SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
Michael J. O’Mara appeals from his conviction after jury trial for possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The weapon in question was a Sten machinegun built and designed to fire in either fully automatic or semiautomatic mode by manipulation of a visible, external selection switch. It is not disputed that the weapon was in fact a machinegun which is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) to include all weapons designed to be fired automatically. It was, therefore, a firearm subject to regulation. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(6) (defining “firearm” to include machineguns). The gun was seized as the result of a search by national park rangers. Appellant challenges the search, and also challenges the court’s instruction to the jury as to the elements of the crime charged. Appellant contends that the district court should have instructed the jury that it was the government’s burden to prove not only that the appellant knew that he possessed the weapon, but also that he knew that the weapon was a dangerous device of the type which might be regulated. We hold that the district court did not err in instructing the jury or in admitting the challenged evidence. We therefore affirm the district court.
[1290]*1290
The Dangerous Weapon Instruction
Appellant maintains that the district court in this case erred in instructing that “the government must prove that the defendant knew that he possessed a weapon which would fire bullets, whether or not he knew that the weapon would fire in the automatic mode.” The defense in this case was based on the assertion that O’Mara believed the weapon to be a semi-automatic replica of a Sten and testified that he was unable to operate the weapon in an automatic mode. He asks us to reverse because the district court refused to give the instruction he wished that contained the following language: “The government must prove that the defendant knew that he possessed a dangerous device and that the device was the type which might be regulated.”
The instruction appellant sought would have added an element of partial scienter to a crime which has historically been treated as one in which the government need not prove any specific intent. For example, we held in United States v. Thomas, 531 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 996, 96 S.Ct. 2210, 48 L.Ed.2d 821 (1976), that the trial court did not err in instructing as follows:
There is no requirement that the defendant be shown to have a specific intent to commit the crime. The Government does not need to show that the defendant ... knew that the firearm was not registered or that he knew he was required to register it. The only knowledge which the Government needs to prove is that the firearm was in his possession.
Id. at 421. In Thomas we rejected a defense of mistake of fact where the defendant possessed an operable rifle as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(c) but claimed that he mistakenly believed the weapon was an antique firearm. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(g) provides an explicit exemption for firearms of a certain age and design. The weapon in Thomas did not meet the clear requirements for exemption as an antique firearm. 531 F.2d at 420.
The language desired by the appellant is drawn from our holding in United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S.Ct. 87, 78 L.Ed.2d 95 (1983). In Herbert, the instruction originally given by the district court was essentially the same instruction given in Thomas. The defense in Herbert, however, was materially different from that in Thomas. In Herbert, the defendant possessed a weapon originally designed not to fire as an automatic, and hence, the weapon as originally designed, was not required to be registered. It had been internally modified, however, to fire in the automatic mode. From external appearance, the weapon looked like an ordinary firearm not subject to regulation. The defendant in Herbert wished to argue that he had no knowledge that it had been modified and therefore would not have been on notice that he had violated the law. We pointed out in Herbert that although there were cases in the circuit, like Thomas, that had approved the type of instruction the district court gave in Herbert, those were all cases in which the weapons appeared to be just what they were—weapons that were subject to regulation—and therefore, by their very nature, would put a reasonable person on notice of the possibility of regulation. 698 F.2d at 986. We held in Herbert that, in the particular circumstances of that case, it was error for the district court to instruct the jury that the mere possession of a firearm that is required to be registered is a violation of law. 698 F.2d at 986-87. We said in Herbert that where “there were no external indications on the weapon that indicate it is subject to regulation,” the district court must expressly instruct the jury that the government must prove the defendant “knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.” 698 F.2d at 986 (quoting United States v. DeBartolo, 482 F.2d 312, 316 (1st Cir.1973)). That or similar language in the circumstances of the Herbert case would permit the defendant to argue to the jury that he did not know about the internal modifications. No similar defense of deception exists in this case.
[1291]*1291The appellant’s reliance on Herbert is therefore misplaced, for the weapon had no internal modifications and was from its external appearances subject to regulation. The district court in this case therefore did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant need not have actual knowledge that the weapon was an automatic weapon.
Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Kindred, 931 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.1991), is also misplaced. In Kindred, the weapon in question was not only old, as was the weapon in Thomas, but was missing parts and could not function. We held that the district court erred in instructing that the government need only prove that the defendant knew that the object was a “gun.” We reasoned that such an instruction was appropriate where the object was a weapon that was obviously dangerous, but was insufficient where the object was obviously not dangerous.
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SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
Michael J. O’Mara appeals from his conviction after jury trial for possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The weapon in question was a Sten machinegun built and designed to fire in either fully automatic or semiautomatic mode by manipulation of a visible, external selection switch. It is not disputed that the weapon was in fact a machinegun which is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) to include all weapons designed to be fired automatically. It was, therefore, a firearm subject to regulation. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(6) (defining “firearm” to include machineguns). The gun was seized as the result of a search by national park rangers. Appellant challenges the search, and also challenges the court’s instruction to the jury as to the elements of the crime charged. Appellant contends that the district court should have instructed the jury that it was the government’s burden to prove not only that the appellant knew that he possessed the weapon, but also that he knew that the weapon was a dangerous device of the type which might be regulated. We hold that the district court did not err in instructing the jury or in admitting the challenged evidence. We therefore affirm the district court.
[1290]*1290
The Dangerous Weapon Instruction
Appellant maintains that the district court in this case erred in instructing that “the government must prove that the defendant knew that he possessed a weapon which would fire bullets, whether or not he knew that the weapon would fire in the automatic mode.” The defense in this case was based on the assertion that O’Mara believed the weapon to be a semi-automatic replica of a Sten and testified that he was unable to operate the weapon in an automatic mode. He asks us to reverse because the district court refused to give the instruction he wished that contained the following language: “The government must prove that the defendant knew that he possessed a dangerous device and that the device was the type which might be regulated.”
The instruction appellant sought would have added an element of partial scienter to a crime which has historically been treated as one in which the government need not prove any specific intent. For example, we held in United States v. Thomas, 531 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 996, 96 S.Ct. 2210, 48 L.Ed.2d 821 (1976), that the trial court did not err in instructing as follows:
There is no requirement that the defendant be shown to have a specific intent to commit the crime. The Government does not need to show that the defendant ... knew that the firearm was not registered or that he knew he was required to register it. The only knowledge which the Government needs to prove is that the firearm was in his possession.
Id. at 421. In Thomas we rejected a defense of mistake of fact where the defendant possessed an operable rifle as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(c) but claimed that he mistakenly believed the weapon was an antique firearm. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(g) provides an explicit exemption for firearms of a certain age and design. The weapon in Thomas did not meet the clear requirements for exemption as an antique firearm. 531 F.2d at 420.
The language desired by the appellant is drawn from our holding in United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S.Ct. 87, 78 L.Ed.2d 95 (1983). In Herbert, the instruction originally given by the district court was essentially the same instruction given in Thomas. The defense in Herbert, however, was materially different from that in Thomas. In Herbert, the defendant possessed a weapon originally designed not to fire as an automatic, and hence, the weapon as originally designed, was not required to be registered. It had been internally modified, however, to fire in the automatic mode. From external appearance, the weapon looked like an ordinary firearm not subject to regulation. The defendant in Herbert wished to argue that he had no knowledge that it had been modified and therefore would not have been on notice that he had violated the law. We pointed out in Herbert that although there were cases in the circuit, like Thomas, that had approved the type of instruction the district court gave in Herbert, those were all cases in which the weapons appeared to be just what they were—weapons that were subject to regulation—and therefore, by their very nature, would put a reasonable person on notice of the possibility of regulation. 698 F.2d at 986. We held in Herbert that, in the particular circumstances of that case, it was error for the district court to instruct the jury that the mere possession of a firearm that is required to be registered is a violation of law. 698 F.2d at 986-87. We said in Herbert that where “there were no external indications on the weapon that indicate it is subject to regulation,” the district court must expressly instruct the jury that the government must prove the defendant “knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of such type as would alert one to the likelihood of regulation.” 698 F.2d at 986 (quoting United States v. DeBartolo, 482 F.2d 312, 316 (1st Cir.1973)). That or similar language in the circumstances of the Herbert case would permit the defendant to argue to the jury that he did not know about the internal modifications. No similar defense of deception exists in this case.
