United States v. Maurice Rakestraw

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 3, 2023
• Docket: 21-4436
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4436

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MAURICE BRANDON RAKESTRAW,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:20-cr-00015-RJC-DCK-1)

Argued: October 26, 2022 Decided: February 3, 2023

Before KING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and Sherri A. LYDON, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. District Judge Lydon wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Heytens joined.

ARGUED: Eric Anthony Bach, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anthony Joseph Enright, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dena J. King, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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LYDON, District Judge:

After Maurice Rakestraw carjacked a vehicle with a baby inside, led police on a

high-speed chase, wrecked the car and fled the scene of the crash, a grand jury indicted

Rakestraw for carjacking, brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence,

possessing a firearm as a felon, and stealing a firearm. He pleaded guilty to all four counts.

Before accepting Rakestraw’s guilty plea, the magistrate judge, with the benefit of a

competency evaluation, found Rakestraw competent to proceed. Nine months later, he was

sentenced to 264 months’ imprisonment—30 months above the Sentencing Guidelines

recommendation. Rakestraw timely appeals and argues the district court should have

ordered a second evaluation prior to sentencing. He also argues his sentence is procedurally

and substantively unreasonable. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

I.

The events leading to Rakestraw’s arrest, conviction, and sentencing started on

December 3, 2019, when he forcibly entered his ex-girlfriend’s residence, assaulted her,

and stole her firearm and vehicle. Sealed J.A. 102–03. Two days later, Rakestraw was a

passenger in a vehicle stopped by Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police officers. Sealed J.A. 101.

Before one of the officers could frisk Rakestraw, he fled on foot and ended up in the parking

lot of a nearby apartment complex. Sealed J.A. 101.

Rakestraw then approached a couple attempting to enter their vehicle and threatened

to kill the driver if he did not give over the car. Rakestraw drove away with the couple’s

baby still in the backseat. Sealed J.A. 101. While fleeing police, he crashed into a trailer

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and flipped the car. Sealed J.A. 102. After the crash, he ran without ever checking on the

status of the baby. Sealed J.A. 102. Police quickly caught him. Sealed J.A. 102.

Rakestraw was charged with carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119,

brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

924(c), possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and

stealing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(l). J.A. 18.1–18.2. After Rakestraw’s

indictment, but before his change of plea hearing, the district court granted Rakestraw’s

motion for a competency evaluation. Sealed J.A. 85–86.

Michael Coffman, a forensic psychologist, evaluated Rakestraw and concluded that

he was competent to stand trial. Sealed J.A. 96. According to Coffman, Rakestraw

purposely tried to achieve a low score on the GCCT-MSH, a standard test used to measure

legal knowledge and competency. Sealed J.A. 94. For example, Rakestraw said he did not

know who his attorney was but then used his lawyer’s name in a request to his case

manager. Sealed J.A. 95. Rakestraw also acknowledged he understood he had a right to

speak with his lawyer. Sealed J.A. 95. Ultimately, Coffman diagnosed Rakestraw with

“malingering,” suggesting Rakestraw feigned mental health symptoms as shown by

“monitored telephone calls express[ing] an understanding that his present evaluation

represented one of several legal tactics in his case.” Sealed J.A. 93–94. Coffman specified

“Rakestraw did not endorse suicidal plan or intent.” Sealed J.A. 92.

The magistrate judge held a combined competency and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea

hearing. J.A. 21–40. Rakestraw indicated he intended to enter a plea of guilty to all four

counts without a plea agreement. J.A. 22. Before taking Rakestraw’s plea, the magistrate

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judge reviewed the competency report, questioned both parties about additional

information related to competency, and found Rakestraw competent to proceed. J.A. 23–

25.

The magistrate judge then placed Rakestraw under oath and warned him he could

be prosecuted for perjury if he answered the court’s questions untruthfully. J.A. 26.

Rakestraw explained he was taking prescription medications Tegretol and Remeron but

confirmed that those medications helped him understand the proceedings and that he

understood he was in court to plead guilty. J.A. 27-28. The magistrate judge found that

Rakestraw’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and not the product of threats or

coercion. J.A. 39.

Following Rakestraw’s guilty plea, the probation officer prepared a presentence

report (PSR), calculating a total offense level of 26 and a criminal history category VI,

resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 120 to 150 months’ imprisonment, plus the

mandatory, consecutive 84-month sentence for Rakestraw’s § 924(c) conviction. Sealed

J.A. 105, 111, 119; see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table),

§ 2K2.4 (2018). The probation officer recounted that Rakestraw assaulted his ex-girlfriend

and stole a firearm and vehicle. Sealed J.A. 102–03. The PSR also set forth the details of

the carjacking involving the baby and the high-speed chase. Sealed J.A.101–102.

