UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-50861
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, VIOLA COLEMAN, M.D.; PREMIUM BASIN LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, COUNCIL #4434; MIDLAND LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, COUNCIL #4386,
Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellants,
versus
MIDLAND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (MO-70-CV-67) _________________________________________________________________ August 12, 2002 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
In this 31-year old school desegregation case, the Intervenors
ask us to reverse the district court’s rulings dismissing
desegregation orders against Defendant-Appellee Midland Independent
School District (“MISD”), adopting a settlement agreement between
MISD and plaintiff United States of America (“DOJ”), and denying
attorneys’ fees to the Intervenors. We affirm.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. In addition to contending that the district court abused its
discretion in denying attorneys’ fees, the Intervenors assert abuse
of discretion in the court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing
in 2001 prior to dismissing the areas of MISD’s operation that
remained under federal supervision and in approving the Consent
Order and Settlement in 1998 between MISD and DOJ over the
Intervenors’ objections. They also advance clear error in the
facts found when the district court dismissed the remaining five
areas under supervision based only on the terms of the 1998 Consent
Order and Settlement. We briefly address each of the assertions of
the Intervenors.
1. Evidentiary Hearing. We are cognizant of the venerable 3-
year probationary rule under Youngblood,1 but we are also aware
that, in 1987, we adopted the First Circuit’s incremental approach.2
This method was approved by the Supreme Court in 1992.3 The
district court implicitly followed the incremental method in the
instant case, developing an intimate knowledge of the school
district’s operations in the process and attaining the same
substantive goals achievable by using the Youngblood procedures.
1 Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, 448 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1971). 2 Overton v. Texas Ed. Agency, 834 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1987)(“Unitary status can be achieved in an incremental fashion.”)(citing Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987)). We explained further in Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 115, 159 (5th Cir. 1990), that when employing the incremental method, “the court will abdicate its supervisory role as to the aspect of the desegregation plan proclaimed unitary.” 3 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992).
2 In the course of its dealings, the district court conducted
evidentiary hearings on at least two occasions.
We are satisfied that the district court had the experience
and incrementally developed record needed to evaluate the
objections of the Intervenors and to determine whether the
substantive results secured by the Youngblood procedure had been
achieved in this case, albeit incrementally. We agree that, in
light of the record and the years since the latest agreement and
the concurring positions of the DOJ and MISD, there was no abuse of
discretion in failing to hold yet another hearing.
2. Factual Findings. We have reviewed the factual findings
underlying the 2001 dismissal and perceive no clear error. The
Intervenors mischaracterized the attention given by the district
court, mischaracterized, at least in part, the record of the
hearings held between 1994 and 2001, and failed to direct us to any
record evidence indicating how the district court might have
clearly erred in the factual determination that MISD had met its
obligations in the last five years remaining under supervision, as
identified in the settlement agreement. Generalized, bald
allegations of error and unsubstantiated allegations of lack of
good faith will not suffice. The claims of factual error are
unavailing.
3. 1998 Consent Order and Settlement. Even though abuse of
discretion is the appropriate standard, the Intervenors assert
clear error in the district court’s disposition of their claims and
adjudication of their rights, given the settlement agreement
3 between the two partes. The Intervenors also allege clear error in
the court’s acceptance of the settlement agreement with the
evidence required for dismissal as to whether MISD had complied
with the settlement agreement between the only direct parties in
the litigation. The 1998 Consent Order and Settlement simply
represented another procedural step in the district court’s
incremental dismissal of this desegregation case. The Intervenors
have failed to advance any viable basis for reversing the district
court’s order and have identified no factor left undecided by the
1998 settlement; neither have they identified any evidence that was
ignored by the district court in its approval of that settlement.
If, however, the 1998 agreement was literally that, then it was a
final order and the Intervenors’ appeal was untimely. Either way,
the Intervenors’ position on the findings cannot prevail.
4. Attorneys’ Fees. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1998(b) “the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee.” We review the
district court’s award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion.4
Despite the prevailing party standard, the Intervenors insist
that they are entitled to seek attorneys’ fees for their monitoring
services, that the considerations of such entitlement are different
from those for determining prevailing party status when an agreed
order has been entered, and that the district court erred in making
no findings on their entitlement to fees. Despite having
4 Volk v. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2001)(citing Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 277 (5th Cir. 2000)).
4 cherrypicked a single step in the overall analysis we performed in
Walker5 to support their argument, Intervenors are incorrect in
their contention that there is some form of entitlement analysis
distinct from the prevailing party analysis of § 1988. We are
satisfied that there is no statutory language, legislative history,
or case law indicating an entitlement analysis separate from the
prevailing party analysis of § 1988(b).
