Appellate Case: 24-1418 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 16, 2025 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-1418
MIGUEL MUNOZ,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:22-CR-00371-JLK-1) _________________________________
Robert S. Jackson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant–Appellant.
Albert C. Buchman, Assistant United States Attorney (Peter McNeilly, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee. _________________________________
Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
McHUGH, Circuit Judge. _________________________________
Defendant–Appellant Miguel Munoz entered a conditional plea of guilty to one
count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop, Appellate Case: 24-1418 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 2
arguing both that the traffic stop was not justified at its inception and that the stop
was unreasonably extended.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude the district
court did not err in denying the suppression motion and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
At around 12:45 p.m. on October 12, 2021, Kansas Highway Patrol Troopers
John Rule and Jerett Ranieri were traveling westbound on I-70 in Wabaunsee County,
Kansas, with Trooper Rule driving the patrol vehicle and Trooper Ranieri sitting in
the passenger seat. As the troopers were beginning to turn into the freeway median at
about mile marker 339, they saw a black Jeep Grand Cherokee driving eastbound. In
place of a typical license plate, the Jeep had a temporary registration tag “that was
flapping or blowing up,” ROA Vol. III at 64, “sticking out so you couldn’t tell where
it was from . . . instead of being flat against the back of the vehicle,” id. at 20–21.
Based on the flapping of the paper registration tag, which they believed to be a
violation of Kansas law, the troopers “turned out of the median . . . into the
eastbound lane, and began catching up to the vehicle.” Id. at 21. Trooper Rule
testified at Mr. Munoz’s suppression hearing that he did not observe the same
flapping after he turned eastbound to follow the Jeep, and “by the time [they] caught
up with the vehicle, [the tag] had settled back down into its normal position where it
should be.” Id. at 25. Although he had no independent recollection of this
observation, Trooper Rule also testified that he wrote in his report that the Jeep had
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drifted onto the right fog line (the solid white line marking the shoulder of the
freeway) twice within a quarter mile while he was following it.
Trooper Rule caught up with the Jeep after a few minutes, at which time he
activated his patrol vehicle’s emergency overhead lights to pull the Jeep over.
Activating the overhead lights caused his dashboard camera to save the previous two
minutes of video footage and to keep recording until he turned the overhead lights off
at the end of the stop. Because it took Trooper Rule a few minutes to catch up to the
Jeep, however, the recorded video does not capture the troopers’ initial viewing of
the Jeep or their turn through the median; rather, the video begins while the patrol
vehicle is already traveling eastbound in pursuit of the Jeep.
The Jeep pulled over in response to Trooper Rule’s activation of the patrol
vehicle’s overhead lights. Mr. Munoz was driving the Jeep, and his wife was sitting
in the passenger seat. After both vehicles had come to a stop, Trooper Rule walked
up to the Jeep, and the following exchange occurred:
Trooper Rule: Hello.
Mr. Munoz: Hi, officer.
Trooper Rule: How are you?
Mr. Munoz: Good.
Trooper Rule: Good, good. Can I see your driver’s license?
Mr. Munoz: We’re going to a funeral.
Trooper Rule: What’s that?
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Trooper Rule: You’re going to a funeral? Yeah, where’s that at?
Mr. Munoz: In, uh—in Kansas.
Dashcam Video at 2:41–2:53.
Mr. Munoz then passed his documents to Trooper Rule with a shaking hand.
Trooper Rule perceived him to be “[e]xtremely nervous,” unlike what he would
expect to see in “a normal traffic stop.” ROA Vol. III at 32.
Trooper Rule asked Mr. Munoz who passed away, and he replied that it was
one of his wife’s aunts. Trooper Rule inquired when the funeral was, and Mr. Munoz
said, “Um, uh—,”and then answered that he thought it was “tomorrow” or the day
after that. Dashcam Video at 3:24–3:31.
Trooper Rule testified he thought it was “extremely odd” for Mr. Munoz to
immediately blurt out the information that he and his wife were going to a funeral, as
in Trooper Rule’s experience individuals who have been pulled over will typically
first ask him why they have been stopped, rather than launching into an explanation
of where they are going. ROA Vol. III at 35. Moreover, Trooper Rule has “commonly
come into contact with drug smugglers who” attempt to elicit sympathy during traffic
stops by claiming that “a funeral or a sick relative [is] the reason for their trip.” Id.
Mr. Munoz’s immediate, unprompted attempt “to justify why he[ was] [t]here” with a
sympathetic-sounding explanation therefore caused Trooper Rule to “think something
isn’t right here.” Id.
Trooper Rule also found it odd that Mr. Munoz said they were going to a
funeral “in Kansas,” as the traffic stop occurred well within the State of Kansas. Id.
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at 30. Indeed, the stop occurred around mile marker 340, meaning that an individual
traveling eastbound on I-70 from Colorado would have already traveled about 340
miles through Kansas to reach this part of the freeway. In Trooper Rule’s three
decades of experience as a Kansas Highway Patrol officer, most people he stops will
tell him “what city they’re going to, not the state that they’re in.” Id. at 31. And in his
experience, the failure to disclose a specific destination point can be consistent with
drug trafficking.
While Trooper Rule spoke with Mr. Munoz, Trooper Ranieri left the patrol car
and looked through the windows of the Jeep. He observed images of the Virgin Mary
and Jesus Malverde hanging from the rearview mirror.
Both troopers returned to the patrol vehicle, where Trooper Rule contacted
dispatch to run Mr. Munoz’s driver’s license and criminal history. Trooper Ranieri
told Trooper Rule about his observation of the Jesus Malverde image. Both troopers
testified at Mr. Munoz’s suppression hearing that Jesus Malverde is known as a
patron saint of drug smuggling and that they commonly find narcotics in vehicles
containing images of Jesus Malverde.
Dispatch reported that Mr. Munoz had a valid Colorado driver’s license, that
the Jeep was registered to him, and that he had two prior misdemeanor arrests but no
drug history. After receiving this information, Trooper Rule exited the patrol vehicle
and motioned for Mr. Munoz to join him at the back of the Jeep. He then explained
that the tag on the back of the Jeep was blowing upward while Mr. Munoz was
driving, and he lifted the unsecured bottom end of the paper tag to demonstrate the
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problem. Trooper Rule told Mr. Munoz that he needed to tape the tag down so he
would not lose it and so it would be visible. Trooper Rule then returned Mr. Munoz’s
license and other documents to him. At this point in the stop, Trooper Rule perceived
Mr. Munoz to still sound nervous despite having been told he would not receive a
ticket.
After returning Mr. Munoz’s documents to him, Trooper Rule began asking
Mr. Munoz more questions about his travel plans and whether he had brought
anything illegal with him. After less than a minute of additional questioning, Trooper
Rule asked if he could take a look in the Jeep. Mr. Munoz said, “Sure,” and opened
the back hatch of the Jeep. Dashcam Video at 12:43–12:48. Within ten minutes of
Mr. Munoz opening the back hatch of the Jeep for Trooper Rule, the troopers found
1,025 fentanyl tablets concealed in a dog food bag and a loaded handgun in a
different bag located in the back seat of the Jeep.
The troopers arrested Mr. Munoz and his wife and transported them to a
Kansas Highway Patrol stationhouse. There, Mr. Munoz agreed to a search of his
phone and provided officers with his phone’s passcode. While Mr. Munoz and his
wife were at the stationhouse, a Kansas Highway Patrol lieutenant spoke with an
Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”). The AUSA told the lieutenant that the
Government would not pursue charges against Mr. Munoz at that time but asked the
Kansas Highway Patrol to “put together an investigative packet” for possible future
prosecution. ROA Vol. III at 89. Mr. Munoz and his wife were accordingly released
from custody.
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However, the information obtained from Mr. Munoz’s phone was used over
the next several months by officers investigating his drug trafficking activities. Based
on the information gathered from this investigation, officers conducted a second
traffic stop of the Jeep in July 2022. At this second traffic stop, an officer found a
gun and suspected cocaine in Mr. Munoz’s pocket, and more drugs were found in the
Jeep. Mr. Munoz was subsequently indicted on several drug trafficking counts and
one firearm count.
Following his indictment, Mr. Munoz filed a Motion to Suppress All Evidence
and Statements, contending that all evidence against him flowed from the traffic stop
on October 12, 2021, which he challenged on several grounds. Among other
arguments, he contended that the stop was not justified at its inception and that the
stop was unreasonably extended after Trooper Rule returned his documents. In
response, the Government argued that the search was justified at its inception
because the troopers had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Munoz had violated two
different Kansas statutes: one requiring license plates to be “securely fastened,” Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 8-133(c), and the other requiring vehicles to “be driven as nearly as
practicable entirely within a single lane,” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522(a). As for
Mr. Munoz’s argument that the stop was unreasonably extended, the Government
argued that the initial detention became a consensual encounter after Trooper Rule
returned Mr. Munoz’s documents to him, or alternatively that the troopers
permissibly detained Mr. Munoz based on reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.
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The district court held a suppression hearing, at which it heard testimony from
Troopers Rule and Ranieri. At the close of the hearing, the district court found that
the troopers “were not impeached, and their testimony was credible.” ROA Vol. III at
119. And based on their testimony, the district court concluded that the stop was
valid and dismissed Mr. Munoz’s Motion to Suppress.
The district court elaborated on its reasoning in a written Order Denying
Defendant Michael Munoz’s Motion to Suppress All Evidence and Statements. In this
Order, the district court held that the traffic stop was justified at its inception because
the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Munoz had violated both
Kansas Statutes Annotated § 8-133(c) and § 8-1522(a). The district court further held
that the troopers had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Munoz was engaged in drug
trafficking, thus justifying the brief extension of the stop. Because it upheld the
extension of the stop on this basis, the district court did not consider the
Government’s alternative argument that “the encounter became consensual once
Trooper Rule returned Mr. Munoz’s documents to him.” ROA Vol. I at 61.
After the district court denied his Motion to Suppress, Mr. Munoz entered a
conditional plea of guilty to Count One of the indictment, which alleged a drug
trafficking conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In exchange for his plea of
guilty, the Government agreed to dismiss the other counts against him. Mr. Munoz’s
plea agreement reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his Motion to
Suppress but waived his other appeal rights.
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The district court accepted Mr. Munoz’s guilty plea and ultimately sentenced
him to 60 months of imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Munoz argues that the district court should have suppressed all
evidence obtained as a result of the October 2021 traffic stop for two reasons: (1) the
traffic stop was not justified at its inception, and (2) the troopers were not justified in
extending the stop after Trooper Rule handed Mr. Munoz’s documents back to him.
We address each argument in turn.
A. Justification for the Traffic Stop
“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate question of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Mayville, 955 F.3d
825, 829 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). In reviewing factual findings
for clear error, “[w]e will not reweigh the evidence presented to the district court,
second guess the district court’s credibility assessments, or question reasonable
inferences the district court drew from the evidence.” United States v. Campbell, 603
F.3d 1218, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
“When, as here, the meaning of a state traffic law is at issue,” we review the
district court’s interpretation of the state law de novo. United States v. Valadez-
Valadez, 525 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2008). However, we defer to the state supreme
court’s interpretation of state law, as “[i]t is axiomatic that state courts are the final
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arbiters of state law.” United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th
Cir. 2004); see also Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300–01 (10th Cir. 2012)
(holding that when police officers justify an arrest based on a state criminal statute,
“the precise scope of [the defendant’s Fourth Amendment] right uniquely depends on
the contours of a state’s substantive criminal law,” which the state supreme court is
“the ultimate authority” in interpreting). “If the state supreme court has not
interpreted a provision of the state’s statutory code, the federal court ‘must predict
how the court would interpret the code in light of state appellate court opinions,
decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, and treatises.’” DeGasso, 369 F.3d
at 1145 (quoting United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 2002) (brackets
omitted)).
