United States v. Martinez
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Opinion
22-902-cr (L) United States v. Martinez
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2023 Nos. 22-902-cr (L), 22-1136-cr (XAP)
UNITED STATES, Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
v.
CARLOS MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
On Appeal from a Judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
ARGUED: JANUARY 8, 2024 DECIDED: JULY 30, 2024
Before: LYNCH, NARDINI, AND MERRIAM, Circuit Judges.
Over the course of two trials, juries returned guilty verdicts against Carlos Martinez, a former federal prison guard, on various charges based on his repeated rape of an inmate. Martinez was sentenced to an aggregate term of ten years in prison by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Edward R. Korman, District Judge). Martinez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying two of the counts, which charged him with aggravated sexual abuse and deprivation of civil rights, both premised on his using force to commit one particular rape. We reject the challenge, because the jury was entitled to credit the victim’s testimony that Martinez physically restrained her during that rape. Martinez argues that his acquittals on other counts reveal that the jury must have completely rejected the victim’s testimony, but it is well established that a defendant cannot rely on inconsistent verdicts to impugn a conviction. The government cross-appeals Martinez’s ten-year sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We agree. The district court committed procedural error by relying on certain clearly erroneous factual findings that were foreclosed by the jury’s guilty verdicts, or that it mistakenly believed were dictated by the jury’s acquittals on other counts; mistakenly treating Martinez’s convictions for committing sexual abuse through threats or fear as legally equivalent to committing sexual abuse of a ward, for which a victim’s consent is immaterial; and failing to effectively sentence him based on all of his convictions. The sentence was also substantively unreasonable because the district court gave dramatically insufficient weight to the seriousness of the full range of Martinez’s offenses, and impermissibly gave weight to its residual doubts about the jury’s guilty verdicts as a mitigating factor. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of conviction and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
RACHEL A. SHANIES (Samuel P. Nitze, David C. James, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Breon Peace, United
2 States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee-Cross- Appellant.
ANTHONY L. RICCO (Steven Z. Legon, on the brief), New York, NY, for Defendant- Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Carlos Martinez, a
former federal prison guard, was convicted after two jury trials in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Edward R. Korman, District Judge) of a number of charges stemming
from his repeated rape of an inmate, whom the parties refer to as
“Maria,” at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn,
New York. At both trials, Maria testified that Martinez raped her on
five occasions while she was assigned to clean his office on weekends
when that area was largely deserted. She testified that Martinez
repeatedly sexually assaulted her by force (by physically holding her
down) and threats and fear (by, for example, threatening to send her
3 to a special housing unit (“SHU”) and warning her that fighting back
would result in charges for assaulting an officer).
The jury at Martinez’s first trial found him guilty of five counts
of sexual abuse of a ward, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b)—one
count for each rape. It also found him guilty of a number of other
counts which were later vacated for reasons that are not at issue in the
present appeal. At a second trial, Martinez was retried on fifteen
counts arising out of the five rapes. As to each rape, Martinez was
charged with sexual abuse by threats or fear in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2242(1); depriving Maria of her civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 242; and aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a)(1). The jury convicted Martinez of five counts of sexual
abuse by threats or fear, 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1). The jury also convicted
Martinez of depriving Maria of her civil rights, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and of
aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1), but only as to the
4 second of the five charged rapes; it acquitted him on those counts as
to the other four incidents.
At sentencing, the district court expressed doubts about
Maria’s testimony and later explained in its written statement of
reasons that it disagreed with the second jury’s guilty verdicts on the
five counts of sexual abuse through threats or fear—despite having
previously denied Martinez’s motions for acquittal. The court also
made several remarks suggesting that the second jury had not
credited Maria’s testimony, even though the jury had returned guilty
verdicts on at least one count relating to each of the five charged
rapes. It additionally described Martinez as “not a violent criminal,”
Gov’t App’x 226, even though the jury had found beyond a
reasonable doubt that, on one occasion, he had forcibly raped Maria.
At bottom, the court appeared to believe Martinez’s defense that he
and Maria had engaged in consensual sex, a version of events
necessarily foreclosed by the guilty verdicts. The district court
5 ultimately imposed a prison sentence of ten years, a dramatic
variance below the advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment.
Martinez now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying his two convictions premised on using force to commit
the second charged rape. We reject the insufficiency claim, because
the jury was entitled to credit Maria’s testimony that Martinez
physically restrained her to carry out that particular instance of sexual
abuse. Martinez argues that his acquittals on some counts reveal that
the jury must have completely rejected the victim’s testimony, but it
is well established that a defendant cannot rely on inconsistent
verdicts to impugn a conviction, and, in any event, the jury’s guilty
verdicts decisively refute any contention that the jury entirely rejected
that testimony.
The government cross-appeals Martinez’s ten-year sentence as
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We agree. The district
court committed a number of procedural errors: It relied on certain
6 clearly erroneous factual findings that were foreclosed by the jury’s
guilty verdicts, or that it mistakenly believed were dictated by the
jury’s acquittals on other counts. It mistakenly treated Martinez’s
convictions for committing sexual abuse through threats or fear as
legally equivalent to committing sexual abuse of a ward, despite the
fact that the former offense, unlike the latter, requires the sexual
contact to have been without the victim’s consent.
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22-902-cr (L) United States v. Martinez
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2023 Nos. 22-902-cr (L), 22-1136-cr (XAP)
UNITED STATES, Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
v.
CARLOS MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
On Appeal from a Judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
ARGUED: JANUARY 8, 2024 DECIDED: JULY 30, 2024
Before: LYNCH, NARDINI, AND MERRIAM, Circuit Judges.
Over the course of two trials, juries returned guilty verdicts against Carlos Martinez, a former federal prison guard, on various charges based on his repeated rape of an inmate. Martinez was sentenced to an aggregate term of ten years in prison by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Edward R. Korman, District Judge). Martinez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying two of the counts, which charged him with aggravated sexual abuse and deprivation of civil rights, both premised on his using force to commit one particular rape. We reject the challenge, because the jury was entitled to credit the victim’s testimony that Martinez physically restrained her during that rape. Martinez argues that his acquittals on other counts reveal that the jury must have completely rejected the victim’s testimony, but it is well established that a defendant cannot rely on inconsistent verdicts to impugn a conviction. The government cross-appeals Martinez’s ten-year sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We agree. The district court committed procedural error by relying on certain clearly erroneous factual findings that were foreclosed by the jury’s guilty verdicts, or that it mistakenly believed were dictated by the jury’s acquittals on other counts; mistakenly treating Martinez’s convictions for committing sexual abuse through threats or fear as legally equivalent to committing sexual abuse of a ward, for which a victim’s consent is immaterial; and failing to effectively sentence him based on all of his convictions. The sentence was also substantively unreasonable because the district court gave dramatically insufficient weight to the seriousness of the full range of Martinez’s offenses, and impermissibly gave weight to its residual doubts about the jury’s guilty verdicts as a mitigating factor. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of conviction and REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
RACHEL A. SHANIES (Samuel P. Nitze, David C. James, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Breon Peace, United
2 States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee-Cross- Appellant.
ANTHONY L. RICCO (Steven Z. Legon, on the brief), New York, NY, for Defendant- Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Carlos Martinez, a
former federal prison guard, was convicted after two jury trials in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Edward R. Korman, District Judge) of a number of charges stemming
from his repeated rape of an inmate, whom the parties refer to as
“Maria,” at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn,
New York. At both trials, Maria testified that Martinez raped her on
five occasions while she was assigned to clean his office on weekends
when that area was largely deserted. She testified that Martinez
repeatedly sexually assaulted her by force (by physically holding her
down) and threats and fear (by, for example, threatening to send her
3 to a special housing unit (“SHU”) and warning her that fighting back
would result in charges for assaulting an officer).
The jury at Martinez’s first trial found him guilty of five counts
of sexual abuse of a ward, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b)—one
count for each rape. It also found him guilty of a number of other
counts which were later vacated for reasons that are not at issue in the
present appeal. At a second trial, Martinez was retried on fifteen
counts arising out of the five rapes. As to each rape, Martinez was
charged with sexual abuse by threats or fear in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2242(1); depriving Maria of her civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 242; and aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a)(1). The jury convicted Martinez of five counts of sexual
abuse by threats or fear, 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1). The jury also convicted
Martinez of depriving Maria of her civil rights, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and of
aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1), but only as to the
4 second of the five charged rapes; it acquitted him on those counts as
to the other four incidents.
At sentencing, the district court expressed doubts about
Maria’s testimony and later explained in its written statement of
reasons that it disagreed with the second jury’s guilty verdicts on the
five counts of sexual abuse through threats or fear—despite having
previously denied Martinez’s motions for acquittal. The court also
made several remarks suggesting that the second jury had not
credited Maria’s testimony, even though the jury had returned guilty
verdicts on at least one count relating to each of the five charged
rapes. It additionally described Martinez as “not a violent criminal,”
Gov’t App’x 226, even though the jury had found beyond a
reasonable doubt that, on one occasion, he had forcibly raped Maria.
At bottom, the court appeared to believe Martinez’s defense that he
and Maria had engaged in consensual sex, a version of events
necessarily foreclosed by the guilty verdicts. The district court
5 ultimately imposed a prison sentence of ten years, a dramatic
variance below the advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment.
Martinez now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying his two convictions premised on using force to commit
the second charged rape. We reject the insufficiency claim, because
the jury was entitled to credit Maria’s testimony that Martinez
physically restrained her to carry out that particular instance of sexual
abuse. Martinez argues that his acquittals on some counts reveal that
the jury must have completely rejected the victim’s testimony, but it
is well established that a defendant cannot rely on inconsistent
verdicts to impugn a conviction, and, in any event, the jury’s guilty
verdicts decisively refute any contention that the jury entirely rejected
that testimony.
The government cross-appeals Martinez’s ten-year sentence as
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We agree. The district
court committed a number of procedural errors: It relied on certain
6 clearly erroneous factual findings that were foreclosed by the jury’s
guilty verdicts, or that it mistakenly believed were dictated by the
jury’s acquittals on other counts. It mistakenly treated Martinez’s
convictions for committing sexual abuse through threats or fear as
legally equivalent to committing sexual abuse of a ward, despite the
fact that the former offense, unlike the latter, requires the sexual
contact to have been without the victim’s consent. And it failed to
effectively sentence him based on all of his convictions. The sentence
was also substantively unreasonable because the district court gave
dramatically insufficient weight to the seriousness of the full range of
Martinez’s offenses, and impermissibly gave weight to its residual
doubts about the jury’s guilty verdicts as a mitigating factor. We
therefore AFFIRM the judgment of conviction and REMAND for
resentencing consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
Martinez, a former Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
Lieutenant, was indicted in May 2017 on twenty counts that charged
7 him with repeatedly raping Maria, an inmate in his care at MDC,
between December 2015 and April 2016. The charges stemmed from
five sexual assaults—two rapes (one oral, one vaginal) on December
13, 2015, and three subsequent vaginal rapes between December 2015
and April 2016. For each assault, Martinez was charged with four
counts: deprivation of civil rights of an inmate, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 242, aggravated sexual abuse of an inmate by force, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1), sexual abuse of an inmate by
threats or fear, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1), and sexual abuse of
a ward, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b).
At an initial trial in January 2018, a jury found Martinez guilty
on all twenty counts. The government later disclosed that it had
failed to provide Martinez with the interview memorandum of an
MDC inmate, which summarized the inmate’s statement that Maria
had told her “that something was going on between [Maria] and
Lieutenant Martinez,” that Maria had declined the declarant’s request
8 to join Maria in cleaning Martinez’s office on one occasion because
Maria said she “was having relations with” Martinez, and that Maria
had declined a pap smear due to her sexual relationship with
Martinez. Gov’t App’x 562. The district court concluded that such
evidence was exculpatory and material to whether Maria had
consented to a sexual relationship with Martinez and accordingly,
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), granted Martinez’s
motion for a new trial on all counts except the five counts for sexual
abuse of a ward, as that offense prohibits sexual acts between an
inmate and a guard regardless of the inmate’s consent to such acts.
See 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b). The district court’s Brady ruling is
not at issue in this appeal.
At a second jury trial in February 2020, Martinez was re-tried
on the fifteen previously vacated counts of conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (five counts of deprivation of civil rights of an inmate), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a)(1) (five counts of aggravated sexual abuse of an inmate), and
9 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1) (five counts of sexual abuse of an inmate by threats
or fear). At trial, Maria testified as follows. 1
While housed at MDC, Maria worked as a cleaner. She was
assigned to clean the second floor, which housed the lieutenants’
office, where Martinez worked. Whenever Maria was called to clean,
she was escorted to the second floor by an officer, who then left her
unsupervised while she completed her work. In August or September
2015, Martinez began requesting that Maria clean his office, typically
on Fridays, Saturdays, or Sundays, when there were fewer staff at
MDC.
While alone with Maria in his office during her cleaning
sessions, Martinez made sexual overtures that made Maria
uncomfortable, including asking her how she “satisf[ied] [her] body,”
which she understood to refer to “orgasm[s],” and telling her that she
“should touch [her]self in his name.” Gov’t App’x 43–44. Maria tried
1 Maria provided substantially similar testimony at the first trial.
10 to rebuff Martinez by replying that she was married, but he retorted
that her husband never came to visit her. Martinez also told Maria
that another inmate, Jenny, was about to be released from MDC
custody because “Jenny didn’t say anything,” id. 45, which Maria
understood to mean that Jenny “remained silent . . . about what had
happened with the officer,” id. 61.
Maria did not report Martinez’s inappropriate sexual
comments to prison officials because she “didn’t want any problems.”
Id. 45–46. She also continued to clean Martinez’s office when called
to do so, because she understood that she could not refuse and that if
she did, she would be placed in the SHU, “a small . . . punishment
room.” Id. 47. Maria did, however, ask to switch jobs, but her request
was denied.
11 On December 13, 2015, 2 Maria was summoned to Martinez’s
office to clean. Upon arrival, she retrieved cleaning supplies from
under a desk. While she was crouched facing the wall, Martinez
exposed his erect penis through the zipper of his pants, grabbed
2Maria testified that this first rape occurred in October 2015. However, the indictment specifies that the first rape was on December 13, 2015, and the government noted in its memorandum of law in opposition to a post-trial motion that it proved [that] the date of this incident [was December 13, 2015,] at trial through a combination of evidence. Multiple witnesses, including Maria, testified that the incident occurred the day Melva Vasquez was able to have a visit for the first time in six months, following the lifting of a disciplinary sanction she received. The trial evidence established that the incident for which Melva received a disciplinary sanction took place on May 23, 2015, that she was first housed in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) for two weeks from May 23, 2015 to June 3, 2015 and then lost her visiting privileges for 180 days for “unauthorized physical contact with female,” starting June 8, 2015 until December 4, 2015. Melva testified that, after the visitor sanction was lifted, a visitor came to the MDC to visit her one day, but Melva was not authorized to see her so the visitor returned the following day and visited with Melva. Visitor records showed a visitor was logged into the MDC system to see Melva on December 12 and 13, 2015; the last visitor logged for Melva prior to that was on June 6, 2015. Gov’t App’x 444 n.3 (citations omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, as we must, see United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4th 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2023), we refer to the incident as having occurred on December 13, 2015, notwithstanding Maria’s testimony. In any event, the discrepancy between dates is not material to the resolution of this appeal.
12 Maria’s head, and pushed it toward him, forcing her to perform oral
sex while she tried to push away from him. Maria said that she
“didn’t want any problems,” id. 53, was crying, and told “him to leave
[her] alone,” id. 54. Martinez, who was much larger and stronger than
Maria, then “stood [her] up,” “put [her chest down] . . . on the desk,”
“forcibly unbuttoned” her pants and pulled down her pants and
underwear, and “penetrated” her vagina with his penis without a
condom while “grabb[ing] [her] by the arm” to “keep[] [her] down on
the desk” until he ejaculated into her. Id. 54–58. Throughout the
assault, Maria was scared, crying, and bleeding, but Martinez “didn’t
care.” Id. 56. Although she did not want to have oral or vaginal sex
with Martinez, she felt as though she had no other choice.
Following these initial rapes, Martinez told Maria not to “talk
to anybody[] because [she] was going to have
problems[,] . . . implying that [she] was going to go to the SHU if [she]
spoke to anybody” or that “[t]hey would take away [her] good time”
13 credits, meaning that she would have “to do more time in jail.” Id.
60–61.
When Maria returned to her cell block, she disclosed to three
other inmates—Kiara Maldonado, Danilda Osoria, and Melva
Vasquez—that “Martinez had penetrated” her, which had caused
vaginal bleeding. Id. 67. Maria went inside the bathroom to speak to
Maldonado because Martinez “could see [her in] the units,” which
worried her because “[h]e told [her] not to tell anybody.” Id. 65. In
the bathroom, Maria told Maldonado “[t]hat Martinez had penetrated
[her],” “didn’t care that [she] was bleeding,” and “just went on.” Id.
64. Osoria gave Maria a sanitary napkin to help with her bleeding
and tried to calm her down, as Maria was crying.
Later that evening, Martinez brought Maria an emergency
contraceptive pill. Maria ingested the pill and had Osoria read the
packaging to her before flushing the packaging down the toilet,
14 because she was afraid to be caught with contraband and risk being
placed in the SHU.
The trial testimony of Maldonado, Osoria, and Vasquez
substantially corroborated Maria’s testimony about the first time
Martinez vaginally raped her. They testified that when Maria
returned from cleaning that day, she was crying and appeared
“frenzied” and “agitated,” id. 288, “nervous,” id. 290, and “freaked
out,” id. 322. They each testified that Maria told them that Martinez
had exposed his penis while she was crouched to get cleaning
supplies and had penetrated her, that she was vaginally bleeding, and
that Martinez later brought her an emergency contraceptive pill.
Maldonado testified that Maria asked her not to tell anyone about
what happened because Martinez had threatened Maria that she
could be sent to the SHU. Vasquez testified that Maria informed her
of Martinez’s threats that if anyone discovered what had happened,
15 Maria “could have problems” and could lose “some of her good time
so she would have to spend more time in jail.” Id. 356.
Maria testified that after the first two rapes, Martinez vaginally
raped her in his office three more times between December 2015 and
April 2016. During each of those subsequent rapes, Martinez used
force by “grabbing [her], twisting [her] arm, . . . grabbing [her] by
[her] hair, [and] however [else] he could.” Id. 79–80. During each
rape, Maria was “scared . . . [t]hat [she] was going to have to spend
more time in jail” and “[t]hat [she] was going to end up in the SHU.”
Id. 80. At no point did she consent to sexual relations with Martinez.
Maria made numerous unsuccessful efforts to prevent
Martinez from raping her, including asking to switch jobs, delaying
going to his office to clean, and asking a male friend to visit her at
MDC and kiss her so that Martinez would believe that she was not
single. On one occasion, Maria slapped Martinez in the head after he
tried to grab her. Martinez met her attempt to fight back by warning
16 her that she could go to prison for five years for assaulting an officer,
and then proceeding to vaginally rape her. She considered physically
fighting back on other occasions, but was too fearful.
Martinez testified in his own defense at the second trial. He
admitted to having sex with Maria in his office on certain occasions
but maintained that the encounters were consensual. 3
Following both the government’s case-in-chief and the defense
case, Martinez moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court
orally denied both motions.
The jury returned general guilty verdicts on seven of the fifteen
remaining counts 4:
3 During the first trial, Martinez did not testify and maintained his innocence with respect to the five counts of sexual abuse of a ward, advancing the theory that he had never engaged in sexual contact with Maria whatsoever. By the time of Martinez’s testimony at the second trial, the district court had declined to vacate his earlier convictions for sexual abuse of a ward. Martinez does not challenge those convictions on this appeal. 4We refer to these counts as renumbered in the Redacted Indictment used during the second trial.
17 • With respect to the December 13, 2015, oral rape: raping
Maria by threats or fear (Count Three);
• With respect to the December 13, 2015, vaginal rape:
depriving Maria of her civil rights (Count Four), aggravated
sexual abuse, namely raping Maria by force (Count Five),
and raping Maria by threats or fear (Count Six); and
• With respect to the three vaginal rapes between December
13, 2015, and April 2016: raping Maria by threats or fear
(Counts Nine, Twelve, and Fifteen).
The jury acquitted Martinez of the remaining eight counts:
deprivation of civil rights and aggravated sexual abuse (forcible rape)
with respect to the oral rape on December 13, 2015, and the three
vaginal rapes that occurred after December 13, 2015.
Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office calculated that
Martinez’s total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
was 46 and his criminal history category was I, yielding an advisory
18 range of life imprisonment. Although it did not explicitly say as much
during sentencing, the district court adopted the Probation Office’s
Guidelines calculations in the written judgment. The government
asked the court to sentence Martinez to more than 20 years in prison,
whereas the defense asked for time served or, at most, 5 years. The
district court varied downward from the advisory Guidelines range
to impose concurrent terms of ten years of imprisonment on each
count.
During the sentencing hearing, the district court made several
remarks suggesting that it accepted the defense’s theory that
Martinez and Maria had engaged in consensual sex in each of the
incidents charged, despite the jury’s verdicts to the contrary. The
court also indicated that it did not believe that Maria was a credible
witness and that it would effectively disregard the jury’s guilty
verdicts on certain counts.
19 The district court also took a narrow view of Maria’s testimony.
It noted that it “[did]n’t believe” that Maria submitted to the sexual
contact “because she was threatened or because of fear” and that
Maria “didn’t testify . . . that the reason for her consent was fear or
force.” Gov’t App’x 200. Instead, the court asserted that Maria
testified only that Martinez “just used force each time in order to have
sexual relations with her. It wasn’t caused by anything other than his
physical strength and his ability to rape her.” Id.; see also id. 231–32,
238.
More broadly, the court opined that “the jury didn’t believe”
Maria’s testimony that Martinez forcibly raped her, id. 238; see id. 206
(“[The jury] rejected her testimony.”), and indicated that the court
held personal doubts about her veracity, see id. 215 (“[T]hat’s one of
the many aspects of Maria’s testimony that I find troubling.”); id. 217
(opining that “people who are in jail[, like Maria,] . . . are not . . . of
the highest moral character and . . . have problems”); id. 218 (“I am
20 concerned about whether false testimony was given by the
complainant . . . .”); id. 227 (“I’m concerned about [Maria’s] veracity
as a witness.”); id. 240 (opining that Maria’s testimony “sounded
awfully” similar to the story she told about being sex trafficked when
applying for a visa).
Even though the district court said at one point that it would
“have to accept the jury’s verdict despite [its] own qualms about
[Maria’s] credibility,” id. 221, it also explained: “[F]or the purpose of
sentencing, I’m looking at this as a one count indictment, one count
conviction, however I have to record it on whatever sheet that the
Sentencing Commission makes me file as their bookkeeper.” Id. 201–
02. The court did not clearly explain which of Martinez’s multiple
counts of conviction was the “one count” on which it would premise
his sentence, but it did make clear that it was discounting (if not
wholly disregarding) the convictions for sexual abuse by threats or
fear.
21 At one point, the court seemed to suggest that the threats-or-
fear counts were irrelevant because the Guidelines calculation was
driven by the more serious convictions for forcible rape—which
implied that perhaps the court based its sentence principally on the
jury’s convictions for forcible rape (although they involved not “one
count,” but rather two counts relating to a single episode). But at
another point, the court seemed to suggest that it was also
disregarding the forcible rape convictions and selecting a sentence
based solely on Martinez’s convictions at the first trial for sexual
abuse of a ward—which did not require his sexual encounters with
Maria to have been nonconsensual. See id. 226 (“He’s not a violent
criminal. . . . But you know, to what extent do I impose a sentence
that would be imposed if it was simply purely consensual and it was
simply a ward situation.”). The court appeared to base that decision
on its belief that Martinez’s sexual encounters with Maria were in fact
consensual, see id., as well as on its view that, because Martinez “ha[d]
22 the ability to cause [Maria] harm” by virtue of their respective roles
as guard and inmate, id. 203, his convictions for sexual abuse by threat
or fear were duplicative of his convictions for sexual abuse of a ward.
The district court said other things during the sentencing
hearing that seemed to brush aside the jury’s guilty verdicts,
including that Martinez’s crimes were serious, but only “assuming
[they were] committed,” id. 221, and that Martinez was “not a violent
criminal” and therefore would “not . . . go out and rape anyone if he’s
released,” id. 226.
After sentencing, the district court instructed the Probation
Office to edit the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) to include
the following unusual language (added as a new paragraph 22),
purporting to reflect the jury’s conclusion that Maria’s testimony was
not credible:
Per the Court’s directive, the presentence report is amended to reflect particular findings made by the jury in the instant case. Specifically, during the trial, the jury found many aspects of the victim’s testimony about the
23 circumstances under which she had sexual intercourse with the defendant not credible. Although the victim testified that on at least four separate occasions she was forcibly raped, the jury rejected her testimony as to all of those occasions except one, which occurred on December 13, 2015. Furthermore, while the jury did convict the defendant on all counts of sexual abuse, the elements of which required that the victim’s consent was induced by threats or fear, the victim did not testify that she consented to have sexual intercourse with the defendant because of threats or fear. She instead testified that each occasion was brought about by force.
Id. 537. The district court issued its judgment and statement of
reasons three days after the amended PSR was issued. The statement
of reasons indicated that the court varied below the Guidelines range
due to Martinez’s history and characteristics—specifically, his age,
charitable service and good works, and military service. It also
provided the following explanation for the court’s sentence:
As the jury did for the reasons I stated on the record, I found many aspects of the victim’s testimony about the circumstances under which she had sexual intercourse with the defendant not credible, and I have considered this in fashioning the ultimate sentence in this case. Indeed, the victim testified that on at least four separate occasions, she was forcibly raped, but the jury rejected her testimony as to all of those occasions except . . . on
24 December 13, 2015. This rejection is clearly reflected in the jury’s not guilty verdicts on counts 1r, 2r, 7r, 8r, 10r, 11r, 13r, and 14r[.] . . . While the jury did convict the defendant on all counts of sexual abuse, the elements of which required that the victim’s consent was induced by threats or fear, the victim did not testify that she consented to have sexual intercourse with the defendant because of threats or fear—instead she testified that each occasion was brought about by force. Indeed, I should have granted the judgment of acquittal, which was made during trial, as to all counts of sexual abuse . . . .
Id. 569–70.
The government objected to the revised PSR in a sealed letter.
It pointed out that “the jury made no particularized findings
whatsoever and certainly not any regarding the credibility of the
victim or that amounted to the jury’s ‘rejection’ of her testimony.” Id.
560. The government also disputed the court’s assertion “that ‘the
victim did not testify that she consented to have sexual intercourse
with the defendant because of threats or fear,’” pointing to places in
Maria’s testimony where she did so. Id. Martinez filed a letter
opposing the government’s objections, contending that “[t]he
language in the revised PSR accurately reflects the trial testimony and
25 the jury findings in this case.” Id. 572. The district court took no
action in response to the letters.
Martinez now appeals two of his convictions on sufficiency
grounds, and the government cross-appeals Martinez’s sentence as
procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
II. Discussion
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Martinez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
only two of his convictions, both arising from the vaginal rape on
December 13, 2015: Count Four, deprivation of civil rights, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242; and Count Five, aggravated sexual abuse,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1). He does not challenge his
convictions, for all five episodes, for sexual abuse through threats or
fear and for sexual abuse of a ward. We review de novo a defendant’s
challenge to his convictions based on sufficiency of the evidence. See
United States v. Krivoi, 80 F.4th 142, 155 (2d Cir. 2023). For the reasons
26 that follow, we affirm Martinez’s convictions on both challenged
counts.
Jury verdicts are entitled to “strong deference” in our criminal
justice system, and so when reviewing a defendant’s insufficiency
challenge to a guilty verdict, “we must ‘draw all permissible
inferences . . . and resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the jury’s
verdict.’” United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4th 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting
United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170, 181 (2d Cir. 2021)), cert. denied, 144
S. Ct. 577 (2024). We must affirm a conviction when “any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Accordingly, “a defendant ‘mounting . . . a [sufficiency] challenge
bears a heavy burden.’” Krivoi, 80 F.4th at 155 (quoting United States
v. Harvey, 746 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2014)).
To convict on Counts Four and Five, the jury had to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez used force against Maria.
27 Count Five, which charged Martinez with aggravated sexual abuse in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1), makes it unlawful for anyone “in a
Federal prison” to “knowingly cause[] another person to engage in a
sexual act . . . by using force against that other person.” The district
court instructed the jury that to find Martinez guilty of that count, it
had to find that (among other things) Martinez “caused [Maria] to
engage in a sexual act . . . by using force against [her],” Gov’t App’x
395, and defined “use of force” as “the use of such physical force as is
required to overcome, restrain or injure a person,” id. 396. 5
Meanwhile, Count Four charged Martinez with a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 242, which makes it unlawful for anyone “under color of any
law . . . [to] willfully subject[] any person . . . to the deprivation of any
5 Defense counsel did not object to the jury instructions before the district court, so we review any such challenges on appeal for plain error, see United States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2020). To the extent Martinez now challenges the district court’s instruction on the definition of “force,” that instruction was not plainly erroneous, see United States v. Lauck, 905 F.2d 15, 17–18 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that “force” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1) means “the use of such physical force as is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person”).
28 rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” The district court
instructed the jury that in order to find Martinez guilty of this count,
it must find that, among other things, his “conduct resulted in
aggravated sexual abuse of Maria.” Gov’t App’x 391. Accordingly,
the district court instructed the jury that, in the circumstances
presented by this case, Count Four required the same findings
regarding force as Count Five.6
Martinez argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that he used force. We are unpersuaded. Maria’s trial testimony
amply supports the jury’s finding that Martinez used force to
“overcome” and “restrain” her while vaginally penetrating her on
December 13, 2015. Maria testified that Martinez, a man of superior
size and strength, pulled her up from her position crouched on the
ground, pinned her chest down to a desk, forcibly removed her pants
6 Martinez does not challenge the district court’s instruction in this respect.
29 and underwear, and held down her arm while he penetrated her
against her will, causing vaginal bleeding. Her testimony alone,
which the jury was entitled to credit, is enough to defeat Martinez’s
sufficiency challenges as to both Counts Four and Five. See United
States v. Lauck, 905 F.2d 15, 17–18 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a
conviction for aggravated sexual abuse under § 2244(a)(1) where the
perpetrator used force by putting his arm around the victim to
prevent her from walking, backing her into a corner, holding her there
to prevent her escape, and holding her head forcibly with his hands
while sexually assaulting her, because “restraint upon the other
person that was sufficient that the other person could not escape the
sexual contact . . . is sufficient force to violate section 2244(a)(1)”).
Martinez argues that these two convictions should nevertheless
be vacated because “there is no rational explanation for the verdicts
of not guilty based upon the same conduct”—i.e., Martinez’s acquittal
on the aggravated sexual abuse counts as to the other three instances
30 of vaginal rape (when Maria testified that Martinez used similar
force) and one instance of oral rape that occurred on the same day—
except that the “jury rejected the testimony of Maria.” Appellant’s Br.
at 29. We disagree, for two reasons.
First, even if Martinez could establish that the verdicts were
mutually irreconcilable, his argument would fail. It is well
established that “a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one
count [cannot] attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with
the jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count.” United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 58 (1984) (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390
(1932)). That is because “[a] court knows only what the jury’s verdicts
were, not what the jury found, and it is not within the province of the
court to attempt to determine the reason or reasons for verdicts that
are inconsistent.” United States v. Acosta, 17 F.3d 538, 546 (2d Cir.
1994). Put simply, a court cannot infer why a jury has returned a
mixed verdict. “[T]he jury, though presumed to follow the
31 instructions of the trial court, may make its ultimate decisions for
impermissible reasons, such as mistake, compromise, or lenity, but its
power to do so is unreviewable . . . .” Id. at 545 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Moreover, courts are not only incapable of reviewing why a
jury reached an inconsistent verdict, but also are in no position to
conclude which of the verdicts were wrong. As the Supreme Court
has explained, when “truly inconsistent verdicts have been
reached, . . . it is unclear whose ox has been gored;” that is, whether it
was the acquittals or the convictions that were erroneously returned.
Powell, 469 U.S. at 64–65. Jury deliberations are, by design, a black
box. Except in the rarest circumstances, a reviewing court has neither
the authority nor the ability to peer inside the jury’s deliberations. 7
7 We have explained that a trial judge may inquire into allegations of jury misconduct only when there is “clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence, that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred which could have prejudiced the trial of a defendant.” United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 250 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Vitale, 459 F.3d 190, 197 (2d Cir. 2006)).
32 Given such uncertainty, and because such inconsistencies “often are
a product of jury lenity,” a defendant may not appeal his conviction
on one count based on his acquittal on some other count. Id. at 65.
We therefore look only to the evidence presented to the jury, not to its
verdicts on other counts, when assessing the factual sufficiency of a
conviction.
Second, in any event, this case does not present an example of
truly inconsistent verdicts. Martinez is incorrect that there is no
rational explanation for the jury’s verdicts other than its wholesale
rejection of Maria’s testimony. To the contrary, there are any number
of plausible explanations. It may very well be that the jury credited
Maria entirely, but determined that only during one episode did the
force she described rise to the level required for a conviction under
§ 2241(a)(1). Or perhaps the jury believed Maria’s testimony beyond
a reasonable doubt in some respects (that Martinez used force to
accomplish the December 13 vaginal rape, and that he used threats or
33 fear to accomplish all of the rapes), but was less firmly convinced, by
only a preponderance of the evidence, about other parts of her
testimony (that he used force to accomplish the other four rapes)—a
choice that could have rested on its conclusion that Martinez’s use of
force during the first vaginal rape was more solidly corroborated by
her vaginal bleeding and the testimony of Maria’s fellow inmates. Or
maybe the jury simply “believe[d] some parts and disbelieve[d] other
parts of [Maria’s] testimony,” a choice that we have repeatedly
stressed it is entitled to make. Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688 F.3d 89,
95 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Diesel Props S.r.l. v. Greystone Bus. Credit II
LLC, 631 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 2011)). As Judge Weinfeld put it many
years ago, “the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is permissive and
not mandatory.” Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 204 F. Supp. 783, 789
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff’d, 325 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1963), modified, 328 F.2d 578
(2d Cir. 1964); see also United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 447 (2d Cir.
2009) (“The assessment of witness credibility lies solely within the
34 province of the jury, and the jury is free to believe part and disbelieve
part of any witness’s testimony . . . .” (quoting United States v.
Josephberg, 562 F.3d 478, 487 (2d Cir. 2009)). It is also possible that the
jury used some other mode of reasoning entirely. The narrow point
is that while we will never know the jury’s logic, there is no inherent
contradiction among the verdicts here. And the broader point is that
this case illustrates precisely why courts are not in the business of
comparing jury verdicts.
We accordingly deny Martinez’s sufficiency challenge and
affirm his convictions on Counts Four and Five.
B. Reasonableness of Sentence
The government cross-appeals, contending that the ten-year
sentence of incarceration was both procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. We employ “a particularly deferential form of abuse-
of-discretion review that we apply both to the procedures used to
arrive at the sentence (procedural reasonableness) and to the length
35 of the sentence (substantive reasonableness).” United States v. Davis,
82 F.4th 190, 195–96 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Broxmeyer,
699 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2012)). For the reasons that follow, we agree
with the government.
i. Procedural Reasonableness
“A district court commits procedural error where,” among
other things, it “rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of
fact,” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc),
or “select[s] a sentence in violation of applicable law,” United States v.
Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2005). “A finding of fact is ‘clearly
erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Fisher v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 32 F.4th 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Anderson v. City
of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). In announcing its sentence, the
district court made clearly erroneous factual findings,
36 misapprehended the law, and effectively failed to sentence Martinez
based on all of his convictions.
First, the court mistakenly relied on factual findings that were
precluded by the guilty verdicts—specifically, it erroneously
accepted the defense’s factual theory that Martinez and Maria had
engaged in consensual sex on each charged occasion. The court
mused: “[T]o what extent do I impose a sentence that would be
imposed if it was simply purely consensual and it was simply a ward
situation[?]” Gov’t App’x 226. It then explained that, in imposing
sentence, it was “looking at this as a one count indictment, one count
conviction,” apparently disregarding Martinez’s convictions for
sexual abuse through threats or fear (and possibly also the two
convictions based on forcible rape, though that is less clear). Id. 201–
02. Indeed, in its written statement of reasons for selecting the
sentence, the court said that it “should have granted” Martinez’s
motion for acquittal on all five of the threats-or-fear counts. Id. 570.
37 But it is well settled that “a guilty verdict, not set aside, binds
the sentencing court to accept the facts necessarily implicit in the
verdict.” United States v. Hourihan, 66 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted). Here, the
jury’s finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Martinez caused
Maria to engage in a sexual act using force (with respect to one rape)
and threats or fear (with respect to all five rapes) forecloses the
sentencing court’s apparent view that Maria consented to the charged
sexual acts. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)(1), 2242(1). To be clear, all of
those guilty verdicts stand: As discussed above, we have upheld
Counts Four and Five against Martinez’s sufficiency challenge, and
Martinez has not appealed the other convictions. It was therefore
clear error for the district court to reach the independent factual
conclusion, contrary to the guilty verdicts, that Maria had consented
in any way to any of the charged sexual acts. Cf. United States v.
Mumuni, 946 F.3d 97, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that it was clear
38 error for the district court to “second-guess,” at sentencing, whether
a defendant who pled guilty to attempted murder actually had the
intent or the capability to kill, because the court was bound by “the
only legally permissible inference to be drawn from” the guilty plea).
Second, the district court mistakenly inferred that certain
factual findings were dictated by the jury’s acquittals on some counts.
Specifically, it clearly erred in concluding that the jury necessarily
rejected Maria’s testimony that she was forcibly raped with respect to
four of the charged episodes, and that the jury therefore rejected her
testimony wholesale with respect to those events.
For one thing, a jury’s acquittals on certain counts (regardless
of their putative inconsistency with counts of conviction) cannot serve
as the independent basis for any factual inferences, much less findings
by a preponderance of the evidence, upon which a court may base its
sentence. As the Supreme Court has explained, “an acquittal is not a
finding of any fact”; it is merely “an acknowledgment that the
39 government failed to prove an essential element of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997)
(internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration marks omitted).
That is why “the jury cannot be said to have necessarily rejected any
facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). With the return of a general
verdict, it is impossible to know anything more than the jury’s
bottom-line decision to acquit. See Acosta, 17 F.3d at 545. It is
inappropriate for a sentencing court to speculatively conclude that
the jury found or rejected a certain fact based on its verdict of
acquittal, let alone to allow such conjecture to guide its sentence.
Watts, 519 U.S. at 156.
We pause to note that, even if a sentencing court could
permissibly draw inferences from a jury’s acquittal (which it may
not), the particular inferences that the sentencing court drew in this
case were untenable. Here, the district court concluded that because
40 the jury acquitted on some counts charging forcible rape, it must have
disbelieved Maria’s testimony in its entirety with respect to those four
rapes. But that inference overlooks the fact that by convicting
Martinez of all counts of sexual abuse by threats or fear, the jury
necessarily credited Maria’s testimony at least to the extent that she
did not consent to Martinez’s sexual acts and submitted due to her
fear resulting from his express and implied threats of retaliation if she
resisted. As noted above, these guilty verdicts precluded the district
court from finding that Martinez did not use threats or fear to
accomplish the charged assaults. See Hourihan, 66 F.3d at 465.
Moreover, the district court’s conclusions were based on a
fundamental misreading of the trial record. According to the district
court, Maria testified that Martinez “just used force each time in order
to have sexual relations with her,” that her consent “wasn’t caused by
anything other than his physical strength and his ability to rape her,”
Gov’t App’x 200, and that this “wasn’t a case where [Maria] said I was
41 caused to do this because I was in fear of threats or force . . . . What
motivated her throughout this was that [he was] essentially forcing
her . . . . ,” id. 238; see also id. 203 (“Could you show me where she said
that the reason that I acquiesced, or she didn’t acquiesce so she
wouldn’t have even said that, but the reason that I had sexual
relations with him was because he threatened [me?]”); id. 537 (PSR)
(“[T]he victim did not testify that she consented to have sexual
intercourse with the defendant because of threats or fear.”); id. 570
(statement of reasons) (same).
Contrary to the district court’s view, Maria repeatedly testified
that Martinez threatened her with harmful consequences if she
resisted his advances or reported him to prison authorities, that his
threats succeeded in intimidating her, and that these fears dissuaded
her from fighting back or taking other actions to stop the abuse. Maria
testified that immediately after the first two rapes, Martinez told her
not to “talk to anybody[] because [she] was going to have
42 problems[,] . . . implying that [she] was going to go to the SHU if [she]
spoke to anybody” or that she would have “to do more time in jail,”
id. 60–61, fears that she expressed to her fellow inmates (and which
the inmates confirmed that she had voiced). She testified that, as a
result, she was fearful during each subsequent rape “[t]hat [she] was
going to have to spend more time in jail” and “[t]hat [she] was going
to end up in the SHU.” Id. 80. At one point, Martinez warned her that
if she fought back, she could go to prison for five years for assaulting
an officer. Martinez also told her that another inmate was about to be
released because “she didn’t say anything,” which Maria interpreted
to mean that the inmate “remained silent . . . about what had
happened with the officer,” id. 45, 61, presumably meaning some
wrongdoing by the officer. She did not report Martinez’s
inappropriate sexual comments because she “didn’t want any
problems,” id. 46, and most significantly, did not refuse to go when
Martinez summoned her to clean his office because she understood
43 that if she refused, she would be put in the SHU. The district court’s
findings to the contrary, memorialized in paragraph 22 of the
amended PSR, and later in its statement of reasons, were clearly
erroneous. 8
In short, even if the jury’s guilty verdicts had not already
conclusively established that Martinez used threats or fear to commit
sexual abuse, it was still a dramatic misreading of the record to
conclude that Maria never testified to that effect.
Third, the district court’s factual finding that Martinez was “not
a violent criminal,” id. 226, was also clearly erroneous. The jury found
Martinez guilty of raping Maria by force, an indisputably violent
crime.
Fourth, the district court based its sentence on a
misapprehension of law—namely, that Martinez’s convictions for
Accordingly, the district court would have committed error if it had 8
granted a judgment of acquittal on the counts of sexual abuse based on threats or fear, which it indicated in its statement of reasons that it regretted not having done.
44 sexual assault by threats or fear were functionally equivalent to his
convictions for sexual abuse of a ward. The court’s discussion on this
score was confusing, at one point misdescribing Martinez’s use of
threats to engender fear as merely one way to induce consent. See id.
537. But sexual abuse by threats or fear, by definition, does not
involve the victim’s consent in any way. As the court instructed the
jury, Martinez would be guilty of sexual abuse by threats or fear if he,
among other things, “caused the victim to engage in a sexual
act . . . by threatening the victim or placing the victim in fear.” Id.
397–98. That standard effectively requires conduct by the defendant
that is contrary to the will of the victim. Such a requirement is quite
different from sexual abuse of a ward, for which the court instructed
the first jury: “the defendant caused the victim to engage in a sexual
act . . . even if the victim consented to the act.” Id. 469–70 (emphasis
added). It is unclear precisely what the district court meant when it
described the threats-or-fear offenses as involving “a kind of forced
45 consent, not by physical force, but by threat of force.” Id. 201. Perhaps
the court was simply referring to a situation where a victim acquiesces
to sexual assault under duress, rather than providing what the law
regards as “consent.” Yet the court unmistakably, and erroneously,
treated the threats-or-fear convictions as functionally equivalent to
those for sexual abuse of a ward, even though those two crimes are
distinct.
All of these errors of fact and law culminated in the district
court essentially disregarding certain of Martinez’s convictions and
thereby not fully appreciating the scope and gravity of his criminal
conduct. A district court’s failure to consider all of a defendant’s
convictions when determining his sentence is error; a court may not
pick and choose which convictions it agrees with and sentence a
defendant as if he had been convicted only of those crimes. See
Hourihan, 66 F.3d at 465 (“[T]he district court’s decision to sentence
defendant for a lesser crime [than his crimes of conviction] cannot be
46 sustained.”). Instead, a sentencing court must accept all of the jury’s
guilty verdicts that have not been properly set aside when
determining an appropriate sentence. Doing otherwise fails to accord
due respect to the jury’s constitutionally established role.
At bottom, a drastic “variance such as that imposed
here . . . must be based on an accurate reading of the record.” United
States v. Singh, 877 F.3d 107, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v.
DeSilva, 613 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a district court
commits procedural error when it “select[s] a sentence based on a
clearly erroneous fact” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Here, it was not. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court committed procedural error by resting its sentence on clearly
erroneous factual findings, relying on a misapprehension of law, and
failing to sentence Martinez based on all of his convictions, leaving us
“with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” DeSilva, 613 F.3d at 356; see Hourihan, 66 F.3d at 465
47 (“[T]he district court’s decision to sentence based on its view of the
evidence rather than the jury’s is reversible error.”).
ii. Substantive Reasonableness
Although procedural error is a sufficient basis to remand for
resentencing, see Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190, we may also assess the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence where appropriate. See
Singh, 877 F.3d at 116–22 (concluding first that the district court’s
sentence was substantively unreasonable before concluding that the
district court also committed procedural error when choosing the
sentence). We exercise that discretion here.
When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence,
“we will set aside ‘only those sentences that are so shockingly high,
shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law that
allowing them to stand would damage the administration of justice.’”
United States v. Muzio, 966 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289). “The particular weight to be afforded
48 aggravating and mitigating factors [under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] is a
matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge,
with appellate courts seeking to ensure only that a factor can bear the
weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case.”
Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). “[A] significant departure or variance from the
recommended Guidelines range ‘should be supported by a more
significant justification than a minor one.’” Mumuni, 946 F.3d at 107
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). “While district
courts have broad discretion at sentencing, this discretion is not
unlimited. Not only must district courts abide by specific procedural
requirements, but they must faithfully evaluate the record to ensure
that the sentence imposed accurately and adequately reflects the
seriousness of the offense conduct.” Id. at 106. The sentence here fails
to meet that standard, for two reasons.
49 First, the district court “drastically discounted the seriousness
of [Martinez]’s offense conduct based on a sterilized and revisionist
interpretation of the record.” Id. The court made numerous
comments, discussed previously, that, in concert, demonstrate that it
effectively ignored many of Martinez’s counts of conviction and
substantially undervalued the severity of his offense conduct. The
court effectively disregarded Martinez’s convictions for forcible rape
and rape by threats or fear, viewing the case as “simply a ward
situation,” Gov’t App’x 226, in other words, that Maria and Martinez
had engaged in consensual sex acts that were criminal only because
he was a guard and she was an inmate.
But what the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt went far
beyond “a ward situation.” The jury found that Martinez engaged in
far more egregious conduct. He used physical force on at least one
occasion, and threats—which were particularly powerful in light of
his position of authority—on five occasions to engage in sexual
50 activity with Maria. He abused his position of authority over an
inmate in his charge to place her into a setting where he could
violently, and serially, overbear her will and rape her without fear of
detection. He instilled fear in Maria not only by demonstrating that
he was willing and able to use physical force against her by forcibly
raping her during their first sexual encounter, but also by threatening
to use his power to lengthen her time in prison, subject her to punitive
conditions of detention, and have her investigated for assaulting an
officer if she ever tried to fight back. And he manipulated that fear to
coerce her into making herself available for repeated instances of
unwanted sexual intercourse.
The district court’s substantive error in evaluating the
seriousness of the offense seems to have flowed from its procedural
error described above—namely, functionally treating this as a case
involving only (or at least, primarily) sexual abuse of a ward, rather
than rape by means of physical force and threats. In sum, the district
51 court erred by not appreciating the true nature of the offense of
conviction. That error resulted in a sentence that was too low to
adequately reflect the seriousness of the crimes for which Martinez
was actually convicted by the jury. What we have said elsewhere
applies fully here:
We are confident that if the District Court had fully appreciated the heinous nature of this offense . . . it would have reconsidered the weight ultimately accorded several aggravating factors, such as: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; and (4) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.
Mumuni, 946 F.3d at 110.
Second, the district court improperly considered as a mitigating
factor its personal belief that Maria’s testimony was not credible. The
court noted that it found parts of Maria’s testimony “troubling,”
Gov’t App’x at 215, opined that Maria was not of the “highest moral
character and . . . [has] problems,” id. at 217, and made clear at several
52 points that it did not believe Maria’s testimony, see id. 218 (“I am
concerned about whether false testimony was given by the
complainant . . . .”); id. 221 (noting its “qualms about her credibility”);
id. 227 (“I’m concerned about [Maria’s] veracity as a witness.”); id. 240
(observing that Maria’s testimony “sounded awfully” similar to the
story she told about being sex trafficked when applying for a visa).
And it noted in its statement of reasons that it “found many aspects
of [Maria’s] testimony about the circumstances under which she had
sexual intercourse with the defendant not credible, and [that it]
considered this in fashioning the ultimate sentence in this case.” Id.
569. Setting aside whether the district court’s generalized disbelief of
Maria’s testimony was unfounded, its doubts about facts necessarily
established by the jury’s convictions were not permissible
considerations at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th
420, 425–27, 429–33 (2d Cir. 2024) (reversing a district court’s grant of
a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)(1)(A), which was
53 based in part on a “certain disquiet” about the jury’s guilty verdict,
and holding that a defendant’s claim of “potential innocence” must
be viewed as an attack on the validity of the conviction, which is
cognizable only under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
In sum, the district court’s assignment of dramatically
insufficient weight to the seriousness of all the offenses of which
Martinez was convicted, and its treatment of its personal disbelief of
Maria’s testimony (and hence of Martinez’s guilt) as a mitigating
factor, render the sentence substantively unreasonable. We therefore
conclude that this “far-below-Guidelines sentence was outside the
bounds of what was reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances
of this case.” United States v. Ceasar, 10 F.4th 66, 87 (2d Cir. 2021), cert.
denied, 142 S. Ct. 2841 (2022). The case is accordingly remanded to the
district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
III. Conclusion
As we have previously held, “[a] guilty verdict, not set aside,
binds the sentencing court to accept the facts necessarily implicit in
54 the verdict.” Hourihan, 66 F.3d at 465 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The district court did not do so here. It procedurally erred
by inappropriately crediting the defendant’s version of events even
though the jury necessarily rejected that account in returning its
guilty verdicts; mistakenly determining that it was obliged to infer
certain facts from the jury’s acquittals on different counts;
misapprehending the legal nature of the defendant’s convictions for
sexual abuse through threats or fear; and effectively failing to
sentence him based on all of his counts of conviction. And its
sentence, which was substantially lower than the advisory Guidelines
range, was substantively unreasonable because it dramatically
undervalued the seriousness of the full range of the defendant’s
offenses and impermissibly treated the court’s lingering doubts about
the jury’s guilty verdicts as a mitigating factor. We cannot allow such
a sentence to stand, as doing so “would damage the administration of
55 justice.” Ceasar, 10 F.4th at 79 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In sum, we hold as follows:
(1) Maria’s testimony that Martinez physically held her
down to accomplish the first rape, which the jury was
entitled to credit, amply supported Martinez’s
convictions on Counts Four and Five, for aggravated
sexual abuse by force, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a)(1), and deprivation of civil rights, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 242. The jury’s acquittal of Martinez on
other counts cannot be invoked to impugn the guilty
verdicts.
(2) Martinez’s ten-year sentence of incarceration is both
56 We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of conviction, ORDER that
paragraph 22 of the PSR be stricken, and REMAND for resentencing
consistent with this opinion.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
110 F.4th 160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-martinez-ca2-2024.