable

consequences of his acts knowingly done or knowingly admitted").

Indeed, Papantoniadis concedes this point in his reply brief.

We start with the attempted forced labor counts (counts

5 and 7), and specifically count 5 as to Teixeira, because several

other employees testified at trial about their observations of

Teixeira's interactions with Papantoniadis. We then proceed

numerically through the forced labor counts (counts 2, 3, and 4).

- 14 - i. Count 5: Attempted Forced Labor as to Teixeira

Teixeira came to the United States from Brazil in 2012

and overstayed his tourist visa. Hired without work authorization,

he toiled long hours at Stash's and did not receive days off. He

viewed Papantoniadis as "intimidating" because Papantoniadis often

yelled at employees.

In August 2013, Teixeira gave notice to Papantoniadis

that he had found a new job but also agreed to help train his

replacement. Once his replacement came on board and settled in,

Teixeira began leaving Stash's earlier so that he could report to

his new position. Papantoniadis then confronted Teixeira about

what he viewed as Teixeira's early departures. When Teixeira

responded that he could not ignore his new job, Papantoniadis

insisted, "You cannot leave. I already gave you the [pay]

increase." Papantoniadis then began yelling, referring to

Teixeira as a "[m]otherfucker pizza guy." After Teixeira insisted

that Papantoniadis "respect [him]," Papantoniadis grabbed

Teixeira's shirt, tearing it and leaving a mark on Teixeira's neck.

As Teixeira backed away, Papantoniadis continued to grab him,

injuring Teixeira's wrist. Teixeira briefly grabbed a knife, then

put it down and ran out the back door of the pizzeria.

Papantoniadis followed him, yelling, "[S]tupid immigrant."

After leaving Stash's, Teixeira asked someone to call

the police, explaining that his employer had assaulted him. Once

- 15 - the police arrived, the officers spoke with Papantoniadis, who

reported that Teixeira had attacked him. The police then told

Teixeira to leave and that he was no longer welcome at Stash's.

Later that day, Teixeira went to a hospital, where medical staff

documented his injuries. Ultimately, Papantoniadis withheld

Teixeira's final paycheck, telling him that he would have to go to

small claims court to receive it.

A rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

that Papantoniadis committed the crime of attempted forced labor

as to Teixeira. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find

that Papantoniadis intended to obtain Teixeira's labor through at

least one of the prohibited means and that he took a substantial

step towards committing that crime. Importantly, Papantoniadis

does not dispute that he used physical force -- one of the

prohibited means under § 1589(a)(1) -- on Teixeira's last day.

Rather, Papantoniadis merely repeats that his conduct was "more

consistent with a quick-tempered employer reacting angrily toward

an employee who had confronted him," than with an employer

attempting to obtain additional labor by physical force. But, in

making this argument, Papantoniadis ignores Teixeira's testimony

that Papantoniadis said, "You cannot leave." A rational jury could

infer from this exchange, and from Papantoniadis's intimidating

conduct, that Papantoniadis sought to force Teixeira to continue

working. Moreover, medical records and the testimony of other

- 16 - employees corroborated Teixeira's account of the attack. Looking

at the evidence as a whole, and in the light most favorable to the

government, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's

verdict as to Teixeira.

ii. Count 7: Attempted Forced Labor as to Yanes

Born in El Salvador, Yanes entered the United States

without legal authorization in 2013. After working on a part-time

basis at Stash's for several months, Yanes left for a different

job. He then returned to Stash's, working full-time, in 2015.

Papantoniadis frequently yelled at, monitored, and insulted Yanes,

calling him a "piece of shit" and making him feel intimidated.

On one occasion, Yanes texted Papantoniadis to request

a day off. Angry that Yanes had texted him at night, Papantoniadis

yelled in person, "What do you think I am, your slut?" Yanes

feared Papantoniadis might hit him because he had a "very scary

look" and a "very, very strong voice." As a result, Yanes quit

and drove away. Papantoniadis pursued him in a pickup truck,

making Yanes worried that Papantoniadis would hit him with the

truck. Papantoniadis also recorded Yanes with his phone and made

a gesture with his wrists crossed, which Yanes understood to mean

that Papantoniadis would have him arrested. The police later

pulled Yanes over after Papantoniadis falsely reported that Yanes

had left the scene of an accident.

- 17 - Based on the evidence as a whole, a rational jury could

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Papantoniadis committed

the crime of attempted forced labor as to Yanes. Viewing the facts

in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury

could find that Papantoniadis intended to coerce Yanes's labor and

took a substantial step towards commission of that crime when he

pursued Yanes and made a threatening crossed-arms gesture after

Yanes announced that he was quitting. Again, Papantoniadis defends

his conduct as that of "a demanding boss trying to run a business."

But, in presenting this defense, Papantoniadis disregards Yanes's

stated fear that he would hit Yanes with his truck and engineer

his arrest. At a minimum, a jury could reasonably infer from this

incident that Papantoniadis used "threats of serious harm" or the

"threatened abuse of law or legal process" in his attempt to force

Yanes to continue working. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2), (3). Overall,

the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict as to

Yanes.

iii. Count 2: Forced Labor as to Hernandez

In 2013, Hernandez came to the United States, without

legal authorization, from El Salvador. Shortly after arriving, he

started working at Stash's seven days per week, without breaks or

regular days off.

Although Hernandez did not see Papantoniadis attack

Teixeira, he arrived at the scene shortly afterwards. He observed

- 18 - that another employee who had been present for the altercation, do

Carmo, looked "just white, white in the face." Hernandez felt

that "the person [he] was . . . work[ing] for was very angry and

a bad person." On a separate occasion, Hernandez saw Papantoniadis

grab a kitchen employee and throw that employee against a door.

Hernandez was afraid to go to the police because Papantoniadis

said that "the police were his friends" and would not listen to

undocumented workers.

According to Hernandez, Papantoniadis often told kitchen

employees that he could have them deported, which Hernandez

believed. Using cameras to surveil him, Papantoniadis called

Hernandez to castigate him if he saw that Hernandez was sitting

down. Papantoniadis also criticized and yelled at Hernandez, often

standing only two to three feet away, which made Hernandez fear

that Papantoniadis would strike him. At one point, Hernandez tried

to quit and left Stash's. In response, Papantoniadis drove after

Hernandez, following him in his car, making Hernandez believe that

the car would hit him.

After Papantoniadis and his wife repeatedly called

Hernandez to return, Hernandez eventually came back to work and

developed painful ingrown toenails in both feet. Although he

needed medical care, Papantoniadis denied him time off. Two weeks

later, Hernandez went to the emergency room, where a doctor removed

one toenail with anesthesia.

- 19 - After learning that Hernandez found a job at another

pizza restaurant and would soon quit his position at Stash's,

Papantoniadis told Hernandez that he knew "everybody

here . . . [at] all the pizza shops," and had given Hernandez "a

good recommendation." When Hernandez reported for work at the

other pizza restaurant, however, he was turned away. Hernandez

moved to another address, changed his phone number, and did not

tell his brother, who also worked at Stash's, where he lived.

On appeal, Papantoniadis contends that his statements

about the police and deportation -- to which Hernandez

testified -- simply reflected his dissatisfaction with employees'

mistakes. But a rational jury could infer that those statements

were threats that caused Hernandez to continue working out of fear.

At the very least, a jury could rely on that testimony to find

that Papantoniadis obtained Hernandez's labor "by means of the

abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process." 18 U.S.C.

§ 1589(a)(3).

Papantoniadis also points to Hernandez's attempts to

quit as proof that Papantoniadis did not force Hernandez to work.

But "[t]he fact that [Papantoniadis's] coercive pressures were not

indefinitely successful in obtaining . . . labor from [Hernandez]

would not preclude a jury from reasonably finding that [they were]

initially successful for a significant period of time."

Martínez-Rodríguez v. Giles, 31 F.4th 1139, 1156 (9th Cir. 2022).

- 20 - Looking to the evidence as a whole, a rational jury could find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Papantoniadis coerced Hernandez to

work for him through one of the means prohibited by the forced

labor statute.

iv. Count 3: Forced Labor as to do Carmo

After coming to the United States from Brazil without

legal authorization in 2005, do Carmo began working at Stash's in

2010. No one at Stash's asked do Carmo for documentation showing

that he was entitled to work in the country. do Carmo recounted

that Papantoniadis had cameras, monitoring the employees "all the

time," in the kitchen. On one occasion, Papantoniadis sent do

Carmo a picture of him sweeping, with the message, "I see

everything."

do Carmo was one of the Stash's employees who witnessed

Papantoniadis's attack on Teixeira. According to do Carmo,

Papantoniadis punched Teixeira, grabbed him, and said, "Come here,

Motherfucker, I'll break you." Papantoniadis also called the

police and kept Teixeira's last paycheck and wallet. do Carmo

testified to his fear of Papantoniadis, who "was so aggressive

because [Teixeira] want[ed] to quit." do Carmo felt that "if [he]

want[ed] to quit, that[] [was] going to happen to [him]," too.

do Carmo also testified that when Hernandez quit his job

at Stash's, Papantoniadis called Hernandez "not a man" but "a

faggot." After learning that Hernandez had contacted the police,

- 21 - Papantoniadis told do Carmo to "tell [Hernandez] not to fuck with

me, I know a lot of people, I have a lot of connections, you're

not going to find work near here." do Carmo understood these words

to mean that Papantoniadis could harm Hernandez.

According to do Carmo, after Papantoniadis learned that

a DOL investigator had asked do Carmo about his work hours and

pay, Papantoniadis exclaimed, "Oh, you fucked me, you fucked me."

His reaction scared do Carmo. From then on, Papantoniadis

commented that he knew do Carmo "d[idn't] have papers," which do

Carmo interpreted to mean that Papantoniadis could cause him to

"get in trouble" by being deported. Papantoniadis also told do

Carmo about Ruben, a former kitchen employee who wanted to quit

and was deported, saying, "[S]ee what happened to [Ruben]." do

Carmo felt "trapped," like he had "nowhere to go."

After do Carmo tried to quit, Papantoniadis said that do

Carmo "ha[d] no balls" and berated him. do Carmo "wanted to leave

that day," but he completed his shift after "seeing all what

[Papantoniadis had] been doing and saying . . . about [Hernandez]

and immigration and deport[ation]." Soon after, Papantoniadis

fired do Carmo.

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on this

count, Papantoniadis attempts to disregard do Carmo's testimony.

He argues that it was objectively unreasonable for do Carmo to

fear violence from him after the attack on Teixeira, because the

- 22 - attack was not part of a scheme to coerce do Carmo to work. Drawing

all inferences in favor of the verdict, however, we conclude that

a rational jury could disagree and find that Papantoniadis intended

his conduct to instill fear in do Carmo. After all, Papantoniadis

not only attacked Teixeira in front of do Carmo but also made

comments to do Carmo that, arguably, threatened to cause do Carmo

to be deported if he quit.

Relying on Bradley, Papantoniadis also seeks to minimize

the impact of his statements about do Carmo's undocumented status

and Ruben's deportation as "permissible warnings of adverse but

legitimate consequences." (Quoting Bradley, 390 F.3d at 151.)

But a rational jury could have found that these statements were

impermissible threats of deportation, amounting either to "threats

of serious harm" or the "threatened abuse of law or legal process"

under the forced labor statute, or were part of a "scheme" to

coerce do Carmo to fear that he might be deported if he quit.

18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2)-(4); see United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th

536, 550 (2d Cir. 2022) ("Whether an employer's threatened

consequences are 'legitimate' and therefore do not qualify as

'serious harm' will depend on the 'surrounding circumstances' in

each case." (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2))). Thus, we reject

Papantoniadis's sufficiency challenge as to do Carmo.

- 23 - v. Count 4: Forced Labor as to Bonilla

Bonilla entered the United States from El Salvador,

without legal authorization, in 2003. In 2013, she started working

at Stash's seven days per week, even though she lacked permission

to work in the country. Although she asked for a day off every

week, Papantoniadis refused for a year. Bonilla did not miss a

day of work because she feared that she would lose her job, not

receive her final paycheck, and Papantoniadis "could call

immigration."

On one occasion, when Bonilla confronted Papantoniadis

about underpaying her, he said, "I'm here, I'm not going to go

anywhere," which she understood to mean that "the one that could

go somewhere was [her]." Papantoniadis also told her that he had

"powerful friends" and that "something could happen." She

interpreted his words as implying that he could physically hurt

her or have her deported.

Bonilla also witnessed Papantoniadis's attack on

Teixeira. She heard Papantoniadis tell the police that Teixeira

tried to kill him. After the incident, she was "very nervous" and

"became afraid of [Papantoniadis]."

Bonilla left Stash's when she became pregnant. Although

she did not intend to return to work, she told Papantoniadis

otherwise because she feared his reaction. She moved to a new

address out of fear that he would assault her or have her deported.

- 24 - Papantoniadis argues that he did not cause Bonilla to

work against her will because he did not direct his violent conduct

and threats at her. But a rational jury could have found that he

knowingly engaged in intimidating behavior that led Bonilla to

fear his reaction if she resigned. Again, the jury was entitled

to consider evidence of Papantoniadis's conduct directed at other

employees, including his attack on Teixeira, at least when viewed

in light of Papantoniadis's statements to Bonilla herself. And a

rational jury could construe Papantoniadis's comments about having

"powerful friends" and that "something could happen" as "threats

of serious harm" or the "threatened abuse of law or legal process"

against Bonilla. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2), (3). As a whole, there

was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that

Papantoniadis obtained Bonilla's labor through means prohibited by

the forced labor statute.

In sum, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to

support Papantoniadis's convictions on counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.

B. Evidentiary Rulings

Papantoniadis also challenges three of the district

court's evidentiary rulings. We review the district court's

rulings on whether to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion. See Coleman, 149 F.4th at 28 (citing United States v.

Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2007)). "[A]n abuse of discretion

occurs when a relevant factor deserving of significant weight is

- 25 - overlooked, or when an improper factor is accorded significant

weight, or when the court considers the appropriate mix of factors,

but commits a palpable error of judgment in calibrating the

decisional scales." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brown,

510 F.3d at 67). We find no reversible error as to any of the

challenged rulings.

1. Bonilla's Testimony About a Former Employee

To begin, Papantoniadis challenges the district court's

ruling admitting Bonilla's testimony about an incident that a

coworker described to her. Namely, Bonilla was told that

Papantoniadis had hit a former employee who was holding a child in

his arms while picking up his final paycheck. Over Papantoniadis's

objection, the court allowed the testimony with a limiting

instruction, explaining that the jury could consider it only "for

the fact it was a comment made to [Bonilla] in the workplace about

a prior incident" and "the effect it had on her." The court

further explained to the jury that there was "no evidence or proof

that the incident actually happened."

Papantoniadis argues that the district court should have

excluded Bonilla's testimony as irrelevant. In his view, her

testimony on this point would have been relevant only if there

were evidence that Papantoniadis intended the incident to have a

certain effect on her. Yet, he contends, the incident "was not

directed at Bonilla personally and she did not witness it," nor

- 26 - was it part of a scheme "aimed at causing Bonilla to remain at

Stash's against her will."

We conclude, however, that any error in admitting

Bonilla's testimony was harmless because it is "highly probable

that the error did not influence the verdict." United States v.

Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 262 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United States

v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 121 (1st Cir. 2004)). Papantoniadis

concedes that multiple employees testified extensively about

"other incidents" of Papantoniadis engaging in "verbal and

physical abuse" -- so much so that "[t]he government simply did

not need [Bonilla's testimony]." Thus, we find no reversible error

as to this challenged testimony.

2. Bonilla's Testimony About Her Father's Murder

Next, Papantoniadis maintains that the district court

erred in admitting, over his objection, Bonilla's testimony about

witnessing her father's murder as a child. Shortly after this

testimony, however, Bonilla also recounted, without any objection,

that seeing Papantoniadis attack Teixeira brought back "all the

memories of [her] father's murder," and she feared she would "see

the same thing happen again."

Citing Bradley, Papantoniadis argues that the initial

portion of Bonilla's testimony to which he did object may have led

the jury improperly to "rely upon some hidden emotional flaw or

weakness [in Bonilla] unknown to [him]." (Quoting Bradley, 390

- 27 - F.3d at 153.) Papantoniadis is right to point out that, in

Bradley, we held that only "known objective conditions that make

the victim especially vulnerable to pressure (such as youth or

immigrant status) bear on whether the employee's labor was

obtain[ed] by forbidden means." 390 F.3d at 153 (alteration in

original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Indeed, at oral argument, the government conceded that Bonilla's

childhood experience would "not have direct relevance unless

[Papantoniadis] knew about it." And the record here does not

suggest that Papantoniadis was aware of Bonilla's father's murder

before assaulting Teixeira in front of her.

Nonetheless, any error by the district court in

admitting Bonilla's brief, initial testimony about witnessing her

father's murder was harmless. For one, the subsequent portion of

her testimony also mentioned her father's murder and was admitted

without objection, thus canceling out any potential harm from her

initial, objected-to testimony. For another, both Teixeira and do

Carmo testified that Papantoniadis's attack on Teixeira was

frightening. And Hernandez testified that do Carmo was "white in

the face" after it. Thus, because there was ample testimony to

support a jury finding that Papantoniadis's attack on Teixeira

would have scared Bonilla even aside from her childhood experience,

it is highly probable that Bonilla's challenged testimony did not

influence the verdict. See Turner, 684 F.3d at 262.

- 28 - 3. Hernandez's Testimony About a Former Employee

Lastly, Papantoniadis challenges the district court's

admission of a portion of Hernandez's testimony. During the

government's case-in-chief, Hernandez testified about

Papantoniadis's threats to deport employees. See supra Section

II.A.2.iii. On cross-examination, Papantoniadis asked Hernandez

whether he had ever told anyone at the DOL or the Department of

Homeland Security that Papantoniadis had threatened to deport him

personally. Hernandez responded that he had not. Then, on

redirect examination, the government asked Hernandez about his

declaration in support of his visa application, which explained

that Ruben, a former Stash's employee, was deported after

announcing his intention to quit.

Papantoniadis objected to this line of questioning about

Ruben. During the attorneys' exchange at sidebar, the government

indicated that it was eliciting this testimony to rebut the

suggestion that Hernandez had fabricated his earlier testimony

about Papantoniadis's deportation threats and thus to rehabilitate

Hernandez's credibility as a witness. For his part, Papantoniadis

argued that his cross-examination of Hernandez had not opened the

door to the Ruben testimony because his questions had been limited

to any threats to deport Hernandez, not other employees. The

district court permitted the government to proceed, with a limiting

instruction that Hernandez's understanding of what happened to

- 29 - Ruben should be considered only for the impact it had on Hernandez

himself, and not to prove that Ruben was actually deported.

Even assuming that the district court abused its

discretion in admitting the testimony about Ruben, any error was

ultimately harmless. The court's limiting instruction made clear

that the jury could not consider Hernandez's testimony concerning

Ruben for the truth of the matter asserted. And Hernandez was

clear that he learned about Ruben's deportation only after

Hernandez had left Stash's, and thus the incident could not have

affected Hernandez's state of mind while working there. Thus, it

is highly probable that Hernandez's challenged testimony did not

In sum, we find no reversible error as to any of the

district court's evidentiary rulings.

C. Sentencing Issues

Papantoniadis next challenges his sentence as

procedurally unreasonable based on what he views as errors in

calculating the guidelines sentencing range (GSR).

We review preserved procedural challenges to a sentence

for an abuse of discretion.2 See United States v. Burgos, 133

F.4th 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2025). In doing so, we review the district

court's factual findings at sentencing for clear error and its

2 We apply the Sentencing Guidelines that were in place at the time of the sentencing.

- 30 - legal conclusions de novo. See id. The court's factual findings

must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.

"Our clear-error review warrants reversal only if, after reviewing

the record, we develop 'a strong, unyielding belief that a mistake

has been made.'" Id. at 190 (quoting United States v. Newton, 972

F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 2018)).

"Where 'the [GSR] would have been the same regardless of

whether the district court's [g]uidelines calculations were

correct, we have generally found any potential error harmless.'"

United States v. Wright, 101 F.4th 109, 115 (1st Cir. 2024)

(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Graham, 976

F.3d 59, 62 (1st Cir. 2020)). "[O]n occasion," however, we have

reviewed a record to ensure that the alleged error "did not

influence the sentencing judge, even where the [GSR] would have

remained unchanged in any event." Graham, 976 F.3d at 62.

In determining Papantoniadis's sentence, the district

court largely adopted the calculations in the presentence

investigation report (PSR), so we begin by describing those

calculations. Based on section 2H4.1(a)(1) of the Sentencing

Guidelines, the Probation Officer identified the base offense

level as 22 for each count that resulted in a conviction. See

U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual § 2H4.1(a)(1) (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n

2024) [hereinafter "U.S.S.G."]. Turning to section 2H4.1(b), the

Probation Officer then applied various enhancements for the

- 31 - duration of the forced labor and the commission of other felony

offenses. See id. § 2H4.1(b)(3), (4). The Probation Officer's

calculations of the adjusted offense level (AOL) for each count

are listed below:

Count Employee Charge Enhancements AOL

2 Hernandez Forced Forced labor for more 25 Labor than one year (+3)

3 do Carmo Forced Forced labor for more 25 Labor than one year (+3)

4 Bonilla Forced Forced labor for more 25 Labor than one year (+3)

5 Teixeira Attempted Forced labor for a 26 Forced period between 180 Labor days and one year (+2)

Felony assault and battery and strangulation (+2)

6 Passos Attempted Forced labor for more 27 Forced than one year (+3) Labor Felony assault and/or assault with a dangerous weapon (+2)

7 Yanes Attempted Forced labor for more 25 Forced than one year (+3) Labor

- 32 - Following section 3D1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines,3

the Probation Officer then calculated the combined offense level

by taking the highest AOL -- here, 27 for count 6 as to

Passos -- and adding five offense levels for the other counts of

conviction. See id. § 3D1.4. This produced a total offense level

(TOL) of 32.

The district court adopted the Probation Officer's

calculations and determined that Papantoniadis's criminal history

category (CHC) was I.4 Based on a TOL of 32 and a CHC of I, the

court then determined that the GSR was 121 to 151 months.

After accounting for the sentencing factors under

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed a downward

variance and sentenced Papantoniadis to 102 months in prison. The

court explained that, in its view, the GSR "produce[d] a result

that [was] higher than appropriate" because the Sentencing

Guidelines group actual slavery with forced labor.

Neither party contests the application of the grouping rules 3

under section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines. To determine the number of units for the purposes of adding 4

offense levels under section 3D1.4, the district court started with one unit for the highest AOL -- here, 27 for count 6 as to Passos. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a). It then added one additional unit for every count with an AOL that was "equally serious or from 1 to 4 levels less serious" than the highest AOL of 27. Id. Because the five other counts all fell within this range, the court added one unit for each count, resulting in six units total. Because the number of units exceeded five, it took the highest AOL -- here, 27 -- and increased it by five offense levels, resulting in a TOL of 32. See id. § 3D1.4 (table).

- 33 - Papantoniadis claims that the district court incorrectly

determined the TOL. According to Papantoniadis, the TOL should

have been at most 28, which, along with a CHC of I, would have

resulted in a GSR of only 78 to 97 months. As he sees it, the

court erred in imposing duration and felony-offense enhancements

and in refusing to apply certain reductions. Finding no reversible

error for the reasons we set out below, we affirm the district

court's sentence.

1. Attempt Reductions

Papantoniadis challenges the district court's decision

not to apply reductions for the attempted forced labor counts as

to Teixeira and Yanes (counts 5 and 7).5 Section 2X1.1(b)(1) of

the Sentencing Guidelines authorizes a three-level reduction from

the base offense level if the defendant is convicted of attempt,

"unless the defendant completed all the acts the defendant believed

necessary for successful completion of the substantive offense."

U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(1).

According to Papantoniadis, he did not complete all the

acts he thought necessary to commit the substantive

offense -- forced labor -- as to Teixeira and Yanes. He argues

Although Papantoniadis challenged the exclusion of the 5

attempt reduction as to Passos before the district court, he does not challenge that exclusion on appeal.

- 34 - that he could have done more to coerce Teixeira and Yanes if he

had wanted to force them to remain in his employ.

The district court disagreed, finding that Papantoniadis

"clearly completed all the acts he felt necessary to commit the

crime." Our review of the record confirms that the preponderance

of the evidence supported the court's finding on this point. For

example, Papantoniadis assaulted Teixeira, telling him, "You

cannot leave," and misrepresented the incident to the police. As

for Yanes, Papantoniadis pursued him in a truck, while making a

threatening crossed-arms gesture signifying arrest, and submitted

a false police report.

The commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines explains

that "[i]n most prosecutions for conspiracies or attempts, the

substantive offense was substantially completed or was interrupted

or prevented on the verge of completion by the intercession of law

enforcement authorities or the victim. In such cases, no reduction

of the offense level is warranted." U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 cmt.

background. Based on the evidence, the district court did not

clearly err in declining to apply the attempt reductions.

2. Duration Enhancements

Next, Papantoniadis argues that the district court erred

in imposing multiple duration enhancements.

Section 2H4.1(b)(3) of the Sentencing Guidelines

authorizes a three-level enhancement if the duration of the forced

- 35 - labor exceeded one year and a two-level enhancement if the forced

labor lasted between 180 days and one year. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2H4.1(b)(3). Papantoniadis objects to the three-level

enhancements as to Hernandez, do Carmo, Bonilla, Passos, and Yanes

(counts 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7) and the two-level enhancement as to

Teixeira (count 5).

The thrust of Papantoniadis's argument is that the

district court simply equated each worker's duration of employment

with their duration of forced labor. But the record refutes any

such error by the district court. At the sentencing hearing, the

court acknowledged that "[t]he issue is not the length of

employment but the length of the forced labor." (Emphasis added.)

After reviewing the issue "fairly carefully" and reading relevant

portions of the PSR, the court determined that there was

"sufficient evidence in the PSR under the circumstances to find

that the enhancement [was] appropriate." Proceeding count by

count, we agree with the district court that the evidence supported

the duration enhancements.

i. Count 2: Hernandez

Hernandez worked for Papantoniadis for over two

years -- from July 2013 to November 2015. In August 2013,

Hernandez witnessed the aftermath of Papantoniadis's attack on

Teixeira, making him fear Papantoniadis. During his employment,

Papantoniadis threatened Hernandez with deportation, surveilled

- 36 - him, taunted him, and, in 2015, pursued him in a car when he tried

to quit. And when Hernandez developed painful ingrown toenails

during his time at Stash's, Papantoniadis denied him time off to

seek medical attention. Based on these facts, the district court

did not clearly err in finding that Hernandez was subjected to

forced labor for over one year.

ii. Count 3: do Carmo

do Carmo worked for Papantoniadis from 2009 to 2017.

Roughly halfway through his employment, in August 2013, do Carmo

witnessed Papantoniadis's attack on Teixeira, which made him

fearful of his boss. He also observed the incident when Hernandez

quit. While do Carmo worked at Stash's, Papantoniadis monitored

him, berated him, threatened him with deportation, and, near the

end of do Carmo's time at Stash's, responded angrily after he spoke

with a DOL investigator. These facts, taken together, support the

government's theory that Papantoniadis intended his attack on

Teixeira to scare do Carmo into continuing to work at Stash's.

Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding that do

Carmo was subjected to forced labor for over one year.

iii. Count 4: Bonilla

Bonilla worked for Papantoniadis for over three

years -- from May 2013 to September 2016. In August 2013, just

months after she began working at Stash's, she witnessed

Papantoniadis attack Teixeira, which made her afraid of her new

- 37 - employer. She also experienced additional threatening behavior by

Papantoniadis, including his statement that he had "powerful

friends." Bonilla's fear of Papantoniadis persisted through the

day that she quit, and she even moved to a new address to avoid

him. These facts, taken together, support the theory that

Papantoniadis intended his attack on Teixeira to scare Bonilla

into continuing to work at Stash's. Thus, the district court did

not clearly err in finding that Bonilla was subjected to forced

labor for over one year.

iv. Count 6: Passos

Passos worked for Papantoniadis for nearly two

years -- from June 2013 to May 2015. After five or six months,

Papantoniadis started "treating [Passos] bad" and telling Passos

that "if [he] quit, [Papantoniadis was] going to call immigration."

"[E]very time" Passos told Papantoniadis that he needed to find

another job, Papantoniadis responded, "You cannot leave me," "I'm

going to call immigration for you," "I know where you live," or

"You [do] not have papers." Papantoniadis also harassed Passos,

touching his nipples while saying, "You're going to be my bitch

forever." Passos testified that he felt "forced to stay." He

finally left after Papantoniadis threw a pan at him. On these

facts, the district court did not clearly err in finding that

Passos was subjected to forced labor for over one year.

- 38 - v. Count 7: Yanes

Yanes worked part-time for Papantoniadis for a few

months in 2013 and then returned to Stash's in 2015, working

full-time until February 2018. After Yanes returned in 2015,

Papantoniadis monitored, criticized, and insulted him, which made

him feel intimidated. Text messages introduced at trial reveal

that interactions of this nature began over a year before Yanes's

departure. Yanes was also afraid to confront Papantoniadis when

he was underpaid and could not take days off. On Yanes's last day

of work, Papantoniadis pursued him in a truck and made a

threatening gesture. Based on these facts, the district court did

not clearly err in finding that Yanes was subjected to forced labor

for over one year.

vi. Count 5: Teixeira

Teixeira worked for Papantoniadis for less than one

year -- from October 2012 to August 2013. While employed, he could

not take days off and did not receive regular breaks.

Papantoniadis yelled at employees, which intimidated Teixeira, and

assaulted Teixeira on his last day of work.

At oral argument, the government conceded that the

duration enhancement of two levels as to Teixeira -- reflecting

forced labor for a period between 180 days and one year -- was

probably the "most vulnerable" duration enhancement at issue on

appeal. We agree.

- 39 - But even assuming that the district court erred in

imposing the enhancement, any such error would have been harmless

because it would not have affected the GSR. See Wright, 101 F.4th

at 115. Because the AOL for count 6 as to Passos was the highest

at 27, it drove the calculation of the TOL. See supra Section

II.C. If the district court had not applied the two-level duration

enhancement as to Teixeira, the AOL for count 5 as to Teixeira

would have been 24 instead of 26. Even in that circumstance, the

court still would have added one unit for that count for the

purposes of section 3D1.4 because the AOL for count 5 would have

remained "1 to 4 levels less serious" than the AOL for count 6.

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a).

Further, even if the district court had not applied

either the two-level duration enhancement or the two-level

felony-offense enhancement as to Teixeira (more on that

enhancement below), the GSR would have remained the same. That is

because the AOL for Teixeira would have topped off at 22, and the

court still would have added one half unit for the purposes of

section 3D1.4. See id.; see also infra Section II.C.3.ii. Holding

the units for the other counts constant, the TOL would have

remained 32 because the total number of units (five and one-half

units) would have still exceeded five for the purposes of

section 3D1.4. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 (table).

- 40 - In sum, we affirm the district court's application of

the various duration enhancements.

3. Felony-Offense Enhancements

Finally, Papantoniadis challenges the application of the

felony-offense enhancements as to Teixeira (count 5) and Passos

(count 6). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a two-level

enhancement is required when "any other felony offense was

committed during the commission of, or in connection with," a

forced labor offense. Id. § 2H4.1(b)(4). For the purposes of

section 2H4.1(b)(4), "any other felony offense" means "any conduct

that constitutes a felony offense under federal, state, or local

law (other than an offense that is itself covered by this

subpart)." Id. § 2H4.1 cmt. n.2.

For count 5 as to Teixeira, the Probation Officer applied

a two-level enhancement for assault and battery and strangulation

based on the August 2013 incident when Papantoniadis attacked

Teixeira on his last day. And for count 6 as to Passos, the

Probation Officer applied a two-level enhancement for assault

and/or assault with a dangerous weapon based on the May 2015

incident when Papantoniadis threw a pan at Passos, even though the

pan did not hit him. At the sentencing hearing, the district court

overruled Papantoniadis's objections to the enhancements.

- 41 - i. Count 6: Passos

We turn first to the question of whether Papantoniadis

committed a separate felony offense as to Passos. Papantoniadis

does not dispute that assault with a dangerous weapon under Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15B(b), is a felony offense that would warrant

the two-level enhancement.6 Rather, he claims that the evidence

was insufficient to establish that he acted with the requisite

intent or that the pan he threw was a dangerous weapon.

We find Papantoniadis's arguments as to this enhancement

unpersuasive. First, Papantoniadis contends that, to find him

guilty of assault, Massachusetts law requires proof that he

intended to hit Passos with the pan when he threw it. He maintains

that the evidence does not show that he acted with such intent.

But Papantoniadis is incorrect that such intent is necessarily

required for assault. Under Massachusetts common law, "an assault

may be perpetrated in either of two ways": "'an attempted battery'

or 'an immediately threatened battery.'" Commonwealth v. Melton,

763 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Mass. 2002) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Gorassi, 733 N.E.2d 106, 109 (2000)). Although attempted battery

requires proof "that the defendant intended to commit a battery,"

6Although the Probation Officer recommended a two-level enhancement as to Passos for "assault and/or assault with a dangerous weapon," Papantoniadis's objection to the PSR and the Probation Officer's response, as well as the parties' briefs, treat assault with a dangerous weapon as the relevant felony offense. And so, in analyzing the enhancement, we focus on that offense.

- 42 - immediately threatened battery requires only proof "that the

defendant intentionally engaged in menacing conduct that

reasonably caused the victim to fear an imminent battery." Id. at

1096 & n.4; see also Commonwealth v. Leonard, 58 N.E.3d 343, 349

(Mass. App. Ct. 2016). The government points to immediately

threatened battery as the relevant theory of assault here.

The district court's application of the enhancement was

justified, at a minimum, under the immediately threatened battery

theory of assault that exists under Massachusetts law. At trial,

Passos testified that Papantoniadis "yell[ed]" at him and "got so

mad" before throwing the pan. Papantoniadis "almost" hit him with

the pan, causing Passos to feel "so scared." This testimony was

enough to meet the requirements of this theory of assault -- that

Papantoniadis intentionally engaged in menacing conduct that

caused Passos to fear an imminent battery. Melton, 763 N.E.2d at

1096. Although the district court did not explicitly rely on the

immediately threatened battery theory at sentencing, we see no

clear error in its application of the enhancement given the

evidence supporting that Papantoniadis "intended to put [Passos]

in fear." Commonwealth v. Oswaldo O., 116 N.E.3d 35, 38 (Mass.

App. Ct. 2018).

Second, Papantoniadis argues for the first time on

appeal that the evidence could not support a finding that the pan

was a "dangerous weapon." We review his unpreserved procedural

- 43 - claim for plain error.7 See United States v. Colón-De Jesús, 85

F.4th 15, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2023).

"Plain error is a formidable standard of review, which

requires [Papantoniadis to] demonstrate: (1) that an error

occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3)

affected [his] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings." United States v. Candelario-Ramos, 45 F.4th 521,

525 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

United States v. Blewitt, 920 F.3d 118, 123 (1st Cir. 2019)). But

Papantoniadis "makes no attempt to show how his . . . claim[]

satisf[ies] the demanding plain-error standard -- his [opening]

brief fails to even mention plain error, let alone argue for its

application here." Coleman, 149 F.4th at 56 (omission in original)

(quoting Candelario-Ramos, 45 F.4th at 525).

In any event, there was no plain error as to this claim.

When an object is not "dangerous per se,"8 Massachusetts law asks

7In his reply brief, Papantoniadis argues that his objection to the PSR's inclusion of the felony-offense enhancement as to Passos "sufficiently encompassed [his] arguments presented on appeal," including his argument that the pan was not dangerous. But his objection to the PSR focused only on the direction he threw the pan, and not the characteristics of the pan. He therefore failed to raise this objection below. Under Massachusetts law, an object is "dangerous per se" if 8

it is "designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm." Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 741 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Mass. 2001)

- 44 - "whether the object, as used by the defendant, is capable of

producing serious bodily harm." Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 741 N.E.2d

827, 833 (Mass. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mercado, 509 N.E.2d

300, 304 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)). Because there was no evidence of

the pan's size, shape, or weight, Papantoniadis argues that the

evidence was insufficient to show that the pan, as used, was

dangerous.

We see no obvious error in the district court's

application of the enhancement given the "capable of producing

serious bodily harm" standard. At a minimum, it was not clear

error for the court to perceive a man throwing an object of this

kind in an enclosed area, such as Stash's kitchen, as meeting the

relevant standard. Indeed, Passos testified that he was "so

scared" when Papantoniadis threw the pan that it caused him to

leave Stash's. Thus, there was no plain error.

ii. Count 5: Teixeira

Papantoniadis also objects to the felony-offense

enhancement as to Teixeira for assault and battery based on Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 13A.9 According to Papantoniadis, simple

(quoting Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1056 (Mass. 1980)). 9 The district court also applied the felony-offense enhancement based on strangulation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15D, which became law in 2014. Papantoniadis contests this enhancement because there was no felony offense for strangulation

- 45 - assault and battery is only a misdemeanor under Massachusetts law

and therefore does not warrant the enhancement.

This argument raises a complicated question about how to

interpret the phrase "conduct that constitutes any other felony

offense" in section 2H4.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Namely,

Papantoniadis contests whether a state-law offense that is

classified as a misdemeanor under state law, even if it is

punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, can

qualify as a "felony offense." See U.S.S.G. § 2H4.1 cmt. n.2.

The government acknowledged at oral argument that the

felony-offense enhancement as to Teixeira was "vulnerable." But

we need not decide whether the district court erred in applying

this enhancement because it did not change the GSR. See supra

Section II.C.2.vi.; Wright, 101 F.4th at 115.

In sum, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district

court.

D. Continuance and New Trial Motions

Finally, Papantoniadis argues that the district court

erred in declining to grant a longer continuance and in denying

his related motion for a new trial based on the government's

delayed disclosure of certain discovery materials. We find no

in Massachusetts at the time he committed the alleged offense in 2013. The government concedes this point.

- 46 - abuse of discretion by the district court in its rulings on these

interconnected motions.

To recap, a grand jury indicted Papantoniadis in

March 2023. In the months that followed, the government produced

significant discovery, including witness interview statements from

the seven employees identified in the indictment by number alone

and not by name. With the parties' input, in December 2023, the

district court scheduled the trial to begin on May 20, 2024.

On April 17, 2024, about one month before the trial was

set to start, Papantoniadis confirmed that he did "not intend to

move for a continuance" and instead "intend[ed] to proceed with

trial as planned." The following week, on April 22, 2024, the

government produced approximately 10,000 pages of discovery, which

included medical records of an employee and grand-jury

transcripts. On April 30, 2024, the government disclosed the names

of the seven employees and the specific immigration benefits that

they had received. Then, on May 3, 2024, the government produced

approximately 19,000 pages of additional discovery, which

consisted largely of documents from the DOL investigation. Of

that total, more than 16,000 pages were copies of Papantoniadis's

own business records, including payroll records, which the DOL had

obtained from him during its investigation.

On May 8, 2024, less than two weeks before the trial was

scheduled to begin, Papantoniadis moved to continue the trial until

- 47 - September 30, 2024. He contended that he was unable to "process

the sheer volume of [recent] discovery with proper attention and

detail." In a separate filing the next day, May 9, 2024,

Papantoniadis pointed to the May 3, 2024 production as part of the

reason for his request for a continuance.

After hearing oral argument, the district court granted

the motion in part and denied it in part. It delayed the start of

trial by eight days, until May 28, 2024, but kept the previous

date for jury empanelment (May 20, 2024). The result was that the

court provided the defense with an extra week to review the recent

discovery in preparation for trial.

Five days before the trial began, on May 23, 2024, the

government produced approximately 1,600 pages of additional

material. This material consisted primarily of immigration files

concerning the seven employees.

After the trial concluded, Papantoniadis filed a motion

for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,

arguing that the government's delay in making required disclosures

violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v.

United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In support of that motion, he

maintained that the district court abused its discretion in

granting only an eight-day continuance after the late disclosures.

In a detailed opinion, the district court denied

Papantoniadis's new trial motion. Briefly put, the court

- 48 - determined that some of the government's delayed

disclosures -- including its disclosures of immigration benefits

on April 30, 2024, and immigration files on May 23,

2024 -- violated its obligations under the local rules. But the

court ultimately concluded that any delay did not unfairly

prejudice Papantoniadis in preparing for trial. In so ruling, the

court explained that Papantoniadis had "substantially overstate[d]

the burden imposed by the volume of the production," which "did

not burden the defense to such a degree that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair."

1. Continuance Motion

We review the district court's ruling on the motion to

continue for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Carbone,

110 F.4th 361, 372 (1st Cir. 2024). Considering the district

court's "broad discretion in managing [its] docket[]," we will not

lightly overturn its ruling. Id. (quoting Delgado v. Pawtucket

Police Dep't, 668 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2012)). In our analysis,

we "look[] primarily to the persuasiveness of the trial court's

reasons" for its decision, giving "due regard" to the factors cited

by the court for reaching its ruling as well as "to its superior

point of vantage." Id. (quoting Delgado, 668 F.3d 42 at 50). To

guide our review, we consider "the reasons contemporaneously

presented in support of the request, the amount of time needed for

effective preparation, the complexity of the case, the extent of

- 49 - inconvenience to others if a continuance is granted, and the

likelihood of injustice or unfair prejudice attributable to the

denial of a continuance." United States v. Williams, 630 F.3d 44,

48 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Rodríguez–Durán, 507

F.3d 749, 763 (1st Cir. 2007)) (affirming the district court's

denial of the defendant's motion to continue trial, "especially in

light of the court's previous [week–long] continuance to

accommodate [defense counsel]").

To overturn a district court's ruling denying a motion

to continue, prejudice is "essential," and a party must "identif[y]

specific, concrete ways in which the denial resulted in

'substantial prejudice' to his or her defense." Carbone, 110 F.4th

at 372 (quoting United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167,

196 (1st Cir. 2014)). Thus, Papantoniadis "bears the burden of

demonstrating to us that in refusing the continuance request, 'the

district court exhibited an unreasonable and arbitrary insistence

upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for

delay.'" Id. (quoting Delgado, 668 F.3d at 50).

Papantoniadis has not demonstrated that the district

court abused its discretion in denying his request to delay the

trial date by more than four months. To begin, we are not persuaded

that the district court "exhibited an unreasonable and arbitrary

insistence upon expeditiousness." Id. (quoting Delgado, 668 F.3d

at 50). Rather, the district court carefully considered the

- 50 - relevant legal factors. For example, the district court considered

(1) that the case was not "unusually complex"; (2) that

Papantoniadis had retained three experienced lawyers, and there

was "no reason to think that counsel ha[d] not been diligent"; (3)

the potential impact on and inconvenience to the government and

its witnesses, including the seven employees; (4) the nature of

the discovery, including materials from the DOL investigation that

had been available to the defense for some time; and (5) that the

delay in disclosing the seven employees' names, although

suboptimal, did not present "an incredibly difficult problem [for

the defense] to overcome." See Williams, 630 F.3d at 48

(identifying the relevant factors). Although Papantoniadis faults

the district court for considering how a continuance would disrupt

its schedule, we have previously observed that "the extent of any

inconvenience to others," including "the court," is a relevant

factor in the analysis. Carbone, 110 F.4th at 372. As for the

likelihood of prejudice, the district court expressed

"confiden[ce]" that defense counsel could review "what need[ed] to

be reviewed" with the additional eight days.

Overall, Papantoniadis has failed to meaningfully

challenge the district court's assessment of the relevant factors.

Although we understand the hectic nature of the weeks before trial,

Papantoniadis has never explained why more than four months was

necessary for a four-person defense team (three attorneys plus a

- 51 - paralegal)10 to review about 20,000 pages of documents, 16,000 of

which were his own documents and previously available. He also

has not pointed to some more reasonable continuance, longer than

eight days but shorter than four months, that in his view would

have been appropriate. Thus, we reject his challenge to the

district court's ruling on the motion to continue.

2. New Trial Motion

We also review the district court's denial of

Papantoniadis's motion for a new trial based on the delayed

disclosure of discovery for "manifest abuse of discretion." United

States v. Martínez-Hernández, 118 F.4th 72, 91 (1st Cir. 2024)

(quoting United States v. Martínez-Mercado, 919 F.3d 91, 104-05

(1st Cir. 2019)). Because the district court "has a special sense

of the ebb and flow of the trial," we afford "substantial deference

to the [district court's] views regarding the likely impact of

belatedly disclosed evidence." Id. (quoting United States v.

Tucker, 61 F.4th 194, 207 (1st Cir. 2023)).

In a criminal case, the government has "an 'affirmative

duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant,'" otherwise

known as "Brady material." United States v. Montoya, 844 F.3d 63,

71 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 342

(1995)). The government's obligation to disclose Brady material

10 Not counting a fourth attorney who joined the team two weeks before the trial began.

- 52 - is not limited to truly exculpatory evidence; it also "includes

the disclosure of information potentially useful to impeaching the

credibility of a government witness where that information is

favorable and material to guilt or punishment." Roe v. Lynch, 997

F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55).

If the government fails to fulfill its duty in a timely manner,

"the defendant may be entitled to relief." Montoya, 844 F.3d

at 71.

Papantoniadis's Brady claim is "one of delayed

disclosure rather than complete suppression." United States v.

Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 588 (1st Cir. 2002). Thus, "we need not

reach the question whether the evidence at issue was 'material'

under Brady unless [Papantoniadis] first can show that [his]

counsel was 'prevented by the delay from using the disclosed

[evidence] effectively in preparing and presenting [his] case.'"

Id. (quoting United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st

Cir. 1986)).

In the circumstances of delayed disclosure, the

"principal concern" is "whether the failure to supply the

information in a seasonable fashion caused the defense to change

its trial strategy." Id. (quoting United States v. Josleyn, 99

F.3d 1182, 1196 (1st Cir. 1996)). To meet his burden,

Papantoniadis must, at the very least, "make a 'prima facie'

showing of a plausible strategic option which the delay

- 53 - foreclosed." United States v. Cruz-Feliciano, 786 F.3d 78, 87

(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Van Anh, 523 F.3d 43, 51

(1st Cir. 2008)); see also Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d at 199 ("When

Brady or Giglio material surfaces belatedly, 'the critical inquiry

is not why disclosure was delayed but whether the tardiness

prevented defense counsel from employing the material to good

effect.'" (quoting United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 8 (1st

Cir. 2003))).

Papantoniadis has failed to meet his burden of showing

an impact on counsel's effectiveness at trial from the belated

disclosure. Mainly, Papantoniadis contends that the government's

late disclosure of discovery violated Brady by preventing him from

raising a collusion defense. From his perspective, the delayed

disclosure foreclosed him from "present[ing] compelling evidence

that [the] employees had colluded to falsely paint themselves as

forced-labor victims to obtain immigration benefits available to

them if they cooperated with the government in Papantoniadis['s]

prosecution."

Papantoniadis has not demonstrated, however, that

additional time would have "caused the defense to change its trial

strategy." Lemmerer, 277 F.3d at 588 (quoting Josleyn, 99 F.3d at

1196). As proof of collusion, Papantoniadis points to specific

DOL documents, which identify the points at which various employees

provided relevant information to the DOL. He contends that the

- 54 - timing of these events, after the first employee learned of

potential immigration benefits, was suspicious. But we are

unpersuaded that earlier access to these records would have

resulted in a new litigation strategy or, as the government states,

"developed into more than a few sentences of closing argument."

As the district court explained, the record does not demonstrate

"why those particular disclosures have such special significance

that their late disclosure rendered the entire trial unfair."

Finally, we agree with the district court that

Papantoniadis "substantially overstates the burden imposed by the

volume of the production." For one, Papantoniadis exaggerates the

number of discovery documents at issue. He asserts that,

"[s]hortly before trial, the government deluged the defense with

roughly 40,000 pages of discovery." But instead, the government

produced approximately 10,000 pages of discovery on April 22, 2024,

well before Papantoniadis moved for a continuance. And only later,

on May 3, 2024, did the government produce an additional 19,000

pages of discovery, most of which were Papantoniadis's own business

records. As the district court observed, the government produced

those documents, which were written in English and included

"relatively brief" statements from the employees, "in an organized

manner, with an accompanying index." Given the nature of these

materials, we are not persuaded that their delayed disclosure

imposed an unfair burden on the defense team. Thus, we leave

- 55 - untouched the district court's decision to deny Papantoniadis's

motion for a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we affirm Papantoniadis's

convictions and sentence.

- 56 -