UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v. Criminal Action No. 24-196 (BAH) MARVIN BENJAMIN MARTIN, Judge Beryl A. Howell Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Defendant, who is facing a jury trial on July 14, 2025, on a charge of attempting to
possess with intent to distribute N,N-dimethylpentylone, also known as “Boot,” a Schedule I
controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 846, has moved
pre-trial to suppress evidence from a search conducted by the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) at the Los Angeles International Airport International Mail Facility of an
inbound package shipped from China. See Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Evid. (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1,
ECF No. 30. The package was addressed to a “Martin Hall” in Washington, D.C. and labeled as
having been shipped from a “Linda” in Santa Ana, California. See Gov’t Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.
to Suppress Evid. (“Gov’t Opp’n”) at 1-2, ECF No. 40. The search revealed that the package
contained approximately ten kilograms of Boot. See Def.’s Mot. at 2; Statement of Facts, Crim.
Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1-1. Defendant retrieved the package after an undercover officer made a
controlled delivery to the address on the package in Washington, D.C. See id. For the reasons
explained below, defendant’s motion is DENIED.
I. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that CBP did not have reasonable suspicion necessary to open and
search the package under 19 U.S.C. § 482, and thus the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
1 See Def.’s Mot. at 2-3. Section 482 allows for officers to search any packages for which the
officer has “reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to
law” or “believe[d] to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 482(a). The government contends that defendant has no Fourth Amendment standing to
challenge this search, considering the package was neither addressed to him nor shipped to a
residence associated with him, so he had no expectation of privacy therein. Gov’t Opp’n at 2-3.
The government further argues, in any case, that no reasonable suspicion was required because
the search occurred not pursuant to § 482 but rather under a different statutory scheme, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1582, which authorizes regulations, including 19 C.F.R. § 162.6, for the broad search of
persons and baggage entering the United States with no showing of reasonable suspicion
required. See Gov’t Opp’n at 4-10. In particular, 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 makes “[a]ll persons,
baggage, and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory of the United States from places
outside thereof . . . liable to inspection and search by a Customs officer.” See Gov’t Opp’n at 4-
10.
Assuming defendant has standing to pursue the Fourth Amendment challenge—which the
Court may do because Fourth Amendment standing is not jurisdictional, see Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978)—the government is correct that the search of the package was
authorized by § 1582 as a routine border search and such searches do not require a showing of
reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Neither party cites D.C. Circuit precedent
on point, but other circuit courts have held that CPB may search packages arriving from abroad
under § 1582 without articulating a reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Sutter, 340
F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a search of defendant’s vehicle trunk just inside
the border was valid because “routine searches of persons and their effects entering the country
2 may be conducted without any suspicion whatsoever” (quoting United States v. Molina-Tarazon,
279 F.3d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1200-05 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that a search of a package at a port of entry mailed from abroad was valid under
§ 1582 because “Customs has the authority to search packages without articulating a ‘reasonable
cause to suspect,’” and rejecting argument that only § 482 authorized searches of packages from
abroad); United States v. Scheer, 600 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a search of a suitcase
arriving from an international flight was authorized under § 1582 without reasonable cause);
United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that search of package
arriving from Thailand at a mail sorting room at a port of entry was valid under § 1582 and the
Fourth Amendment). 1 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has explained, “searches made at the
border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and
examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the
fact that they occur at the border.” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)
(considering the context of internationally mailed letters). While more invasive searches might
require a greater showing of cause, the straightforward search of items contained in a parcel
shipped from abroad falls within searches recognized as routine, see Gov’t Opp’n at 8-9; Sutter,
340 F.3d at 1025-26, and defendant does not argue otherwise.
Defendant does contest, however, that § 1582 rather than § 482 applies here because
§ 1582 only governs border searches of “arriving baggage or mail,” not “baggage or mail or
1 The D.C. Circuit’s view seems likely to be consistent with those circuits. In one case, in affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence from a search and seizure of documents in an international traveler’s suitcase at the border, the court impliedly rejected the defendant’s argument that only § 482 authorizes customs searches with reasonable suspicion and instead cited to § 1582 and the Supreme Court’s language that “searches made at the border . . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.” See United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144, 148-50 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)) (nonetheless noting that the customs officers in fact had legitimate suspicions about the defendant and that, regardless, any error would have been harmless).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v. Criminal Action No. 24-196 (BAH) MARVIN BENJAMIN MARTIN, Judge Beryl A. Howell Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Defendant, who is facing a jury trial on July 14, 2025, on a charge of attempting to
possess with intent to distribute N,N-dimethylpentylone, also known as “Boot,” a Schedule I
controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 846, has moved
pre-trial to suppress evidence from a search conducted by the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) at the Los Angeles International Airport International Mail Facility of an
inbound package shipped from China. See Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Evid. (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1,
ECF No. 30. The package was addressed to a “Martin Hall” in Washington, D.C. and labeled as
having been shipped from a “Linda” in Santa Ana, California. See Gov’t Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.
to Suppress Evid. (“Gov’t Opp’n”) at 1-2, ECF No. 40. The search revealed that the package
contained approximately ten kilograms of Boot. See Def.’s Mot. at 2; Statement of Facts, Crim.
Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1-1. Defendant retrieved the package after an undercover officer made a
controlled delivery to the address on the package in Washington, D.C. See id. For the reasons
explained below, defendant’s motion is DENIED.
I. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that CBP did not have reasonable suspicion necessary to open and
search the package under 19 U.S.C. § 482, and thus the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
1 See Def.’s Mot. at 2-3. Section 482 allows for officers to search any packages for which the
officer has “reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to
law” or “believe[d] to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 482(a). The government contends that defendant has no Fourth Amendment standing to
challenge this search, considering the package was neither addressed to him nor shipped to a
residence associated with him, so he had no expectation of privacy therein. Gov’t Opp’n at 2-3.
The government further argues, in any case, that no reasonable suspicion was required because
the search occurred not pursuant to § 482 but rather under a different statutory scheme, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1582, which authorizes regulations, including 19 C.F.R. § 162.6, for the broad search of
persons and baggage entering the United States with no showing of reasonable suspicion
required. See Gov’t Opp’n at 4-10. In particular, 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 makes “[a]ll persons,
baggage, and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory of the United States from places
outside thereof . . . liable to inspection and search by a Customs officer.” See Gov’t Opp’n at 4-
10.
Assuming defendant has standing to pursue the Fourth Amendment challenge—which the
Court may do because Fourth Amendment standing is not jurisdictional, see Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978)—the government is correct that the search of the package was
authorized by § 1582 as a routine border search and such searches do not require a showing of
reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Neither party cites D.C. Circuit precedent
on point, but other circuit courts have held that CPB may search packages arriving from abroad
under § 1582 without articulating a reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Sutter, 340
F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a search of defendant’s vehicle trunk just inside
the border was valid because “routine searches of persons and their effects entering the country
2 may be conducted without any suspicion whatsoever” (quoting United States v. Molina-Tarazon,
279 F.3d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1200-05 (3d Cir.
1984) (holding that a search of a package at a port of entry mailed from abroad was valid under
§ 1582 because “Customs has the authority to search packages without articulating a ‘reasonable
cause to suspect,’” and rejecting argument that only § 482 authorized searches of packages from
abroad); United States v. Scheer, 600 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a search of a suitcase
arriving from an international flight was authorized under § 1582 without reasonable cause);
United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that search of package
arriving from Thailand at a mail sorting room at a port of entry was valid under § 1582 and the
Fourth Amendment). 1 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has explained, “searches made at the
border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and
examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the
fact that they occur at the border.” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)
(considering the context of internationally mailed letters). While more invasive searches might
require a greater showing of cause, the straightforward search of items contained in a parcel
shipped from abroad falls within searches recognized as routine, see Gov’t Opp’n at 8-9; Sutter,
340 F.3d at 1025-26, and defendant does not argue otherwise.
Defendant does contest, however, that § 1582 rather than § 482 applies here because
§ 1582 only governs border searches of “arriving baggage or mail,” not “baggage or mail or
1 The D.C. Circuit’s view seems likely to be consistent with those circuits. In one case, in affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence from a search and seizure of documents in an international traveler’s suitcase at the border, the court impliedly rejected the defendant’s argument that only § 482 authorizes customs searches with reasonable suspicion and instead cited to § 1582 and the Supreme Court’s language that “searches made at the border . . . are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.” See United States v. Gurr, 471 F.3d 144, 148-50 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)) (nonetheless noting that the customs officers in fact had legitimate suspicions about the defendant and that, regardless, any error would have been harmless).
3 other items which have already ‘arrived’ but which are suspected of having been imported
contrary to law.” Def.’s Reply at 3, ECF No. 43 (quoting United States v. Taghizadeh, 41 F.3d
1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). The distinction defendant draws is correct—§ 482
authorizes searches of packages “wherever found” with reasonable cause while § 1582 confers
authority for searches only “effectively carried out at the border,” i.e., of “incoming international
packages.” Taghizadeh, 41 F.3d at 1265-66. Yet defendant’s argument fails at its application
because the parcel here was, in fact, an “incoming international package[]” searched at the
border. Id.
Defendant nonetheless presses the point that the location of the search qualifies only for
application of § 482 because the package was “searched at a warehouse and not specifically at
the point of entry” at an unknown time “after it arrived.” Def.’s Reply at 4. A search need not
occur physically at the border, however, to be considered a “border search.” “Some searches,
though not at the border, occur so spatially and temporally close to it that they are considered
border searches.” Sutter, 340 F.3d at 1026 (quoting United States v. Ogbuehi, 18 F.3d 807, 813
(9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original)); see also United States v. Baxter, 951 F.3d 128, 133
(3d Cir. 2020) (describing border searches as occurring at “an international boundary ‘or its
functional equivalent’” (quoting United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1994))). In
Sutter, for instance, the defendant had passed through a first customs inspection area, and the
search occurred “at a secondary inspection area.” 340 F.3d at 1026. That secondary area was
considered “both temporally and geographically close enough to the border to be considered a
border search” because it was “part of, not subsequent to, his initial entry into the United States.”
Id. In the terms of Taghizadeh, as quoted by defendant, the defendant in Sutter was still
4 “arriving” when in the secondary inspection place. Def.’s Reply at 4 (quoting Taghizadeh, 41
F.3d at 1266).
Likewise, here, the package was still in the process of entry at the time of the search at
the inspection warehouse. The package had arrived at LAX via commercial air and was
offloaded to a specific airport facility for inspection. Just as in Sutter, the package at the
secondary inspection area was still “close enough to the border to be considered a border
search.” 340 F.3d at 1026; see also Pringle, 576 F.2d at 1116-18 (considering a search
conducted in a mail sorting room at a port of entry to be at a “border area”). Defendant strains to
distinguish the instant case by pointing out the obvious, namely: that the search at issue did not
involve a “ship [arriving at a] port, a “person arriv[ing] by airplane,” or “a bus passenger arriving
at a port of entry.” Def.’s Reply at 3. This argument is just as obvious a straw man tactic that
collapses easily since defendant does not and cannot explain why the package should not be
considered to have been in an analogous situation—i.e., in the process of arriving into the United
States—when at the customs warehouse for inspection here.
Finally, even if § 482 applied here and a showing of reasonable suspicion was required,
that standard is met. The package in question arrived on a shipment from China—a country
known for producing illegal precursor chemicals—yet contained a sender address from a “Linda”
in Santa Ana, California. This labeling, alone, would give rise to a reasonable suspicion
warranting search. See United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 894 (4th Cir. 1988) (as cited by
defendant, holding that the following facts could give rise to “reasonable cause to suspect” to
justify a search: an international parcel that was “heavier than normal letters, and felt as if [it]
contained something other than correspondence,” “originated from a known source country for
drugs, and felt ‘powdery’ when squeezed”).
5 II. CONCLUSION & ORDER
For the reasons explained, it is hereby—
ORDERED that defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, ECF No. 30, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Date: June 27, 2025 __________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge