United States v. Matlock

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: May 23, 2025
• Docket: 24-7054
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-7054 Document: 70-1 Date Filed: 05/23/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 23, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-7054 (D.C. No. 6:22-CR-00158-RAW-1) DANIEL MATTHEW MATLOCK, (E.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Following a jury trial, Daniel Matlock was found guilty of, inter alia, Sexual

Abuse in Indian Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2242(1), 2246(2)(A), 1151,

1153. On appeal, Matlock asserts the evidence was insufficient for a jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly placed the victim of the abuse in fear.

Cf. id. § 2242(1) (criminalizing the following conduct: “knowingly[] caus[ing]

another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other person in

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Accordingly, on May 2, 2025, this court entered an order submitting the case without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-7054 Document: 70-1 Date Filed: 05/23/2025 Page: 2

fear”). Implicit in Matlock’s appellate argument is the proposition § 2242(1)’s

“knowingly” mens rea element applies to both the causing-another-person-to-engage-

in-a-sexual-act element and the placing-that-other-person-in-fear element. This court

recently held, however, that § 2242(1)’s knowingly mens rea element does not extend

to the fear element. United States v. Flaming, 133 F.4th 1011, 1023-25 (10th Cir.

2025). Because Flaming forecloses Matlock’s sole claim of error, this court exercises

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms.

Although the parties’ merits briefs were filed before this court issued Flaming,

this court invited the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing that decision.

Matlock filed a supplemental brief and the government responded thereto. Matlock’s

supplemental brief appears to grudgingly recognize Flaming forecloses his claim of

error. See Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 2-3 (“The most straight-forward reading of

[§ 2242(1)] is that it is violated when someone uses threats or intimidation to cause

another person to engage in a sexual act. However, the Flaming Court held that prior

precedent compelled otherwise.”). Matlock nevertheless asserts this panel should

disregard Flaming because it was wrongly decided. See id. at 3-4, 4-7 (arguing

Flaming relies on a misreading of this court’s decision in United States v. Castillo,

140 F.3d 874, 885-86 (10th Cir. 1998)1 and, even assuming Flaming did not

1 Page three of Matlock’s supplemental brief argues as follows: “In Flaming, the appellant argued, as Mr. Matlock does here, that § 2242(1) requires that ‘defendants have the specific intent to put someone in fear.’” [United States v. Flaming, 133 F.4th 1011, 1024 (10th Cir. 2025)]. Flaming [incorrectly] deemed United States v. Castillo to have foreclosed this argument.”

2 Appellate Case: 24-7054 Document: 70-1 Date Filed: 05/23/2025 Page: 3

misconstrue Castillo, Castillo is no longer good law2). Matlock’s arguments in these

regards can be boiled down to the following essence: “[T]his Court should not follow

Flaming because it was wrongly decided.” Appellee’s Supp. Br. at 2. Such an

approach is at odds with binding circuit precedent. This court is “bound by the

precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary

decision by the Supreme Court.” In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993).

Matlock has not identified any en banc or Supreme Court decisions issued after

Flaming calling Flaming into question. Nor has he identified an exception to the

Smith rule that would allow this panel to reconsider Flaming’s reliance on Castillo.

Flaming is a published opinion and constitutes binding authority this panel must

apply. Flaming holds § 2242(1) “require[s] that the defendant ‘knowingly’

committed the act” but does not “require[] that a defendant specifically intend to

place a victim in fear.” 133 F.4th at 1024 (quoting Castillo, 140 F.3d at 885-86).

Thus, Flaming dooms Matlock’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.

Alternatively, Matlock asserts Flaming is distinguishable on its facts. He

argues there is no record evidence he knew his victim was in fear. He notes that the

defendant in Flaming, on the other hand, “understood from the evidence that [his]

lewd or indecent proposition of oral sex frightened the minor.” Flaming, 133 F.4th

at 1023 (alterations and quotations omitted). Matlock seizes on this

2 Page four of Matlock’s supplemental brief argues as follows: “The Castillo method of statutory interpretation, as understood by Flaming, cannot survive subsequent Supreme Court decisions.”

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“underst[anding]” to claim the defendant in Flaming, unlike him, knew his victim

was in fear. Id. In so arguing, Matlock misinterprets Flaming. The Flaming

defendant’s concession relates to whether his victim was actually placed in fear, not

whether the defendant knew or intended to place the victim in fear. See id. at 1024

(“Flaming does not dispute that his conduct ‘frightened’ Doe generally.”). This court

specifically recognized the Flaming defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence was whether “the evidence is insufficient to show that he intended to use

fear to cause [his victim] to engage in a sexual act.” Id. at 1023 (quotation omitted).

That is the exact argument Matlock makes in this appeal. See Appellant’s Opening

Br. at 12 (“[N]o evidence was presented that Mr. Matlock knew [the victim] was

afraid or that he had intended or attempted to place her in fear or that he had

attempted to accomplish the assault by inducing fear. Hence, he did not knowingly

place her in fear—an essential element of the crime.”). And, like the defendant in

Flaming did on appeal, Matlock concedes in his opening brief there was sufficient

evidence his victim was placed in fear because the victim “did testify that she was in

fear during the assault.” Id. Thus, Flaming is factually on all fours with this case.

Flaming directly rejects Matlock’s argument “that the ‘fear’ element under

§ 2242 requires that a defendant specifically intend to place a victim in fear.” See

133 F.4th at 1024. We are bound by the rule of law set out in Flaming. In re Smith,

10 F.3d at 724. Matlock’s arguments that Flaming was wrongly decided must be

presented to the en banc court, not this three-judge panel. Id.

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Accordingly, the district court’s judgment of conviction is hereby

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge