USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 1 of 17
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-6293
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MELISSA DARLENE BARRETT,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cr-00025-JPJ-25)
Argued: January 30, 2025 Decided: March 27, 2025
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Gregory join.
ARGUED: Erin Margaret Trodden, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer R. Bockhorst, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mary E. Maguire, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 2 of 17
PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
While Melissa Barrett was serving a 168-month sentence for federal drug offenses,
Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines took effect. Made retroactive by the
Sentencing Commission, Amendment 821 limited the impact of “status points” that had
been used to calculate Barrett’s original Guideline range. Relying on Amendment 821,
Barrett moved the court to reduce her sentence to 120 months.
The government agreed Barrett was eligible for a sentence reduction. But the parties
disagreed as to the scope of Amendment 821’s retroactive effect. Barrett argued that
Amendment 821 affected both her criminal history category and her offense level, leading
to a substantial reduction in her Guideline range. The government believed Amendment
821 should be applied retroactively only to Barrett’s criminal history category, producing
a more modest effect on her sentencing range. The district court sided with the government
and accordingly reduced Barrett’s sentence to 150 months, rather than the 120 months
Barrett had requested.
On appeal, Barrett argues that the district court erred by failing to give full
retroactive effect to Amendment 821. We agree, and therefore vacate the district court’s
judgment and remand for further consideration of Barrett’s motion.
I.
For context, we begin with a review of the relevant Sentencing Guidelines
provisions and Amendment 821. We then describe Melissa Barrett’s original sentencing
and the Amendment 821 proceedings that give rise to this appeal.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 3 of 17
A.
Section 4A1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines assigns criminal history points based
on a defendant’s prior convictions and sentences. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. A defendant’s total
number of points determines her criminal history category (somewhere between I and VI),
which is then combined with the defendant’s offense level to establish an advisory
sentencing range. See U.S.S.G § 1B1.1(a) (setting out steps for determining a Guideline
range). For example, at her original sentencing, Barrett had a criminal history score of
three. She received one criminal history point for a prior state conviction. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.1(c). And directly relevant here, she also received two “status points” because she
committed the instant offense – the offense for which she was being sentenced – while on
probation for that state conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (2016) (adding points for
offenses committed “while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation[]”).
Next comes Guidelines provision § 2D1.1, which governs offense levels for drug
offenses like Barrett’s. Depending on her criminal history score, as calculated under
§ 4A1.1, a defendant may be eligible for a two-level offense reduction under
§ 2D1.1(b)(17).1 The first criterion for this reduction is that the “defendant does not have
more than 1 criminal history point.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(17) (incorporating
§ 5C1.2(a)(1)). That was enough to render Barrett, with her three criminal history points,
1 Barrett’s plea agreement provided that she would be sentenced under the 2016 edition of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Guidelines refer to the 2016 edition. We note that this two-level reduction currently appears at U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(18) (2023).
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 4 of 17
ineligible at the time of her original sentencing. Under the remaining criteria, whether a
defendant qualifies turns on whether her offense was violent, her role in the offense, and
the extent of her cooperation with the government. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(17)
(incorporating § 5C1.2(a)(2)-(5)).2 If a defendant meets all of the criteria, she
automatically receives the two-level reduction.
Amendment 821 amends § 4A1.1, the provision for calculating criminal history
points. Part A of the amendment limits the impact of “status points” under § 4A1.1. See
U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, amend. 821, part A, at 240-41 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023).
Previously, defendants like Barrett had received two status points – i.e., two criminal
history points – if they committed their instant offenses while on probation or under some
other criminal justice sentence. Under Amendment 821, that number dropped to one or to
zero, depending on the defendant’s criminal history. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (Nov. 1,
2023). The parties agree that under Amendment 821, Barrett would receive zero status
points, reducing her total criminal history points from three to one.
Amendment 821 became effective in November 2023, after Barrett’s original
sentencing. But Amendment 821 is retroactive, which means that a previously sentenced
2 Section 2D1.1(b)(17) incorporates its standards by reference, providing for a two- level decrease in a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant meets the criteria set forth in subdivisions (1)-(5) of subsection (a) of § 5C1.2 (Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases)[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(17). Section 5C1.2(a), in turn, tracks a federal statute that allows for a departure from a mandatory minimum sentence under the specified circumstances. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5)). This all sounds very complicated. But as both parties agree, the only issue before us here is application of § 2D1.1(b)(17) itself; Barrett is not seeking a departure from a mandatory minimum sentence, and we need not address eligibility for that relief. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 5 of 17
defendant whose Guideline range is lowered by the amendment may seek a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction is
discretionary, and it must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) – which brings us to § 1B1.10 of the
Guidelines, the provision most directly at issue here. The policy statement at § 1B1.10
governs sentence reductions resulting from retroactive Guidelines amendments, instructing
district courts to determine such reductions as follows:
In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction . . . is warranted, the court shall determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the [retroactive amendment] had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced. In making such determination, the court shall substitute only the [retroactive amendment] for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1).
B.
With the table set, we turn to Barrett’s sentencing proceedings. Barrett was indicted
as one of 28 defendants involved in a drug conspiracy in Southwest Virginia. Pursuant to
an agreement with the government, she pled guilty to two counts: distribution of
methamphetamine, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 6 of 17
Barrett was sentenced in June 2019. Applying the 2016 edition of the Guidelines,
consistent with the parties’ plea agreement, the district court determined that Barrett’s
criminal history score was three: as previously noted, one point for a prior conviction and
two status points for committing the instant offense while on probation. That put Barrett
in criminal history category II. Barrett’s total offense level was 33, which included a three-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and no enhancements. Together, Barrett’s
criminal history category and offense level produced a Guideline advisory sentencing range
of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.3 The district court imposed a sentence of 168 months
– in the middle of that range – on each count of conviction, to run concurrently.
When Amendment 821 took effect in 2023, the probation office filed an addendum
to Barrett’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), finding her eligible for a sentence
reduction. As a result of Amendment 821 Part A, the addendum explained, Barrett no
longer received any status points under § 4A1.1, which meant that her criminal history
score dropped from three to one and her criminal history category from II to I. With a
lower criminal history category of I and an unchanged offense level of 33, the PSR
addendum calculated a revised Guideline range of 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment, and
noted that a revised sentence of 150 months would represent a proportionate reduction in
Barrett’s sentence.
The government responded, agreeing that Barrett was eligible for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) as a result of Amendment 821. It also agreed with
3 Barrett’s two counts of conviction were grouped for Guideline calculation purposes under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b). 6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 7 of 17
the PSR addendum that Barrett’s revised Guideline range was 135 to 168 months, in light
of her lowered criminal history category. Should the court exercise its discretion to grant
a reduction, the government advised, a reduced sentence of 150 months would fall midway
within that range, at a point analogous to Barrett’s original sentence.
Barrett agreed with the government as to her eligibility for a reduction but disagreed
as to the rest. According to Barrett, Amendment 821 affected not only her criminal history
category but also her offense level: Because she now had only a single criminal history
point under § 4A1.1, she was newly eligible for a two-level offense reduction under
§ 2D1.1(b)(17). And because the record showed that she satisfied all of § 2D1.1(b)(17)’s
criteria, Barrett argued, her offense level should go down to 31, which, combined with her
criminal history category of I, would yield a revised Guideline range of 108 to 135 months’
imprisonment. With that revised range, Barrett finished, a sentence of 120 months – not
150 – would represent a proportionate reduction.
The district court disagreed. It recognized, along with both parties, that Barrett was
eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 821.
United States v. Melissa Barrett, No. 18-cr-00025-025, 2024 WL 1070960, at *1 (W.D.
Va. Mar. 12, 2024). But in the court’s view, like the government’s, Amendment 821 could
be applied retroactively only to modify Barrett’s criminal history score under § 4A1.1, and
not her offense level. Id. at *1-2. Barrett could not receive the benefit of § 2D1.1(b)(17)’s
two-level offense reduction, the court reasoned, because that provision had not been
amended by Amendment 821. Id. at *2. Instead, application of § 2D1.1(b)(17) was an
“other guideline application decision” that must be left “unaffected” under the Sentencing
7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 8 of 17
Commission’s policy statement at § 1B1.10(b). Id. (explaining that the court must
“substitute only” the retroactive amendment and “leave all other guideline application
decisions unaffected”) (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)).
Accordingly, the court adopted the PSR addendum’s revised Guideline range of 135
to 168 months’ imprisonment, reflecting a change in Barrett’s criminal history category
but not her offense level. After considering the § 3553(a) factors, the court granted Barrett
relief under Amendment 821, and entered an order reducing her sentence to 150 months.
Barrett timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s ruling on the scope of its authority under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Spruhan, 989 F.3d 266, 269 (4th Cir. 2021). For
the reasons given below, we agree with Barrett that the district court construed
§ 1B1.10(b)’s policy statement too narrowly and failed to give appropriate retroactive
effect to Amendment 821.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen the [Sentencing] Commission makes
a Guidelines amendment retroactive” – as it did with Amendment 821 – “18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce an otherwise final sentence that is based
on the amended provision.” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010). But in so
doing, the district court is bound by the policy statement at § 1B1.10. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) (authorizing reduced sentence “if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”); Dillon, 560 U.S. at
8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 9 of 17
830 (affirming mandatory nature of § 1B1.10). So as the parties agree, this case turns on
the terms of § 1B1.10(b)(1), which – translated to this case – direct the court to
determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if [Amendment 821] had been in effect at the time [she] was sentenced. In making such determination, the court shall substitute only [Amendment 821] for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when [Barrett] was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1). Or as the Supreme Court summarized in Dillon, § 1B1.10(b)(1)
directs district courts to “substitute the amended Guidelines range” only and leave
undisturbed all “other guideline application decisions.” 560 U.S. at 821 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The government argues first that this policy statement by its terms prohibited the
district court from applying Amendment 821 retroactively to Barrett’s offense level.
Criminal history categories and offense levels, the government explains, are different
things. And Part A of Amendment 821 amended only the calculation of criminal history
scores (and concomitant criminal history categories) under § 4A1.1; it made no changes to
offense level calculations under § 2D1.1(b)(17). It follows, the government says – and the
district court agreed – that the court was limited to recalculating Barrett’s criminal history
score, while leaving § 2D1.1(b)(17) “unaffected.”
We read the policy statement differently. In its first sentence, it tells district courts
to “determine the amended guideline range” that would apply if the relevant amendment
had been in effect at the time of sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1); see Dillon, 560 U.S.
9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 10 of 17
at 821 (under § 1B1.10(b)(1), courts are to “substitute the amended Guidelines range”). A
Guideline “range,” as explained above, is the product of both a criminal history category
and an offense level. It is not a criminal history category standing alone, or “any other
intermediate step in the guideline calculation, but the bottom-line, final range that was the
basis for the [defendant’s] sentence.” See United States v. Koglin, 822 F.3d 984, 986 (7th
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting argument that § 1B1.10(b)(1)
requires court to look only at provision amended and “ignore any potential interaction”
between that provision and “other parts of the guidelines”). And to calculate Barrett’s
“amended guideline range,” it is necessary to account not only for Amendment 821’s
impact on Barrett’s criminal history score under § 4A1.1, but also its direct effect on her
eligibility for a lower offense level under § 2D1.1(b)(17).
If plain text left any doubt, we think this reading is supported as well by § 1B1.1(a)
of the Guidelines, which provides express instructions for how to “determine” a “guideline
range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a). That provision lays out seven steps, starting with five that
together calculate a defendant’s offense level, a sixth for the defendant’s criminal history
category, and then a seventh in which the court will “[d]etermine the guideline range . . .
that corresponds to the [defendant’s] offense level and criminal history category.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a)(1)-(7); see United States v. Helm, 891 F.3d 740, 742-43 (8th Cir.