Rakestraw did not object to the PSR. Sealed J.A. 123.

The day before the scheduled sentencing hearing, Rakestraw, through counsel,

moved to continue. Sealed J.A. 124. In the continuance motion, counsel explained that he

had struggled to schedule a meeting with Rakestraw because of a COVID-related prison

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lockdown and Rakestraw’s transport to the hospital for a mental health watch. Sealed J.A.

124. Counsel further provided that “there was a self-harm issue” that felt like “a legitimate

competency issue . . . as opposed to an issue of malingering.” Sealed J.A. 125. Because

counsel believed this self-harm incident presented a legitimate competency issue, he

explained he needed 10 to 14 days to receive the medical records to fully assess the

situation. Sealed J.A. 125.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court allowed counsel to present arguments

regarding the requested continuance and the issue of competency. J.A. 48. Counsel asserted

that Sheriff’s Department staff had informed him that Rakestraw jumped off “an elevation”

and “also tried to choke himself with a bedsheet.” J.A. 48–49. Counsel told the district

court he needed a continuance to obtain Rakestraw’s medical records to determine whether

there was a competency issue. J.A. 49–50.

The district court, referencing the prior evaluation, noted that nothing counsel

argued called the earlier evaluation into question. J.A. 49. Counsel replied that the

attempted suicide cast renewed doubt on Rakestraw’s competency. J.A. 49–50. The court

credited the veracity of counsel’s presentation but denied the motion to continue, finding

no evidence Rakestraw was incompetent. Sealed J.A. 50–52. The court concluded

Rakestraw had a chance to read the PSR, to understand its contents, and to review it with

counsel. J.A. 50–52. Further, the district court determined counsel had adequate time to

prepare for Rakestraw’s sentencing. J.A. 51–52. Rakestraw also talked with his counsel

during a brief recess. J.A. 51–52.

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The sentencing went forward and counsel asked the district court to order the

sentence on the § 924(c) count to run concurrently with the sentence on the other counts.

J.A. 54. Counsel emphasized that Rakestraw’s birth mother was addicted to crack cocaine,

likely leading to Rakestraw’s “severe mental health problems.” J.A. 55. On the other hand,

counsel noted that Rakestraw had support from his adopted parents and wished to provide

for his daughter when released from prison. J.A. 55–56. Counsel requested “a sentence in

the 60-month range on Counts One and Three.” J.A. 56.

The court asked counsel how he could reconcile Rakestraw’s desire to provide for

his daughter with “a pretty reckless disregard for the health and safety of a baby trapped in

a car that [he] carjacked.” J.A. 57. Counsel admitted “it is extremely hard to reconcile those

things,” but indicated that Rakestraw had been able “to get some mental health treatment”

in detention. J.A. 57. In allocution, Rakestraw “accept[ed his] wrongdoing,” and said he

wished to “get [himself] together” and support his daughter. J.A. 58. The Government

requested an aggregate sentence of 235 months’ imprisonment based on the egregious

offense conduct, Rakestraw’s detention misconduct, and his lengthy criminal history. J.A.

58–63. The court also heard from the carjacking victims. J.A. 64–65. The couple asked the

court to enter a just sentence to account for the continued fear and worry they have faced

since the violent incident. J.A. 64–65.

The court reviewed counsel’s mitigation arguments. J.A. 65–66. The court also

emphasized Rakestraw’s long criminal history and asserted that “the facts of the case are

appalling.” J.A. 66. The court noted many of Rakestraw’s prior convictions did not receive

any criminal history points. J.A. 66–67. And, reviewing the facts of the case, the court also

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observed “[m]any of these facts are not accounted for in the [G]uidelines.” J.A. 67. The

court considered the need to protect the public and was concerned that prior, shorter

sentences had not deterred Rakestraw’s criminal activity. J.A. 67–68. The district court

believed the Guidelines range did not adequately accomplish the goals of sentencing and

imposed a variant sentence of 264 months’ imprisonment—30 months above the

Guidelines recommendation. J.A. 68. Rakestraw filed a timely notice of appeal. J.A. 83.

On appeal, Rakestraw challenges the district court’s failure to order a second competency

hearing and his above-Guidelines sentence.

II.

A.

We review a district court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Snead, 502 F. App’x 231, 233 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing

United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 742 (4th Cir. 2007)). * A district court must order a

competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may

presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent

to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings

against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). “Reasonable cause

may be established through evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at

* The Government argues Rakestraw failed to preserve his argument that the district court should have ordered a second competency hearing. Government’s Resp. Br., p. 23. However, Rakestraw’s counsel squarely raised the issue of competency before the district court prior to sentencing while arguing for a motion for a continuance. Accordingly, we find the issue preserved.

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trial, and medical opinions concerning the defendant’s competence.” United States v.

Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 592–93 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation

omitted). “To prevail, the defendant must establish that the trial court ignored facts raising

a bona fide doubt regarding [his] competency.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263,

291 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Rakestraw argues the district court erred by not ordering a second competency

evaluation following his suicide attempt prior to his sentencing. We conclude the court did

not abuse its discretion in declining to order a second evaluation. “[T]he presence of some

degree of mental illness is not to be equated with incompetence.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 593

(cleaned up). Instead, “the legal test for competency is whether the defendant has sufficient

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).

Here, the district court granted Rakestraw’s first motion for a competency

evaluation, and the defendant underwent an assessment conducted by a forensic

psychologist. The psychologist determined Rakestraw to be competent and observed that

Rakestraw treated the evaluation merely as a legal ploy. Prior to accepting the guilty plea,

the magistrate judge conducted a competency hearing. During the hearing the magistrate

judge read key portions of the forensic evaluation and solicited additional evidence from

both parties before determining Rakestraw was competent to proceed.

A review of the transcripts from the guilty plea hearing and the sentencing hearing

reveals Rakestraw clearly understood the nature of the charges against him and their

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potential consequences. The only information presented at the sentencing hearing calling

Rakestraw’s competence into question was his recent suicide attempt. Previously, we have

found a defendant incompetent only when his attempted suicide coincided with additional

factors. See United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1292 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting defendant’s

“suicide attempt [was] accompanied by medical reports submitted to the court that indicate

[he] was suffering from an affective disorder and alcohol dependence during the trial, as

well as evidence that two physicians are of the opinion that [he] was not competent during

the first phase of the trial”).

Here, Rakestraw’s counsel failed to provide any additional information calling into

question Rakestraw’s ability to consult with his counsel and participate in his own defense.

Indeed, the district court expressly credited the suicide attempt but determined that, without

additional evidence, nothing existed to challenge the previous determination of

Rakestraw’s competence to proceed. Furthermore, Rakestraw’s conduct during the

sentencing hearing demonstrated he understood the proceedings and could assist his

attorney in preparing a mitigation argument. See United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389,

398 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that defendant “was cooperative during the sentencing hearing

and informed the district court that he was able to discuss and review the presentence report

with his attorney”). Therefore, we find that, while Rakestraw’s attempted suicide presented

a serious event, it alone did not require the district court to sua sponte order a second

competency evaluation.

B.

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We now review Rakestraw’s above-Guidelines sentence “under a deferential abuse-

of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under the Gall

standard, we review a sentence for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at

51. In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court

properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, allowed the

parties to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,

and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–51. If a sentence is free of

“significant procedural error,” then we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]

into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.

Rakestraw raises one procedural challenge to his sentence, arguing the district court

erred in imposing an upward departure without providing notice under Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(h). The district court imposed an upward variance and not an upward departure. Rule

32(h) only applies when a district court imposes an upward departure under the Guidelines,

not a variance under the § 3553(a) factors. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714

(2008). We thus discern no procedural error in this case. See United States v. Spencer, 848

F.3d 324, 327–28 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasizing the distinction between departures and

variances and looking at district court’s intent in determining whether it imposed an upward

departure or variance).

Rakestraw also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. “In

reviewing a variant sentence, we consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably

both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the extent

of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938,

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944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We will vacate such [a] sentence

if its stated reasoning is inadequate or if it relies on improper factors.” United States v.

Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 915 (4th Cir. 2017). “While a district court’s explanation for the

sentence must support the degree of the variance, it need not find extraordinary

circumstances to justify a deviation from the Guidelines.” Spencer, 848 F.3d at 327

(cleaned up). Because our review is ultimately for an abuse of discretion, we accord “due

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the

extent of the variance.” United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017). Even if

“we might reasonably conclude that a different sentence is appropriate, that conclusion,

standing alone, is an insufficient basis to vacate the district court’s chosen sentence.” Id.

(cleaned up).

We discern no abuse of discretion here. The district court cited several of the §

3553(a) factors in explaining why it chose to vary above the Guidelines range—i.e., the

violent nature of the offense; Rakestraw’s long criminal history which, according to the

district court, was not adequately considered by the Guidelines; the need to protect the

public; and the lack of a deterrent effect of previous, shorter sentences. And the facts were

particularly egregious—Rakestraw carjacked a vehicle with a baby inside, led police on a

high-speed chase with the baby still in the car, wrecked the car, and fled the scene of the

crash without checking on the child’s wellbeing. The district court considered counsel’s

arguments, credited some of the points he made, but ultimately found that the § 3553(a)

factors called for a sentence above the Guidelines range. Accordingly, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in imposing a 30-month variance.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err by failing to

order a second competency evaluation and find the sentence procedurally and substantively

reasonable. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED