NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6495 D.C. No. Appellee, 2:23-cr-00035-MCS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JUAN LUIS MARTINEZ MEDINA,
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 4, 2026 Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District
Judge.**
Juan Luis Martinez Medina challenges his jury convictions for conspiracy to
distribute fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distribution of fentanyl in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(vi); and distribution of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii), on
numerous grounds. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. We review the decision on whether to disclose a confidential informant’s
(“CI”) identity for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 903
(9th Cir. 2006). “Nondisclosure is an abuse of discretion only if disclosure is relevant
and helpful to the defense of the accused, or essential to a fair determination of the
defendant’s cause.” Id. at 903–04. “In ruling on disclosure requests, a trial court must
balance 1) the extent to which disclosure would be relevant and helpful to the
defendant’s case, and 2) the government’s interest in protecting the identity of a
particular informant.” United States v. Spires, 3 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1993).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disclose
the CI’s identity. When the court denied Martinez’s motion, it found that the CI did
not organize the sale and the government would not call the CI to testify at trial; that
“Defendant’s counsel did not give a responsive answer” to the court’s questions
about how the CI’s identity would contribute to any defenses; and that the CI
“continue[d] to cooperate with law enforcement in ongoing drug trafficking
investigations.” These findings support the court’s conclusion that Martinez “failed
to meet his burden to show that disclosure of the [CI’s] identity is necessary and
outweighs the public’s interest against nondisclosure.” Additionally, at trial, defense
counsel’s failure to ask Gutierrez if he heard the conversation between Martinez and
2 24-6495 the CI suggests the exchange would not have aided Martinez’s defense. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel disclosure.
2. We review rulings on motions in limine for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Alvirez, 831 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2016). Because defense counsel did
not request a limiting instruction as to Gutierrez’s testimony, we review the court’s
decision not to give that instruction for plain error. United States v. Sauza-Martinez,
217 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2000). We “will use our discretion to reverse the
conviction only if there is an error that was clear under current law and affected
[Martinez’s] substantial rights such that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation modified).
The district court did not plainly err in not giving a limiting instruction as to
Gutierrez’s testimony. Although Martinez objected to the admissibility of
Gutierrez’s testimony on their history of dealing drugs—and although the court and
the prosecution agreed that a limiting instruction was warranted—when Gutierrez
testified about said history during trial, defense counsel did not object, nor did he
request or propose a limiting instruction. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to sua
sponte provide a limiting instruction was not plain error. See United States v.
Hardrick, 766 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is well-settled that where no
limiting instruction is requested concerning evidence of other criminal acts, the
failure of the trial court to give such an instruction sua sponte is not reversible error.”
3 24-6495 (citation modified)).
3. Where the defendant did not move for acquittal under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29 both during and after the trial, we review a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claim for plain error. United States v. Ross, 338 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th
Cir. 2003). Martinez moved for acquittal during trial, but not after; thus plain error
applies. We first assume that the jury resolved any evidentiary conflicts in the
government’s favor, then determine whether the evidence was sufficient to allow a
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conviction of Martinez on
conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. To prove the essential elements of a drug
conspiracy, “the government must prove (1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal
objective; and (2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United States v.
Garrison, 888 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Duenas,
691 F.3d 1070, 1085 (9th Cir. 2012)). “[I]t is well-established that a jury may infer
the existence of an agreement from circumstantial evidence, such as the defendant’s
conduct.” Id. (citation modified).
At trial, the government put on evidence that Martinez had told Gutierrez that
he needed help getting rid of some pills. Around the same time, officers saw
Martinez meet two women in a Kia sedan and pass off a black grocery bag. Martinez
4 24-6495 and the women were also seen pulling up to a restaurant and walking through a rear
entrance. Shortly after Martinez left the restaurant, one of the women was seen
passing off a black plastic bag, which authorities recovered, finding fentanyl inside.
In light of this substantial circumstantial evidence, a rational jury could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez had an agreement—whether with the
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6495 D.C. No. Appellee, 2:23-cr-00035-MCS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JUAN LUIS MARTINEZ MEDINA,
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 4, 2026 Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District
Judge.**
Juan Luis Martinez Medina challenges his jury convictions for conspiracy to
distribute fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distribution of fentanyl in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(vi); and distribution of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii), on
numerous grounds. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. We review the decision on whether to disclose a confidential informant’s
(“CI”) identity for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 903
(9th Cir. 2006). “Nondisclosure is an abuse of discretion only if disclosure is relevant
and helpful to the defense of the accused, or essential to a fair determination of the
defendant’s cause.” Id. at 903–04. “In ruling on disclosure requests, a trial court must
balance 1) the extent to which disclosure would be relevant and helpful to the
defendant’s case, and 2) the government’s interest in protecting the identity of a
particular informant.” United States v. Spires, 3 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1993).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disclose
the CI’s identity. When the court denied Martinez’s motion, it found that the CI did
not organize the sale and the government would not call the CI to testify at trial; that
“Defendant’s counsel did not give a responsive answer” to the court’s questions
about how the CI’s identity would contribute to any defenses; and that the CI
“continue[d] to cooperate with law enforcement in ongoing drug trafficking
investigations.” These findings support the court’s conclusion that Martinez “failed
to meet his burden to show that disclosure of the [CI’s] identity is necessary and
outweighs the public’s interest against nondisclosure.” Additionally, at trial, defense
counsel’s failure to ask Gutierrez if he heard the conversation between Martinez and
2 24-6495 the CI suggests the exchange would not have aided Martinez’s defense. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel disclosure.
2. We review rulings on motions in limine for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Alvirez, 831 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2016). Because defense counsel did
not request a limiting instruction as to Gutierrez’s testimony, we review the court’s
decision not to give that instruction for plain error. United States v. Sauza-Martinez,
217 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2000). We “will use our discretion to reverse the
conviction only if there is an error that was clear under current law and affected
[Martinez’s] substantial rights such that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation modified).
The district court did not plainly err in not giving a limiting instruction as to
Gutierrez’s testimony. Although Martinez objected to the admissibility of
Gutierrez’s testimony on their history of dealing drugs—and although the court and
the prosecution agreed that a limiting instruction was warranted—when Gutierrez
testified about said history during trial, defense counsel did not object, nor did he
request or propose a limiting instruction. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to sua
sponte provide a limiting instruction was not plain error. See United States v.
Hardrick, 766 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is well-settled that where no
limiting instruction is requested concerning evidence of other criminal acts, the
failure of the trial court to give such an instruction sua sponte is not reversible error.”
3 24-6495 (citation modified)).
3. Where the defendant did not move for acquittal under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29 both during and after the trial, we review a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claim for plain error. United States v. Ross, 338 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th
Cir. 2003). Martinez moved for acquittal during trial, but not after; thus plain error
applies. We first assume that the jury resolved any evidentiary conflicts in the
government’s favor, then determine whether the evidence was sufficient to allow a
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conviction of Martinez on
conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. To prove the essential elements of a drug
conspiracy, “the government must prove (1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal
objective; and (2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United States v.
Garrison, 888 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Duenas,
691 F.3d 1070, 1085 (9th Cir. 2012)). “[I]t is well-established that a jury may infer
the existence of an agreement from circumstantial evidence, such as the defendant’s
conduct.” Id. (citation modified).
At trial, the government put on evidence that Martinez had told Gutierrez that
he needed help getting rid of some pills. Around the same time, officers saw
Martinez meet two women in a Kia sedan and pass off a black grocery bag. Martinez
4 24-6495 and the women were also seen pulling up to a restaurant and walking through a rear
entrance. Shortly after Martinez left the restaurant, one of the women was seen
passing off a black plastic bag, which authorities recovered, finding fentanyl inside.
In light of this substantial circumstantial evidence, a rational jury could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez had an agreement—whether with the
women in the Kia, the people in the SUV, or both—to distribute fentanyl.
Similarly, there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s conviction
of Martinez on distribution of fentanyl. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the government
is required “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knowingly or
intentionally (2) distributed (3) any controlled substance.” United States v. Collazo,
984 F.3d 1308, 1320 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (citation modified). As explained
above, the government presented enough evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez knowingly distributed fentanyl.
Finally, there is also sufficient evidence to support Martinez’s conviction on
distribution of methamphetamine. Martinez argues that the knowing element under
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) “remains unsupported” because the government’s case hinged
on “the credibility of [Gutierrez,] whose testimony was directly contradicted by
DEA agents and unsupported by any objective evidence.” But the DEA agents and
Gutierrez each offered explanations for why the officers did not know Gutierrez was
at the sale, and the jury weighed these testimonies. Even if the jury was presented
5 24-6495 with conflicting evidence, “[w]e will not assume the function of the jury to make
credibility determinations.” United States v. Ramos-Atondo, 732 F.3d 1113, 1121
(9th Cir. 2013). Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
Martinez knowingly distributed methamphetamine.
AFFIRMED.
6 24-6495