United States v. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority

97 F. Supp. 2d 155, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20535, 50 ERC (BNA) 1644, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6244, 2000 WL 561873
District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided May 5, 2000·No. 98CV10267·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON A MOTION BY THE UNITED STATES FOR AN ORDER OF IN-JUNCTIVE RELIEF

STEARNS, District Judge.

On February 12, 1998, the United States, on behalf of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), brought this enforcement action against the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (“MWRA”) and the Metropolitan District Commission (“MDC”) 1 , alleging *157 violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f, et seq., and EPA’s Surface Water Treatment Rule (“SWTR”), 40 C.F.R. Part 141. The United States seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring the MWRA to build a filtration plant to treat the water that it draws from the Wachusett Reservoir to supply the metropolitan Boston area.

The MWRA initially maintained that because the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”), the primary agency responsible for enforcement of the SWTR, had determined that it was in compliance with the SWTR’s filtration avoidance criteria, it could not be compelled by the EPA to filter its water. The MWRA proposed instead to treat its water with ozone, which coupled with aggressive watershed protection and an accelerated program to replace aging pipes, the MWRA believed to be a more cost-efficient alternative to filtration. The MWRA conceded that subsequent to the DEP’s determination (and after the filing of its initial brief), it fell, albeit narrowly, out of compliance with the fecal coliform avoidance criterion (one of the eleven filtration avoidance criteria specified by the SWTR). The EPA immediately renewed its request for a filtration order, arguing that, the SWTR admits only a filtration remedy for a compliance violation, no matter what its magnitude. The MWRA took the position that because the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(b), authorizes a district court to enforce compliance with the SWTR by entering “such judgment as protection of public health may require,” the court’s power to fashion a remedy for a compliance violation is more flexible than the enforcement mandate conferred by Congress on the EPA.

In a written opinion, the court agreed with the MWRA that “the SDWA does not deprive a court of discretion in fashioning remedies- for a violation of the SWTR.” See United States v. MWRA, 48 F.Supp.2d 65, 72 (D.Mass.1999). After the Court of Appeals rejected the EPA’s petition for interlocutory review of the court’s determination, twenty-four days of eviden-tiary hearings were held to consider the EPA’s request for injunctive relief. Twenty-three witnesses, mostly experts, testified and 524 exhibits, were entered in evidence. Final arguments were held on April 14, 2000. The court agreed to the parties’ request that it expedite its decision for release on May 5, 2000, so that there would be no delay in the construction of the planned new treatment facility.

This self-imposed deadline has aspects both good and bad. On the positive side, this opinion is much shorter than it would otherwise have been. There is, however, a lingering fear, that in reviewing the mass of testimony and exhibits offered during the trial, I may have missed something truly important. As a prophylaxis, I have used the very thorough suggested findings submitted by the parties as a cross-check on my evaluation of the evidence. I have read the transcripts of the witness testimony and, to the extent humanly possibly in so short a time, the tens of thousand pages of trial exhibits.

What follows is not a conventional finding of facts. I have not selected one version of a contested fact over another based on any assignment of the burden of proof. Burdens of proof, while they work well in resolving most legal disputes, do not easily lend themselves to the resolution of scientific controversies. Science, by and large, rejects binary decision making in favor of a more nuanced quest for understanding. While a scientist might testify that a supposed fact has been proven to be false, the same scientist, when asked about conflicting data, will say only that an asserted fact has not been disproven or “falsified,” and could therefore “possibly” be true. In this decision, I relate those facts, including those that are in dispute, that fall within *158 what I consider to be a reasonable range of possibility, indicating where appropriate the facts that I believe were shown to enjoy the greater empirical support or reflected the thinking of witnesses whom I found especially credible.

I will incorporate the rulings of law made in United States v. MWRA, supra. No subsequent decision of a higher court has caused me to doubt their essential correctness. 2

While there is no doubt that Congress, in enacting a statute, “may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts’ discretion,” its decision to do so is not to be “lightly assume[d],” especially in the absence of a clear legislative command. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). “Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. ‘The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences or doubtful construction.’ ” Id., quoting from Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946).
The most explicit Congressional statement clarifying the intent of § 300g-3(b) [providing for judicial review of regulatory orders of the EPA Administrator] appears in the House Conference Committee Report on the 1974 enactment of the SDWA. The Conference Report states that:
[t]he Committee intends that courts which are considering remedies in enforcement actions under this section are not to apply traditional balancing principles used by equity courts. Rather they are directed to give utmost weight to the Committee’s paramount objective of providing maximum feasible protection of the public health.
H.R.Conf. Rep. No. 93-1185, at 23 (1974), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454.
In emphasizing its overriding goal of protecting the public health, Congress did not, however, say that a court was to limit itself to mechanical enforcement of EPA compliance orders. Had it been Congress’s intent to strip the courts of their equitable powers, one would think that it would have drafted § 300g-3(b) to say so, for example, by imposing the same narrow mandate on the courts that it imposed on the EPA in § 300g-1(b)(7)(C)®. Instead Congress used language descriptive of the traditional powers of a court of chancery.

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United States v. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, 97 F. Supp. 2d 155, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20535, 50 ERC (BNA) 1644, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6244, 2000 WL 561873 (D. Mass. 2000).

97 F. Supp. 2d 155 (United States v. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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