ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge.
Michael E. Smith appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict of guilty on all four counts of an indictment charging him with making threats against the President and Vice President of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871 (counts 1 and 2), and with making threats against a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 115 (counts 3 and 4). In his direct appeal Smith has raised six different grounds for reversal: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to acquit him of the charges because the proofs failed to substantiate that he had any intention actually of harming the individuáis named therein; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to acquit him because the language of the letters which were employed to prove the threats could not as a matter of law be taken as such but instead were [741]*741merely expressions of the personal feelings of the defendant; (3) that he was denied a fair trial because of the prosecution’s improper introduction of evidence concerning his alcoholism and other statements he had made earlier concerning the persons involved and before delivery of the letters which actually brought about his prosecution; (4) that the trial court erred in failing to give his proffered instruction concerning the requisite state of mind and intent necessary to his conviction; (5) that the trial court committed reversible error by its intemperate remarks made in criticism of defense counsel both in and out of the presence of the jury; and (6) that the trial court erred in failing to state reasons for its sentencing decision.
We have little difficulty in affirming the judgment of the district court with respect to the first four assignments of error raised by Smith. The evidence was fully sufficient to warrant submission to the jury on the question of whether Smith was guilty of each of the four counts relating to threats made against the President, Vice President and against the federal officers involved. United States v. Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir.1982) (defendant may be convicted of threatening the President even if he does not harbor an actual, subjective intent to carry out his threat). The facts in Vincent were very similar to those present here, and we set a standard under 18 U.S.C. § 115 which does not require that an actual subjective intent to carry out the threat be present. That was the standard and remains the standard. We have also reviewed the trial court’s instructions to the jury and find them to be correct and to embody substantially the substance of defendant’s request to charge No. 15, to the extent it was legally required. The trial judge was not obliged to adopt the precise language sought by Mr. Smith or his counsel. United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir.1986).
Likewise we find no merit in Smith’s sixth claim of error. Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) it is required that the district court “shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and if the sentence: (1) is of the kind, and within the range, described in subsection (a)(4) and that range exceeds 24 months, the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range; ____” (emphasis added). We find the trial judge’s comments in this respect at least minimally sufficient. He was not required to be more particular with respect to the reason for imposing sentence at a particular point within the range since the guideline range for the offenses, being between 63 and 78 months, did not exceed 24 months. Under existing case law the trial judge was not required to be more specific. See United States v. Duque, 883 F.2d 43, 45 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Zine, 906 F.2d 776, 779 (D.C.Cir.1990).
Issue No. 5, however, has caused the court more difficulty. During defense counsel’s final argument, the trial court interrupted him to admonish him against comments which the court considered to be improper in the circumstances. It is necessary to an understanding of the issue that we repeat in its entirety the colloquy which then took place:
“MR. ATTENBOROUGH (DEFENSE COUNSEL): Even when he was in a prison cell, he wrote and put his return address. He’s never tried to hurt anybody, and every time he’s contacted the government, it has been to the very people who are charged with arresting people who do try to hurt somebody. So a reasonable person would not think—
THE COURT: Excuse me just a moment, Mr. Attenborough. That’s improper, and I caution you not to do it again.
Ladies and gentlemen, the remark of counsel that it’s the purpose of government to hurt people is improper.
Would you refrain from any such remarks? Do come forward.
SIDEBAR CONFERENCE
THE COURT: The government is not on trial, Mr. Attenborough.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: You misheard me. I did not say that the government’s job was to hurt people.
[742]*742THE COURT: That’s exactly what you said. Well, don’t shake your head. You said it like it’s the government who does hurt people.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: I said it was the government’s duty to — the government agencies who arrest people who are trying to hurt anyone.
THE COURT: Ms. Schwab, read what counsel said.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: The argument doesn’t matter now. I move for a mistrial. You have criticized me in front of the jury in the middle of my closing argument.
THE COURT: I certainly did.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: You have undermined my credibility. You have deprived the defendant of a fair trial. He is entitled to a mistrial at this point.
THE COURT: Nonsense. You have no right to make such an argument.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: Would you ask her to read it?
THE COURT: Read it, Ms. Schwab, would you?
(The record was read.)
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: You heard her read it. I said it’s the agencies of the government’s responsibility to arrest people who try to hurt other people.
THE COURT: Your language is highly inflammatory, Mr. Attenborough, and it is subject to the interpretation that I put upon it.
MR.
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ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge.
Michael E. Smith appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict of guilty on all four counts of an indictment charging him with making threats against the President and Vice President of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871 (counts 1 and 2), and with making threats against a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 115 (counts 3 and 4). In his direct appeal Smith has raised six different grounds for reversal: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to acquit him of the charges because the proofs failed to substantiate that he had any intention actually of harming the individuáis named therein; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to acquit him because the language of the letters which were employed to prove the threats could not as a matter of law be taken as such but instead were [741]*741merely expressions of the personal feelings of the defendant; (3) that he was denied a fair trial because of the prosecution’s improper introduction of evidence concerning his alcoholism and other statements he had made earlier concerning the persons involved and before delivery of the letters which actually brought about his prosecution; (4) that the trial court erred in failing to give his proffered instruction concerning the requisite state of mind and intent necessary to his conviction; (5) that the trial court committed reversible error by its intemperate remarks made in criticism of defense counsel both in and out of the presence of the jury; and (6) that the trial court erred in failing to state reasons for its sentencing decision.
We have little difficulty in affirming the judgment of the district court with respect to the first four assignments of error raised by Smith. The evidence was fully sufficient to warrant submission to the jury on the question of whether Smith was guilty of each of the four counts relating to threats made against the President, Vice President and against the federal officers involved. United States v. Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir.1982) (defendant may be convicted of threatening the President even if he does not harbor an actual, subjective intent to carry out his threat). The facts in Vincent were very similar to those present here, and we set a standard under 18 U.S.C. § 115 which does not require that an actual subjective intent to carry out the threat be present. That was the standard and remains the standard. We have also reviewed the trial court’s instructions to the jury and find them to be correct and to embody substantially the substance of defendant’s request to charge No. 15, to the extent it was legally required. The trial judge was not obliged to adopt the precise language sought by Mr. Smith or his counsel. United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir.1986).
Likewise we find no merit in Smith’s sixth claim of error. Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) it is required that the district court “shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and if the sentence: (1) is of the kind, and within the range, described in subsection (a)(4) and that range exceeds 24 months, the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range; ____” (emphasis added). We find the trial judge’s comments in this respect at least minimally sufficient. He was not required to be more particular with respect to the reason for imposing sentence at a particular point within the range since the guideline range for the offenses, being between 63 and 78 months, did not exceed 24 months. Under existing case law the trial judge was not required to be more specific. See United States v. Duque, 883 F.2d 43, 45 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Zine, 906 F.2d 776, 779 (D.C.Cir.1990).
Issue No. 5, however, has caused the court more difficulty. During defense counsel’s final argument, the trial court interrupted him to admonish him against comments which the court considered to be improper in the circumstances. It is necessary to an understanding of the issue that we repeat in its entirety the colloquy which then took place:
“MR. ATTENBOROUGH (DEFENSE COUNSEL): Even when he was in a prison cell, he wrote and put his return address. He’s never tried to hurt anybody, and every time he’s contacted the government, it has been to the very people who are charged with arresting people who do try to hurt somebody. So a reasonable person would not think—
THE COURT: Excuse me just a moment, Mr. Attenborough. That’s improper, and I caution you not to do it again.
Ladies and gentlemen, the remark of counsel that it’s the purpose of government to hurt people is improper.
Would you refrain from any such remarks? Do come forward.
SIDEBAR CONFERENCE
THE COURT: The government is not on trial, Mr. Attenborough.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: You misheard me. I did not say that the government’s job was to hurt people.
[742]*742THE COURT: That’s exactly what you said. Well, don’t shake your head. You said it like it’s the government who does hurt people.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: I said it was the government’s duty to — the government agencies who arrest people who are trying to hurt anyone.
THE COURT: Ms. Schwab, read what counsel said.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: The argument doesn’t matter now. I move for a mistrial. You have criticized me in front of the jury in the middle of my closing argument.
THE COURT: I certainly did.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: You have undermined my credibility. You have deprived the defendant of a fair trial. He is entitled to a mistrial at this point.
THE COURT: Nonsense. You have no right to make such an argument.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: Would you ask her to read it?
THE COURT: Read it, Ms. Schwab, would you?
(The record was read.)
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: You heard her read it. I said it’s the agencies of the government’s responsibility to arrest people who try to hurt other people.
THE COURT: Your language is highly inflammatory, Mr. Attenborough, and it is subject to the interpretation that I put upon it.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: Would you ask her to read it again, Judge? I’m sure you’ll be persuaded if you listen to this one sentence again.
THE COURT: I have heard what you said.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: I didn’t say the government was hurting anybody.
THE COURT: Go on with your final argument. Make no more comments like that.
MR. ATTENBOROUGH: I never made that in the first place, Judge.
SIDEBAR CONFERENCE CONCLUDED
(Transcript Day 3 of Trial, pp. 14-16)
Relying primarily upon United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir.1979), counsel for Mr. Smith urges strenuously that the cited language of the trial judge not only indicated outright bias on the part of the trial judge but so belittled defense counsel as to warrant a reversal and a new trial.
From our review of the entire record it is evident that the incident referred to was isolated and confined to that which has been recorded above. Further it is evident that, to the extent the trial judge’s comments were otherwise objectionable, they were made in the main at the sidebar and therefore out of hearing of the jury. By the court reporter’s characterization of the event, we have no reason to believe that the statements which occurred at the sidebar were actually heard by the jury and therefore its verdict could only have been improperly influenced, if at all, by the relatively brief colloquy which occurred in its presence. Viewed as such, we are unable to conclude that the trial judge’s comments constituted error, much less error justifying reversal and new trial. It is evident from the record that a misunderstanding of what defense counsel had said or had inferred triggered the court’s interruption and precautionary instruction. Crediting both the court and defense counsel with a fair understanding of what each thought he heard, the comments of Mr. Smith’s counsel were ambiguous and were interpreted by the court in a manner which, if so construed, would have merited the admonition. As so interpreted, the trial court’s precautionary admonition was within his discretion. Although an entirely different meaning may have been intended by defense counsel and may also have been actually conveyed to the jury, the comments of the trial judge actually made in the presence of the jury did not rise to that element of reversible error, especially since the record seems to have been singularly free of similar incidents elsewhere in the course of trial.
[743]*743What defense counsel would have us believe, however, is that the statements made by the trial judge at the sidebar conference were not only improper but were also, to his client’s prejudice, heard by the jury. In that presumption we may not indulge. Not having been present at the trial, we are unable to say what conduct beyond that reported, may have prompted the seemingly intemperate remarks of the trial court. A criminal jury trial is rarely if ever a perfect exercise in dispassionate logic and advocacy. It is an intensely human event, only imperfectly translated into the sterile medium of the written record. Without commenting further upon the exchange at the sidebar, it is sufficient to say that we are fully satisfied that the jury verdict was unaffected by it.
In the light of the above observations and because we further conclude that the trial was in all other respects fairly and impartially conducted, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.