“A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an
observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion
that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United States v.
Callarman, 273 F.3d 1284, 1286 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and brackets
omitted). “The government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
officer’s suspicion.” United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010).
Ultimately, “[t]he dispositive inquiry is whether state law provided the officer with
an objectively justifiable basis for the stop.” Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d at 991–92
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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Here, the district court concluded that the troopers observed a violation of
Kansas Statutes Annotated § 8-133(c) when they saw Mr. Munoz’s paper tag flapping
as he drove down the freeway. Section 8-133(c) provides:
Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned, to prevent the plate from swinging, and at a height not less than 12 inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of such plate. The license plate shall be fastened in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-133(c). As we have previously noted, this statute’s “reference to
‘[e]very license plate’ apparently includes temporary registration permits.” United
States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1046 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 8-133(c)).
The Kansas Supreme Court recently published an opinion interpreting
§ 8-133(c). See State v. Yeargin-Charles, 577 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2025). Specifically, the
Kansas Supreme Court considered as a matter of first impression “[w]hether the
failure to securely fasten a license plate to a vehicle constitutes a violation
of [§] 8-133(c) where visibility and legibility are not in question.” Id. at 547. As a
matter of statutory interpretation, the court concluded that “a strict reading of the
statute’s plain language imposes four requirements for the display of license plates:
(1) the license plate must be securely fastened to the vehicle, (2) the license plate
must be positioned at least 12 inches from the ground, (3) the license plate must be
clearly visible, and (4) the license plate must be clearly legible.” Id. at 548. The court
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then concluded that “non-compliance with any of these requirements may provide
reasonable suspicion for law enforcement to initiate a traffic stop.” Id. at 549.
While the court acknowledged that “the primary objective of [§] 8-133(c)’s
requirements is presumably to ensure license plates can be easily read to identify
vehicles,” the court held that the plain language of the statute requires license plates
“to be ‘securely fastened’ to vehicles, regardless of their visibility or legibility.” Id.
at 548. Accordingly, applying this interpretation to the facts of the case before it, the
Kansas Supreme Court held that a deputy’s observation of a “car’s license plate
hanging askew and ‘flapping in the wind[]’” was enough in itself to give rise to
“reasonable suspicion of a violation of [§] 8-133(c)’s provision requiring a vehicle’s
license plate to be ‘securely fastened.’” Id. at 549.
Mr. Munoz argues on appeal that § 8-133(c) is not violated if a license plate
can be read by an officer following the vehicle at a safe distance. He therefore
maintains that because the troopers could read his temporary tag as they were
following him, they lacked reasonable suspicion that he was violating this statute.
Mr. Munoz also argues that this statute requires only that the license plate be fastened
securely enough to prevent it from swinging, and he contends that the dashcam video
shows that the temporary tag met this standard. Relatedly, he argues that the district
court clearly erred in finding that the temporary paper tag was flapping because the
dashcam footage contradicts this finding.
As an initial matter, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that the temporary paper tag was flapping. See Mayville, 955 F.3d at 829. Both
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troopers testified that they saw the temporary tag flapping and blowing upward when
they first saw the Jeep, and Trooper Rule explained that the tag had “settled back
down into its normal position” by the time they caught up to the Jeep. ROA Vol. III
at 25. The dashcam video, which does not capture the troopers’ initial view of the
Jeep, does not contradict this testimony. And while the video neither proves nor
disproves the troopers’ testimony that the tag was flapping when they first saw the
Jeep, it does corroborate the troopers’ testimony that the tag was fastened in a way
that would flap upward. Indeed, footage from the traffic stop shows Trooper Rule
physically demonstrating to Mr. Munoz that the tag was not secured at the bottom by
lifting it up and showing him the flapping motion it was making while he drove.
Moreover, the district court specifically found the troopers’ testimony to be
credible—an assessment we will not “second guess” on appeal. Campbell, 603 F.3d
at 1228. We accordingly accept the district court’s factual finding that the troopers
observed the temporary tag flapping and blowing upward. See Mayville, 955 F.3d
at 829.
Applying the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 8-133(c) to the facts
found by the district court, we hold that a reasonable officer in the troopers’ position
would have had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Munoz violated this statute. In
Yeargin-Charles, the Kansas Supreme Court squarely considered and rejected the
argument that § 8-133(c) is violated only if a license plate is not visible or legible,
which is the primary argument Mr. Munoz makes on appeal. See 577 P.3d at 548.
Likewise, although Mr. Munoz contends that the statute requires only that a license
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plate be fastened well enough to prevent “swinging,” the Kansas Supreme Court
rejected a similar statutory interpretation of § 8-133(c) in Yeargin-Charles. The court
there held that this interpretation “focuses too narrowly on the statutory phrase ‘to
prevent the plate from swinging,’ while overlooking the broader statutory
requirement that the plate be ‘securely fastened.’” Id. The state court accordingly
held that an officer had reasonable suspicion of a violation of § 8-133(c) based on
testimony “that the license plate was ‘loosely secured by a bolt or a screw on the left
side in the manufacturer’s hole and was tilted downwards to the right,’ that it was
‘not secured by anything’ on the opposite end, and that the plate was visibly
‘moving’ and ‘flapping in the wind.’” Id. at 547. The facts here are similar, as
Trooper Rule’s demonstration of the flapping paper tag showed that it was not
secured by anything on its bottom end, and the troopers’ uncontroverted testimony
established that the tag was visibly moving and flapping in the wind.
Although Yeargin-Charles was published after the traffic stop at issue in this
case, its interpretation of the plain language of § 8-133(c) is sufficient to establish
that the troopers here had “an objectively justifiable basis for the stop.” Valadez-
Valadez, 525 F.3d at 991–92 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). We
therefore hold that the traffic stop was valid based on the troopers’ reasonable
suspicion that the temporary tag on Mr. Munoz’s Jeep violated § 8-133(c) because it
was not securely fastened.
Because we uphold the traffic stop on this basis, we do not consider the
Government’s alternative argument that the traffic stop was independently justified
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based on the troopers’ suspicion that Mr. Munoz violated Kansas Statutes Annotated
§ 8-1522(a).
B. Extension of the Traffic Stop
“Once an officer returns the driver’s license and registration, the traffic stop
has ended and questioning must cease; at that point, the driver must be free to leave.”
United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009). “Continued detention is
lawful only if the encounter becomes consensual or if, during the initial lawful traffic
stop, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion that the detained person is engaged
in criminal activity.” United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“The Supreme Court has defined ‘reasonable suspicion’ as a ‘particularized
and objective basis for suspecting’ criminal conduct under a totality of the
circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
This totality of the circumstances “approach precludes a divide-and-conquer analysis,
where the court views each factor that would support reasonable suspicion in
isolation.” United States v. Latorre, 893 F.3d 744, 751 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)).
“Although the government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of
an officer’s suspicion, reasonable suspicion is not, and is not meant to be, an onerous
standard.” Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379 (quotation marks omitted). The reasonable
suspicion standard “requires considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence
and obviously less than probable cause.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It
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does not require an officer to “rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,” nor does
it require an officer to “have evidence suggesting a fair probability of criminal
activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “As long as an officer has a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting an individual may be involved in
criminal activity, he may initiate an investigatory detention even if it is more likely
than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
“In this analysis, the officer’s subjective motives are irrelevant. Instead, we
ask whether the facts available to the detaining officer, at the time, warranted an
officer of reasonable caution in believing the action taken was appropriate.” Latorre,
893 F.3d at 751 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And again, in
reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, “we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate question of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment.” Mayville, 955 F.3d at 829 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court concluded that the troopers were justified in briefly
extending the traffic stop because they “had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting criminal conduct” based on “Mr. Munoz’s physical nervousness,
unprompted statement that he was going to a funeral, and unspecified travel plans, in
addition to the image of Jesus Malverde in the Jeep.” ROA Vol. I at 64. Mr. Munoz
objects to the district court’s evaluation of these factors. However, we see no error in
the district court’s factual findings, and we agree with the district court that these
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facts, considered under the totality of the circumstances, created reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.