[1291]*1291The appellant’s reliance on Herbert is therefore misplaced, for the weapon had no internal modifications and was from its external appearances subject to regulation. The district court in this case therefore did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant need not have actual knowledge that the weapon was an automatic weapon.
Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Kindred, 931 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.1991), is also misplaced. In Kindred, the weapon in question was not only old, as was the weapon in Thomas, but was missing parts and could not function. We held that the district court erred in instructing that the government need only prove that the defendant knew that the object was a “gun.” We reasoned that such an instruction was appropriate where the object was a weapon that was obviously dangerous, but was insufficient where the object was obviously not dangerous. We held that the defendant therefore should have been given the opportunity to argue to a properly instructed jury that he did not know that the device was “of such a dangerous type as to be subject to regulation.” Here, by contrast, there is no contention that the weapon was not in fact dangerous, only that the defendant mistakenly believed the weapon was not an automatic, despite the visible, external selection switch designed to permit firing in both semi-automatic and automatic modes. The appellant here, as in Thomas, was not entitled to defend on the ground that he was mistaken about the true nature of the weapon.
The concurrence suggests that section 5861(d), as interpreted by this circuit, requires no proof that a defendant knew of those characteristics of the weapon subjecting it to the federal registration requirement. Concurring Opinion at page 1292. This suggestion may be somewhat misleading. Under the cases of this circuit, there is strict liability under the statute when the firearm in question, by its very nature or appearance, alerts its owner of the likelihood of regulation. Our cases recognize an exception where the nature of the weapon is not evident. The concurrence cites United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir.1989) (en banc), with approval. Anderson comments on the harsh injustice of finding guilt where, unknown to a gun owner and despite a genuine and reasonable belief to the contrary, a semi-automatic pistol turns out to have been secretly “modified to be fully automatic.” 885 F.2d at 1254. In such a case, however, as the foregoing discussion of Herbert and Kindred explains, the law of this circuit, too, would require proof by the government that the defendant actually knew of the characteristics of the weapon which subject it to regulation.
In sum, this court has in Herbert and Kindred created narrow exceptions to the general rule that where the government proves that a defendant is in possession of a gun requiring registration, it need not prove that the defendant knew of the specific properties of the weapon that subject it to registration. The exception in Herbert was for a weapon that was subject to registration only by virtue of internal modification. In Kindred, it was for a weapon that did not appear to be dangerous. In this case, where the defendant knowingly possessed a weapon, and that weapon bore all the external indicia subjecting it to regulation, the defendant is not entitled to defend on the grounds that he lacked knowledge of the specific characteristics that triggered the registration requirement.
The Search
The appellant’s challenge to the legality of the search which produced the weapon does not merit lengthy discussion. The park rangers, having received reports of illegal firearms discharges in the Joshua Tree National Monument, began stopping all outgoing cars along the only exit route from the campground area where the discharges were reported. Their purpose was to question exiting visitors briefly. Witnesses had furnished descriptions of suspects and the park rangers were also looking for persons fitting these descriptions.
Appellant was stopped and the park ranger immediately noticed that he and his passenger matched the descriptions wit[1292]*1292nesses had given. The ranger asked the occupants how they were doing, if they had been in the area long, and whether they had heard any gun shots. At this point the ranger noticed details of the appearance of the occupants of the car which further matched the description of the suspects. He therefore asked them to wait, walked to his own truck and radioed for backup. The subsequent search of the vehicle resulted in the seizure of several weapons, including the Sten machinegun.
Appellant contends that the initial stop had to be supported by particularized suspicion and that the evidence seized should, therefore, have been excluded. Our decision, however, is controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). The Court there, after weighing public interest, the degree of intrusion, and the likely effectiveness of the stops, held that roadblock sobriety checks do not violate the fourth amendment. The public interest in apprehending persons who randomly shoot dangerous weapons in a public campground is as weighty as the interest involved in Sitz. The intrusion is no greater. The degree to which the stop could be expected to further the public interest in this case was higher than that of the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz, since the officers in this case had good reason to believe that one of the cars exiting the park had occupants which had committed a crime.
AFFIRMED.