United States v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

178 F. Supp. 3d 927, 100 Fed. R. Serv. 243, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52472, 2016 WL 1559647
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 18, 2016
DocketCase No. 14-cr-00175-TEH
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 178 F. Supp. 3d 927 (United States v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 178 F. Supp. 3d 927, 100 Fed. R. Serv. 243, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52472, 2016 WL 1559647 (N.D. Cal. 2016).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

THELTON E. HENDERSON, United ' States District Judge

Defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company (“PG&E”) and the Government submitted simultaneous motions in limine on January 11, 2016. Dkt. Nos. 236, 237. Both parties timely opposed and replied in support of their respective motions. Dkt. Nos. 277, 281, 300, 308. The Court held limited oral argument on April 12, 2016. After carefully considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the Court now GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the parties’ motions in limine, as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On September 9, 2010, a gas line owned and operated by PG&E ruptured, causing significant , damage to a residential community in San Bruno, California. Superseding Indictment (“SI”) ¶ 6 (Dkt. No. 22). PG&E stands charged with one count of obstructing the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) investigation that followed the San Bruno explosion. Id. ¶ 61. PG&E is also charged with 12 counts of violating the minimum federal safety standards for the transportation of natural gas by pipeline (“Pipeline Safety Act”), as set forth in 49 C.F.R. pt. 192 (“Part 192”). Id. ¶¶ 62-75. Congress criminalized “knowing and willful” violations of these minimum standards under 49 U.S.C. § 60123 (“Section 60123”).

I. Count 1: Obstruction

The NTSB began an investigation immediately after the San Bruno explosion, examining the cause of the explosion, the characteristics and history of the failed pipe, the adequacy of PG&E’s emergency response, and PG&E’s operations. SI ¶¶ 54-55. The investigation revealed a number of deficiencies in PG&E’s record-keeping, integrity management program, and maintenance practices as they related to various sections of the pipeline, including the line that ruptured — Line 132. Id. The agency concluded that these deficiencies were a probable cause of the explosion. Id.

As part of its investigation, “the NTSB sent PG&E a series of data requests concerning instances where PG&E’s planned and unplanned pressure increases exceeded the 5-year MOPs and/or MAOPs of pipelines in HCAs.” Id. ¶ 56. HCAs, or high consequence areas, are densely populated locales where a release of gas could pose a significant risk of injury or death, 49 C.F.R. § 192.903; the 5-year MOP is the “maximum operating pressure experienced during the preceding five years,” 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(3)(i); and the MAOP is the “maximum allowable operating pressure” for a pipeline segment, 49 C.F.R. § 192.903.

In response to the NTSB data requests, PG&E provided a copy of Risk Management Instruction-06 (“RMI-06”), an internal policy document that stated “PG&E would only consider a manufacturing threat as unstable if the pressure on the line exceeded the 5-year MOP by 10%.” SI ¶ 57. The Pipeline Safety Act makes no such “10% or more” allowance. See 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e) (“If an operator identifies any of the following threats, the opera[940]*940tor must.. .address -the threat.. .[including] [operating pressure increases above the [MOP] experienced during the preceding five years.”).

On April 6, 2011, PG&E sent a letter to the NTSB (1) explaining that the “10% or more”, version of RMI-06 that had previously been disclosed was actually an “unapproved draft,” and (2) attaching another version of RMI-06 that did not include the “10% or more” policy. SI ¶ 69. The Government alleges that what PG&E did not disclose in this letter is that its integrity management group had actually followed the “10% or more” policy set forth in the original copy of RMI-06, whether or not that policy was formally approved and despite knowing that such a policy violated the Pipeline Safety Act. Id. ¶ 60.

On the basis of this conduct, the indictment charges that PG&E “did corruptly influence, obstruct, and impede” the NTSB investigation. Id. ¶ 61.

II. Counts 2-13: Pipeline Safety Act Violations

Counts 2-131 allege knowing and willful violations of the Pipeline Safety Act.

Counts 2 and 5-8 allege violations of Part 192’s Subpart O, known as the Integrity Management (“IM”) regulations. Id. ¶¶ 62-63, 66-73. Count 2 charges PG&E with violating 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(b), which states that “[t]o identify and evaluate the potential threats to a covered pipeline segment, an operator must gather and integrate existing data and information on the entire pipeline that could be relevant to the covered segment,” on two pipelines: Lines 132 and 109. Id. ¶63. Count 5 charges PG&E with violating 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(a), which states that “[a]n operator must identify and evaluate all potential threats to each covered pipeline segment,” on three pipelines: Lines 132, 153, and DFM 1816-01. Id. ¶67. Count 6 charges PG&E with violating 49 C.F.R. § 192.919, which states that “[a]n operator must include [certain] elements in its written baseline assessment plan,” on six pipelines: Lines 132, 153, DFM 1816-01, 107, 191-1, and 109. Id. ¶ 69. Count 7 charges PG&E with violating 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(3), which states that “[i]f an operator identifies the threat of manufacturing and construction defects (including seam defects) in the covered segment, an operator must analyze the covered segment to determine the risk of failure from these defects,” and if certain changes occur, that “an operator must prioritize the covered segment as a high risk segment for the baseline assessment or a subsequent reassessment,” on four pipelines: Lines 132, 153, DFM 1816-01, and 109. Id. ¶71. Count 8 charges PG&E with violating 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4), which states that “[i]f a covered pipeline segment contains [certain characteristics], an operator must select an assessment technology or technologies with a proven application capable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies, [and] must prioritize the covered segment as a high risk segment for the baseline assessment or a subsequent reassessment,” on five pipelines: Lines DFM 1816-01, 191-1, 109, 107, and 132. Id. ¶ 73.

Counts 3-4 and 9-13 allege that PG&E’s recordkeeping practices fell below the standards required of Part 192’s record-keeping provisions. Counts 3-4 charge PG&E with violating 49 C.F.R. [941]*941§ 192.709

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178 F. Supp. 3d 927, 100 Fed. R. Serv. 243, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52472, 2016 WL 1559647, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-pacific-gas-electric-co-cand-2016.