First, as to Mr. Munoz’s argument that his nervousness could not support
reasonable suspicion, the district court found that “[o]ut-of-the-ordinary signs and
specific indicia of nervousness are present here” based on Mr. Munoz’s unusual,
unprompted explanation that he was traveling to a funeral, Trooper Rule’s testimony
that Mr. Munoz’s hands were shaking, and Trooper Rule’s testimony that
Mr. Munoz’s voice sounded very nervous even after Trooper Rule informed him that
he would not receive a ticket. Id. at 62. Although Mr. Munoz argues that it is not
strange for an individual to volunteer information about his travel plans in
anticipation of being asked, the dashcam video supports the district court’s finding
that Mr. Munoz’s initial exchange with Trooper Rule was unusual and suggestive of
extreme nervousness. Mr. Munoz did not simply make a casual reference to his travel
plans in the course of a conversation with Trooper Rule; rather, in response to
Trooper Rule’s initial request to see his driver’s license, he quickly blurted out,
“We’re going to a funeral.” Dashcam Video at 2:41–2:48.
While there may have been a “plausible innocent explanation” for this
immediate unprompted comment about his travel plans, “the existence of a plausible
innocent explanation does not preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Pettit, 785
F.3d at 1381. And Mr. Munoz “does not persuasively argue that it would be
objectively unreasonable to infer,” id., that his unprompted explanation of his travel
plans immediately after being pulled over was based on unusual nervousness
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stemming from his criminal activities. Moreover, the district court’s factual finding
of unusual nervousness was also supported by Trooper Rule’s testimony that
Mr. Munoz’s hands were shaking as he handed over his registration and other
documents, which Mr. Munoz does not contest. See Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1148
(holding that uncontrollable shaking can support a finding of abnormal nervousness);
United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (determining that a
defendant displayed abnormal nervousness based in part on a trooper’s testimony that
“he was just shaking so bad”).
Our review of the appellate record, particularly the dashcam video, persuades
us that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Munoz demonstrated
specific indicia of abnormal nervousness. And based on this finding, “the district
court properly considered [Mr. Munoz’s] demeanor alongside other relevant factors
in finding the trooper[s] had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop.” Pettit,
785 F.3d at 1381.
For his second argument, Mr. Munoz contends that his description of his travel
plans cannot contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion because it was not
implausible for him to be traveling to Kansas for a funeral, and only implausible
travel plans can give rise to a finding of reasonable suspicion. However, while
implausibility can indeed support a finding of reasonable suspicion, so too can
“inconsistencies, internal contradictions, or vagueness” in individuals’ descriptions
of their travel plans. United States v. Lopez, 849 F.3d 921, 927 (10th Cir. 2017); see
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also Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1150 (“[This] court has found vague, inconsistent or
evasive answers with respect to travel plans supportive of reasonable suspicion.”).
Here, Mr. Munoz gave the vague, hesitant answer of “In, uh—in Kansas”
when asked where the funeral would occur, even though he was in Kansas (and had
already driven more than 300 miles into Kansas from the Colorado border) when he
provided this answer. Dashcam Video at 2:52–2:54. Moreover, when asked when the
funeral would take place, he said, “Um, uh,” and then conveyed that he was unsure
but thought it might be “tomorrow” or the next day. Id. at 3:24–3:31.
A reasonable officer in the troopers’ position could have viewed these answers
as inexplicably vague and evasive. This would support a finding of reasonable
suspicion even if there might be an innocent alternative explanation for Mr. Munoz’s
unusual uncertainty about either the location or the date of the funeral that he had
volunteered information about attending. See Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1381; see also Lopez,
849 F.3d at 927 (“[I]nexplicable vagueness . . . in purported travel plans can be a
significant factor in assessing reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Santos, 403
F.3d 1120, 1131 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a highway trooper could reasonably
suspect the defendant’s purported travel plans were fabricated because, among other
things, he “volunteered information about his family, but was unable to supply
corroborative details ordinarily known to a family member”); United States v.
19 Appellate Case: 24-1418 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 20
Olivares-Campos, 276 F. App’x 816, 821 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) 1 (“We have
found similar situations, in which the driver’s particular destination was unknown or
could not be pinpointed, to contribute to the reasonable suspicion of an experienced
officer.”).
Finally, Mr. Munoz argues that the Jesus Malverde image in his vehicle should
be given little, if any, weight in the reasonable suspicion analysis. For support, he
primarily relies on this court’s opinion in United States v. Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d
1092 (10th Cir. 2014), in which we held that the district court erred in “allow[ing] a
purported expert on certain religious iconography to testify that veneration of a figure
known as ‘Santa Muerte’ was so connected with drug trafficking as to constitute
evidence that the occupants of the vehicle were aware of the presence of drugs in a
secret compartment.” Id. at 1095.
As Mr. Munoz acknowledges, however, this court has held that “Medina-
Copete is the exception not the rule.” United States v. Vann, 776 F.3d 746, 759 (10th
Cir. 2015). The unreliability of the expert’s testimony in Medina-Copete resulted
from the specific facts of that case, such as the fact that the expert in Medina-Copete
based his testimony not only on his “law enforcement knowledge and experience, but
also on his personal ‘self-study’ of narcotics iconography.” United States v. Martinez,
88 F.4th 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Unlike
1 We cite unpublished cases for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding authority. See United States v. Ellis, 23 F.4th 1228, 1238 n.6 (10th Cir. 2022). 20 Appellate Case: 24-1418 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 21
expert testimony from law enforcement officers based on their experience—routinely
upheld by this court—the Medina-Copete decision hinged on the expert’s inability to
establish how his personal self-study led to his conclusion, how it provided a
sufficient basis, or how it was reliably applied to the facts.” Id. at 1315 (emphasis
omitted). Thus, in Martinez we upheld the admission of law enforcement testimony
regarding Santa Muerte because this testimony, unlike the testimony about Santa
Muerte in Medina-Copete, “was based solely on [the officer’s] 22 years of law-
enforcement experience, . . . not personal self-study.” Id. at 1314; see also Vann, 776
F.3d at 759 (“Medina-Copete is the exception not the rule, and, as noted, we have
consistently allowed police officers to testify as to conclusions deriving from their
expertise and experience.”); Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (explaining that the totality of
the circumstances evaluation of reasonable suspicion “allows officers to draw on
their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude
an untrained person’” (quoting Cortez, 499 U.S. at 418)).
In this case, Trooper Ranieri testified that he had attended “several training
classes over the years” about the association between Jesus Malverde and drug
trafficking. ROA Vol. III at 67. Moreover, both troopers testified that, in their law
enforcement experience, narcotics are commonly found in vehicles that display
images of Jesus Malverde. Mr. Munoz introduced no evidence to challenge this
testimony, and we are not persuaded that the district court clearly erred in finding it
credible. We agree with the district court that this uncontroverted testimony is
21 Appellate Case: 24-1418 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 22
entitled to weight in determining whether the troopers had “a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting” that Mr. Munoz might “be involved in criminal
activity.” Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379–80 (quotation marks omitted); see also Arvizu, 534
U.S. at 273.
Based on the facts identified by the district court, which we view in the light
most favorable to the Government and consider as a whole under the totality of the
circumstances, we hold that the troopers had “a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting” criminal activity, Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379–80 (quotation marks omitted),
justifying their brief extension of the stop to ask Mr. Munoz a few additional
questions and seek his consent to a search of his vehicle.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Mr. Munoz’s suppression motion. The conviction and sentence are therefore
AFFIRMED.