OPINION
SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Marvin Reedy under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm. The events that' led up to his conviction occurred around midnight on July 22, 1991. At that time, residents near the 1600 block of West Washington Street, Charleston, West Virginia, reported hearing gunshots. One local resident, Lori Dillon, told police that she heard voices shout “he’s got a gun” and saw two men in a dark car drive into a nearby parking lot.
Ms. Dillon told police
that one of the men was Marvin Reedy and that the dark car was “sitting up there at the red light.”
Upon receiving this information, the police raced up to the car sitting at the red light and pulled it over. When Reedy stepped out, the police saw a shotgun lying on the passenger seat of the car. They seized the gun and arrested Reedy. A pat-down search of him revealed ammunition for the seized shotgun.
Before trial, Reedy moved unsuccessfully to suppress the gun, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation. At trial, Reedy stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 921(a)(20). As a result, the government did not present evidence of Reedy’s undisputed prior convictions at trial. After the jury found him guilty, the court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison pursuant to the mandatory sentence enhancement provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
We consider Reedy’s three major arguments on appeal. First, Reedy contends that the district court erred in finding that the police had reasonable suspicion, required by
Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to stop the car in which he was a passenger. Second, he argues that his stipulation did not discharge the government from its responsibility of proving an essential element of § 922(g)(1)—that his civil rights had not been restored for the prior felony conviction — and the district court erred by not instructing the jury on that point. Finally, Reedy asserts that the district court improperly considered his previous convictions to enhance his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We affirm the district court on Reedy’s first two arguments, but we reverse on his third.
I
In denying Reedy’s motion to suppress the shotgun, the district court concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of the car in which Reedy was a passenger. We agree. As we have held, a police officer may conduct a
Terry
stop if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity
“
‘may be afoot.’ ”
United States v. Crittendon,
883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir.1989) (quoting
Terry,
392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884). Here, the police received reports of gunshots in the area late at night. A citizen on the scene substantiated those reports, adding that she had seen a dark car drive into a parking lot amid shouts that' someone had a gun. She identified the defendant and pointed the officer in the direction of the car. Based on the totality of these circumstances, we uphold the district court’s conclusion that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car.
See Terry,
392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.
II
Reedy next argues that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of the firearm offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was plain error.
See United States v. Polowichak,
783 F.2d 410, 415-16 (4th Cir.1986). After considering the effect of Reedy’s stipulation, we find that the district court did not err in its instructions to the jury.
Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a felon to possess a firearm.
A viola
tion of § 922(g)(1), however, cannot be predicated on a felony conviction for which a person’s civil rights have been restored. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
We recently held in
United States v. Essick,
935 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir.1991), that to obtain a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove as an element of its case that the state
has not
restored the defendant’s civil rights for the predicate felony.
See Polowichak,
783 F.2d at 415 (requiring every element of an offense, requested or not, to be included in jury instructions). Thus, Reedy argues, the court erred in not instructing the jury on that element.
It is true that the court did not charge the jury on the element of restoration of civil rights, nor did the government prove the continuing vitality of Reedy’s prior felony conviction. In fact, in reliance on Reedy’s stipulation, the government offered
no
proof that Reedy had previously been convicted of a felony. The stipulation provided:
The Defendant Marvin James Reedy stipulates and admits on July 22, 1991, and at all times relevant to the indictment that he had been convicted of a felony as charged in the indictment and within the meaning of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 921(a)(20).
The express language of the stipulation shows Reedy’s agreement that he had been convicted of a felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
and
921(a)(20). Reedy has made no effort to invalidate the stipulation by showing, for instance, that it was wrong, that he entered into it inadvertently, or that he was incompetent when he made it. By presenting nothing to cast doubt on the stipulation’s validity, Reedy abandoned any basis for challenging its evidentiary value as to the stipulated elements.
