United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 18-1793
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
DUSTIN MOSS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Simon R. Brown, with whom Preti Flaherty PLLP was on brief, for appellant. John S. Davis, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Scott W. Murray, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
August 26, 2019 TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Dustin Moss ("Moss") appeals
from the district court's denial of his motion to suppress
approximately twenty pounds of methamphetamine that a postal
inspector discovered in two United States Postal Service Priority
Mail Express packages, as well as any evidence resulting from the
searches of those packages. After careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. The 730 Package
On April 18, 2017, U.S. Postal Inspector Bruce Sweet
("Sweet") singled out from a list of incoming mail a package
scheduled to arrive from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Manchester, New
Hampshire. Since October 2016, Sweet had been participating in the
investigation of a drug conspiracy in which packages containing
methamphetamine were sent from Las Vegas to New Hampshire and, in
return, packages containing money were sent from New Hampshire to
Las Vegas. According to postal databases, the singled-out package
weighed twenty-six pounds; was addressed to Brian O'Rourke at 3
Blackberry Way, Apt. 108, Manchester, New Hampshire; and bore the
tracking number EL810533730US (the "730 Package"). More
importantly, it had "328 Florrie Ave."1 in Las Vegas as the return
1 Sweet later determined that the "328 Florrie Ave." address in Las Vegas did not exist.
-2- address, which matched the "Florrie Ave." return address used in
other packages identified throughout the drug conspiracy
investigation. Based on these characteristics and his knowledge
of the investigation, Sweet deemed the 730 Package suspicious.
Accordingly, the night before the package's arrival,
Sweet drafted an affidavit in support of a warrant to search the
730 Package and e-mailed it to Assistant United States Attorney
William Morse ("AUSA Morse"). Sweet's affidavit included an
attachment labelled "Attachment A," which accurately described the
730 Package as a "black 'Kicker Speaker' cardboard box," and
detailed the package's weight and dimensions. The attachment also
identified the 730 Package's addressee, O'Rourke, as well as the
package's final destination.
Sweet collected the 730 Package and placed it in a canine
drug-sniff lineup shortly after the package arrived in Manchester
on the morning of August 19, 2017. After the drug-sniffing dog
alerted on the 730 Package, Sweet secured the package in the United
States Postal Inspection Service's parcel inspection room.2 Sweet
effectively separated the 730 Package from all other mail held in
the postal facility given that there were no other packages in the
parcel inspection room at this point.
2 Access to the parcel inspection room is limited to Postal Inspection Service employees.
-3- AUSA Morse proceeded to e-mail Sweet's affidavit to
court personnel that same morning. AUSA Morse's e-mail indicated
that his office was still working on the associated paperwork.
Within an hour of the e-mail's delivery, AUSA Morse and Sweet
arrived at the magistrate judge's chambers with a complete search
warrant packet consisting of: (1) the search warrant application;
(2) Sweet's affidavit and its two accompanying attachments; and
(3) the proposed search warrant. In the space provided for a
description of the property to be searched, the warrant application
stated: "See Attachment A to Affidavit of U.S. Postal Inspector
Bruce A. Sweet which is incorporated herein by reference.". As
mentioned above, Attachment A of Sweet's affidavit provided an
accurate and detailed description of the 730 Package. After
reviewing the search warrant application and Sweet's affidavit,
the magistrate judge issued the search warrant.3
However, due to a clerical error in the U.S. Attorney's
Office, the document identified as "Attachment A" that was appended
to the search warrant was different from the one attached to
Sweet's affidavit and reviewed by the magistrate judge. The issued
warrant's Attachment A did not describe the 730 Package, a twenty-
3 Similar to the search warrant application, the actual search warrant stated "See Attachment A, as attached hereto and incorporated herein" in the space provided for the description of the property to be searched.
-4- six-pound cardboard box, but rather a five-ounce envelope Sweet
had searched during the course of an unrelated investigation from
November 2016. 4 The warrant, nevertheless, still included
information reflecting its relation to the 730 Package.
Specifically, its caption correctly read:
In the Matter of the Search of
(Briefly describe the property to be searched . . .)
USPS Priority Mail Express Package Bearing Tracking
Number EL810533730US.
In other words, the issued warrant included the 730 Package's
exclusive tracking number, despite the description of another
package in its Attachment A.
Unaware of the mistakenly appended attachment, Sweet
proceeded to search the 730 Package. Inside the package, he found
a large speaker and, inside the speaker, twelve zip-top bags, each
containing almost exactly one pound of a white crystalline
substance later identified as methamphetamine. Sweet then
replaced the narcotics with miscellaneous items to bring the box
to its original weight, repackaged the speaker, resealed the
4 Apart from being of a different type and weight than the 730 Package, the package described in the issued warrant's Attachment A was addressed to a different recipient, Mr. Golden; destined to a different city, Laconia, New Hampshire; had a different sender, Sequoia High School in California; and, of course, was identified with a different tracking number, EL576175385US.
-5- package, and delivered it to the post office for the next stage of
the government's operation -- apprehension of the 730 Package's
addressee, Brian O'Rourke.
O'Rourke was a crack cocaine addict. His supplier was
Sabrina Moss ("Sabrina"), defendant-appellant Moss's sister.
O'Rourke, Sabrina, and Moss had all been in the same hotel room
with other drug users about a week prior to the arrival of the 730
Package. O'Rourke and Moss did not know each other and did not
speak to each other in that hotel room. Their interaction was
limited to what can be described as a mutual acknowledgement of
each other's presence: They waved at each other after Sabrina
pointed out Moss to O'Rourke. Sabrina then asked O'Rourke if he
was willing to receive a package at his apartment on Moss's behalf
in exchange for three-and-a-half grams of crack cocaine.5 O'Rourke
agreed.
But the terms of this agreement were never fleshed out
any further. O'Rourke left the hotel room without Sabrina telling
him when to expect the package to arrive or the number of packages
he would receive. Nonetheless, from their conversation's
reference to "a package," O'Rourke understood that their
arrangement was limited to the receipt of a single piece of mail.
5 According to O'Rourke, this amount of crack cocaine had a street value of around $300.
-6- O'Rourke believed everything would transpire in a simple, quick
manner: The package would arrive at his apartment, Moss would pick
it up, and he would receive his illicit compensation. To
O'Rourke's dismay, not even his first assumption materialized.
The same day the 730 Package arrived in Manchester, a
postal inspector dressed as a letter carrier delivered a notice to
O'Rourke's mailbox informing him that the package was ready for
pickup at the post office. Moss met with O'Rourke at the latter's
apartment, where, instead of going directly to the post office,
they waited, believing that the 730 Package might yet be delivered
there. Several hours later, Sabrina and her boyfriend arrived at
O'Rourke's apartment and joined the waiting game. Once they
realized the 730 Package would not be delivered directly to
O'Rourke's apartment, the four individuals decided to decamp.
O'Rourke and Moss left the apartment at the same time. O'Rourke
drove directly to the post office, while Moss drove to a shopping
center located approximately a quarter mile away from the post
office and parked behind a furniture store.
Sweet, who was behind the counter at the post office,
handed the 730 Package to O'Rourke. O'Rourke then met with Moss
behind the furniture store and placed the 730 Package in the back
seat of Moss's vehicle. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement
-7- intervened and arrested Moss and O'Rourke on the spot. O'Rourke
was subsequently released on bond, while Moss remained in custody.
2. The 962 Package
Three days later, on April 22, 2017, a second package
from Las Vegas, bearing the EL652259962US tracking number (the
"962 Package"), was delivered to O'Rourke's address. Because it
was a box too large to fit in his mailbox, the 962 Package was
placed in the building's parcel lockbox. O'Rourke noticed a key
in his mailbox, which served to notify residents that they had a
larger package ready for pickup. Because he was not expecting a
package and wanted "nothing to do with it," he opted to ignore the
key and wait until he had spoken with his lawyer before taking any
action. The following day, however, O'Rourke's friend, Brenda
Krimtler ("Krimtler") -- who was helping O'Rourke get his affairs
in order before he entered a drug rehabilitation program -- picked
up his mail and used the key to retrieve the 962 Package from the
building's parcel lockbox.
Krimtler then brought the 962 Package to O'Rourke's
kitchen, opened it, and noticed it was full of white powder. She
reacted to this surprise by telling O'Rourke, who was in another
room, about the package's contents. O'Rourke responded by
instructing Krimtler to reseal the package and return it to the
-8- parcel lockbox, which she did without O'Rourke ever setting his
eyes on it.
O'Rourke then called his attorney and told her about the
package. With O'Rourke's agreement, the attorney called Sweet and
explained the situation. She informed Sweet about the 962 Package,
told him that the 962 Package had been opened, that O'Rourke
believed it contained narcotics, that O'Rourke did not want it,
and that Sweet could search it.
