United States v. Matthew Elder

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: October 25, 2016
• Docket: 15-2584
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 15‐2584 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

MATTHEW ELDER, Defendant‐Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division. No. 13‐cr‐00017 — Richard L. Young, Chief Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 25, 2016 ____________________

Before POSNER, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. MANION, Circuit Judge. Matthew Elder was convicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. He now appeals his conviction and sentence. For the reasons that follow, we af‐ firm Elder’s conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. 2 No. 15‐2584

I. BACKGROUND A. Trial and Conviction In 2013 Matthew Elder (“Elder”) and seven codefendants, including his father Bill Elder (“Bill”), were charged in a su‐ perseding indictment with conspiring to traffic large quanti‐ ties of methamphetamine from Arizona to southwest Indiana. Elder and Bill pleaded not guilty and went to trial, while the remaining codefendants all pleaded guilty. At trial, Elder’s coconspirators testified in detail about his involvement in the conspiracy. Perhaps the most important testimony came from coconspirator Michael Curinga, who first met Elder in Arizona in the summer of 2012. Curinga be‐ gan supplying Elder with methamphetamine for personal use, though it wasn’t long before Elder expressed an interest in buying “large quantities” of methamphetamine to transport to Indiana.1 To that end, Elder introduced Curinga to Bill around October 2012, and the three met at a restaurant a few days later to exchange drugs. The deal went off without a hitch. Elder gave Curinga a cooler with money inside. Curinga took the cooler to his supplier, replaced the money with methamphetamine, then returned to the restaurant and gave the cooler back to Bill and Elder. Curinga charged Bill and Elder $33,000 for the drugs. Elder and Curinga continued to deal on very similar terms over the next several months. Each time, Elder gave Curinga a cooler packed with money; Curinga brought the cooler to his supplier, replaced the money with several pounds of

1 Curinga initially testified that Elder asked him for 3.5 ounces of

methamphetamine, but he later clarified that the two exchanged numer‐ ous pounds of methamphetamine during the conspiracy. No. 15‐2584 3

methamphetamine, and then returned the cooler to Elder. On one occasion in December 2012, Curinga noticed that Elder’s payment for the drugs came up short. Elder insisted that the money was all there, and Curinga eventually decided to “eat the difference” because the deal was still profitable. But Curinga was not the only one concerned about Elder’s mal‐ feasance; a few months later, Bill called Curinga and com‐ plained that Elder was “getting his hands in the money” and was bad for business. As a result, Bill and Curinga agreed to cut Elder out of the next delivery, which took place in Febru‐ ary 2013. The jury also heard from a coconspirator named Michael Clark, who testified that he purchased methamphetamine from Bill and Elder at a Phoenix hotel in December 2012. Clark arrived at the hotel with a bag of money, Bill and Elder counted the money, and Elder left with the money and re‐ turned a few hours later with methamphetamine. (Clark ex‐ plained that he knew the substance brought by Elder was methamphetamine because he had been using that drug for the past twenty years and so was very familiar with it, and because the substance produced the same effect as metham‐ phetamine when he tried it.) Bill and Elder then distributed the methamphetamine among the three of them, and Clark transported his share of the drugs back to Indiana as usual. Further evidence against Elder came from coconspirators Lauri Cupp and Terry Ward, who were dating and lived to‐ gether at Ward’s house in Indiana during the conspiracy. Ward used to travel to Phoenix with Bill to buy methamphet‐ amine and then bring it back to Ward’s house for further dis‐ tribution among the conspirators. A portion of the drugs would go to Cupp, who used some for herself and sold the 4 No. 15‐2584

rest to her customers. On one particular drug run in Decem‐ ber 2012, Bill and Ward took longer than usual. Cupp testified that when they returned, she heard them angrily complaining that their trip was delayed because Elder gave them only part of the methamphetamine that he owed them. Defense counsel objected to Cupp’s testimony as hearsay, but the court admit‐ ted the testimony under the coconspirator exclusion to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Following trial, the jury found Elder guilty of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detect‐ able amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. B. Sentencing Before sentencing, the government filed an information under 21 U.S.C. § 851 indicating that Elder had two prior Ar‐ izona drug convictions: a 1999 conviction for possession of equipment or chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs, and a 1997 conviction for possession of drug parapher‐ nalia. The government argued that Elder’s two prior convic‐ tions were “felony drug offenses” under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which requires a defendant to be sentenced to life if he is convicted of a serious drug offense after having previously been convicted of two or more drug‐related felo‐ nies. The district court reluctantly agreed, explaining that it believed a life sentence was overly harsh and unjust, but that it had no discretion to issue a lesser sentence under the stat‐ ute. Based on its finding that Elder’s prior convictions quali‐ fied as felony drug offenses, the court sentenced Elder to a mandatory term of life imprisonment in July 2015. No. 15‐2584 5

II. DISCUSSION Elder raises three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the district court erred by allowing Cupp to testify about the conversation she overheard concerning his involvement in the conspiracy. Second, he argues that the jury’s verdict must be overturned because it is not supported by sufficient evidence. Third, he argues that the district court erroneously imposed a mandatory term of life imprisonment. We address each argument in turn. A. Statements of Coconspirators Elder challenges the district court’s decision to admit Cupp’s testimony about the conversation she overheard be‐ tween Bill and Ward when they returned from Arizona in De‐ cember 2012. In particular, he contends that the coconspirator exclusion does not apply because the conversation was not “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). We review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion and its underlying factual findings for clear er‐ ror. United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2000). Federal Rule of Evidence 801 provides that a statement of‐ fered against a party is not hearsay if the statement was “made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Statements can further the conspiracy in a number of ways. “Some examples include comments designed to assist in recruiting potential members, to inform other members about the progress of the conspiracy, to control damage to or detection of the conspir‐ acy, to hide the criminal objectives of the conspiracy, or to in‐ still confidence and prevent the desertion of other members.” 6 No. 15‐2584

Johnson, 200 F.3d at 533. A coconspirator’s statement may sat‐ isfy the “in furtherance” requirement even if the statement was not “exclusively, or even primarily, made to further the conspiracy.” United States v. Cruz‐Rea, 626 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal marks omitted). We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that the challenged statements in this case were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Cupp testified that she heard Bill and Ward saying that Elder did not give them the agreed‐upon amount of drugs to be distributed in Indiana as planned. Bill and Ward’s statements directly related to the conspiracy’s pro‐ gress and were clearly part of the ordinary “information flow” among conspirators designed to “help each perform his role.” See United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 545 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal marks omitted). The statements also worked to undermine confidence in Elder as a reliable drug source, and they alerted Cupp to a deficiency in her supply chain (recall that Ward got the drugs from Elder, while Cupp got her drugs from Ward) that resulted in an appreciable delay in business as well as an unanticipated reduction in supply. Far from mere “narrative declarations” of past events, Johnson, 200 F.3d at 533, the statements also betokened the conspiracy’s im‐ pending reorganization: shortly after complaining about El‐ der’s misconduct, Bill called Curinga to exclude Elder from future transactions because he was bad for business. In sum, the challenged statements were made between two conspirators, in the presence of a third conspirator, about a problem that arose during a recent conspiratorial transac‐ tion with a fourth conspirator, and that appears to have prompted a decisive remedial change in the conspiracy’s structure. Under these circumstances, there was plainly a No. 15‐2584 7

“‘reasonable basis’” to conclude that the statements furthered the conspiracy. See Cruz‐Rea, 626 F.3d at 937. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Cupp’s testimony under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Elder next contends that the government presented insuf‐ ficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy. In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and will overturn a conviction only if the record contains no evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty.” United States v. Longstreet, 567 F.3d 911, 918 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Jones, 222 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[A]s long as any rational jury could have returned a guilty verdict, the verdict must stand.”). When challenging a convic‐ tion for insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant bears a “heavy” burden that is “‘nearly insurmountable.’” United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2008). To prove a conspiracy charge, “the government must show both that a conspiracy existed and that the defendant knowingly agreed to join it.” United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1999). The essence of a conspiracy is “an agreement to commit an unlawful act.” United States v. Baker, 40 F.3d 154, 160 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal marks omitted). Here, the government introduced ample evidence estab‐ lishing that Elder knowingly agreed with others to unlawfully distribute methamphetamine as charged in the superseding indictment. Curinga testified that he and Elder negotiated several high‐volume deals to further the drug ring’s opera‐ tions in Indiana, and that Elder successfully introduced him 8 No. 15‐2584

to Bill to expand the drug ring and increase supply. Addi‐ tional testimony showed that, around December 2012, Elder supplied methamphetamine to coconspirators Clark, Bill, and Ward, who then delivered the drugs to Indiana according to plan. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the uncontroverted testimony of Elder’s coconspirators was more than sufficient to enable a rational jury to find Elder guilty of the charged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Elder’s arguments to the contrary are easily disposed of. He first argues that the evidence was insufficient because it “came from almost entirely biased witnesses.” As we have said time and again, however, “[i]t is for the jury—not the court of appeals—to judge the credibility of witnesses, and at‐ tacks on witness credibility are insufficient to sustain a chal‐ lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Grif‐ fin, 84 F.3d 912, 927 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Curry, 79 F.3d 1489, 1497 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that argu‐ ments challenging witness credibility are “wasted on an ap‐ pellate court” because “questions of credibility are solely for the trier of fact”). Indeed, “a conviction for conspiracy may be supported by testimony that is ‘totally uncorroborated and comes from an admitted liar, convicted felon, large scale drug‐dealing, paid government informant.’” United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 206 (7th Cir. 1995). The testimony of Elder’s coconspirators supports the verdict, and we will not second‐ guess the jury’s assessment of their credibility. See United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008). Elder further argues that the evidence at trial was deficient because, when questioning Curinga on direct examination, the prosecution made a reference to “3.5 pounds” of metham‐ phetamine in response to Curinga’s testimony that Elder No. 15‐2584 9

asked him for “3.5 ounces.” Elder argues that this discrepancy cast “enormous doubt” over Curinga’s subsequent testimony that he regularly supplied Elder with multiple‐pound ship‐ ments of methamphetamine. Once again, this argument fails at the outset because it was distinctly within the province of the jury to weigh the consistency of Curinga’s testimony and assess his overall credibility. See United States v. Muthana, 60 F.3d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Assessing a witness’[s] credi‐ bility ‘is a matter inherently within the province of the jury.’”). Elder also exaggerates the supposed inconsistency in Curinga’s testimony. Notwithstanding his initial reference to “3.5 ounces,” Curinga consistently testified, without prompt‐ ing from the government, that he and Elder negotiated the sale of “large quantities” of methamphetamine; that, on sev‐ eral occasions, he supplied Elder with shipments of metham‐ phetamine weighing more than three pounds each; that the drugs were carefully packaged in “one pound bricks” before being placed in the cooler; and that a single deal was worth tens of thousands of dollars. Finally, Elder challenges Clark’s testimony about the De‐ cember 2012 drug exchange at the Phoenix hotel, arguing that Clark’s identification of the exchanged substance as metham‐ phetamine was based on “pure speculation.” This argument borders on the frivolous. Clark testified that he had been us‐ ing methamphetamine for the previous twenty years; that he routinely traveled to Arizona to buy methamphetamine from his coconspirators; and that, when he did so in December 2012, the substance he obtained from Elder looked like meth‐ amphetamine and produced the same effect as methamphet‐ amine when he tried it. Clark’s testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supports a reasonable in‐ 10 No. 15‐2584

ference that the substance supplied by Elder was metham‐ phetamine. See United States v. Bradley, 165 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that it is “common sense” that those who use, buy, and sell illegal drugs are the “real experts” on what those drugs are). All in all, the government presented substantial evidence showing that Elder procured, possessed, trafficked, and dis‐ tributed large amounts of methamphetamine, and that he did so in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in the superseding indictment. Elder’s conviction is supported by sufficient evi‐ dence, and the jury’s verdict must stand. C. Mandatory Life Sentence As discussed earlier, the district court in this case reluc‐ tantly imposed a mandatory life sentence after concluding that Elder’s prior two Arizona convictions (one in 1997 and one in 1999) qualified as “felony drug offenses” under 21 U.S.C. § 841. On appeal, Elder argues that his 1997 conviction was not a conviction for a felony drug offense because it was not punishable by more than one year imprisonment. Elder did not raise this argument at sentencing, so our review is for plain error only. See United States v. Gray, 332 F.3d 491, 492 (7th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under § 841’s “three strikes” provision, a person who con‐ spires to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine must be sentenced to life in prison if he has previously been convicted of two or more felony drug offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). For purposes of § 841, a prior offense is a “fel‐ ony drug offense” only if, among other things, it is “punisha‐ ble by imprisonment for more than one year.” 21 U.S.C. § 802 (44). Although Elder’s 1997 offense of conviction—possession No. 15‐2584 11

of drug paraphernalia in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13‐3415(A)—is presently punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, the offense carried a one‐year maximum sentence at the time of Elder’s conviction in 1997. Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13‐702(D) (effective Jan. 1, 2009), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13‐701(C) (amended Jan. 1, 2009). As a consequence, Elder’s 1997 conviction was not a conviction for a felony drug offense within the meaning of § 841, and the district court’s finding to the contrary was plainly erroneous. The government agrees and correctly concedes that the man‐ datory life sentence was improper. We therefore vacate Elder’s sentence and remand for a complete resentencing in conform‐ ity with this opinion.2 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Elder’s conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

2 Elder also challenges the district court’s finding that his 1999 Ari‐

zona conviction qualified as a felony drug offense. Because we conclude that Elder’s sentence must be vacated based solely on the district court’s erroneous finding regarding the 1997 conviction, we do not reach this ad‐ ditional argument. The parties are free to address the significance of the 1999 conviction on remand.