United States v. Miguel Pedraza

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: April 29, 2025
• Docket: 24-11944
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 1 of 9

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11944 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MIGUEL PEDRAZA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20286-CMA-9 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 2 of 9

2 Opinion of the Court 24-11944

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Miguel Pedraza, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his third motion for compassionate release as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration as to that decision. The Government has moved for summary affirmance. After re- view, 1 we grant the Government’s motion. I. DISCUSSION A. Motion for Compassionate Release 1. Failing to evaluate extraordinary and compelling reasons Pedraza contends the district court abused its discretion in only considering the § 3553(a) factors without first making a deter- mination as to whether extraordinary and compelling circum- stances justify his release. District courts lack the inherent author- ity to modify a term of imprisonment but may do so within § 3582(c)’s provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) the 18 U.S.C.

1 We review a district court’s denial of an eligible defendant’s request for com-

passionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 3 of 9

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§ 3553(a) sentencing factors 2 favor doing so; (2) there are extraordi- nary and compelling reasons for doing so; and (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the community within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy statement.3 United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (noting that relief must be “consistent with applicable policy state- ments issued by the Sentencing Commission”). While district courts need not address these three conditions in a specific se- quence, as the absence of even one forecloses a sentence reduction, Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237-38, they are required “to weigh and balance [these] considerations in the first instance,” United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2021).

2 The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors include: (1) the nature and circum-

stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; (3) the kinds of sentences availa- ble; (4) the applicable Guidelines range; (5) pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7). 3Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides the applicable policy

statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. That policy statement states extraordinary and compelling reasons include, in relevant part, the defend- ant’s medical circumstances and family circumstances, such as situations where the defendant would be the only available caregiver to an immediate family member. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1), (3). In addition, § 1B1.13 states the district court must also determine the defendant is not a danger to the safety of others, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Id. § 1B1.13(a)(2). USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 4 of 9

4 Opinion of the Court 24-11944

Pedraza’s argument is foreclosed by Tinker’s holding that courts need not determine whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist before evaluating the § 3553(a) factors. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237-38. Pedraza asserts Tinker’s holding is erro- neous, but he points to no binding authority overruling this prece- dent, and this Court must follow it. See United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating the prior precedent rule requires us to follow a prior binding precedent unless it is overruled by this Court en banc or by the Supreme Court). Pedraza faults the district court for not expressly acknowl- edging his arguments as to extraordinary circumstances, but the court was not required to expressly address all of Pedraza’s mitigat- ing evidence. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241 (stating while “an acknowledgement by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is sufficient,” “[a] sen- tence may be affirmed so long as the record indicates that the dis- trict court considered ‘a number of’ the factors’”). Further, to the extent the court failed to consider his arguments as to extraordi- nary circumstances, the court was not required to do so, because its unfavorable § 3553(a) analysis precluded relief, thereby render- ing frivolous any arguments as to extraordinary circumstances. See id. at 1237-38. 2. Weight given to offense conduct Pedraza contends the district court abused its discretion in putting too much weight on his offense conduct, which occurred approximately ten years ago, to the exclusion of his arguments USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 5 of 9

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regarding postsentencing circumstances. A district court abuses its discretion “when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant fac- tors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241 (quotation marks omitted). “While a district court need not exhaustively analyze each § 3553(a) factor or articulate its findings in great detail, it must provide enough analysis that meaningful ap- pellate review of the factors’ application can take place.” Id. (quo- tation marks omitted). Further, when a court considers the § 3553(a) factors in the context of a motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), “it must ensure that the record reflects that it considered the appli- cable § 3553(a) factors.” Cook, 998 F.3d at 1185 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). All applicable § 3553(a) factors must be considered, but the weight given to each § 3553(a) factor “is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and “a district court may attach great weight to one § 3553(a) factor over others.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Supreme Court has observed that, although “evidence of postsentencing re- habilitation may be highly relevant to several of the § 3553(a) fac- tors that Congress has expressly instructed district courts to con- sider at sentencing,” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 491 (2011), “the First Step Act does not require a district court to accept a mo- vant’s argument that evidence of rehabilitation . . . counsel[s] in fa- vor of a sentence reduction,” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 502 (2022). USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 6 of 9

6 Opinion of the Court 24-11944

It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to at- tach great weight to the severe nature of Pedraza’s offense conduct. Pedraza’s offense conduct directly relates to the sentencing factors relied upon by the court, including his history and characteristics, the seriousness of the offense conduct, and the need to afford ade- quate specific and general deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Alt- hough Pedraza’s postsentencing conduct, personal health, and family circumstances indeed relate to his history and characteris- tics, the court acted within its discretion in attaching greater weight to the seriousness of his offense conduct, the need for deterrence, and the negative aspects of his history and characteristics. See But- ler, 39 F.4th at 1355. Pedraza asserts the district court erred because it “did not consider any arguments.” However, the court implicitly showed consideration of those arguments by explaining that an assessment of Pedraza’s characteristics weighed against granting relief. Alt- hough the court’s acknowledgment of Pedraza’s arguments was not explicit or as comprehensive as its prior orders denying com- passionate release, the court’s language is contextualized by the fact this is the third instance in less than four years where the court rejected Pedraza’s argument based on the § 3553(a) factors. Even if Pedraza had been totally rehabilitated, this would not alter the severity of his offense conduct. Notably, Pedraza stipulated to hav- ing murdered a rival gang member, as well as trafficking in guns and drugs. USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 7 of 9

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The Government’s position that the district court acted within its discretion in denying Pedraza’s motion for compassion- ate release is clearly correct as a matter of law. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 4 (explain- ing summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous”). Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion for summary affirmance as to this issue. B. Motion for Reconsideration Pedraza contends the district court abused its discretion in failing to afford him sufficient time to reply to the Government’s response in opposition to his motion for reconsideration. The local rules for the Southern District of Florida state: [A] movant may, within seven (7) days after service of an opposing memorandum of law, file and serve a re- ply memorandum in support of the motion, which re- ply memorandum shall be strictly limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition without reargument of matters covered in the mo- vant’s initial memorandum of law . . . .

4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir- cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 8 of 9

8 Opinion of the Court 24-11944

Time shall be computed under this Local Rule in ac- cordance with applicable federal rules of procedure (e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)). S.D. Fla. L. R. 7.1(c)(1). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in turn, state, “Whenever a party must . . . act within a specified time after being served and service is made under Rule 49(a)(4)(C) . . . , 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(c). Pursuant to Rule 49(a)(4)(C), service may be completed by “mailing [the document] to the per- son’s last known address—in which event service is complete upon mailing.” Id. R. 49(a)(4)(C). Thus, a movant who is served an op- posing memorandum by mail has ten days to file and serve a reply memorandum in support of his motion. See S.D. Fla. L. R. 7.1(c)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(c), 49(a)(4)(C). The Government’s position that the district court’s denial of Pedraza’s motion for reconsideration was not an abuse of discre- tion is clearly correct as a matter as a matter of law. See Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Even in light of his pro se status, Pedraza had 10 days to file a reply once the Government filed its May 10, 2024, response to his motion for reconsideration, and the district court waited 12 days to issue its May 22, 2024, paperless or- der denying the motion. See United States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating “a pro se defendant must follow the rules of procedure”); United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 792 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating we liberally construe pro se filings). Thus, the courts issuance of its order at that time was not an abuse of discretion. USCA11 Case: 24-11944 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 9 of 9

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Furthermore, the Government is also correct regarding: (1) the court’s inability to address Pedraza’s reply, as it was filed after his notice of appeal; and (2) the lack of any evidence suggest- ing that Pedraza’s reply would have changed the outcome of his case because he merely reiterated his prior arguments, and thus, any error in this regard was harmless. See Griggs v. Provident Con- sumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (“The filing of a notice of ap- peal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (providing harmless error is an error “that does not affect substantial rights” and “must be disregarded”). Thus, the dis- trict court’s failure to wait for Pedraza’s reply was not an abuse of discretion. II. CONCLUSION We grant the Government’s motion for summary affir- mance. AFFIRMED.