With permission from O'Rourke's attorney, Sweet called
O'Rourke later that evening. O'Rourke confirmed the information
that had been previously conveyed by his attorney. He told Sweet
that his friend had opened the package, that it appeared to contain
narcotics, and that he consented to the package being seized and
searched. Because O'Rourke expressly granted him permission to
search the package, Sweet did not seek a warrant. Instead, he
contacted another postal inspector who lived closer to O'Rourke,
Steve Riggins, who proceeded to retrieve the 962 Package from the
parcel lockbox.6
Riggins took the 962 Package to his car and, with Sweet
on the phone, opened it. Inside the package he found a freezer
6 Given that the parcel lockboxes are designed to lock in the key and remain open once a resident gains access, the lockbox with the 962 Package was open when Riggins arrived to retrieve the package.
-9- bag. After unfurling the top of the freezer bag,7 he noticed that
it contained zip-top bags with white powder. Riggins then took
the 962 Package to the Manchester postal facility, where he and
Sweet thoroughly searched it and found that it contained a total
of eight zip-top bags with approximately one pound of
methamphetamine each.
B. Procedural History
On May 17, 2017, a grand jury indicted Moss for
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance (50 grams or more
of methamphetamine), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1),
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 2). Moss moved
to suppress the 730 Package and the 962 Package, as well as any
fruits obtained from their searches. The government opposed Moss's
motion to suppress, contending, among other things, that Moss
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the packages.8
7 The top of the freezer bag was not sealed but rather furled to one side, which allowed the bag to fit within the 962 Package. 8 While courts typically treat the question of whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy as a threshold issue, sometimes "refer[ing] to it as an issue of 'standing,'" United States v. Lipscomb, 539 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted), this analysis is "more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing," Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)). As the Supreme Court recently explained, whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy "is not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be
-10- On April 13, 2018, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing on the motion to suppress. After listening to the
testimony of Sweet, O'Rourke, Riggins, and Moss, the district court
denied Moss's motion to suppress from the bench. In doing so,
however, the court opted to assume Moss had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the packages and denied his motion to
suppress because neither search was unconstitutional.
On April 25, 2018, Moss pleaded guilty to both counts.
Under the plea agreement, however, Moss explicitly reserved the
right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress. On August 2, 2018, the district court issued a written
decision explaining the basis for its ruling on the motion to
suppress, and sentenced Moss to a total of 300 months'
imprisonment: 240 months for Count 1 and 60 months for Count 2, to
be served consecutively.
In its written decision, as it had done in its ruling
from the bench, the district court again assumed arguendo that
Moss held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched
packages and concluded that neither search was unconstitutional.
addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim." Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018). Accordingly, we do not use the term "standing" to describe the question. See United States v. Bouffard, 917 F.2d 673, 675 (1st Cir. 1990).
-11- The district court found that the warrant authorizing
the search of the 730 Package was not facially invalid despite the
government's attachment of the incorrect Attachment A. The court
reasoned that, although the attachment "described the wrong
package, the face of the warrant listed the correct tracking number
and, under the circumstances, the probability that Inspector Sweet
-- who had already secured the 730 package -- would execute the
warrant by searching an incorrect package was exceedingly low."
As to the 962 Package, the court held that Riggins's
warrantless search was justified by both the private search
doctrine and O'Rourke's consent. Specifically, it found that the
private search doctrine applied because Riggins's search did not
exceed the scope of Krimtler's private search, and that O'Rourke
had both apparent and actual authority to provide consent given
that he was both the addressee and recipient of the package. The
current appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
We review the district court's denial of a motion to
suppress scrutinizing its factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions, including its ultimate constitutional
determinations, de novo. See United States v. Owens, 917 F.3d 26,
34 (1st Cir. 2019). We "may affirm . . . suppression rulings on
any basis apparent in the record." United States v. Ackies, 918
-12- F.3d 190, 197 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Arnott,
758 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2014)).
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever
the government intrudes upon any place and in relation to any item
in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See
United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)); United States v. Stokes, 829 F.3d 47, 51 (1st Cir.
2016). To advance claims for protection under the Fourth
Amendment, the defendant carries the burden of "showing that he
has 'a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched and
in relation to the items seized.'" Stokes, 829 F.3d at 51 (quoting
United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Because whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation
of privacy is not jurisdictional, it is within an appellate court's
discretion to forgo the question and proceed directly to the
constitutionality of the challenged searches. See Byrd v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530-31 (2018). We opt to exercise this
discretion here and, without deciding whether Moss had a reasonable
-13- expectation of privacy, address the constitutionality of the
searches of the 730 and 962 Packages in turn.
A. Sweet's Search of the 730 Package
Moss contends that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the 730 Package and the fruits of its
search. Because the warrant incorporated by reference an
attachment that described a totally distinct package, Moss argues
that it failed to particularly describe the 730 Package and was
thus facially invalid for failure to comport with the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement. While we do not condone
the government oversight in assembling the 730 Package's search
warrant, this argument fails.
The Fourth Amendment unambiguously requires that
warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." Groh v. Ramírez, 540 U.S.
551, 557 (2004) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV) (emphasis omitted).
The manifest purpose of this constitutional rule, known as the
particularity requirement, "is to prevent wide-ranging general
searches by the police." United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864,
866 (1st Cir. 1986). "The test for determining the adequacy of the
description [in a warrant] of the location to be searched is
whether the description is sufficient to enable the executing
officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort,
-14- and whether there is any reasonable probability that another
premise might be mistakenly searched." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). When carrying out our inquiry, we do not strictly
limit our analysis to the four corners of the warrant but also
"consider[] the circumstances of [the warrant's] issuance and
execution." Id. Notwithstanding, the content of the warrant
application is outside the scope of our analysis -- it cannot save
the actual warrant from its failure to provide an adequate
description. See Groh, 540 U.S. at 557. "The fact that [a
warrant] application adequately describe[s] the 'things to be
seized' does not save [a] warrant from its facial invalidity. The
Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the
warrant, not in the supporting documents." Id. (emphasis omitted).9
Supreme Court precedent provides useful guidance. In
Groh, the Supreme Court held that a warrant that "did not describe
the items to be seized at all" was facially invalid under the
9 Notwithstanding, "[a]n affidavit may be referred to for purposes of providing particularity if the affidavit accompanies the warrant, and the warrant uses suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit." United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980) (citation omitted); accord Groh v. Ramírez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-58 (2004) ("We do not say that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrant from cross-referencing other documents. Indeed, most Courts of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant.").
-15- Fourth Amendment because it did not meet the particularity
requirement. Id. at 558. While the warrant application stated
that law enforcement sought to seize "automatic firearms . . .
grenades, grenade launchers, [and] rocket launchers," among other
things, the warrant itself simply referenced the place to be
searched -- a "single dwelling residence . . . blue in color" --
in the space provided for the description of the items to be
seized. Id. at 554, 558. In reaching its conclusion that the
warrant did not meet the particularity requirement, the Supreme
Court stressed that the "obviously deficient" warrant "did not
simply omit a few items from a list of many to be seized, or
misdescribe a few of several items. Nor did it make what fairly
could be characterized as a mere technical mistake or typographical
error." Id. at 558.
Our decision in Bonner is similarly helpful here. There,
the defendants challenged a warrant authorizing the search of their
residence, claiming that it was defective because it omitted the
residence's exact address. 808 F.2d at 865-66. In upholding the
validity of the search warrant, we concluded that, despite the
"technical omission" of the address, the "[defendants'] residence
was described with sufficient particularity," given that a
detailed physical description of the residence was included in the
warrant. Id. at 866-67. We also found that "[t]here was no risk
-16- that federal agents would be confused and stumble into the wrong
house, or would take advantage of their unforeseeable windfall and
search houses indiscriminately." Id. at 866-67. In support of
this conclusion, we emphasized that "[t]he agents, having
previously conducted the surveillance [of the residence], knew
exactly which house they wanted to search . . . and searched only
that house." Id. at 867.
We faced a similar situation in United States v. Vega-
Figueroa, 234 F.3d 744 (1st Cir. 2000), and again denied the
defendant's challenge to the district court's denial of his motion
to suppress. In that case, the defendant claimed that a warrant
to search his residence failed to comply with the particularity
requirement because it "mistakenly described the apartment to be
searched as building 44, apartment 446," when "[his] address was
in fact building 45, apartment 446." 234 F.3d at 756. Noting that
the defendant's apartment was the only residence eventually
searched and that the same officer who "made the observations that
were the basis for issuing the warrant" was also the warrant's
executing officer, as well as a member of the search team, we
concluded that there was no risk of the wrong house being searched.
Id. Therefore, we ruled that the warrant was properly issued and
executed. Id.
-17- Here, the district court did not err in denying Moss's
motion to suppress. The present case is distinguishable from Groh
and more analogous to Bonner and Vega-Figueroa. In Groh, the
issued warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all.
540 U.S. at 558. In turn, the warrant at issue in this appeal
provides a description of the 730 Package in the form of its
exclusive tracking number, which was included in the issued
warrant's caption. In other words, the warrant was not totally
devoid of an accurate description of the 730 Package. And Moss
concedes as much.
Our inquiry, however, does not end here. Because the
730 Package's warrant includes two conflicting descriptions -- on
one hand, the correct tracking number in its caption and, on the
other, the inaccurate description in the appended attachment -- we
must look further to ensure it meets the particularity requirement.
Thus, we employ the rubric set out in Bonner to ascertain the
adequacy of the warrant's description.
Under the test established in Bonner, we first examine
the adequacy of a warrant's description based on whether it is
"sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify"
the object to be searched with reasonable effort. 808 F.2d at 866
(emphasis added). Because Sweet had segregated the 730 Package in
the parcel inspection room prior to the issuance of the search
-18- warrant, there was no real risk here of him having to expend an
unreasonable effort to locate and identify it. Moreover, Sweet's
familiarity with the 730 Package, which will be discussed in detail
below, meant that, in any case, he did not require a description
beyond the exclusive tracking number to properly execute the
warrant. See id. at 867 (holding that a detailed description of
a residence, albeit one without a specific address, was sufficient
to meet the particularity requirement given that the agents
executing the warrant because had previously surveilled it). While
definitely not as detailed as the description that Sweet and Moss
intended to incorporate by reference into the warrant, the tracking
number's unique combination of thirteen digits provided a
description with a high degree of particularity. Again, Moss
concedes as much. Thus, we conclude that, within the circumstances
of this case, the inclusion of the 730 Package's tracking number
in the warrant would have been sufficient for the executing
officer, Sweet, to locate and identify it without expending an
unreasonable effort even if he had not isolated it in the parcel
inspection room prior to the issuance of the warrant.
Considering the circumstances of its issuance and
execution, the warrant authorizing the 730 Package's search
suffered from a mere technical error. See id. at 866; see also
United States v. Qazah, 810 F.3d 879, 886 (4th Cir. 2015)
-19- (classifying the inclusion of an incorrect attachment in a search
warrant as a "technical one"). The fact that Sweet isolated the
730 Package in the parcel inspection room following the positive
dog sniff but prior to the issuance of the search warrant coupled
with his familiarity with the package's physical characteristics
(e.g., size, weight, etc.) effaced any reasonable probability of
him mistakenly searching another package. Apart from being the
warrant's executing officer, Sweet participated in every stage
leading up to the search of the 730 Package. He conducted the
investigation that led to the 730 Package being singled out even
before its arrival in Manchester; was present during the canine's
drug sniff; drafted the search warrant application's affidavit;
sought issuance of the warrant from the magistrate judge; and, of
course, executed the search. Cf. Bonner, 808 F.2d at 866-67; Vega-
Figueroa, 234 F.3d at 756. Furthermore, Sweet knew that the
package described in the issued search warrant's Attachment A was
related to a separate 2016 investigation in which he had
participated.10
In sum, we find that, despite the presence of conflicting
descriptions in the warrant, the 730 Package was described with
10 Furthermore, the property described in the issued warrant's Attachment A and the 730 Package had significantly different physical characteristics; while the first was a five-ounce envelope, the second was a twenty-six-pound box.
-20- sufficient particularity for Sweet to identify it and there was no
reasonable probability of Sweet searching another package;
therefore, the warrant was valid.
B. Warrantless Search of 962 Package
The warrantless search of the 962 Package was justified
by O'Rourke's consent. O'Rourke verbally consented to the search
of the 962 Package twice -- first through his attorney and then
directly to Sweet. As the package's addressee and recipient,
O'Rourke had actual authority over the 962 Package and therefore
capacity to consent to its search. See United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (recognizing control as a factor to
be considered when determining whether a person has authority over
property); see also Eagle Tr. Fund v. United States Postal Serv.,
365 F. Supp. 3d 57, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2019) ("[T]he Domestic Mail
Manual, which sets out the procedures for mail delivery by the
Postal Service, provides that an addressee controls the delivery
of its mail."), appeal on other grounds docketed, No. 19-5090 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 8, 2019); 39 C.F.R. § 211.2(a)(2) (stating that the
Domestic Mail Manual forms part of the Postal Service's
regulations). Notwithstanding, even if he lacked authority, as
Moss contends, the search was valid because, being the package's
addressee, it was reasonable for Sweet and Riggins to believe that
O'Rourke had apparent authority to consent to its search. See
-21- United States v. González, 609 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2010) ("A
search is valid if, at the time, officers reasonably believe a
person who has consented to a search has apparent authority to
consent, even if the person in fact lacked that authority.").
We therefore hold that the warrantless search of the 962
Package did not infringe Moss's Fourth Amendment rights.11
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's
denial of Moss's motion for suppression of evidence.
Affirmed.
11 Because O'Rourke's consent justified the warrantless search of the 962 Package, we need not address the district court's alternate, private search doctrine basis for the denial of the package's suppression. See United States v. Ackies, 918 F.3d 190, 197 (1st Cir. 2019).
-22-