United States v. Marshall Alderson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 18, 2024
• Docket: 23-1779
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0129n.06

No. 23-1779

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Mar 18, 2024 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN MARSHALL ALDERSON, aka George Anderson, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )

Before: GRIFFIN, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Marshall Alderson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute

controlled substances, and the district court sentenced him to eight years in prison. Less than two

years later, he moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on his

family circumstances, health, and an allegedly low recidivism risk, but the district court denied his

motion. We affirm.

“We review a district court’s denial of a compassionate release motion for abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 2021). A district court considers

three criteria when ruling on a motion for compassionate release: “extraordinary and compelling

reasons for release; the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors; and any applicable policy statements.” Id.

“[W]e can affirm a district court’s denial of a compassionate release motion based on the

defendant’s failure to meet any one of those criteria.” Id. And the district court need not

exhaustively explain its reasoning for denying compassionate release if the record shows that it No. 23-1779, United States v. Alderson

“considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal

decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation

omitted).

When denying Alderson’s motion, the district court found Alderson was ineligible for relief

because there existed no extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence, and it

separately concluded the § 3553(a) factors did not favor doing so even if he were eligible. We

need not decide whether Alderson’s family circumstances were an extraordinary and compelling

reason to reduce his sentence because the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors

and determined that they weighed against release even assuming Alderson’s eligibility for

compassionate release.

Before turning to the § 3553(a) factors, we note that Alderson has likely forfeited any

argument on the district court’s balancing of § 3553(a) factors because his brief is “skeletal” at

best and requires us “to put flesh on its bones,” which we are loath to do. United States v.

Hendrickson, 822 F.3d 812, 829 n.10 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). To the extent that he

makes any § 3553(a) argument, Alderson contends that the district court failed to give proper

weight to his reduced risk of recidivism based on his age, release plan, and completion of the

Residential Drug Abuse Program. We disagree.

The district court addressed “the need to protect the public from further crimes by”

Alderson and “commend[ed]” him for his “purported compliance with the terms of bond, efforts

at rehabilitation, and commitment to his family.” In doing so, it effectively contemplated

Alderson’s rehabilitation efforts and his recidivism risk upon release—i.e., the exact

considerations Alderson argues the district court ignored. At any rate, the district court weighed

Alderson’s good behavior against the seriousness of his drug offense—the record shows he

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maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, was

a dealer in a drug conspiracy, and was found responsible for more than 5,000 kilograms of

converted drug weight—and his criminal history that started when he was only nineteen years old

with a similar controlled-substance offense. Given this analysis, the district court explained its

reasoning in far more detail than in similar compassionate-release denials we have upheld. See,

e.g., United States v. Harvey, 996 F.3d 310, 312, 314–15 (6th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); Navarro,

986 F.3d at 669–72. And especially after considering that Alderson had served less than a quarter

of his sentence when he moved for compassionate release, we cannot conclude that the district

court abused its discretion by denying his motion.

We affirm the district court’s order denying Alderson’s motion for compassionate release.

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