2018) (describing provision). Given the “near identical language” in this provision
(“determine the guideline range”) and § 1B1.10(b)(1) (“determine the amended guideline
range”), the natural inference is that § 1B1.10, too, contemplates a “determination” of an
“amended guideline range” that may incorporate an amendment’s impact on both offense
10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 11 of 17
level and criminal history category. See United States v. Zapatero, 961 F.3d 123, 128 (2d
Cir. 2020) (reading § 1B1.10’s instructions on retroactivity consistent with § 1B1.1’s
application instructions).
In fairness, the government does not really contest this common-sense reading of
the first sentence of § 1B1.10(b)(1). Instead, it focuses on the second: “[T]he court shall
substitute only the [retroactive amendment]” and “shall leave all other guideline
application decisions unaffected.” According to the government, Barrett’s new eligibility
for a two-level offense reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(17) is an “other guideline application
decision[]” that must be left “unaffected” by Amendment 821. Again, we disagree.
“The phrase ‘leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected’ simply
instructs the court to apply only the amendments [given retroactive effect] and avoid
relitigating the factual findings made in the original sentencing decision.” Koglin, 822 F.3d
at 986; see United States v. Stewart, 595 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2010). So if, for instance,
Barrett was asking for a reduction in her offense level based on some other, nonretroactive
Guideline change, or challenging an enhancement applied at her original sentencing, that
would be foreclosed. But here, the potential change to Barrett’s offense level, like the
change to her criminal history score, is a direct result of Amendment 821 itself. Put
differently, what falls “outside the scope” of § 1B1.10(b)(1) are “aspects of the sentence
the defendant seeks to correct that were not affected by” the retroactive amendment, see
Dillon, 560 U.S. at 831 (cleaned up and emphasis added) – and here, Barrett’s whole point
is that both her criminal history score and her offense level were affected by Amendment
821.
11 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 12 of 17
The scope of Amendment 821’s retroactive effect appears to be a question of first
impression. But our assessment is consistent with case law applying other retroactive
amendments. In Koglin, which we have mentioned already, the Seventh Circuit confronted
precisely the argument the government is making here: that under § 1B1.10(b)(1), a court
may consider the effect of a retroactive amendment only as applied to the amended
provision itself. The Seventh Circuit disagreed in no uncertain terms. “The policy
statement does not instruct the court to ignore the effect of the amended guideline on other
guideline provisions that, in combination, produced the defendant’s sentencing range.”
Koglin, 822 F.3d at 986 (emphasis in original). The result was that the defendant was
ineligible for relief: His two-level reduction under § 2D1.1(a)(5)’s amended drug quantity
provision in turn affected an entirely separate provision, “cancel[ling] out” a reduction he
originally received and leaving his “amended guideline range” unchanged. Id. at 987.
Similarly, both parties recognize a series of cases in which retroactive amendments to
§ 2D1.1(c)(4)’s drug quantities have lowered a defendant’s offense level, which in turn
affects his status under a different provision – the career offender provision, see U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(b) – not itself amended. See, e.g., United States v. Tellis, 748 F.3d 1305, 1308
(11th Cir. 2014) (applying career offender guideline because it became higher than
retroactively amended drug weight guideline); United States v. Counts, 500 F. App’x 220,
220-21 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 2012) (same). There seems to be agreement, in other words, that
when a retroactive amendment directly affects more than one component of a guideline
range, its full effect may and should be accounted for consistent with § 1B1.10(b)(1).
12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 13 of 17
We appreciate the government’s point that a defendant’s criminal history category
and her offense level are separate calculations under the Guidelines, serving separate
purposes. For that reason, a retroactive change to one ordinarily will not affect the other.
But this appears to be an unusual case, in that the Guidelines closely and directly connect
the two, tying a defendant’s criminal history score under § 4A1.1 to both her criminal
history category and her qualification for a two-level offense adjustment under
§ 2D1.1(b)(17). Where an amendment has this kind of direct impact on two provisions
integral to a defendant’s “amended guideline range,” see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1),
retroactive application of that amendment means accounting for both.
