United States v. McKinney

Fourth Circuit

United States v. McKinney

98 F. App'x 245

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedMay 28, 2004

Docket03-4749

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 98 F. App'x 245 (United States v. McKinney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. McKinney, 98 F. App'x 245 (4th Cir. 2004).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Anthony Lamont McKinney appeals from the judgment of the district court convicting him of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. McKinney claims that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm.

McKinney first claims that the court erred in concluding that his encounter with Officer C.T. Sluder of the UNC-Greensboro Police Department was consensual in nature. Because this claim involves mixed questions of fact and law, this court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the legal conclusions drawn from the facts de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Gerant, 995 F.2d 505, 508 (4th Cir.1993).

Our review of the record supports the district court’s conclusion. Sluder’s interaction with the occupants of the vehicle was described as cooperative. It was brief, and there were no actions taken by Sluder that suggest McKinney’s will was overborne. Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. See United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997).

McKinney also asserts that even if the encounter was consensual, Sluder lacked probable cause to arrest McKinney for possession of a concealed weapon because such possession is not per se illegal in North Carolina. As this issue was not presented to the district court, we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim P. 52(b); *247 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). North Carolina law provides for the issuance of a concealed weapon permit. See N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 14-415.10—415.23 (2001). However, North Carolina also requires one with a concealed weapon to advise a law enforcement officer “when approached” that the individual is carrying a concealed weapon and has the appropriate permit on his person. See § 14-415.11(a). McKinney did not advise Sluder that he was carrying a weapon until asked and did not inform Sluder that he had a permit for such a weapon. As a consequence, Sluder had reason to believe that McKinney was in violation of North Carolina law. It was not plain error for the district court to conclude otherwise.

We affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Anthony Lamont McKinney appeals from the judgment of the district court convicting him of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. McKinney claims that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm.

McKinney first claims that the court erred in concluding that his encounter with Officer C.T. Sluder of the UNC-Greensboro Police Department was consensual in nature. Because this claim involves mixed questions of fact and law, this court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the legal conclusions drawn from the facts de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Gerant, 995 F.2d 505, 508 (4th Cir.1993).

Our review of the record supports the district court’s conclusion. Sluder’s interaction with the occupants of the vehicle was described as cooperative. It was brief, and there were no actions taken by Sluder that suggest McKinney’s will was overborne. Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. See United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997).

McKinney also asserts that even if the encounter was consensual, Sluder lacked probable cause to arrest McKinney for possession of a concealed weapon because such possession is not per se illegal in North Carolina. As this issue was not presented to the district court, we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim P. 52(b); *247 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). North Carolina law provides for the issuance of a concealed weapon permit. See N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 14-415.10—415.23 (2001). However, North Carolina also requires one with a concealed weapon to advise a law enforcement officer “when approached” that the individual is carrying a concealed weapon and has the appropriate permit on his person. See § 14-415.11(a). McKinney did not advise Sluder that he was carrying a weapon until asked and did not inform Sluder that he had a permit for such a weapon. As a consequence, Sluder had reason to believe that McKinney was in violation of North Carolina law. It was not plain error for the district court to conclude otherwise.

We affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

98 F. App'x 245, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mckinney-ca4-2004.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack