United States v. Naajeh Torres

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-2842
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________

Nos. 25-2842 & 25-2865 ______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

NAAJEH SAYYID TORRES, Appellant ______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Nos. 3:24-cr-00110 & 3:17-cr-00152) U.S. District Judge: Hon. Karoline Mehalchick ______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) July 1, 2026 ______________

Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and McKEE, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 1, 2026) ______________

OPINION * ______________

∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Naajeh Torres appeals his convictions and sentences for federal drug offenses and

violations of the terms of his supervised release. His counsel argues that the appeals

present no nonfrivolous issues and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967). We agree, and we will grant the motion and affirm.

I

Torres was on supervised release for a federal drug crime when he sold cocaine

and methamphetamine to undercover agents and was charged with three counts of

distributing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). After he was

charged, the Government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a), alleging that he

was subject to a statutory sentencing enhancement based on his prior federal drug

conviction.

Torres pleaded guilty to the § 841(a) charges and admitted his prior conviction.

Because he was at least eighteen years old at the time of the § 841(a) offenses and had

two prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses—the prior federal drug

conviction and a prior state drug conviction—Torres was designated a career offender

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(1), which triggered a base offense level of thirty-seven and a

criminal history category of VI, resulting in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’

imprisonment. The District Court varied downward and sentenced him to 180 months’

imprisonment followed by eight years’ supervised release.

Based on this conviction, Torres was also charged with a Grade A violation of the

conditions of his supervised release, which required, among other things, that he commit

2 no other crimes. Torres admitted to the violation and was sentenced to eighteen months’

imprisonment—which was the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range—to be served

consecutively to the drug sentence.

Torres appeals. His counsel moves to withdraw under Anders, identifies potential

issues for appeal, and explains that they provide no basis for overturning his convictions

or sentences. 1

II 2

A

“Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) reflects the guidelines the Supreme

Court promulgated in Anders to [ensure] that indigent clients receive adequate and fair

representation.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). Rule 109.2(a)

allows defense counsel to file a motion to withdraw and a supporting brief when counsel

has reviewed the record and concluded that “the appeal presents no issue of even

arguable merit.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). When counsel submits an Anders brief, we

must determine: “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and

(2) whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”

Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. An issue is frivolous if it “lacks any basis in law or fact.”

McCoy v. Ct. of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988).

1 Torres had the opportunity to file a pro se brief, but he did not. He did file a pro se notice of appeal in which he stated that his career offender sentence was excessive. 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We exercise plenary review to determine whether there are any nonfrivolous issues for appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). 3 To determine whether counsel has fulfilled Rule 109.2(a)’s requirements, we

examine the Anders brief to see if counsel: (1) thoroughly examined the record in search

of appealable issues, identifying those that arguably support the appeal; and (2) explained

why those issues are frivolous. See United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir.

2022); United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780-81 (3d Cir. 2000). If we determine

that the Anders brief is adequate, then “we confine our scrutiny to those portions of the

record identified by” it. Youla, 241 F.3d at 301.

Counsel’s Anders brief satisfies both elements, and an independent review of the

record reveals no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. First, the brief demonstrates a thorough

examination of the record and identifies several issues: (1) jurisdiction; (2) whether

Torres’s guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary; and (3) the procedural and substantive

reasonableness of his sentences. Second, the brief explains why any challenge based on

these issues would be frivolous. Counsel has thus fulfilled his Anders obligations, and

we will proceed to review the issues counsel identified. See Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.

B

Our independent review of the record accords with counsel’s assessment with

respect to the District Court’s jurisdiction and Torres’s conviction and sentence under §

841(a).

