UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________
No. 00-40322 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE JESUS MENDOZA-OSEGUERA; GERARDO CASTILLO,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas U.S.D.C. No. L-99-CR-276-1
August 9, 2001
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jose Jesus Mendoza-Oseguera (“Mendoza”) and Gerardo Castillo (“Castillo”) were convicted
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(a), 846 and possession of more than five kilograms, that is,
approximately 492 pounds of cocaine, with intent to distribute in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(a). Each appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm.
I
Law enforcement personnel were aware that drug traffickers purchased supplies to package
drugs from a supply store in Laredo. While observing this store, two Laredo police officers witnessed
Mendoza ent er and later exit with two bags containing boxes. The officers decided to follow
Mendoza, which led them to a second building supply store. Following Mendoza into the store, the
officers passed Mendoza’s truck and noticed that the bags from the first supply store contained boxes
of “vacuum pack bags,” an item frequently used to package drugs. In the second store, Mendoza
went straight to the aisle containing duct tape. Mendoza purchased thirty rolls of duct tape, which
he paid for in cash from a large roll of money. This conduct amplified the officers’ suspicions that
drug trafficking was afoot. The officers then followed Mendoza from the second store to a residence
in Laredo. Upon reaching the residence, Mendoza carried the items inside. Believing the residence
was a “stash house” for drugs, the officers requested continuous surveillance of the residence, which
began between 11 a.m. and noon.
Mendoza left the residence twice, the first time alone and the second time with his co-
defendant, Jose Antonio Zepeda-Martinez (“Zepeda”).1 Apart from Mendoza and Zepeda, no one
else was seen entering or exiting the house during the time the house was under surveillance.
Mendoza drove himself and Zepeda to an international bridge located between Mexico and the United
States. About four blocks from the bridge, Zepeda exited the truck and walked across the bridge.
Mendoza drove the truck across the bridge. The officers found this conduct to be consistent with
drug traffickers carrying large sums of money across the border, i.e., splitting the money between two
1 Zepeda pled guilty to count one.
-2- persons who cross the border separately. A few hours later, the Customs Service informed the
officers that the truck Mendoza was driving re-entered the United States. The officers then resumed
their surveillance of Mendoza, following him to his apartment and later a truck stop. At the truck
stop, Mendoza conversed with a Hispanic male who Mendoza drove to a warehouse. After remaining
at the warehouse a short time, Mendoza left and drove back toward Mexico.
The officers did not follow Mendoza into Mexico, but instead returned to the residence where
Mendoza had dropped off the packaging materials. Between 5:30 and 6 p.m., the officers knocked
on the door of the residence, but no one responded. That evening, the officers learned that the truck
Mendoza was driving had re-entered the United States. At approximately 7:45 p.m., Mendoza
returned to the residence with Zepeda. Mendoza was seen leaving the house only once to obtain
what appeared to be a cell phone from the truck. During this time, lights were on in the residence’s
third bedroom and the kitchen. The lights turned off at around 10 p.m. About an hour later, t he
officers again knocked on the door. Mendoza answered the knock and was greeted by the officers
who requested Mendoza’s permission to search the house for narcotics. Mendoza claimed that he
did not live at the house, and was merely visiting with friends and watching a movie. Mendoza
informed the police that he lived at another location, adding that there was a gun and ten thousand
dollars in cash at that location. When asked about his whereabouts earlier in the day, Mendoza
denied visiting either of the supply stores. Next, Castillo and Zepeda came to the door. The officers
requested that they grant oral and written permission to search the house. Both individuals provided
written permission, and Castillo also gave oral permission, stating that he lived elsewhere but
occasionally stayed at the residence.
Upon searching the house, the officers found 221 bundles of cocaine (over 220 kilograms)
-3- in the third bedroom, as well as a prescription bottle with Castillo’s name on it in the closet of that
bedroom, four food saver sealers, a box of unused duct tape, two bags of boxes containing vacuum
pack bags, a box containing used duct tape, pieces of rope, pieces of canvas material, a utility knife,
cocaine wrappers, disposable gloves, a chair, and a fan. In the utility room, there were trash bags,
used wrappers, duct tape, a truck gas tank, tools, a box with bags, pinto bean sacks, a duffle bag, and
broken padlocks. The garage contained a truck, an empty truck gas tank, gas cans, cans of grease,
a roaster oven, and a roll of wrap. The following items were also obtained from the house: seven
cash receipts for rolls of duct tape, boxes of food saver bags, a razor knife, Mendoza’s phone
receipts, a magazine receipt bearing Mendoza’s name, a handwritten note signed by Mendoza, and
a Federal Express air bill and receipt listing Mendoza as the recipient.