The government also argues that Amendment 821 cannot be applied retroactively
to Barrett’s offense level under § 2D1.1(b)(17) because that would entail prohibited fact-
finding by the district court. The government does not dispute that as a result of
Amendment 821, Barrett now has just one criminal history point, which self-evidently
allows her to satisfy the threshold criterion for an offense level reduction under
§ 2D1.1(b)(17). But § 2D1.1(b)(17) has four other criteria, the government reminds us,4
4 The first criterion for the automatic sentence reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(17) – that “the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point” – is not at issue, as explained above. The remaining criteria require that
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense; (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; (4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines (Continued) 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 14 of 17
and determining whether Barrett meets those standards, it says, would require fact finding
outside the scope of the limited § 3582(c)(2) proceeding permitted by statute and the
Commission’s policy statement. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3) (“[P]roceedings under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement do not constitute a full resentencing of the
defendant.”).
It is common ground that § 3582(c)(2) permits “only a limited adjustment to an
otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing,” as the Supreme Court explained
in Dillon. 560 U.S. at 826. But it does not necessarily follow that a district court can make
no factual determinations as part of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. Indeed, at the same time
the Court in Dillon emphasized the “circumscribed nature” of such proceedings, 560 U.S.
at 830, it recognized that they could involve fact finding by the district court, 560 U.S. at
828 (explaining that “facts found by a judge at a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding” do not implicate
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).
Consistent with that understanding, we have held squarely that in applying a
retroactive guideline amendment under § 1B1.10, a district court is not only permitted but
may in some cases be required to make supplemental findings of fact. United States v.
and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(17) (incorporating criteria at U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)). 14 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 15 of 17
Peters, 843 F.3d 572, 577-78 (4th Cir. 2016). Section 3582(c)(2), we emphasized, “does
not allow a do-over of an original sentencing proceeding, in which the defendant is cloaked
in rights mandated by statutory law and the Constitution.” Id. at 574 (internal quotation
marks omitted). But it also does not preclude a court from finding facts necessary to
determine the effects of a retroactive Guideline amendment on a defendant’s sentencing
range. Id. at 577-78 (explaining that district court may need to determine drug quantity
with more precision than in original sentencing hearing in order to apply retroactive
amendment to drug quantity Guideline). So long as those findings are “supported by the
record and consistent with earlier findings,” we held, they do not run afoul of any limit on
proceedings under § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 577.
When we decided Peters in 2016, it already was the case that “our sister circuits
agreed that additional findings lie within a sentencing court’s discretion.” Id. at 578
(cleaned up) (citing cases from multiple circuits). As far as we can tell – and the
government has not cited any contrary authority – that consensus continues to hold, with
the circuit courts in general agreement that “nothing prevents the court [in a § 3582(c)(2)
proceeding] from making new findings that are supported by the record and not
inconsistent with the findings made in the original sentencing determination.” United
States v. Hall, 600 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2010).
That is all Barrett is asking for here. According to Barrett, the district court on
remand could find that she qualifies for the § 2D1.1(b)(17) reduction based on the record
from her first sentencing and without contradicting any earlier findings.
15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 16 of 17
Under Peters, Barrett is entitled to make that
case before the district court.5
C.
In sum, we find that the district court misapprehended the scope of its authority in
this § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. Amendment 821 applies retroactively, and the court was
authorized under the policy statement in § 1B1.10(b)(1) to consider the amendment’s
effect on both Barrett’s criminal history category under § 4A1.1 and her offense level under
§ 2D1.1(b)(17). We therefore remand so that the district court may determine whether
Barrett qualifies for the offense-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(17) and, if so, recalculate
Barrett’s amended Guideline range and reconsider her motion accordingly.
5 Whether the district court could go beyond the existing record in making factual determinations under § 2D1.1(b)(17) is a different question, on which there appears to be a division of authority. Compare United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 340 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he court should not consider any evidence or materials beyond those that were before it at the time of the original sentence proceeding.”) with United States v. Rios, 765 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2014), as amended (Sept. 8, 2014) (“[N]ew findings are often necessary” in applying Guidelines amendments retroactively and the district court has “broad discretion in how to adjudicate § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, including whether to hold an evidentiary hearing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Barrett expressly disclaims the need for an evidentiary hearing, we need not resolve that issue today. 16 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6293 Doc: 60 Filed: 03/27/2025 Pg: 17 of 17
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand to the
district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED