United States v. Mighty

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: 24-3043-cr
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-3043-cr United States v. Mighty

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of December, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee, v. 24-3043-cr

EDWARD MIGHTY, AKA MIGHTY, AKA ANTHONY, AKA TONY,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________

FOR APPELLEE: Tiffany H. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, for Michael DiGiacomo, United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, New York.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Edward Mighty, pro se, Lisbon, Ohio. Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New

York (Frank Paul Geraci, Jr., Judge.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the order of the district court, entered on November 7, 2024, is AFFIRMED.

Edward Mighty, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying his second

motion for a sentence reduction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In 2015, Mighty pled

guilty to: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, at least 5 kilograms

of cocaine and at least 280 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A), and 846; and (2) possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2. In 2017, the district court sentenced Mighty

principally to 300 months’ imprisonment, which was the combined minimum sentence for the two

counts at the time under the statutes. In 2020, Mighty filed a pro se motion for compassionate

release based on his medical conditions and the COVID-19 pandemic, which the district court

denied. In May 2024, Mighty filed a second pro se motion for a sentence reduction, arguing that

(1) changes in the law resulted in him now having an unusually long and grossly-disparate

sentence, (2) he suffered punitive conditions while incarcerated during the COVID-19 pandemic,

and (3) the sentencing factors, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), supported reducing his term of

imprisonment to time-served or to 180 months. With respect to the change in the law, Mighty

noted, inter alia, that his prior state conviction would no longer trigger the enhanced mandatory

minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment on the drug count, but rather would now result in a 10-year

minimum. In denying the motion, the district court concluded that Mighty had not demonstrated

the requisite extraordinary and compelling circumstances for a reduction. In particular, the

2 district court explained that, “while it is true that [Mighty] would no longer face a mandatory

minimum sentence of 240 months, his 240-month sentence still falls within the guideline range [of

210 to 262 months]” and “[h]e would also still be subject to the mandatory five-year consecutive

sentence for possession of a firearm.” App’x at 129. Thus, the district court “conclude[d] that

there is not a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be

imposed today[,]” and “[t]herefore, [Mighty] ha[d] not demonstrated ‘extraordinary and

compelling’ reasons for a sentence reduction based on an unusually long sentence and change in

law.” Id. at 129–30. The district court also rejected Mighty’s argument that the punitive

conditions during the COVID-19 lockdown constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason

for a sentence reduction. The district court further concluded, in the alternative, that the Section

3553(a) factors did not warrant a sentence reduction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as

necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review the denial of a motion for a discretionary sentence reduction for abuse of

discretion and underlying matters of statutory interpretation de novo. See United States v. Moore,

975 F.3d 84, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2020). “A district court has abused its discretion if it has (1) based

its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,

or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”

United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court “may reduce” a defendant’s term of

imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and “after

3 considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also Keitt,

21 F.4th at 71. Because extraordinary and compelling circumstances and the Section 3553(a)

factors must both support relief, concluding that either condition is lacking is sufficient to deny

relief and for this Court to affirm. See Keitt, 21 F.4th at 73.

Here, even assuming arguendo that Mighty demonstrated extraordinary and compelling

circumstances warranting a sentence reduction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that the Section 3553(a) factors weighed against granting his motion. In explaining

its decision, the district court referenced its consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors at

Mighty’s sentencing, as well as in its denial of his first motion for a sentence reduction. In

particular, the district court reiterated that Mighty’s offense conduct was “serious” because “[he]

was identified as one of the leaders of the Rochester drug operation which involved kilo quantities

of cocaine being transported . . . into this community[,] which is a poison that destroys individuals

and families and communities[,]” and “[he] had several previous convictions.” App’x at 133

(internal quotation marks omitted). On this record, the district court’s determination that the 300-

month sentence “remain[ed] appropriate,” id., was based on a reasonable analysis of the Section

3553(a) factors that was “located within the range of permissible decisions,” Keitt, 21 F.4th at 71

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

On appeal, Mighty argues that the district court overlooked the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants under Section 3553(a)(6), namely, the

lower sentences received by his co-defendants. We disagree. As a threshold matter, “we have

repeatedly made clear that § 3553(a)(6) requires a district court to consider nationwide sentence

disparities, but does not require a district court to consider disparities between co-defendants.”

4 United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 55 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In any event, in denying Mighty’s motion, the district court explained that his “role as

a leader of the conspiracy as well as his lack of cooperation with the Government [were] reasonable

explanations for the sentencing disparities between [Mighty] and other co-defendants.” App’x at

133; see also United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] reasonable

explanation of the different sentences here is readily apparent, namely, the varying degrees of

culpability and cooperation between the various defendants.”). As we have noted, “[t]hat the

district court gave greater weight to [the] unchanged factors [from the original sentence] than to

the changed circumstances on which [the movant] relies does not mean that the court failed to

consider the latter.” United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 571 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam).

Moreover, to the extent that Mighty contends that the analysis was insufficient because it

did not contain an explicit consideration of each of the Section 3553(a) factors, “[a] district court

is presumed to have considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record

suggests otherwise.” Id. at 570 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, nothing in

the record suggests a failure by the district court to consider the relevant Section 3553(a) factors.

Although Mighty disagrees with the district court’s balancing of the Section 3553(a) factors, we

have emphasized that we do not require “that a particular factor be given determinative or

dispositive weight” because “the weight to be afforded any § 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly

committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d

122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, Mighty’s “[m]ere

disagreement with how the district court balanced the § 3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient

ground for finding an abuse of discretion.” Halvon, 26 F.4th at 569 (internal quotation marks and

5 citation omitted).

In sum, the district court acted within its discretion in determining that the Section 3553(a)

factors did not warrant a sentence reduction and denying Mighty’s motion.

* * *

We have considered Mighty’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court