McCREE, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a jury conviction on three counts of an indictment charging that Huffman mailed three letters which threatened the lives of the President and Vice President of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a).1 The District Court sentenced Huffman to imprisonment for three concurrent five-year terms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2).
Appellant contends that the evidence does not support the jury’s determination that he possessed the requisite criminal intent; that the jury instruction on intent was erroneous; and that the court did not give counsel an opportunity to object to its instructions after they had been given and before the jury had begun its deliberations as required by Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant does not deny that he wrote and mailed the letters.
We conclude that the instructions were erroneous and that the court failed to comply with Rule 30. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Appellant is a man of below average intelligence, and an avowed homosexual. It is undisputed that he has a history of mental disorders and that he was under emotional stress and was deeply disturbed at the time he wrote these letters. He also has a history of repeated criminal activity. He was previously convicted in North Carolina of writing a threatening letter to the President, and as a result of that conviction, he was transferred from a state prison to a federal prison. At the time he wrote the letters for which he was indicted here, he was confined by the United States Army in the stockade at Fort Knox, Kentucky, for having been absent without leave.
During his incarceration at Fort Knox, he was confined, for a period, to a psychiatric ward in Ireland Army Hospital because he had intentionally cut his own wrists three times in the stockade. He characterizes these incidents as suicide attempts, but appellee contends that the cuts were superficial and were intended only to procure his release from the stockade.
The letters were written during June 1971. The first letter, dated June 18, 1971, was addressed to the Vice President and stated that Huffman would kill him if the Vice President did not have Huffman released from the Army within 14 days and did not provide him with [191]*191$100,000 in 20 and 50 dollar bills.2 The second letter, dated June 21, 1971, was addressed to the President. It informed him that Huffman had made plans to kill the Vice President and that he had decided to kill the President two days before killing the Vice President.3 The third letter, dated June 27, 1971, was addressed to the President and stated that Huffman had “made up his mind” to kill the President pursuant to a plan whereby Huffman would become the owner of “at least one-half of the United States.” The letter also threatened the lives of the President’s daughter, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior, J. Edgar Hoover (the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and the Vice President. It further stated that Huffman intended to undergo a sex change and to become the first woman President of the United States.4
At trial, Huffman’s only defense was that he was suffering from a mental disturbance at the time he wrote the letters, and that it was so serious that he did not know what he was doing and could not conform his conduct to the re[192]*192quirements of the law.5 In support of this defense, he submitted the testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Curtis L. Barrett, Jr., who had administered several tests of different types to Huffman and had interviewed him twice, on one occasion for about four hours. In rebuttal, the Government submitted the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. John D. Trawiek, Jr., who had interviewed Huffman at the Jefferson County Jail on August 25, 1971, for a period of “somewhat over an hour.” The principal purpose of Dr. Trawick’s interview with Huffman was to determine competency to stand trial, but Dr. Trawiek testified that he was also able to form some conclusions about Huffman’s mental state two months earlier.
Both parties submitted written requests for jury instructions on insanity as a defense. In his written request, the Assistant United States Attorney asserted that he followed our decision in United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968). In that case we expressed approval of the standards of the American Law Institute stated in its Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Official Draft, 1962)6 :
We now elect generally to adhere to the test of criminal responsibility [stated in] the Model Penal Code. We believe it to be a test which a jury will readily comprehend; one which comports with and makes available modern scientific knowledge and one which may serve to aid the continuing development of the federal law.
The questions for jury consideration pertaining to criminal responsibility when defendant offers an insanity defense are as follows:
1. Was he suffering from a mental illness at the time of the commission of the crime?
2. Was that illness such as to prevent his knowing the wrongfulness of his act ?
3. Was the mental illness such as to render him substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he is charged with violating ?
A negative finding as to the first question or negative findings as to both the second and third questions would require rejection of the insanity defense. An affirmative finding as to the first question, plus an affirmative finding as to either the second or the third question, would require a jury verdict of “not guilty” because of defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility.
If in the judgment of the court the lay and psychiatric testimony provides no issue in relation to the second [193]*193question, there is no need to submit it to the jury.
We emphasize that by approving the ALI standard and by setting forth the questions above we are not seeking to require judicial instructions in these specific words.
But we specifically stated in a footnote that we did not adopt an additional definition endorsed by the ALI:
We do not, however, adopt the following additional definition endorsed by the ALI: “As used in this Article, the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.” Model Penal Code § 4.01(2) (Official Draft, 1962). The purpose of this definitional sentence was obviously to exclude from the definition of insanity “psychopathic personalities” who demonstrate mental abnormality principally by habitual violation of the law.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
McCREE, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a jury conviction on three counts of an indictment charging that Huffman mailed three letters which threatened the lives of the President and Vice President of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a).1 The District Court sentenced Huffman to imprisonment for three concurrent five-year terms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2).
