United States v. Martinez

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-4290 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:22-cr-01753-GPC-1 v. MEMORANDUM * 0F

ENRIQUETA MARTINEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 13, 2025 1F

Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN, FORREST, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Following a jury trial, Defendant-Appellant Enriqueta Martinez was

convicted of one count of unlawful importation of methamphetamine and one count

of unlawful importation of fentanyl. She was sentenced to 92 months imprisonment

followed by three years of supervised release. Martinez challenges the district

court’s denial of her motion for a mistrial, alleging that she was prejudiced by the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Government’s references to a prior drug smuggling incident that the court ultimately

found inadmissible. We affirm.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Charmley, 764 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1985). We must

first “determine de novo whether the trial court identified the correct legal rule to

apply to the relief requested.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th

Cir. 2009) (en banc). Then we determine “whether the trial court’s application of the

correct legal standard was (1) ‘illogical,’ (2) ‘implausible,’ or (3) without ‘support

in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’” Id. (quoting Anderson

v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 577 (1985)).

1. Martinez argues the district court failed to apply the correct legal

standard because it improperly considered the prosecutor’s motive as part of its

rationale for denying the motion for a mistrial. But Martinez fails to cite any

authority, nor are we aware of any, establishing that this is reversible error. The

Supreme Court has held that a district court may declare a mistrial only when,

“taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for

doing so.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773−74 (2010) (emphasis added) (citation

modified). Thus, we conclude that the district court did not apply an incorrect legal

standard.

2 23-4290 2. Martinez also argues that, even if the district court applied the correct

legal standard, it abused its discretion in denying a mistrial because she was

significantly prejudiced by the jury’s exposure to the inadmissible evidence about a

prior smuggling event. Again, we disagree. While Martinez’s concern about her trial

strategy choices that were based on the district court’s pretrial ruling that the subject

evidence could come in is understandable, we conclude that the district court

reasonably held a mistrial was not warranted because the questioning on the

inadmissible evidence was “limited” and the court “immediately admonished and

instructed the jury” not to consider the evidence when the issue arose during trial

and the court reconsidered its pretrial ruling. The district court did not abuse its

“‘broad discretion’” in concluding that the jury would follow the instructions given.

Id. at 774 (citation omitted).

Additionally, the district court took proper remedial steps in instructing the

jury not to consider the inadmissible evidence. See Charmley, 764 F.2d at 677

(“Where evidence heard by the jury is later ruled inadmissible, a cautionary

instruction is ordinarily sufficient to cure any alleged prejudice to the defendant.”).

Martinez has not demonstrated that the evidence “was [] so extremely inflammatory

and repetitive that it could not be cured by an admonition to the jury.” United States

v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d

471, 473 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 479 (9th Cir.

3 23-4290 1988). And insofar as Martinez challenges the curative instructions themselves, the

argument is waived because defense counsel drafted the instructions. See United

States v. Magdaleno, 43 F.4th 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining the invited

error doctrine).

Thus, the evidence presented, though prejudicial, was not so prejudicial as to

render the curative instruction entirely ineffective. See United States v. Lemus, 847

F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016).

As to the weight of the evidence presented at trial, this court has held that “[i]f

the case against a defendant is very strong, though not overwhelming, and the

reviewing court is unconvinced that the admission of the evidence influenced the

outcome of the case, the court may uphold the verdict.” Aichele, 941 F.2d at 765.

The Government presented evidence that on the day of her arrest, Martinez was the

sole occupant, driver, and registered owner of a vehicle carrying 57.6 kilograms of

methamphetamine and 3.24 kilograms of fentanyl. See United States v. Collins, 764

F.2d 647, 652 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Mere possession of a substantial quantity of narcotics

is sufficient evidence to support a finding that a defendant knowingly possessed the

narcotics.”). Thus, we conclude the Government presented a sufficiently strong case

such that the prejudice alleged was insufficient to warrant the extraordinary remedy

of a mistrial. See Lemus, 847 F.3d at 1024.

AFFIRMED.

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