Earlier in the lengthy history of this case, Intervenors did
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-50861
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, VIOLA COLEMAN, M.D.; PREMIUM BASIN LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, COUNCIL #4434; MIDLAND LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, COUNCIL #4386,
Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellants,
versus
MIDLAND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (MO-70-CV-67) _________________________________________________________________ August 12, 2002 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
In this 31-year old school desegregation case, the Intervenors
ask us to reverse the district court’s rulings dismissing
desegregation orders against Defendant-Appellee Midland Independent
School District (“MISD”), adopting a settlement agreement between
MISD and plaintiff United States of America (“DOJ”), and denying
attorneys’ fees to the Intervenors. We affirm.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. In addition to contending that the district court abused its
discretion in denying attorneys’ fees, the Intervenors assert abuse
of discretion in the court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing
in 2001 prior to dismissing the areas of MISD’s operation that
remained under federal supervision and in approving the Consent
Order and Settlement in 1998 between MISD and DOJ over the
Intervenors’ objections. They also advance clear error in the
facts found when the district court dismissed the remaining five
areas under supervision based only on the terms of the 1998 Consent
Order and Settlement. We briefly address each of the assertions of
the Intervenors.
1. Evidentiary Hearing. We are cognizant of the venerable 3-
year probationary rule under Youngblood,1 but we are also aware
that, in 1987, we adopted the First Circuit’s incremental approach.2
This method was approved by the Supreme Court in 1992.3 The
district court implicitly followed the incremental method in the
instant case, developing an intimate knowledge of the school
district’s operations in the process and attaining the same
substantive goals achievable by using the Youngblood procedures.
1 Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, 448 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1971). 2 Overton v. Texas Ed. Agency, 834 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1987)(“Unitary status can be achieved in an incremental fashion.”)(citing Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987)). We explained further in Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 115, 159 (5th Cir. 1990), that when employing the incremental method, “the court will abdicate its supervisory role as to the aspect of the desegregation plan proclaimed unitary.” 3 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992).
2 In the course of its dealings, the district court conducted
evidentiary hearings on at least two occasions.
We are satisfied that the district court had the experience
and incrementally developed record needed to evaluate the
objections of the Intervenors and to determine whether the
substantive results secured by the Youngblood procedure had been
achieved in this case, albeit incrementally. We agree that, in
light of the record and the years since the latest agreement and
the concurring positions of the DOJ and MISD, there was no abuse of
discretion in failing to hold yet another hearing.
2. Factual Findings. We have reviewed the factual findings
underlying the 2001 dismissal and perceive no clear error. The
Intervenors mischaracterized the attention given by the district
court, mischaracterized, at least in part, the record of the
hearings held between 1994 and 2001, and failed to direct us to any
record evidence indicating how the district court might have
clearly erred in the factual determination that MISD had met its
obligations in the last five years remaining under supervision, as
identified in the settlement agreement. Generalized, bald
allegations of error and unsubstantiated allegations of lack of
good faith will not suffice. The claims of factual error are
unavailing.
3. 1998 Consent Order and Settlement. Even though abuse of
discretion is the appropriate standard, the Intervenors assert
clear error in the district court’s disposition of their claims and
adjudication of their rights, given the settlement agreement
3 between the two partes. The Intervenors also allege clear error in
the court’s acceptance of the settlement agreement with the
evidence required for dismissal as to whether MISD had complied
with the settlement agreement between the only direct parties in
the litigation. The 1998 Consent Order and Settlement simply
represented another procedural step in the district court’s
incremental dismissal of this desegregation case. The Intervenors
have failed to advance any viable basis for reversing the district
court’s order and have identified no factor left undecided by the
1998 settlement; neither have they identified any evidence that was
ignored by the district court in its approval of that settlement.
If, however, the 1998 agreement was literally that, then it was a
final order and the Intervenors’ appeal was untimely. Either way,
the Intervenors’ position on the findings cannot prevail.
4. Attorneys’ Fees. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1998(b) “the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee.” We review the
district court’s award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion.4
Despite the prevailing party standard, the Intervenors insist
that they are entitled to seek attorneys’ fees for their monitoring
services, that the considerations of such entitlement are different
from those for determining prevailing party status when an agreed
order has been entered, and that the district court erred in making
no findings on their entitlement to fees. Despite having
4 Volk v. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2001)(citing Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 277 (5th Cir. 2000)).
4 cherrypicked a single step in the overall analysis we performed in
Walker5 to support their argument, Intervenors are incorrect in
their contention that there is some form of entitlement analysis
distinct from the prevailing party analysis of § 1988. We are
satisfied that there is no statutory language, legislative history,
or case law indicating an entitlement analysis separate from the
prevailing party analysis of § 1988(b).
Earlier in the lengthy history of this case, Intervenors did
achieve prevailing party status and were awarded attorneys’ fees
for it. The period for which fees are now sought, however, saw no
prevailing by the Intervenors —— at least nothing that would rise
to the level of abuse of discretion by the district court in
finding none. In fact, Intervenors failed to prevail in any of
their repeated objections following their refusal to sign the
settlement agreement in 1998. In sum, the Intervenors have failed
to show in what way, if any, the district court abused its
discretion in determining that they should not be awarded
attorneys’ fees.
In conclusion, our thorough review of the pertinent portions
of the record on appeal, the law as presented by the briefs of the
parties, and the positions espoused by able counsel at oral
argument satisfies us that the district court clearly and correctly
disposed of the final chapter in this multi-decade school
desegregation case. It is now ripe (if not over-ripe) for
5 Walker v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 1996).
5 finality. For the reasons expressed by the district court, as
amplified above, the judgment and all rulings of the district court
appealed from by Intervenors are, in their entirety,
AFFIRMED. S:\OPINIONS\UNPUB\01\01-50861.0.wpd 4/29/04 6:50 pm