United States v. Nayar Beltran Campos

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 13, 2024
• Docket: 22-50258
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 13 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-50258

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:15-cr-00206-FMO-4 v.

NAYAR JOSUE BELTRAN CAMPOS, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando M. Olguin, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 6, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: FORREST and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and DONATO,*** District Judge.

Nayar Josue Beltran Campos appeals a custodial sentence of 127 months

imposed for his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 963 and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1) for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. conspiracy to import controlled substances. Campos contends that the district

court did not properly consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

among the co-defendants in this case, as it was required to do pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). We affirm.

“The district court need not tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show

that it has considered them.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.

2008) (en banc). In addition, we “assume that district judges know the law and

understand their obligation to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors,” and the district

court need not “articulate in a vacuum how each § 3553(a) factor influences its

determination of an appropriate sentence.” Id.

The record demonstrates that the district court properly addressed the factors

described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and gave specific attention to the question of

unwarranted sentence disparities. The district court was clearly “familiar with

[Campos’s] crimes, personal situation, and both the government’s and [Campos’s]

arguments regarding sentencing.” United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1117

(9th Cir. 2009). The district court stated at the beginning of the sentencing hearing

that it had read and considered defendant’s sentencing papers, which contained

defendant’s sentencing disparities argument. During the hearing, Campos raised

the sentences his co-defendants had received, and the need to avoid unwarranted

disparities. The district court “heard and considered” Campos’s arguments and it

2 considered the § 3553(a) factors, including the need to avoid unwarranted sentence

disparities among similarly situated defendants. Id. at 1118.

Consequently, there was no plain error in the district court’s consideration

and application of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Valencia-Barragan,

608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). Because the sentencing was “procedurally

sound,” we “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence

imposed.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

The sentence was not substantively unreasonable because it was different

from the sentences imposed on Campos’s co-defendants. Campos contends that he

received a longer sentence than two co-defendants, but he failed to address what

crimes these co-defendants were convicted of. See Carter, 560 F.3d at 1121

(collecting cases listing various considerations that warrant disparate co-defendant

sentences). In addition, for one of the co-defendants, Campos does not know for

sure what sentence that co-defendant received. And for the other, Campos argues

that the co-defendant was more culpable because he possessed a larger quantity of

drugs, despite having argued to the district court that the purity and quantity of

drugs possessed are not necessarily reliable indicators of a defendant’s degree of

culpability. In sum, Campos has not shown that his sentence was lengthier than

the sentences received by co-conspirators who were “similarly situated” to him,

3 and the alleged disparities between Campos’s sentence and those of his co-

conspirators do not make Campos’s sentence substantively unreasonable. Id.

AFFIRMED.