United States v. Al-Arian

280 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6432, 2003 WL 21078080
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedApril 10, 2003
Docket8:03-cr-00077
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 280 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (United States v. Al-Arian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Al-Arian, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6432, 2003 WL 21078080 (M.D. Fla. 2003).

Opinion

ORDER

PIZZO, United States Magistrate Judge.

The government has moved to detain each Defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) and (B). After a detention hearing, and having considered the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the government’s motions to detain Defendants Al-Arian and Hammoudeh are granted but denied as to Defendants Fariz and Ballut.

*1347 I.

The Bail Reform Act requires a judicial officer to consider certain factors when deciding if conditions of release can be set reasonably assuring a defendant’s presence as required and the safety of any other person and the community. These are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the crime charged, and particularly whether the offense is a crime of violence; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). The government must show the defendant is a serious flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(f); United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir.1988). In this case, because all the Defendants are charged with conspiracy to kill, maim, or injure persons in a foreign country (18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1); count 2), a rebuttable presumption exists that each Defendant is a flight risk and a danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Thus, each Defendant carries the burden of production to come forward with evidence to rebut these presumptions. In other words, every Defendant has the burden to produce evidence “to suggest that he ... [is] either not dangerous or not likely to flee if turned loose on bail.” United States v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 916 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir.1985)).

Although the Bail Reform Act does not list the length of pretrial delay as a factor a court should consider in weighing-conditions of release, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, accepting the Second Circuit’s reasoning, that “at some point and under some circumstances, the duration of pretrial detention becomes unconstitutional.” Quartermaine, 913 F.2d at 917 (quoting United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 339 (2d Cir.1986)). 1 In this case the pretrial delay will be more than a year, perhaps two. Added to this is the length of the anticipated trial — six months to a year. To determine if pretrial detention will become excessive, courts look to these factors: (1) its length, (2) the extent of the prosecution’s responsibility for the delay of the trial, (3) the gravity of the charges, and (4) the strength of the evidence upon which detention was based. United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir.2000).

II.

A Perspective

All the Defendants are charged with being members of an international terrorist organization, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ). Comprehending the seriousness of the offenses leveled against these Defendants requires perspective. In the overwhelming majority of cases prosecuted in federal court, the charged offense impacts no more than a few victims. For some cases, like serious drug crimes or organized criminal rings, the breadth of the affected might extend to a neighborhood or the local community. And almost always, the prospect of economic gain drives the conduct. This case is different. The breadth of the affected here extends to nations and world regions. Moreover, a zealous commitment to a violent philosophy fuels the actors. Appreciating the magnitude of the accusations requires examining the PIJ’s structure, the Defendants’ positions within the organization, and their claimed interaction with one *1348 another against the backdrop of the events occurring in the Mid-East during critical dates.

B. The government’s proffer

The PIJ considers itself the “vanguard of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement.” (Court’s ex. 3). Its creed is blunt, violent, and uncompromising. The PIJ rejects any peaceful solution to the Palestinian question. It advocates the destruction of Israel, the elimination of Western influence, particularly from the United States, in the region, and the creation of an Islamist state. And it aims to achieve all this through terror — the senseless, brutal murder of innocents in public places designed to instill fear, instability, and panic in the populace and the government of Israel. The PIJ killed over a hundred in Israel and the occupied territories during the period referenced in the indictment. It maimed many more. The roll call of dead and wounded included Americans.

The “Secretary General” and a ten-member “Shura Council,” or managing board of directors, run the PIJ. Fathi Shiqaqi acted as the PIJ’s Secretary General from its beginning until his assassination in October 1995. Defendants Al-Ari-an, Muhammed Tasir Hassan Al-Khatib (Al-Arian’s brother-in-law), Abd Al Aziz Awda, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, and Ba-shir Musa Mohammed Nafi served on the Shura. The PIJ operates cells worldwide. For example, Al-Arian, according to the government, acted as the PIJ’s leader in North America and operated the Tampa cell that included Defendants Shallah (for a time), Hammoudeh, Fariz, and Mazen Al-Najjar (Unindicted Co-Conspirator Twelve and Al-Arian’s brother-in-law). Defendants Ballut and Fariz, until he recently moved to this district, were alleged members of the PIJ’s Chicago unit. Notably, the PIJ paid some members, like Hammoudeh and Al-Najjar, though they were not on the Shura.

Al-Arian, Shallah, Hammoudeh, and Mazen Al-Najjar taught or attended the University of South Florida (USF); the government asserts this was not a coincidence. USF provided them academic cover and the opportunity to bring PIJ members and associates into the United States. See doc. 1 at ¶ s 16 and 28. From 1986 through the return of the indictment, Al-Arian served on the engineering faculty. 2

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Bluebook (online)
280 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6432, 2003 WL 21078080, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-al-arian-flmd-2003.