See United States v. Poore,
594 F.2d 39, 41 (4th Cir.1979) (defendant’s stipulation to a prior felony satisfied 18 U.S.C.
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OPINION
SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Marvin Reedy under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm. The events that' led up to his conviction occurred around midnight on July 22, 1991. At that time, residents near the 1600 block of West Washington Street, Charleston, West Virginia, reported hearing gunshots. One local resident, Lori Dillon, told police that she heard voices shout “he’s got a gun” and saw two men in a dark car drive into a nearby parking lot.
Ms. Dillon told police
that one of the men was Marvin Reedy and that the dark car was “sitting up there at the red light.”
Upon receiving this information, the police raced up to the car sitting at the red light and pulled it over. When Reedy stepped out, the police saw a shotgun lying on the passenger seat of the car. They seized the gun and arrested Reedy. A pat-down search of him revealed ammunition for the seized shotgun.
Before trial, Reedy moved unsuccessfully to suppress the gun, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation. At trial, Reedy stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 921(a)(20). As a result, the government did not present evidence of Reedy’s undisputed prior convictions at trial. After the jury found him guilty, the court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison pursuant to the mandatory sentence enhancement provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
We consider Reedy’s three major arguments on appeal. First, Reedy contends that the district court erred in finding that the police had reasonable suspicion, required by
Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to stop the car in which he was a passenger. Second, he argues that his stipulation did not discharge the government from its responsibility of proving an essential element of § 922(g)(1)—that his civil rights had not been restored for the prior felony conviction — and the district court erred by not instructing the jury on that point. Finally, Reedy asserts that the district court improperly considered his previous convictions to enhance his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We affirm the district court on Reedy’s first two arguments, but we reverse on his third.
I
In denying Reedy’s motion to suppress the shotgun, the district court concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of the car in which Reedy was a passenger. We agree. As we have held, a police officer may conduct a
Terry
stop if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity
“
‘may be afoot.’ ”
United States v. Crittendon,
883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir.1989) (quoting
Terry,
392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884). Here, the police received reports of gunshots in the area late at night. A citizen on the scene substantiated those reports, adding that she had seen a dark car drive into a parking lot amid shouts that' someone had a gun. She identified the defendant and pointed the officer in the direction of the car. Based on the totality of these circumstances, we uphold the district court’s conclusion that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car.
See Terry,
392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.
II
Reedy next argues that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of the firearm offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was plain error.
See United States v. Polowichak,
783 F.2d 410, 415-16 (4th Cir.1986). After considering the effect of Reedy’s stipulation, we find that the district court did not err in its instructions to the jury.
Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for a felon to possess a firearm.
A viola
tion of § 922(g)(1), however, cannot be predicated on a felony conviction for which a person’s civil rights have been restored. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
We recently held in
United States v. Essick,
935 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir.1991), that to obtain a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove as an element of its case that the state
has not
restored the defendant’s civil rights for the predicate felony.
See Polowichak,
783 F.2d at 415 (requiring every element of an offense, requested or not, to be included in jury instructions). Thus, Reedy argues, the court erred in not instructing the jury on that element.
It is true that the court did not charge the jury on the element of restoration of civil rights, nor did the government prove the continuing vitality of Reedy’s prior felony conviction. In fact, in reliance on Reedy’s stipulation, the government offered
no
proof that Reedy had previously been convicted of a felony. The stipulation provided:
The Defendant Marvin James Reedy stipulates and admits on July 22, 1991, and at all times relevant to the indictment that he had been convicted of a felony as charged in the indictment and within the meaning of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 921(a)(20).
The express language of the stipulation shows Reedy’s agreement that he had been convicted of a felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
and
921(a)(20). Reedy has made no effort to invalidate the stipulation by showing, for instance, that it was wrong, that he entered into it inadvertently, or that he was incompetent when he made it. By presenting nothing to cast doubt on the stipulation’s validity, Reedy abandoned any basis for challenging its evidentiary value as to the stipulated elements.
See United States v. Poore,
594 F.2d 39, 41 (4th Cir.1979) (defendant’s stipulation to a prior felony satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)’s requirement of a prior felony conviction);
see also Wheeler v. John Deere Co.,
935 F.2d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir.1991) (a stipulation is an admission and cannot be disregarded or set aside at will);
Mangaroo v. Nelson,
864 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir.1989) (equitable estoppel prevents a party from contesting a stipulated issue when other party has relied on it with substantial detriment);
United States v. Ferreira-Alameda,
815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir.1987) (failure to object at trial to any portion of the stipulated evidence invalidates claim that stipulation was involuntary).
Here, the government had no reason to present evidence that would have duplicated the stipulated facts. In fact, such evidence might have been inadmissible as prejudicial to the defendant.
See Poore,
594 F.2d at 41. Instead, the government justifiably relied on the stipulation not only as proof that Reedy had been convicted of a prior felony, but also as proof of the
Essick
element: that Reedy’s civil rights had not been restored for that felony.
See
18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20), 922(g)(1);
United States v. Essick,
935 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir.1991). Hence, the district court’s instructions were not error, plain or otherwise.
Ill
Reedy’s final challenge is to the district court’s application of the armed career criminal enhancement provision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), to sentence him to fifteen years in prison.
For § 924(e)’s mandatory enhancement provision to apply, a defendant must have three previous convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Reedy does not dispute that he has three previous West Virginia felony convictions: entering without breaking in 1968, breaking and entering in 1978, and burglary in 1982. In 1975, however, West Virginia officially restored Reedy’s civil rights for the 1968 conviction. Because of this civil rights restoration, Reedy objects to the district court’s use of his 1968 conviction toward enhancing his sentence under § 924(e). We agree that Reedy’s 1968 conviction does not qualify as a “violent felony” for sentencing purposes; thus, the district court erred in applying the enhancement provision of section 924(e).
It is true that section 924(e) defines “violent felony” as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and under that bald definition the 1968 conviction would count as an enhancing conviction. Section 921(a)(20), however, modifies the definition of “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to exclude convictions “for which a person ... has had civil rights restored.”
As Reedy correctly points out, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), by its terms, applies to the entire firearms chapter of the United States Code, which includes 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We recognized that recently in
United States v. Lender,
985 F.2d 151, 155 (4th Cir.1993) (published), where we characterized § 921(a)(20) as “the relevant definitional section of the chapter.” To the same effect, see
Davis v. United States,
972 F.2d 227, 229 (8th Cir.1992),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1360, 122 L.Ed.2d 740 (1993);
United States v. Ellis,
949 F.2d 952, 953 (8th Cir.1991);
United States v. Davis,
936 F.2d 352, 356 (8th Cir.1991),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1268, 117 L.Ed.2d 496 (1992);
United States v. Burns,
934 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (10th Cir.1991),
cert. denied,
— U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1246, 117 L.Ed.2d 478 (1992);
United States v. Decoteau,
932 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (7th Cir.1991);
United States v. Traxel,
914 F.2d 119, 122 (8th Cir.1990);
United States v. Erwin,
902 F.2d 510, 511-13 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied,
498 U.S. 859, 111 S.Ct. 161, 112 L.Ed.2d 127 (1990).
Compare United States v. Bell,
983 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (reading §§ 921(a)(20) and 924(e) simultaneously)
with United States v. Sherbondy,
865 F.2d
996, 1004-05 (9th Cir.1988) (reading them separately).
The question whether a felon’s civil rights have been restored is, of course, a question of state law. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20);
Lender,
at 155. Here, it is undisputed that Reedy’s civil rights for one of his three previous convictions have been officially restored under the laws of West Virginia. In 1975, the West Virginia Commissioner of Public Institutions sent Reedy an “Official Certificate of Discharge” stating without qualification that “any and all civil rights heretofore forfeited are restored” for his 1968 conviction. Thus, that conviction should not have been applied toward enhancing his sentence.
In consideration of the above, we affirm the district court’s judgment as to Reedy’s guilt and remand with instructions to vacate Reedy’s sentence and resentence him in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.