Appellant contends that the evidence does not support the jury’s determination that he possessed the requisite criminal intent; that the jury instruction on intent was erroneous; and that the court did not give counsel an opportunity to object to its instructions after they had been given and before the jury had begun its deliberations as required by Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant does not deny that he wrote and mailed the letters.
We conclude that the instructions were erroneous and that the court failed to comply with Rule 30. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Appellant is a man of below average intelligence, and an avowed homosexual. It is undisputed that he has a history of mental disorders and that he was under emotional stress and was deeply disturbed at the time he wrote these letters. He also has a history of repeated criminal activity. He was previously convicted in North Carolina of writing a threatening letter to the President, and as a result of that conviction, he was transferred from a state prison to a federal prison. At the time he wrote the letters for which he was indicted here, he was confined by the United States Army in the stockade at Fort Knox, Kentucky, for having been absent without leave.
During his incarceration at Fort Knox, he was confined, for a period, to a psychiatric ward in Ireland Army Hospital because he had intentionally cut his own wrists three times in the stockade. He characterizes these incidents as suicide attempts, but appellee contends that the cuts were superficial and were intended only to procure his release from the stockade.
The letters were written during June 1971. The first letter, dated June 18, 1971, was addressed to the Vice President and stated that Huffman would kill him if the Vice President did not have Huffman released from the Army within 14 days and did not provide him with [191]*191$100,000 in 20 and 50 dollar bills.2 The second letter, dated June 21, 1971, was addressed to the President. It informed him that Huffman had made plans to kill the Vice President and that he had decided to kill the President two days before killing the Vice President.3 The third letter, dated June 27, 1971, was addressed to the President and stated that Huffman had “made up his mind” to kill the President pursuant to a plan whereby Huffman would become the owner of “at least one-half of the United States.” The letter also threatened the lives of the President’s daughter, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior, J. Edgar Hoover (the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and the Vice President. It further stated that Huffman intended to undergo a sex change and to become the first woman President of the United States.4
At trial, Huffman’s only defense was that he was suffering from a mental disturbance at the time he wrote the letters, and that it was so serious that he did not know what he was doing and could not conform his conduct to the re[192]*192quirements of the law.5 In support of this defense, he submitted the testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Curtis L. Barrett, Jr., who had administered several tests of different types to Huffman and had interviewed him twice, on one occasion for about four hours. In rebuttal, the Government submitted the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. John D. Trawiek, Jr., who had interviewed Huffman at the Jefferson County Jail on August 25, 1971, for a period of “somewhat over an hour.” The principal purpose of Dr. Trawick’s interview with Huffman was to determine competency to stand trial, but Dr. Trawiek testified that he was also able to form some conclusions about Huffman’s mental state two months earlier.
Both parties submitted written requests for jury instructions on insanity as a defense. In his written request, the Assistant United States Attorney asserted that he followed our decision in United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968). In that case we expressed approval of the standards of the American Law Institute stated in its Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Official Draft, 1962)6 :
We now elect generally to adhere to the test of criminal responsibility [stated in] the Model Penal Code. We believe it to be a test which a jury will readily comprehend; one which comports with and makes available modern scientific knowledge and one which may serve to aid the continuing development of the federal law.
The questions for jury consideration pertaining to criminal responsibility when defendant offers an insanity defense are as follows:
1. Was he suffering from a mental illness at the time of the commission of the crime?
2. Was that illness such as to prevent his knowing the wrongfulness of his act ?
3. Was the mental illness such as to render him substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he is charged with violating ?
A negative finding as to the first question or negative findings as to both the second and third questions would require rejection of the insanity defense. An affirmative finding as to the first question, plus an affirmative finding as to either the second or the third question, would require a jury verdict of “not guilty” because of defendant’s lack of criminal responsibility.
If in the judgment of the court the lay and psychiatric testimony provides no issue in relation to the second [193]*193question, there is no need to submit it to the jury.
We emphasize that by approving the ALI standard and by setting forth the questions above we are not seeking to require judicial instructions in these specific words.
But we specifically stated in a footnote that we did not adopt an additional definition endorsed by the ALI:
We do not, however, adopt the following additional definition endorsed by the ALI: “As used in this Article, the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.” Model Penal Code § 4.01(2) (Official Draft, 1962). The purpose of this definitional sentence was obviously to exclude from the definition of insanity “psychopathic personalities” who demonstrate mental abnormality principally by habitual violation of the law. The ALI commentators argue that to date mental health facilities in this nation offer little hope for curative treatment of these persons, and that mental health facilities are already overburdened by patients as to whom the prospects for successful treatment are considerably brighter. There is, however, great dispute over the psychiatric soundness of section 4.01(2). See Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychiatrist’s Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A. J. 527, 530 (1962); Diamond, From M’Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 Calif.L.Rev. 189, 193-194 (1962).
Smith, supra, 404 F.2d at 727 n.8 (emphasis added). Cf., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 at 992-994 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
Nevertheless, the Assistant United States Attorney’s request included this rejected definition:
As used in these instructions, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
And the court erroneously delivered this instruction to the jury. This was plain error which requires reversal of the conviction and remand for a new trial despite appellant’s failure to state distinctly his objection to it. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); United States v. Krosky, 418 F.2d 65, 66 (6th Cir. 1969). This is so because the instruction foreclosed the jury from considering whether Huffman’s homosexuality and anti-social behavior were manifestations of a mental disease or defect which might have prevented him from knowing the wrongfulness of his act or have rendered him substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. It is clear that this was a theory of the defense, because defense counsel’s closing argument to the jury included the following statement:
Now, you heard Doctor Barrett’s testimony. . . . And his opinion was, as you heard, that this man, because of the circumstances he was in at the time the letters were written, did not have the mental capacity necessary to form this intent which the Government must prove.
Doctor Trawick admitted that the acts that you’ve heard here during the day were the acts of a deeply disturbed person. And, believe me, I think that common sense will dictate to all of us that you don’t have to be either a psychologist or a psychiatrist to figure out that a man who does the things that this man has done is in any respects a normal individual.
We observe that compliance with Rule 30 might have made reversal unnecessary because it would have afforded the trial court the opportunity of correcting this error in its charge before the jury began its deliberations. The rule provides, in part:
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission [194]*194therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury and, on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury.
In this case, the following proceedings occurred after the court delivered its instructions :
BY THE COURT:
Now, any — any request for any further instructions?
All of the jury must agree — any objections or exceptions?
MR. WARNER [defense counsel] : May I approach the bench? I’ve got one or two points. Are we going to argue that now?
BY THE COURT: We can go ahead and take them up while they’re out.
MR. WARNER: All right.
The court then gave the jury forms on which to return its verdicts, and proceeded as follows:
BY THE COURT:
You may take them to their room, Mr. Marshal. And you may adjourn court till the jury returns.
(WHEREUPON, AT ABOUT THE HOUR OF 4:30 P.M. THE JURY RETIRED TO BEGIN ITS DELIBERATIONS AND THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS OCCURRED IN CHAMBERS).
MR. WARNER: Judge, I’ve got one —two specific objections to the instructions as given.
The other objection I have, sir, is again based on our discussion in chambers previously that I don’t feel that the instructions which were given relative to the mental issue adequately covered the related issue of diminished capacity. I think there is too much in there about sanity and insanity, and I feel that we were entitled, or we are entitled, to have the jury instructed specifically on that issue as tendered in my instructions.
MR. TOWNES: I disagree. As I said earlier, I think that it was redundant. I feel that the instructions set out the issues that were presented to the jury, and I feel they were in accordance with the procedure set out by the Sixth Circuit.
BY THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WARNER: That’s all I have, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: Okay. Overruled.
(WHEREUPON, AT ABOUT THE HOUR OF 4:50 P.M. THE JURY RETURNED TO THE COURTROOM AND THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS OCCURRED IN OPEN COURT).
[The jury returned its verdicts of guilty.]
This procedure frustrated the purpose of the rule to provide an opportunity for the court to make corrections before the jury begins deliberations. See 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 484, at 284 n.35 & n.36; 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice P0.04, and cases cited therein. Since the jury had already begun to deliberate, counsel may have considered the opportunity to make objections meaningless because the court would have been understandably reluctant to recall the jury to amend or correct its instructions. It is also possible that any correction would have come too late — after the jury had reached a conclusion about the issue affected by the erroneous instruction.
The judgment of conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded for retrial in accordance with this opinion. Upon retrial, after the jury has been instructed, and before it begins deliberating, counsel must be permitted to object on the record, to the instructions, <xs given, out of the hearing of the jury. Upon request, counsel must be permitted to make objection out of the presence of [195]*195the jury.7 One preferred procedure for a District Court to follow after completing its instructions is to excuse the jury with the admonition not to begin its deliberations until it is instructed to do so. Then, in the absence of the jury, counsel may be asked to state any objections and to make any requests for corrections or additional instructions. With the jury absent, counsel may argue for suggested changes without risking alienation of the jury. When the judge has decided the matter, he may direct the jury to begin its deliberations either with or without supplemental instructions.8
Reversed and remanded.