United States v. Midland Independent School District

334 F. Supp. 147, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11136
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 21, 1971
Docket7:70-cv-00067
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 334 F. Supp. 147 (United States v. Midland Independent School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Midland Independent School District, 334 F. Supp. 147, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11136 (W.D. Tex. 1971).

Opinion

GUINN, District Judge.

In this school case, the judicial power of this Court can be invoked only on a showing of discrimination violative of the constitutional standards declared in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 374 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).

“The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must al *148 ways reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole.” (Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education v. Catherine Scott et al., August 31, 1971, by the Chief Justice).

“We are concerned in these cases with the elimination of the discrimination inherent in the dual school systems, not with myriad factors of human existence which can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds. The target of the eases from Brown I to the present was the dual school system. The elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large task and one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities. One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the important objective of Brown I to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, although desegregation of schools ultimately will have impact on other forms of discrimination.”

“Our objective in dealing with the issues presented by these cases is to see that school authorities exclude no pupil of a racial minority from any school, directly or indirectly, on account of race; it does not and cannot embrace all the problems of racial prejudice, even when those problems contribute to disproportionate racial concentrations in some schools.”

“The record in this case reveals the familiar phenomenon that in metropolitan areas minority groups are often found concentrated in one part of the city. In some circumstances certain schools may remain all or largely of one race until new schools can be provided or neighborhood patterns change. Schools all or predominantly of one race in a district of mixed population will require close scrutiny to determine that school assignments are not part of state-enforced segregation.”

“In light of the above, it should be clear that the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system which still practices segregation by law.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed. 2d 554.

There have been four plans submitted to this Court, two by the School Board of the Midland Independent School District and two by the Intervenors. The Plaintiff in the case, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, stated that these plans meet the constitutional requirements in so far as they relate to Negro children and the Court agrees with the Plaintiff on this point. Consequently, the decision of this Court is simplified,- — which plan should be adopted rests entirely in the hands of the school board since this Court can not and would not take over the administrative functions resting in the discretion of school authorities.

The Defendant School District has stated that it approves the plan referred to as A-2. If it approves this plan and decides to put it into effect it may do so since it does not violate any of the constitutional standards required by the Supreme Court.

A different question is presented with regard to Mexiean-American children since the record reveals that there has never been any de jure segregation of Mexican-Ameriean children, and that there is no evidence showing discrimination violative of the constitutional standards. Consequently, the plan of the Midland Independent School District relating to the De Zavala School is approved. The Plaintiff, Department of Health, Education and Welfare opposes the plan of the School District on this point.

To give the background of this case, the United States acting through its Department of Health, Education and Welfare, filed its complaint on August 7, 1970, in the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas, including as defendants the Texas Education Agency, the Midland Independent School District and six other school districts in the *149 Western District of Texas. Since the Midland Independent School District lies within the Midland-Odessa Division of the Western District of Texas, the ease was transferred from Austin to the Midland-Odessa Division and severed from the other defendant school districts which remained in the Austin Division.

Hearings were held in El Paso, Texas, for pendente lite relief for the 1970-71 school year on August 24 and August 25, 1970. Testimony was presented at that time concerning the proposed plan of the United States and a defense by the School District of its proposed plan for the 1970-71 school year.

The United States complaint asserted that the school system was operating a dual system based on race and unless restrained by the Court the school district would continue to maintain and operate a dual system in violation of the constitutional rights of the Negro and Mexiean-American children. At the hearings in El Paso on August 24 and 25, 1970, the plan of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was fully developed and the action of the School Board after Brown I to eliminate the previous existing de jure segregation of Negi’o students was likewise fully developed.

The record from those hearings established that the School Board of the Midland Independent School District worked diligently with the segregation problem in attempting a desegregation plan which the School Board believed eliminated once and for all all vestiges of the dual system of education. The Court finds that the School Board acted consistently in good faith in preparing its plan in June of 1968 to eliminate all vestiges of the dual system of education in the school district. This plan was as follows:

The Midland Plan

Two High Schools:

Midland High, fully integrated, is in the center of town and is fed by youngsters of all races and ethnic groups.

Lee High, fully integrated, is in the northwestern part of town and is fed by youngsters of all races and ethnic groups.

Two Freshmen (Ninth Grade) Schools:

Edison Junior High is in the southeastern part of town, is occupied by ninth grade students only, is fully integrated and is fed by youngsters of all races and ethnic groups.

Austin Junior High is in the northeastern part of town, is occupied by ninth grade students only, is fully integrated and is fed by youngsters of all races and ethnic groups.

Three Seventh and Eighth Grade Junior High Schools:

Alamo Junior High is in the western part of town, is occupied by seventh and eighth grade students only, is fully integrated and is fed by youngsters of all races and ethnic groups.

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Related

Hart v. Community School Board
383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. New York, 1974)
Hart v. COMMUNITY SCH. BD. OF BROOKLYN, NY SCH. D. 21
383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. New York, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
334 F. Supp. 147, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-midland-independent-school-district-txwd-1971.