United States v. Musa

833 F. Supp. 752, 1993 WL 376760
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedSeptember 24, 1993
Docket4:93CR89 DJS (CDP)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 833 F. Supp. 752 (United States v. Musa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Musa, 833 F. Supp. 752, 1993 WL 376760 (E.D. Mo. 1993).

Opinion

833 F.Supp. 752 (1993)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,
v.
Tawfiq MUSA, Zein Isa, Saif Nijmeh, and Luie Nijmeh, Defendants.

No. 4:93CR89 DJS (CDP).

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, E.D.

September 24, 1993.

*753 Tom Day, St. Louis, MO, for Zein Isa.

Neil J. Bruntrager, Bruntrager & Billings, St. Louis, MO, for Luie Nijmeh.

Keith G. Liberman, St. Louis, MO, for Saif Nijmeh.

Linda Murphy, Clayton, MO, for Tawfiq Musa.

James Steitz, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, MO, for U.S.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PERRY, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the undersigned on the government's motion for a protective order to protect the dissemination of classified information that will be provided to the defendants in discovery in this case. All pretrial motions in this case were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

The government has already produced to the defendants approximately 250 tape recorded conversations, which have been declassified and which constitute the bulk of the information that the government intends to introduce in its case in chief. It intends to produce tapes of approximately 100 additional declassified conversations. However, the government has indicated that much of the remaining discoverable material required to be turned over to defendants in this case constitutes "classified national security information," that is, documents or audio tapes that have been classified by an executive agency of the United States government as "confidential", "secret", "top secret", or "sensitive compartmented information." In fact, the government has indicated that most of the discovery materials to be turned over in this case are classified as "secret". The government has agreed to produce approximately 7,000 reels of audio tapes of conversations, most in languages other than English, and the government logs of those telephone conversations, which are in English, as part of discovery.[1] These documents and tapes must be produced to the defendants in a format that will allow counsel to review them, to seek assistance from interpreters and others such as expert witnesses, where appropriate, and to allow defendants themselves to review the materials, all in preparation for trial. Because the documents and tapes are classified, however, procedures must be established pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act ("CIPA"), 18 U.S.C.App. *754 III, to restrict the dissemination of these materials.

All four defendants in this case have been detained pending trial (one, Zein Isa, is currently under sentence of death from Missouri state courts). Thus, in addition to the issues regarding dissemination of classified materials, the Court must consider methods for allowing defendants themselves to review this material and discuss the same with their attorneys, in a secure yet confidential environment.

I. Objections to Any Protective Order

Some defendants have filed objections to any protective order being entered in this case, and have argued that the restrictions set forth in the CIPA violate their rights to due process, a fair and public trial, and to effective assistance of counsel of their choosing, as protected by the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. These objections are easily rejected.

Congress enacted CIPA to combat "greymail", that is, the situation where a defendant's threat to or right to reveal classified information during a public trial might thwart the government's ability to proceed with a criminal prosecution. CIPA sets up a procedural mechanism to deal with the competing needs of criminal defendants to introduce classified information in evidence at trial and the government's need to protect such materials from unnecessary disclosure. The major thrust of the legislation is to provide a framework for pretrial determination of the admissibility of classified information at a defendant's behest.[2] Section 3, however, authorizes the court to issue a protective order protecting any classified information from unnecessary dissemination during the discovery process, and that is the section at issue here.

Although there are very few cases discussing the terms of a protective order under section 3, and the undersigned has located none dealing specifically with the constitutionality of section 3, other provisions of CIPA have withstood constitutional challenges. See e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1094-94 (D.C.Cir.1991) (affirming district court denial of motion to dismiss on claim that CIPA discovery provisions infringed on defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights); United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2nd Cir.1984) (section 5 notice requirements are constitutional), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839, 107 S.Ct. 143, 93 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 976 (4th Cir.1983) (CIPA provisions did not infringe on defendant's confrontation rights or privilege against self incrimination); United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir.) (no denial of right to fair trial where defendants not allowed to examine classified surveillance equipment on airplane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007, 104 S.Ct. 524, 78 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); United States v. Jolliff, 548 F.Supp. 229 (D.Md.1981) (upholding constitutionality of Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of CIPA).

Here the defendants have simply argued that any restrictions on their use and dissemination of the materials produced to them in discovery is unconstitutional. They have provided no basis for this argument. Rule 16(d), Fed.R.Crim.P., gives the Court broad discretion to regulate discovery in criminal cases. In this case the defendants are being provided with these tapes and logs, and the government is not attempting to avoid producing any of these materials by reason of their classification status. The CIPA protective order provisions do not restrict defendants' fifth or sixth amendment rights, and the right to a public trial is not infringed by the protective order sought here, which simply prohibits unnecessary disclosure of classified information provided to defendants in discovery. A later determination will be made, if necessary, regarding the use of classified information at trial. Defendants' general objections to the issuance of a protective order will be overruled.

*755 Defendants have also argued generally that the interests of national security do not require the information involved in this case to be classified at all, as it largely consists of telephone conversations among the defendants themselves and others. The determination whether to designate information as classified is a matter committed to the executive branch. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1217-18 (4th Cir.1984), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 780 F.2d 1102

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Bluebook (online)
833 F. Supp. 752, 1993 WL 376760, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-musa-moed-1993.