USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 1 of 8
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4640
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MELVIN ANTONIO EUGENE MAXWELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (7:24-cr-00281-HMH-1)
Submitted: April 13, 2026 Decided: June 9, 2026
Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew R. Galeotti, Thomas E. Booth, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, Kathleen Stoughton, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Maxwell B. Cauthen, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 2 of 8
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 3 of 8
PER CURIAM:
In November 2023, Officer Brandon Dorsett of the Cherokee County Sheriff’s
Office in South Carolina noticed a Nissan in the left-most lane (the passing lane) driving
slowly enough that vehicles were needing to pass it on its right. He followed the Nissan in
the passing lane for “about a half a mile” before turning on his blue lights to pull the Nissan
over. J.A. 33. 1
Upon approach of the vehicle, Dorsett smelled “an overwhelming odor of
marijuana” and called for backup. J.A. 34. Dorsett told the driver, Melvin Maxwell, that
he had been driving too slowly in the passing lane, in violation of South Carolina law. After
running Maxwell’s license, Dorsett returned to the Nissan and asked Maxwell about the
smell of the marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Maxwell denied having any marijuana.
Dorsett then reached into the vehicle and unlocked the passenger door, at which point
Maxwell hit the accelerator and sped off. Dorsett pursued Maxwell by car, but Maxwell
eventually crashed his vehicle and took off on foot. With the assistance of other officers,
Dorsett detained Maxwell.
With Maxwell detained, Dorsett and other officers proceeded to search Maxwell’s
vehicle. Dorsett began his search in the trunk of the car, where he found a firearm,
marijuana, and cocaine.
Maxwell was charged by grand jury with possession of a firearm as a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of cocaine and crack cocaine, in
1 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 4 of 8
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Maxwell filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from the search of his vehicle, arguing both that the initial stop was impermissible and that
police lacked probable cause to search the trunk of his car.
After a suppression hearing, in which the Government played Dorsett’s body-worn-
camera footage from the incident and Dorsett testified in person, the district court denied
the motion to suppress. Noting that “this is a credibility issue,” it found that Maxwell “was
committing a traffic violation by going slower than the traveling vehicles in the right lane,”
and therefore “it was proper for [Dorsett] to stop the defendant’s vehicle because of a traffic
violation.” J.A. 56.
Maxwell then entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress.
In June 2024, the district court held a combined hearing for sentencing and
revocation of Maxwell’s supervised release for a prior crime. The court calculated a
Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months for the firearm- and drug-possession charges.
Maxwell asked that the court not impose a term of supervised release as part of either
sentence. He specifically feared that while on supervised release some probation officers
might not let him travel with his children, noting “it depends who you get.” J.A. 104.
After considering “the statutory factors applicable to revocation under 3553(a) and
3583(e),” the district court sentenced Maxwell to 18 months’ imprisonment for violating
the terms of his supervised release. J.A. 104. And after considering “the relevant statutory
sentencing factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” it sentenced him to a term of 87
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 5 of 8
months for the firearm-possession charge and 12 months for the narcotics charges. 2
J.A. 105. The district court also imposed a total of three years of supervised release
following Maxwell’s release from prison.
Maxwell timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress and that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable. We affirm.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review legal conclusions de
novo and factual findings for clear error. In doing so, we consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government.” United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir.
2021) (cleaned up).
Here, Dorsett’s in-person testimony and body-worn-camera footage support the
district court’s factual finding that Maxwell committed a left-lane violation under South
Carolina law. See United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 653 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that
“we particularly defer to [the] district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of
the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion
to suppress” (cleaned up)); S.C. Code § 56-5-1885(A) (2021) (providing that, unless an
exception applies, a “vehicle may not be driven in the farthest left-hand lane of a controlled
access highway except when overtaking and passing another vehicle”). And “[o]bserving
a traffic violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the offending
vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.”
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008).
2 The district court specified that all three sentences were to be served concurrently. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 6 of 8
As to the search of the trunk, it is uncontested that Officer Dorsett smelled marijuana
upon approach of Maxwell’s car, and “the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable
cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.” United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175,
184 (4th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 1 of 8
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4640
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MELVIN ANTONIO EUGENE MAXWELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (7:24-cr-00281-HMH-1)
Submitted: April 13, 2026 Decided: June 9, 2026
Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew R. Galeotti, Thomas E. Booth, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, Kathleen Stoughton, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Maxwell B. Cauthen, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 2 of 8
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 3 of 8
PER CURIAM:
In November 2023, Officer Brandon Dorsett of the Cherokee County Sheriff’s
Office in South Carolina noticed a Nissan in the left-most lane (the passing lane) driving
slowly enough that vehicles were needing to pass it on its right. He followed the Nissan in
the passing lane for “about a half a mile” before turning on his blue lights to pull the Nissan
over. J.A. 33. 1
Upon approach of the vehicle, Dorsett smelled “an overwhelming odor of
marijuana” and called for backup. J.A. 34. Dorsett told the driver, Melvin Maxwell, that
he had been driving too slowly in the passing lane, in violation of South Carolina law. After
running Maxwell’s license, Dorsett returned to the Nissan and asked Maxwell about the
smell of the marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Maxwell denied having any marijuana.
Dorsett then reached into the vehicle and unlocked the passenger door, at which point
Maxwell hit the accelerator and sped off. Dorsett pursued Maxwell by car, but Maxwell
eventually crashed his vehicle and took off on foot. With the assistance of other officers,
Dorsett detained Maxwell.
With Maxwell detained, Dorsett and other officers proceeded to search Maxwell’s
vehicle. Dorsett began his search in the trunk of the car, where he found a firearm,
marijuana, and cocaine.
Maxwell was charged by grand jury with possession of a firearm as a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of cocaine and crack cocaine, in
1 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 4 of 8
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Maxwell filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from the search of his vehicle, arguing both that the initial stop was impermissible and that
police lacked probable cause to search the trunk of his car.
After a suppression hearing, in which the Government played Dorsett’s body-worn-
camera footage from the incident and Dorsett testified in person, the district court denied
the motion to suppress. Noting that “this is a credibility issue,” it found that Maxwell “was
committing a traffic violation by going slower than the traveling vehicles in the right lane,”
and therefore “it was proper for [Dorsett] to stop the defendant’s vehicle because of a traffic
violation.” J.A. 56.
Maxwell then entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress.
In June 2024, the district court held a combined hearing for sentencing and
revocation of Maxwell’s supervised release for a prior crime. The court calculated a
Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months for the firearm- and drug-possession charges.
Maxwell asked that the court not impose a term of supervised release as part of either
sentence. He specifically feared that while on supervised release some probation officers
might not let him travel with his children, noting “it depends who you get.” J.A. 104.
After considering “the statutory factors applicable to revocation under 3553(a) and
3583(e),” the district court sentenced Maxwell to 18 months’ imprisonment for violating
the terms of his supervised release. J.A. 104. And after considering “the relevant statutory
sentencing factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” it sentenced him to a term of 87
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 5 of 8
months for the firearm-possession charge and 12 months for the narcotics charges. 2
J.A. 105. The district court also imposed a total of three years of supervised release
following Maxwell’s release from prison.
Maxwell timely appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress and that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable. We affirm.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review legal conclusions de
novo and factual findings for clear error. In doing so, we consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government.” United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir.
2021) (cleaned up).
Here, Dorsett’s in-person testimony and body-worn-camera footage support the
district court’s factual finding that Maxwell committed a left-lane violation under South
Carolina law. See United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 653 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that
“we particularly defer to [the] district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of
the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion
to suppress” (cleaned up)); S.C. Code § 56-5-1885(A) (2021) (providing that, unless an
exception applies, a “vehicle may not be driven in the farthest left-hand lane of a controlled
access highway except when overtaking and passing another vehicle”). And “[o]bserving
a traffic violation provides sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the offending
vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.”
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008).
2 The district court specified that all three sentences were to be served concurrently. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 6 of 8
As to the search of the trunk, it is uncontested that Officer Dorsett smelled marijuana
upon approach of Maxwell’s car, and “the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable
cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage.” United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175,
184 (4th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, by the time police searched
Maxwell’s trunk, not only had officers smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle, but
Maxwell had also attempted to flee the traffic stop in his car and on foot. Such “flight” is
appropriate for us to consider as a factor contributing to probable cause. See District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 59 (2018) (“Unprovoked flight upon noticing the police
. . . is certainly suggestive of wrongdoing and can be treated as suspicious behavior that
factors into the totality of the circumstances.” (cleaned up)); States v. Patterson, 25 F.4th
123, 151 (2d Cir. 2022) (“We have long recognized flight as an appropriate factor
supporting a finding of probable cause to search a vehicle after it is stopped.”). So, at the
very least, the smell of marijuana and the flight from the traffic stop combined to create
probable cause to search the vehicle’s trunk for evidence of a crime.
Overall, then, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
Maxwell also appeals the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. 3 We review
the reasonableness of a sentence under “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United
States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). In assessing
procedural reasonableness, we review whether the district court “committed . . . significant
3 The government contends that Maxwell waived this argument below. We assume without deciding that this issue is preserved for appeal.
6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 7 of 8
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
Maxwell argues that (1) the district court’s passing reference to the § 3553(a) factors
in the sentencing hearing was insufficient to demonstrate that it had fully considered those
factors and (2) the district court did not adequately explain its decision to deny Maxwell’s
request for a variance, specifically, for it to impose no term of supervised release.
But both arguments are without merit.
First, we do not demand that district courts “robotically tick through” each
sentencing factor—particularly when, as here, the sentence is within the Guidelines range.
United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292, 321 (4th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). The
district court stated that it had “considered” the § 3553(a) factors in general, J.A. 105, and
specifically expressed significant concerns with Maxwell’s extensive criminal history and
disappointment that Maxwell did not seem to be turning his life around, see, e.g., J.A. 101
(“Why are you still doing what you’re doing?”), J.A. 101–02 (“[Y]ou already had your
previous convictions and then you were dealing drugs again.”).
As to the variance, the district court fully explained its rationale for denying that
request. Maxwell seemed to want to avoid a term of supervised release because he feared
that some probation officers would unfairly deny him the occasional right to travel with his
family. But the district court addressed that concern head-on and dismissed it, asserting
7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4640 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/09/2026 Pg: 8 of 8
that it believed the probation officers would operate fairly, so long as Maxwell would “just
keep [his] nose clean and follow instructions and do right.” J.A. 103.
Overall, then, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Maxwell’s
within-Guidelines sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED