United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette

E.D. Pennsylvania

United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette

477 F. Supp. 32, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10943

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

DecidedJuly 18, 1979

DocketCiv. A. 78-609

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 477 F. Supp. 32 (United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp. 32, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10943 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

HUYETT, District Judge.

The United States has commenced condemnation and forfeiture proceedings against one 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, Serial No. 1Z37L6S419778. Claimant Diane Morales as alleged owner seeks return of the vehicle. All parties agree that jurisdiction of this action exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1355. Claimant has stipulated that the government has met its initial burden of showing probable cause for the institution of the proceedings. See United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette, 393 F.Supp. 344, 346 (E.D.Pa.1975). Following a non-jury trial, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The stipulation of uncontested facts, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, is adopted, and incorporated herein by reference.

2. On September 14, 1977, when Carmen Garcia sold heroin to an individual cooperating with the Drug Enforcement Administration, and when Carmen Garcia was operating defendant vehicle, the vehicle was registered to Adalberto Torres, 12203 Barbary Rd., Philadelphia, Pa.

3. Claimant Diane Morales purchased defendant vehicle from Adalberto Torres on September 28 or 29,1977, for approximately $4,000.00 cash.

4. Claimant Diane Morales applied for and received a temporary registration certificate for defendant vehicle on October 1, 1977, after purchasing defendant vehicle from Adalberto Torres.

5. On October 31, 1977, a certificate of title to a motor vehicle for defendant vehicle was issued to claimant by the Department of Transportation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

6. On September 14,1977, defendant vehicle was neither owned by claimant Diane Morales, titled to her, in her possession or custody, nor in any manner under her control.

7. No evidence was introduced in this proceeding linking defendant vehicle with the transportation, possession, or sale of any contraband article after September 14, 1977.

8. No evidence was introduced in this proceeding upon which to base a finding that the purchase of defendant vehicle by claimant Diane Morales was a sham transaction intended to avoid the operation of any forfeiture statute.

9. No evidence was introduced in this proceeding upon which to base a finding that claimant Diane Morales was aware of the sale of heroin conducted by Carmen Garcia on September 14, 1977.

10. After she purchased defendant vehicle, claimant Diane Morales rented a garage from Carmen Garcia in which she stored defendant vehicle.

11. Defendant vehicle was seized from the garage claimant rented from Carmen Garcia on November 22, 1977.

12. Claimant Diane Morales did not give Carmen Garcia permission to use defendant vehicle after she purchased it.

*34 13. Claimant Diane Morales did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the defendant vehicle from being used to facilitate the transportation, sale, possession, or concealment of any article of contraband.

14. Claimant Diane Morales was not involved in the illegal transactions upon which this forfeiture action is based.

15. At the time she purchased defendant vehicle and up until at least the time the vehicle was seized, claimant Diane Morales was unaware of the illegal transactions upon which this forfeiture action is based.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1355.

2. The Government had probable cause to institute forfeiture proceedings against defendant vehicle. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d); 19 U.S.C. § 1615.

3. Following establishment of probable cause to institute the proceeding, the burden of proof is on the claimant to establish a valid defense.

4. Claimant Diane Morales has established a valid defense to the forfeiture of defendant vehicle since:

a. At the time defendant vehicle was used to facilitate the sale or transportation of contraband, the vehicle was neither owned by her, titled to her, in her possession or custody, nor in any manner under her control;

b. She was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity;

c. She did all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of her property;

d. Prior to the time she purchased defendant vehicle, or the vehicle was in some other manner under her control, she had no duty to prevent the use of defendant vehicle in illegal activity;

e. Her purchase of defendant vehicle was a bona fide purchase and was not a sham transaction intended to avoid the operation of any forfeiture statute.

5. Under the facts of this case, as found supra, forfeiture of claimant’s vehicle would constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974).

6. The claim of Diane Morales to rightful possession and ownership of defendant vehicle is granted and defendant vehicle is not forfeited to the United States.

MEMORANDUM

Forfeiture proceedings, such as the instant action, are generally considered as in rem actions against the vehicle. United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette, 393 F.Supp. 344, 347 (E.D.Pa.1975). For this reason, it has been stated that “the innocence, non-involvement and lack of negligence of the owner of a seized vehicle is not a defense in a forfeiture action.” Id. However, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), the Court alluded to the possibility that in certain situations an innocent owner may prevail:

It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent. [Citations omitted]. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.

Id. at 689-90, 94 S.Ct. at 2094-2095. (footnote omitted).

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