The District Court had jurisdiction over the federal drug crimes Torres committed.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231, 3237(a). Moreover, Torres’s plea complied with the

Constitution, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969), and Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11. The Court confirmed that Torres was competent, understood the

4 nature of the proceedings and charges, his available options, and the consequences of

pleading guilty, including his maximum penalties. The Court also advised Torres of his

rights, including that he could plead not guilty and proceed to trial with the assistance of

counsel who could cross-examine witnesses, that he had a right to testify and subpoena

witnesses, and that the jury would presume him innocent, unless and until the

Government proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court confirmed Torres

understood these rights and found a factual basis for Torres’s guilty plea and that he

pleaded guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Therefore, there is no issue of arguable merit

with respect to the validity of Torres’s plea.

Further, Torres’ sentence for the § 841(a) violations was procedurally reasonable

because the District Court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and meaningfully

considered and applied the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558,

567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). The sentence was also substantively reasonable because we

cannot say “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence . . .

for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. at 568. Because the sentence was below

the applicable Guidelines range, it is presumptively reasonable. See Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir.

2008) (“[I]t follows [from Rita] that a below-guideline sentence is also presumptively

reasonable against an attack by a defendant claiming that the sentence is too high.”). The

District Court varied downward from the applicable career offender range of 262 to 327

5 months and sentenced Torres to 180 months’ imprisonment based on his remorse and

because his prior offenses were not violent and occurred when he was much younger.

Any challenge to Torres’s career offender designation is meritless. Torres

maintains that his state offense was not a qualifying conviction because it covered more

conduct than federal law prohibits and thus was not a “controlled substance offense”

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), but he concedes this argument is foreclosed by United States

v. Lewis, 58 F.4th 764, 771 (3d Cir. 2023) (holding that under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), it is

irrelevant whether the state law the defendant violated defines the prohibited drug more

broadly than federal law). 3

C

3 Torres maintains for the first time on appeal that the District Court may have erred by failing to provide Torres a hearing under 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). Because Torres did not preserve this argument, we review for plain error. See United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 528 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993)). The District Court did not err. Section 851(b) requires that, if the Government files an information of prior conviction under the section, the court shall after conviction but before pronouncement of sentence inquire of the person with respect to whom the information was filed whether he affirms or denies that he has been previously convicted as alleged in the information, and shall inform him that any challenge to a prior conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). The District Court advised Torres of the § 851 information at his change-of-plea hearing, where Torres admitted that he was previously convicted of the offense identified in the information. Nothing in § 851 requires a court to hold a separate, unrequested hearing. Cf. United States v. Guyton, 144 F.4th 449, 463 (3d Cir.) (determining district court had “disregard[ed] [the] straightforward command” of § 851(b) by not giving the defendant the chance to affirm or deny prior conviction alleged in the information), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 900 (2025). Even if the District Court erred by not holding an additional hearing, Torres concedes that his unpreserved argument fails at Olano step three because he cannot show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome would have been different, given that his prior conviction 6 Our independent review of the record also accords with counsel’s assessment with

respect to the supervised release violation.

The District Court had jurisdiction over Torres’s prior offense and the authority to

revoke his supervised release. See 18 U.S.C §§ 3231, 3583(e)(3). Further, after the

District Court advised Torres of his rights, the Government’s burden of proof, and the

possible penalties for violating the terms of his supervised release, Torres admitted to the

violation and voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to a formal revocation hearing

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b).

Further, Torres’s sentence for the violation was both procedurally and

substantively reasonable. The sentence was procedurally reasonable because the District

Court correctly calculated the Guidelines range for his Grade A violation as eighteen to

twenty-four months’ imprisonment, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), considered the applicable

§ 3553(a) factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), and arrived at a bottom-of-the-range eighteen-

month consecutive sentence. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. Imposing a consecutive sentence

is consistent with the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 7B, introductory cmt., addresses the breach

of trust from his noncompliance, and “provide[s] adequate community protection and

deterrence.” App. 72. Since we cannot say no reasonable sentencing judge would have

imposed such a sentence, it is also substantively reasonable. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.

appears to meet the definitions of “serious drug felony” and “felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) and (58), thereby enhancing his sentence ranges under § 841(b)(1)(B) and (C). 7 III

Because counsel thoroughly examined the record and identified no nonfrivolous

grounds for appeal, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm.