United States v. Marquez

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedJune 26, 2018
Docket17-2221
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Marquez (United States v. Marquez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Marquez, (10th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 26, 2018 _________________________________ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 17-2221 v. (D.C. Nos. 1:16-CV-00641-JAP-SMV and 1:07-CR-00286-JAP-1) LEONARD G. MARQUEZ, (D. N.M.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY _________________________________

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Defendant Leonard Marquez seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal

the denial by the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico of his

motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring COA

to appeal denial of relief under § 2255). We decline to grant a COA and dismiss the

appeal.

A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a

demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,

for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or

that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant must show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional

claim was either “debatable or wrong.” Id.

In 2011, Defendant was sentenced to a term of 15 years under the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for being a felon in possession of a firearm

following three prior convictions for violent felonies. The ACCA defines a violent felony

as one that:

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another [the elements clause]; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives [the enumerated-offenses clause], or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another [the residual clause].

Id. After the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551

(2015), that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, Defendant filed his motion

under § 2255 challenging the sentencing court’s characterization of his prior convictions

for New Mexico burglary and New Mexico aggravated assault as violent felonies. The

district court denied the motion on the ground that New Mexico burglary is a violent

felony under the enumerated-offenses clause and New Mexico aggravated assault is a

violent felony under the elements clause.

In this court, Defendant acknowledges that his claims are contrary to circuit

precedent: Our decision in United States v. Turrieta, 875 F.3d 1340, 1347 (10th Cir.

2017), held that New Mexico residential burglary fits within the ACCA’s enumerated

crime of burglary. And we held in United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663, 670–671

(10th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243

2 (2016), that New Mexico’s crime of aggravated assault is a violent offense under the

elements clause of the ACCA. See also United States v. Maldonado-Palma, 839 F.3d

1244, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2016) (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under NMSA

1978, § 30–3–2(A) is a crime of violence under the elements clause of USSG § 2L1.2

(2015)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1214 (2017).

Defendant argues that our precedents were wrongly decided. But we cannot

overturn our precedents. See United States v. Badger, 818 F.3d 563, 569 (10th Cir.

2016). Accordingly, no reasonable jurist could debate the correctness of the district

court’s denial of relief.

We therefore DENY Defendant’s request for a COA and DISMISS this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge

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Related

Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
United States v. Ramon Silva
608 F.3d 663 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Johnson v. United States
576 U.S. 591 (Supreme Court, 2015)
United States v. Badger
818 F.3d 563 (Tenth Circuit, 2016)
Mathis v. United States
579 U.S. 500 (Supreme Court, 2016)
United States v. Maldonado-Palma
839 F.3d 1244 (Tenth Circuit, 2016)
United States v. Turrieta
875 F.3d 1340 (Tenth Circuit, 2017)

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United States v. Marquez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-marquez-ca10-2018.