On this evidence and the testimony presented at trial, the jury convicted Mendoza and Castillo
of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Mendoza was sentenced to 360
months’ imprisonment on each count to run concurrently, and five years’ supervised release on each
count to run concurrently. This sentence included a two level enhancement for obstruction of justice,
and a two level enhancement for acting as a leader or organizer in the commission of the offense.
Castillo received a sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment on each count to run concurrently, and five
years’ supervised release on each count to run concurrently. Castillo was denied a two level sentence
reduction for minimal participation.
II
Mendoza and Castillo each argue that there was insufficient evidence to convict them of the
counts charged. We narrowly review sufficiency of the evidence claims, meaning “we will affirm if
a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence established the essential elements of the
-4- crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir. 2000). “We
review all evidence and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government,” and
we do not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. United States v. Monroe, 178 F.3d
304, 307 (5th Cir. 1999). However, “[i]f the evidence . . . gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial
support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, we must reverse the conviction, as under these
circumstances a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Ramos-Garcia, 184 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1999).
For the government to demonstrate that Mendoza and Castillo participated in “a narcotics
conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) an agreement existed
between two or more persons to violate narcotics laws; (2) each alleged conspirator knew of the
conspiracy and intended to join it; and (3) each alleged conspirator voluntarily participated in the
conspiracy.” United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The
elements of the charge need not be proved by direct evidence, rather “[t]he agreement, a defendant’s
guilty knowledge and a defendant’s participation in the conspiracy may all be inferred from ‘the
development and collocation of circumstances.’” United States v. Delagarza-Villarreal, 141 F.3d
133, 139 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
The elements of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are “(1) knowledge, (2) possession, and (3)
intent to distribute the controlled substance.” United States v. Delgado, — F.3d —, No. 99-50635,
2001 WL 716951, at *6 (5th Cir. June 26, 2001). Possession may be actual or constructive. See
United States v. Steen, 55 F.3d 1022, 1031 (5th Cir. 1995). “Constructive possession is defined as
ownership, dominion, or control over illegal drugs or dominion over the premises where drugs are
found. Either direct or circumstantial evidence can support a finding of possession.” Id. (internal
-5- quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
To obtain a conviction for aiding and abetting the possession of drugs “the government must
establish that the defendant became associated with, participated in, and in some way acted to further
the possession and distribution of the drugs.” Delgado, 2001 WL 716951, at *6. The government
need not prove “actual physical possession.” Id. Moreover, “‘18 U.S.C. § 2 does not define a
separate crime,’ but rather provides another means of convicting someone of the underlying offense.”
United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 752 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
A
Mendoza claims that his purchase of the packaging materials was legal, and that he delivered
the materials to Zepeda as a favor. He asserts that he did not exercise control over the house, that
he was only in the house for brief periods of time, and that there was no evidence that he knew of the
drugs. In short, Mendoza maintains that he was merely present in a location where drugs were
discovered, but was not involved with the drugs. According to Mendoza, none of the evidence
presented was sufficient to prove otherwise, and as a result, he avers that we must reverse his
convictions. We disagree.
While “mere presence at the crime scene or close association with conspirators” by itself is
not sufficient for a jury to infer a defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy, “presence or association
is a factor that, along with other evidence, may be relied upon to find conspiratorial activity by the
defendant.” United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 935 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Here, the evidence presented, including the testimony of the officers conducting
the surveillance and search, shows that Mendoza was more than merely present or simply associating
with the members of the conspiracy. Mendoza purchased, in cash, large quantities of materials
-6- commonly used to package drugs, carried these materials into the house the drugs were stored, and
later lied to the officers about the purchase of the materials. After dropping the packaging materials
off at the house, Mendoza left and returned to the house two times, suggesting that Mendoza came
and went from the residence at his pleasure. On the same day he purchased the packaging materials,
Mendoza traveled to Mexico twice, on one occasion following a pattern employed by drug traffickers
bringing large sums of money into Mexico, i.e., dropping his co-defendant off before the international
bridge and then crossing separately.
Mendoza was present in the house for approximately three hours after he returned from his
second trip from Mexico. When the house was searched, officers found in various areas of the house
materials to package and conceal drugs, some of which were the materials Mendoza purchased earlier
in the day. Furthermore, in the third bedroom, which contained packaging materials, the police also
discovered over 220 kilograms of cocaine. The door to this bedroom was open when the officers
entered the house. Also, there was testimony that personal items belonging to Mendoza were found
in the house, e.g., Mendoza’s phone receipts, a magazine receipt bearing Mendoza’s name, a
handwritten note signed by Mendoza, and a Federal Express air bill and receipt listing Mendoza as
the recipient.2 This evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the
elements of the possession and the conspiracy charges. See United States v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425,
1430 (5th Cir. 1989) (the existence of the defendant’s receipts, papers, clothes, and prescription
bottles at the house where the drugs were located was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the
defendant exercised dominion and control over the premises).
2 We do not discuss the evidence presented in the defendants’ cases-in-chief, as the defendants moved for judgment of acquittal at the end of the government’s case-in-chief and the court deferred ruling on that motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b).
-7- B
Like Mendoza, Castillo claims that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him of either
of the counts charged. Castillo also tenders a “mere presence” argument. While the evidence against
Castillo is less than that against Mendoza, it is enough for the jury to have found Castillo guilty of
the counts charged.
Based on the surveillance o f the officers, Castillo was left alone for over seven hours in a
small, track house that contained over 220 kilograms of cocaine with a street value of up to $4.4
million. When officers knocked on the door of the house the first time, they received no answer.
However, a few hours later when the officers knocked again Castillo emerged and consented to the
search of the house. At this point, Castillo claimed that he did not live at the house, but admitted that
he stayed there occasionally. A search of the house revealed drug packaging materials in three areas
of the house. In the third bedroom, the door to which was open when the officers searched the
house, the officers found over 220 kilograms of cocaine. Further, the officers discovered a medicine
bottle with a label bearing Castillo’s name in the bedroom where the cocaine was stored. Finally, at
trial an officer, experienced in narcotics investigations, testified that this house was a stash house and
that drug traffickers do not reveal the location of, or allow admittance to, a stash house by persons
other than trusted members of the drug organization. See United States v. Martinez-Moncivais, 14
F.3d 1030, 1035 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that “reasonable jurors could conclude that [a drug dealer]
would not entrust millions of dollars . . . of drugs to an unknowing, innocent [individual,]” as there
is a high risk that the individual would inform authorities or steal the drugs); United States v.
Martinez, 190 F.3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding it reasonable to infer defendant’s knowledge
of drugs when, inter alia, defendant was entrusted to transport, alone, over one million dollars worth
-8- of drugs). Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we believe a
reasonable jury could determine that Castillo was a member of the conspiracy.
Furthermore, as we have previously acknowledged, “[o]ften, the evidence that supports a
conspiracy conviction also supports an aiding and abetting conviction.” Delgado, 2001 WL 716951,
at *6; see Gonzales, 121 F.3d at 936 (finding that the evidence presented supporting the defendant’s
conspiracy conviction was sufficient to affirm the defendant’s aiding and abetting charge). That
maxim rings true in this case. The evidence presented above makes out the elements of an aiding and
abetting charge, i.e., a reasonable jury could have concluded that Castillo’s presence at the house was
to watch over the drugs, thus, aiding in the possession and distribution of the cocaine. Accordingly,
we affirm Castillo’s convictions.
III
Both Mendoza and Castillo contend that the district court erred in the admission of evidence.
Where a defendant has made a timely objection below, we review the district court’s evidentiary
rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 832 (5th Cir. 1995).
Any abuse of discretion, if found, is reviewed for harmless error. See United States v. Moody, 903
F.2d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 1990). Where the defendant fails to object below, we review the evidentiary
ruling for plain error only. See United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir.
1998).
Mendoza asserts that the district court erred in allowing the government’s witnesses to testify
that Mendoza’s actions were consistent with drug t rafficking. We have previously held that “an
experienced narcotics agent may testify about the significance of certain conduct or methods of
-9- operation to the drug distribution business, as such testimony is often helpful in assisting the trier of
fact understand the evidence.” United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1283 (5th Cir. 1995); see
United States v. Armendariz-Mata, 949 F.2d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 1991) (allowing an experienced drug
enforcement agent to testify as to the meaning of “code words” and the significance of the
defendant’s actions). The admission of the officers’ testimony as to the meaning of Mendoza’s actions
is not in error so long as it “was helpful and its relevance was not outweighed by the possibility of
unfair prejudice or confusion.” United States v. Garcia, 86 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 1996).
The record reveals that the officers testifying as to the consistency of Mendoza’s actions
with drug trafficking were experienced in narcotics investigations. Through their experience they had
knowledge of the mode of operation of those involved in drug trafficking. Their testimony assisted
the jury in understanding the significance of Mendoza’s actions. See United States v. Garcia, 86 F.3d
394, 400 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that the district court did not err in admitting agent’s testimony that
166.9 kilograms of cocaine was indicative of a large drug trafficking organization or that such an
organization used “car swaps,” and “stash houses” because the “average juror” may not be aware of
the import of this information); see also United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997)
(allowing a DEA agent to testify as to the meaning of drug jargon because it was “a specialized body
of knowledge, familiar only to those wise in the ways of the drug trade, and therefore a fit for expert
testimony.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err in admitting this testimony.
Mendoza contends that the jury heard about an uncharged offense, i.e., that marijuana was
present in the house. This contention is counterfactual. The record reflects that the court refused
to allow the government to inquire about a detergent box, found in the bathroom, that contained both
cocaine and marijuana.
-10- Mendoza also alleges that the government’s question as to whether he was selling contraband
clothing was more prejudicial than probative, making its admission erroneous under Fed. R. Evid.
403. Mendoza did no t object to this question below. Thus, we review it for plain error only.
Mendoza testified on direct examination that he had come to Laredo to form a transportation
company and to sell clothing. Mendoza’s atto rney inquired into Mendoza’s clothing sales, asking
about the shipments, and the quality and brands of the clothing. Mendoza testified that he was selling
“Versace, Giorgio Armani, and Mossoni [sic]” clothing. This testimony was part of the defense’s
theory of the case that Mendoza had innocently come to Laredo for work and was just helping out
a friend when he purchased the rolls of tape and the vacuum seal bags, knowing nothing about what
his friend was doing inside the house. Mendoza testified that he was supporting himself by selling
this clothing while trying to form a transportation company, and that his girlfriend was helping him
sell the clothing. In answering the government’s question on cross-examination that his girlfriend
refused to help sell the clothing because it was contraband, Mendoza admitted that she refused to help
him because the clothing was not “original.” Hence, the government’s questions on cross-
examination referring to the clothing Mendoza soled as contraband were part of its attempt to
impeach the credibility of Mendoza’s testimony as to his purportedly lawful occupation in Laredo.
Thus, the government’s inquiries tended to show that Mendoza’s testimony on direct examination
was false and their admission was not erroneous.
Mendo za co ntends that the cumulative effect of all of this evidence rendered his trial
fundamentally unfair. Because we find that the district court committed no error with respect to the
admission of any of the evidence to which Mendoza points, we find this claim unavailing. See United
States v. Loe, 248 F.3d 449, 465-66 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the
-11- cumulative effect of valid evidentiary rulings violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).
B
Castillo asseverates that the district court erroneously admitted into evidence a prescription
bottle that has a label containing his name on it, which was found in the bedroom with the cocaine.
Castillo maintains that the label is hearsay. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a
“statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Where an out of court
statement is admitted for another purpose it is not hearsay. See United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d
380, 394 (5th Cir. 1997). The government contends that the bottle was not offered to show
Castillo’s ownership of the bottle, but to infer that because o f its location Castillo had been in the
bedroom with the cocaine. Castillo responds that such an inference is only possible if admitted for
the truth of the matter asserted on the label, i.e., that it was Castillo’s prescription bottle.
We encountered a similar hearsay question in United States v. Hernandez, 668 F.2d 824 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982). In that case, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting a gun
receipt into evidence. The receipt had been found in the boat’s cabin in which the customs agents
located drugs and guns. See id. at 825, 828. The defendant maintained that the receipt was offered
to prove the receipt’s assertion, i.e., that he had purchased the gun from a local gun shop. We
rejected that argument finding that the gun’s purchase, what the defendant paid for it, or even
whether he owned the gun were not at issue. See id. at 828. Instead, we found that the receipt was
introduced as a “circumstantial link” between the defendant and the contents of the cabin, and as
such, was not hearsay. See id. Likewise, in the case sub judice, whether Castillo actually owned the
bottle is not in issue. By virtue of his name being on the bottle, the government sought to infer that
-12- Castillo had been in the room and knew of its contents. Accordingly, the evidence was not hearsay
and the court properly admitted it. See United States v. Arrington, 618 F.2d 1119, 1126 (5th Cir.
1980) (concluding that utility bills found at defendant’s residence were not offered to prove their
contents but to establish that the residence was in fact the defendant’s and thus the bills were not
hearsay).
IV
Mendoza and Castillo appeal several of the district court’s sentencing decisions. We review
the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. We review its findings of fact
for clear error. See United States v. McClatchy, 249 F.3d 348, 360 (5th Cir. 2001). A factual finding
is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the whole record. See United States v. Brown, 7
F.3d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1993) (quotations and citation omitted).
Mendoza challenges the district court’s sentence enhancement for his role as an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The district court’s determination
that Mendoza played such a role is a finding of fact. See United States v. Perez, 217 F.3d 323, 331
(5th Cir. 2000). Mendoza asserts only that there is “no sound basis” in the record for this conclusion.
Our review of the record reveals otherwise. Mendoza admitted he brought Castillo in from
California, he drove Castillo to the residence, and he purchased the packaging materials. Further,
Mendoza drove Zepeda to Nuevo Laredo and back. These acts tend to show authority over others
as well as participation in the planning of the offense. See United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046,
1065 (5th Cir. 1996) (Ҥ 3B1.1(c) requires that a defendant be the organizer or leader of at least one
other participant in the crime and that he assert control or influence over at least that one
-13- participant.”); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4 (courts are to consider, inter alia, “the recruitment of
accomplices, . . . the degree of participation in planning and organizing the offense, . . . and the
degree of control and authority exercised over others” in determining whether this enhancement
applies). Thus, the record supports the district court’s finding that Mendoza played a supervisory
role and the district court did not commit clear error in applying this enhancement.
Mendoza also contends that the district court erred in increasing his guideline sentence two
levels for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Section 3C1.1 provides for a two level
increase where the defendant has “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, the prosecution, or sentencing of the
offense.” The district court’s determination that Mendoza willfully obstructed or attempted to
obstruct justice is a finding of fact. See United States v. Odiodio, 244 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 2001).
The application of this sentencing enhancement is required when the district court concludes that the
defendant has committed perjury. See United States v. Gonzalez, 163 F.3d 255, 263 (5th Cir. 1999).
Mendoza maintains, as with his challenge to the district court’s finding t hat he was a leader, that
there is “no sound basis” in the record for the district court’s conclusion. The district court found
that Mendoza came to Laredo to engage in drug trafficking and his testimony to the contrary was
perjury. Because Mendoza offered testimony that the jury necessarily disbelieved by virtue of its
guilty verdict, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mendoza committed perjury.
Castillo avers that the district court erred in denying his request for a reduction for his minimal
participation. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 provides that a defendant may have his offense level decreased by
four, if he is found to be a minimal participant or by two if he is found to be a minor participant. A
-14- defendant bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled
to a sentencing reduction under this section. See United States v. Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir.
1994). To show that he was a minor participant, the defendant must demonstrate that he is
“substantially less culpable” than the average participant. United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593,
597-98 (5th Cir. 2001) quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. background. The district court’s
determination that the defendant was not a minor or minimal participant is a finding of fact reviewed
for clear error. See id.
Castillo maintains that he is entitled to such a reduction because he provided nothing
necessary or essential to the operation, instead he was merely present in the house with the cocaine
and the drug paraphernalia. While Castillo provides us with a litany of what his role was not in this
case, Castillo only addresses the fact that he was left alone for over seven hours with over 220
kilograms of cocaine, which had a street value of up to $4.4 million, by arguing that he was “merely
present in the house.” In convicting him, the jury rejected this argument. The district court
concluded, based on the evidence offered at trial, that Castillo was not entitled to such a reduction.
The record supports the district court’s assessment. Castillo was given access to the stash house,
something given only to trusted members of a drug trafficking organization. Further, as the only
person in the house, he was in essence left to watch over a large amount of cocaine for a significant
period of time, a role surely not peripheral to the advancement of the organization. See United States
v. Miranda, 238 F.3d 434, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n order to qualify as a minor participant, a
defendant must have been peripheral to the advancement of the illicit activity.”); see also United
States v. Zuniga, 18 F.3d 1254, 1261 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying a reduction for either minor or minimal
participation where the defendant was “entrusted with four ounces of heroin and she arranged to be
-15- available at the apartment to receive the cooperating individual’s telephone call and to complete the
actual delivery.”); United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1038 (1st Cir. 2001) (defendant was
not a minimal participant because “[i]n his role as a guard for the money, [the defendant] occupied
a position integral to the completion of the deal.”). Therefore, the district court did not err in
declining to grant Castillo this reduction.
V
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM both Mendoza’s and Castillo’s convictions and
sentences.
-16-