United States v. Mass-Soto

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 9, 2026
• Docket: 24-893
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF No. 24-893 AMERICA, D.C. No. 4:22-cr-00766-JGZ-AMM-1 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MEMORANDUM*

SANTOS NAUL MASS-SOTO,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Jennifer G. Zipps, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 2, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

After a jury trial, Santos Naul Mass-Soto (Mass) was convicted on one count

of reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He was sentenced to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 27 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Mass appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. We review for plain error a district court’s failure to order a competency

exam sua sponte where, as here, the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.

United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 814 (9th Cir. 2008). A defendant is

incompetent to stand trial if he “lacks the capacity to understand the nature and

object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in

preparing his defense.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). We have

held that whether the district court plainly erred is “ultimately reducible to the

question of whether ‘the evidence of incompetence was such that a reasonable

judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the defendant’s

competence.’” United States v. Dreyer, 705 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1981)).

The district court was not faced with such evidence of incompetence. First,

no medical evidence suggested that Mass had a mental disease or defect. The only

medical information in the record demonstrated that Mass had never been under

the care of mental health professionals and did not display symptoms suggesting

serious emotional problems. See United States v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th

Cir. 2014) (explaining that a defendant will “almost certainly fail” to show plain

error without medical evidence indicating incompetency).

2 24-893 Second, although none of Mass’s four successive attorneys affirmatively

stated that they believed he was competent, at least three were exposed to Mass’s

U visa theory and none moved for a competency hearing. See Hernandez v. Ylst,

930 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[D]efendant’s counsel is in the best position to

evaluate a client’s comprehension of the proceedings.”). In addition, a reasonable

judge likely would have interpreted Mass’s strained relationships and evident

displeasure with his attorneys—who told him that neither the facts nor the law

supported his U visa story—as evidence of frustration, not incompetence. See

United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that

counsel believed that his client was competent but “just [did not] want to hear what

[counsel was] telling him”).

Third, Mass’s insistence that he had been promised a U visa was not so

irrational as to suggest that he was unable to understand the proceedings. His belief

was not inherently implausible: Mass had been detained as a material witness in a

criminal case and immigration relief can be offered in those circumstances. See 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). Mass contends that his fixed false belief about being

promised a U visa, and his shifting story about who told him that he was entitled to

one, demonstrated cognitive impairment, but a reasonable judge could have

perceived it as evidence of desperation. Similarly, Mass’s persistence in testifying

about the U visa promise at trial—even though the judge had ordered him not to do

3 24-893 so because it had no bearing on the elements of the charged offense—could

reasonably have been understood as an attempt to distract or garner sympathy from

the jury. Moreover, Mass demonstrated that he could comprehend aspects of his

trial, with the district court remarking to Mass at one point that it had “the

impression that you do understand what my ruling is but that you disagree with it.”

Finally, Mass’s behavior was not sufficiently “bizarre or erratic” to raise a

genuine doubt as to his competency. United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 657 (9th

Cir. 2015). Mass was responsive and generally coherent while testifying. And

although he was briefly removed from the courtroom after speaking out of turn, his

conduct was less extreme than that of defendants in similar cases where we held

that the district court did not have to order a competency hearing sua sponte. See,

e.g., United States v. White, 670 F.3d 1077, 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2012) (district

court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order a second competency hearing

where the defendant was removed multiple times because of his behavior, which

included “shouting profanities and threats,” and where he “was able to remain in

court without incident on only four” of twenty-five days).

2. A defendant’s right to be present at his trial is not absolute. Badger v.

Cardwell, 587 F.2d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1978); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c). A

defendant may lose that right if, after being warned, he continues to act in a

disorderly and disruptive manner. See United States v. Kizer, 569 F.2d 504, 506–07

4 24-893 (9th Cir. 1978). During his two-day trial, Mass spoke out of turn loudly enough for

the court to hear on three occasions. The first two times, the judge warned Mass

that he might be removed if he continued, including issuing a “final warning” after

the second occurrence. Under Kizer, the district court did not err in removing Mass

after his third interruption.

Nor did the district court err by allowing the trial to proceed in Mass’s

absence. Mass cites no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit precedent that requires

alternative listening arrangements to be made before a trial may proceed. And by

proceeding only briefly before seeing if Mass was willing to behave appropriately

and return, the district court acted in accordance with the Supreme Court’s

statement in Illinois v. Allen that “the right to be present can . . . be reclaimed as

soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum

and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.” 397 U.S.

337, 343 (1970).

AFFIRMED.

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